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The Kiev Offensive (or Kiev Operation) was an attempt by the Second Polish Republic, led at the time by Józef Piłsudski during the Polish-Bolshevik war, to wrest control of central and eastern Ukraine, or of a substantial part of it, from warring Ukrainian factions and Soviet Russia. The stated goal of the operation was to create an independent Ukraine allied with Poland, although the Ukrainian population were ambivalent to what many viewed as a variety of a new occupation Ukrainians fought on the side of Polish led forces as well as in the ranks of the Red Army. A major military operation in the Polish-Soviet War, this campaign was conducted from April to June 1920 by the Polish Army in alliance with Ukrainian People's Republic forces under the nationalist leader Symon Petliura, opposed by the Bolshevik-led Red Army, likewise with Ukrainian participation.

Initially successful for the Polish army, which captured Kiev in May, 1920, the campaign was dramatically reversed. The ambivalence of the Ukrainian population prevented Piłsudski and Petliura from gaining the support they expected, and the allied forces were forced to retreat under mounting pressure from a Red Army counteroffensive. Polish forces and Petlyura's Ukrainians were forced into retreat.

Before the Battle

On April 21 Poland signed a treaty with the exiled Ukrainian government of Symon Petliura. Petliura ended up in the Polish exile and had found asylum there after multiple military defeats from the Bolshevik forces in central Ukraine. In exchange for agreeing to a border along the Zbruch river, recognizing the recent Polish territorial gains in western Ukraine obtained by the Poland's defeating the Ukrainian's attempt to create a Ukrainian state in largely Ukrainian populated Volhynia and Galicia, Petliura was promised military help in regaining the control of Kiev for his government that was afterwards supposed to enter into a Federation with Poland. The treaty thus defined the borders between Poland and Ukraine, as well as recognized each country's independence and guaranteed respecting cultural and ethnic minority rights within each country. It was followed by an alliance signed by Petliura and Piłsudski on April 24. On the same day, Poland (assisted by Petliura's forces) begun the Kiev Operation, aimed at securing Ukraine as a buffer between Poland and Russia. Sixty-five thousand Polish and 15,000 Ukrainian soldiers took part in the initial invasion.

The success of the joint Polish-Ukrainian political campaign depended on the creation of a strong Ukrainian army capable of defeating the Soviets in Ukraine. While initially successful, the campaign ultimately failed. The local population was tired of hostilities after several years of war and the Ukrainian Army never exceeded two divisions largely due to the ambivalent attitude of Ukrainians towards the "alliance". Petliura was only able to recruit 20,000 soldiers into his army, a number insufficient to hold back the Soviet forces.

The plan of Kiev Operation was to defeat the Soviet troops on the Polish southern flank and establish a friendly government in Ukraine. The main task of the advancing Polish armies was to outflank the Bolsheviks and destroy them in a single battle. After winning the battle in the South, the Polish General Staff planned a speedy withdrawal of the 3rd Army and strengthening of the northern front where Piłsudski expected the main battle with the Red Army to take place. As is often the case, the actual course of events differed from that expectation.

Polish advance

The 3rd Army easily won border clashes with the Soviets and the combined Polish-Ukrainian forces captured Kiev on May 7, encountering only token resistance. On May 9th the Polish troops celebrated the capture of Kiev with the victory parade on Kreschatyk, the city's main street. However as the parading troops were Piłsudski's Poles instead of Petliura's Ukrainians, the Kievans watched this demonstration of force with great ambivalence, which looked to them just like another occupation army.

However the Bolshevik army, although badly mauled, avoided total destruction. The Polish offensive stopped at Kiev and only a small bridgehead was established on the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

Bolshevik counterattack

The Polish-Ukrainian military thrust soon met the Red Army counterattack. On May 24, 1920 the Polish-Ukrainian forces were engaged for the first time by Semyon Budionny and his elite First Cavalry Army. Two days later, Budionny's cavalry, with two major units from the Russian 12th Army, opened an assault on the Polish forces centered around Kiev. After a week of heavy fighting south of the city, the Russian assault was repulsed and the front line restored. On June 3, 1920 another Russian assault began north of the city.

Meanwhile, Polish military intelligence was aware of Russian preparations for a counteroffensive, and Polish commander-in-chief Józef Piłsudski ordered the commander of Polish forces on the Ukrainian Front, General Antoni Listowski, to prepare for a strategic withdrawal. From the perspective of staff maps in Warsaw, it was clear that the recently-created Polish Army was too weak to withstand both the offensive in the southern, Ukrainian sector and the spring offensive being prepared by the Bolsheviks in Belarus and north of the Pripyat Marshes. However, the commander of the Polish 3rd Army in the vicinity of Kiev, General Edward Rydz-Śmigły, was seeking a way to repulse the upcoming Russian assault rather than withdraw, and even proposed to the General Staff regrouping all his forces at Kiev and defending there until relieved. His plan was turned down by Piłsudski, who knew that no relief force could be prepared any time soon. He repeated his order to withdraw the Polish 3rd and 6th Armies from the Kiev area.

General Rydz organized a series of tactical counter-attacks which resulted in victories in the areas of Bila Tserkva, where the Bolshevik 44th Rifle Division lost the entire staff and one of its brigades and the Battle of Wołodarka, which routed the Bolshevik 4th Cavalry Division and made one of its cossack regiments switch sides. Repeated attacks by the elite Budionny's cossack cavalry eventually broke the Polish Ukrainian front on June 5th and on June 10th Polish armies were retreating along the entire front. Despite counter-attacks and high morale, the Polish-Ukrainian forces only succeeded in slowing down the Red Army. On June 13 Kiev was evacuated and left to the Soviets.

