The Abandonment of the Jews

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Ronreisman (talk | contribs) at 23:38, 13 August 2013 (→Wyman's Argument: Added introductory paragraph.). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Revision as of 23:38, 13 August 2013 by Ronreisman (talk | contribs) (→Wyman's Argument: Added introductory paragraph.)(diff) ← Previous revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)

This article possibly contains original research. Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed. (October 2010) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, published in 1984, is a book by David S. Wyman, former Josiah DuBois professor of history at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Wyman is currently the chairman of the David S. Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies. The Abandonment of the Jews has been well-received by most (though not all -- see below) historians, and has won numerous prizes and wide-spread recognition, including "the National Jewish Book Award, the Anisfield-Wolf Award, the Present Tense Literary Award, the Stuart Bernath Prize from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the Theodore Saloutos Award of the Immigration History Society, and was nominated for the National Book Critics Circle Award."

Wyman's Argument

In response to Nazi determination and concerted action to remove Jews from Europe -- by any means necessary -- the non-Axis world closed many possibilities for immigration to other countries. For example, legal immigration to the refuge in Palestine -- an area that had been assigned by the League of Nations as a Jewish Homeland for Jews who were not safe in their original countries -- was severely limited by the British in 1939, and many nations simply refused to allow European Jews entry to their countries. As Nazi Germany gained power and inherited larger Jewish populations in conquered territories (eg Poland) the policies of the world's nations was either to eliminate Jewish presence (in the case of Axis countries) or to discourage Jewish immigration (in the case of non-Axis countries.) The closing of these immigration possibilities in America is covered by Wyman in his 1968 book "Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941" . Wyman continues to document this aspect of World War II history in "The Abandonment of the Jews," which covers the the period of 1941-1945, when America and the Allies fought against Germany and the Final Solution Holocaust progressed to it's most lethal stages.

Wyman summarizes his principal findings in the Preface (presented below in edited precis):

1. The American State Department and the British Foreign Office had no intention of rescuing large number of European Jews. On the contrary, they continually feared that Germany or other Axis nations might release tens of thousands of Jews into Allied hands. Any such exodus would have placed intense on Britain to open Palestine and the United States to take in more Jewish refugees ... Consequently, their polices aimed at obstructing rescue possibilities ....

2. Authenticated information that the Nazis were systematically exterminating European Jewry was made public ... in November 1942. President Roosevelt did nothing ... for fourteen months, then moved only because ... political pressures ....
3. The War Refugee Board ... received little power, almost no cooperation ... and grossly inadequate funding. (Contributions from Jewish organizations .... covered 90 percent of the WRB's costs)... save approximately 200,000 Jews and at least 20,000 non-Jews.

4. ... State Department ... policies, only 21,000 refugees were allowed to enter ... during ... war with Germany ... 10 percent of the number who could have been legally admitted ....

5. .... factors hampered (rescue) ... anti-Semitism and anti-immigration attitudes, ... entrenched in Congress; the mass medias's failure ... near silence of the Christian churches and almost all of their leadership; indifference ... President's failure ....

6. American Jewish leaders ... failure to assign top priority to the rescue issue.

7. In 1944 the United States ... rejected several appeals to bomb the Auschwitz gas chambers and railroads ... in the very months that ... numberous massive American bombing raaids were taking place with fifty miles of Auschwitz. Twice ... bombers struck ... not five miles from the gas chambers.

8. ... much more could have been done to rescue the Jew, if a real effort had been made .... the reasons repeatedly invoked by government official for not being able to rescue Jews could be put aside when it came to other Europeans who needed help.

9. ... Roosevelt's indifference ... the worst failure of his presidency.

10. ... the American rescue record was better than that of Great Britain, Russia, or the other Allied nations ... because of the work of the War Refugee Board ... American Jewish organizations ... provide most of the WRB's funding, and the overseas rescue operations of several Jewish organizations.

The Abandonment of the Jews argues that American (and British) political leaders during the Holocaust, including President Roosevelt, turned down proposals that could have saved hundreds of thousands of European Jews from death in German concentration camps. Wyman documents, for example, how Roosevelt repeatedly refused asylum to Jewish refugees and failed to order the bombing of railway lines leading to Auschwitz In the same time, most Jewish leaders in America and in Palestine did little to pressure these governments to change their policy. Some American newspapers, including the New York Times, are said to have under-reported or buried reports off their front pages, and not just for reasons of anti-Semitism, as the Times was owned by Jews, who may have wanted to not appear as Jewish advocates in their coverage.

Wyman examines the documents suggesting that the U.S. and British governments turned down numerous proposals to accept European Jews. The issue was raised at a White House conference on March 27, 1943 of top American and British wartime leaders, including President Roosevelt, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, presidential advisor Harry Hopkins, and the British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax. Hull raised the question of having the Allies offer to accept 60,000 to 70,000 Jews from Bulgaria, a German ally. Eden reportedly objected, citing the risk that Hitler may take up similar offers for the Jews of Germany and Poland, and said "... and there simply are not enough ships and means of transportation to handle them."

Wyman writes that, because of a combination of nativism, anti-Semitism and an unwillingness to act on any proposal not of direct strategic value, thousands and possibly million of Jews died who might otherwise have been saved. He documents numerous cases where the Allies found resources (such as shipping) to give air and rescue to tens of thousands of non-Jewish refugees, while at the same time denying similar aid or rescue efforts for Jews. For instance, he documents how the British turned back endangered Jews from Mandatory Palestine, while at the same time they generously took between 9,000 and 12,000 non-Jewish Greek and 1,800 non-Jewish Polish refugees Palestine. He cites many cases where US and British authorities turned down offers by Nazis to exchange Jews for resources, often with documentation on how the Allies appeared to fear that there would be so many Jews that it could strain the Allies' war effort, He also documents the efforts of the US State Dept. to deny asylum to endangered Jews, and the failure of the American Jewish establishment to put sufficient pressure on US politicians (eg President Roosevelt) to engage in effective rescue operations. Breckinridge Long, one of the four assistant secretaries of state, and a clique of other State Department executives, figure prominently in many episodes in this history. Wyman documents how Long and his colleagues repeatedly obstructed measures that would have effectively rescued Jews.

Counter-arguments

This section does not cite any sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (October 2010) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

This section may contain material not related to the topic of the article. Please help improve this section or discuss this issue on the talk page. (October 2010) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Some of Wyman's arguments have been challenged by other researchers and Holocaust historians, such as James H. Kitchens III, and William D. Rubinstein. For instance, Rubinstein's book The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis argues that the Western powers had a creditable record of accepting immigrants and that effective allied action against the Extermination Camps was not possible. The Auschwitz bombing debate remains unresolved.

Even Wyman's most strident critics, however, acknowledge that many of Wyman's contentions are valid. Rubinstein, for instance, appears to largely agree with Wyman (and many other historians) that the influence of Palestinian Arab political leadership, led by Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini, and the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine were factors in causing the British government to abandon the League of Nations' British Mandate for Palestine (legal instrument), which was primarily a mandate to establish a Homeland for the Jewish people that would be available to facilitate rescue of endangered Jews in their time of need . Both Wyman and his critics agree that Britain's abandonment of their mandatory responsibilities was embodied in the White Paper of 1939 which reduced Jewish immigration to Palestine to a yearly quota of only 10,000, with a maximum of 75,000 immigrants, and after a five-year period relegated all Jewish immigration to the approval of the Palestinian Arab polity. The devastating consequences to the Jews of Europe during the Holocaust of this British abandonment of their internationally-recognized Mandate is generally recognized by Wyman's critics, though Wyman details the detrimental effects in greater detail than many of his detractors.

The differences of opinion between Rubinstein and Wyman on this issue rests principally on Rubinstein's argument that the Zionist Jews in Palestine (eg Ben Gurion) are primarily to blame for not giving refuge to European Jews in Palestine, rather than putting the responsibility on British policy-makers or the Palestinian Arabs who violently opposed such rescue efforts . Some historians have taken Rubinstein and other Wyman critics to task for such assertions, and have directly attacked these criticisms of Wyman's positions as unscholarly "polemic."

Examples where Jews were saved from the Axis countries

Many historians (e.g. Dr. David Kranzler) note that large number of Jews were saved and argue that even more could have been saved, often using the same historical examples that are covered by Wyman in his book, though they often use such examples to draw very different conclusions. Examples include:

The Papal Nuncio's intervention in 1942 was a key factor in stopping the deportation trains from Slovakia for about two years.
Protection papers handed out from Switzerland by Jewish rescuers George Mantello and Recha Sternbuch saved large numbers.
Rabbi Solomon Schonfeld arranged refuge for many hundreds of Jews in Britain.
In the USA persistent pressure on the Roosevelt administration by Hillel Kook and his rescue group led to establishment of the War Refugee Board. One if its actions was support of the Wallenberg mission to Budapest. David Wyman and Rafael Medoff credit the War Refugee Board with the rescue of over 200,000 (including 120,000 in Hungary, in part because of the Wallenberg mission).
Twenty four hours after receipt George Mantello publicized what has now been called the Wetzler-Vrba Report included in the Auschwitz Protocol. This triggered a major grass roots protest in Switzerland, with about 400 glaring headlines protesting against Europe's barbarism and its Dark Age in the twentieth century. Publication of the report also triggered Sunday sermons in Swiss churches expressing deep concern over the fate of Jews and there were various street protests. This led to Churchill, Roosevelt and other world leaders threatening Hungary's ruler Horthy, who stopped the transports carrying 12,000 Jews a day to Auschwitz.
The lull in deportations enabled the Wallenberg mission and also rescue by many others in Budapest, such as Carl Lutz, Monsignor Angelo Rotta, Giorgio Perlasca, the Spanish legation, the Zionist Youth Underground in Budapest and "put rescue in the air" empowering ordinary citizens to act on behalf of the remnant of Hungary's Jews.
After controversial negotiations between Rudolf Kastner and Adolf Eichmann, a train carrying some 1,700 Hungarian Jews was sent to Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in return for money and gold and freed at the end of 1944.
There were many other successful rescue initiatives and also many more which some argue could have succeeded if Churchill and Roosevelt had received more public pressure. With ships packed with refugees, such as the St. Louis and refugee ships headed for Palestine were turned back it is difficult to make a case for the thesis that rescue was not possible. (References to books and views on various Web pages, for example David Kranzler, Hillel Kook, Chaim Michael Dov Weissmandl).

References

Wyman, David S. 'The Abandonment Of The Jews: America and the Holocaust. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, 444pp.
Wyman, David S., Medoff, Rafael. A Race Against Death: Peter Bergson, America, and the Holocaust. New Press, 2004.

also

"Could The Allies Have Bombed Auschwitz", Jewish Virtual Library.
Abraham Fuch, The Unheeded Cry
Ben Hecht, Perfidy
David Kranzler, The Man Who Stopped the Trains to Auschwitz: George Mantello, El Salvador, and Switzerland's Finest Hour, Forward by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Syracuse University Press (March 2001)
David Kranzler, Holocaust Hero: The Untold Story of Solomon Schonfeld, an Orthodox British Rabbi, Ktav Publishing House (December 2003)
David Kranzler, Thy Brothers' Blood: The Orthodox Jewish Response During the Holocaust, Artscroll (December 1987)
David Kranzler, Heroine of Rescue: The Incredible Story of Recha Sternbuch Who Saved Thousands from the Holocaust
Laurence Jarvik, Who Shall Live and Who Shall Die (video documentary, distributed by Kino International at: http://www.kino.com/video/item.php?film_id=349)
Rapaport, Louis. Shake Heaven & Earth: Peter Bergson and the Struggle to Rescue the Jews of Europe. Gefen Publishing House, Ltd., 1999.
VERAfilm, Among Blind Fools (documentary video)

Notes

http://thenewpress.com/index.php?option=com_title&task=view_title&metaproductid=1002
"Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941" ( (University of Massachusetts Press, 1968) ISBN 0-87023-040-9
"Abandonment of the Jews", pp. x, xi
"Abandonment of the Jews", pp. 244, 24; 172, 173.
"Abandonment of the Jews", pp. 47; 82; 115-118; 264-266.
"Abandonment of the Jews", p. 295.
"Abandonment of the Jews", pp. 157-177; 328-330; 345-348.
"Abandonment of the Jews", pp. 26, 38, 76, 299n, 321
"Abandonment of the Jews", pp. 96-100.
"Abandonment of the Jews", p. 97.
"Abandonment of the Jews", pp. 338, 339.
"Abandonment of the Jews", pp. 104-142.
The Myth of Rescue: Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis, by William D. Rubinstein, (NY: Routledge.; 1997)
"Myth, Rubinstein", pp 15, 30, 100, 123, 127, 138, 143, 198, 216, 218, 237, 250
"Myth, Rubinstein", pp. 14, 146, 233, 267
Book Review by David Cesarani, English Historical Review, Vol. 113, No. 454, Nov. 1998, pp. 1258–1260

Categories:

Misplaced Pages