Before their withdrawal the Polish army destroyed both Kiev bridges across the Dnieper River. Soviet propaganda claimed that Poles also destroyed much of Kiev's infrastructure, including the passenger and cargo railway stations, and other purely civilian objects crucial for the city functioning, such as the electric power station, the city sewerage and water supply systems. The Poles denied that they committed any such acts of vandalism, claiming that the only deliberate damage they carried out during their evacuation was blowing up the bridges over the Dnieper, for strictly military reasons. Recently one book, published by a Russian historian Mikhail Meltyukhov, made a charge that Poles committed the acts of vandalism in the city. No confirmation of this can be found in modern sources devoted to the history of Kiev.

The Soviet advance into Ukraine was characterized by mass killing of civilians and the burning of entire villages, especially by Budyonny's cossacks, designed to instill a sense of fear in the Ukrainian population. Behind Polish lines, the Soviet forces destroyed railroads, hung suspected enemies on the spot,and and cut telegraph wires. Ultimately, in the pacification of Ukraine that began during the Soviet counteroffensive in 1920 and which would not end until 1922 the Soviets would take 10,000s of Ukrainian lives.

As the withdrawal was started too late, the forces of Rydz found themselves in an extremely difficult situation. Russian Golikov's and Yakir's Groups, as well as the 1st Cavalry Army managed to capture several strategically important positions behind the Polish lines and the risk of the Polish armies being surrounded and defeated became high. However, mostly due to lack of reconnaissance, poor command and conflicts within the staff of the South-Western Front, the Polish-Ukrainian units managed to withdraw in order and relatively unscathed. Such an outcome of the operation was equally unexpected by both sides. Although the Poles withdrew to their initial positions, they remained tied down in Ukraine and lacked sufficient strength to support the Polish Northern Front and strengthen defenses at the Auta River during the decisive battle that was soon to take place there. On the other hand, the Bolshevik objectives were not accomplished either and the Russian forces had to remain in Ukraine and got tied down with heavy fighting for the area of the city of Lwów.

In the aftermath of the defeat in Ukraine, Polish government of Leopold Skulski resigned on the June 9, and a political crisis gripped Polish government for most of June.

Opposing forces

The following is the Order of Battle of Polish and Bolshevik forces taking part in the struggles in Ukraine, as of April 25, 1920. It should be noted that the command structure of both sides changed during the operation. Also, the Russian forces were joined by Budennyi's 1st Cavalry Army in the latter part of the operation, while a large part of the Polish forces was withdrawn by then to Belarus.

Among Polish Airforce was the 7th Kościuszko Squadron.

Poland/Ukrainian People's Republic

Soviet Russia/Soviet Ukraine

Notes

1. The outcome of the Polish and Bolshevik operations in Ukraine is sometimes disputed. Neither the Poles nor the Russians forced their opponent to fight a major battle or outflanked his forces and destroyed them, which was the main military goal of operations for both sides. However, the Polish retreat from Kiev and Russian advance was a severe blow to Józef Piłsudski's political plans to create a pro-Polish government in Kiev, as part of the "Międzymorze federation.". As such, the operation may be viewed as a defeat for Piłsudski, as well as to Petliura.

See also

• Kiev Expedition

References

Inline

1. ^ Tadeusz Machalski, then a captain, (the future Polish attache in Ankara) wrote in his diary: "Ukrainian people, who saw in their capital an alien general with the Polish army, instead of Petliura leading his own army, didn't view it as the act of liberation but as a variety of a new occupation. Therefore, the Ukrainians, instead of enthusiasm and joy, watched in gloomy silence and instead of rallying to arms to defend the freedom remained the passive speactators". Quoted from: "Figures of the 20th century. Józef Piłsudski: the Chief who Created a State for Himself," Zerkalo Nedeli (the Mirror Weekly), Feb. 3-9, 2001, available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
2. Peter Abbot. "Ukrainian Armies 1914-55", Chapter "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 1917-21", Osprey, 2004, ISBN 1841766682
3. "n practice, was engaged in a process of conquest that was bitterly resisted by Lithuanians and Ukrainians (except the latter's defeat by the Bolsheviks left them with no one else to turn but Pilsudski)."
   Roshwald, Aviel (2001). Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, the Middle East and Russia, 1914-1923. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0415242290. {{cite book}}: External link in |chapterurl= (help); Unknown parameter |chapterurl= ignored (|chapter-url= suggested) (help)
4. "The Bolsheviks had flooded the Ukraine, forcing Ataman Semyon Petlura(a Ukrainian bookkeeper turned national hero) to sign an alliance with Pilsudski, securing Lwow for Poland and possibly Pilsudski's federation. On 7 May the Polish army liberated Kiev in the intention of giving it to Petlura in a Polish-Ukrainian-Federation. On 5 June the Bolsheviks were back in Kiev. The major problem which prevented Pilsudski from securing Kiev and creating his federation was the unwillingness of the inhabitants of Ukraine, to rush to the aid of Petlura and his Ukrainian nationalist forces. Most Ukrainians had no idea what Bolshevism was and were easily manipulated by the Russians. Besides, many of the Ukrainian peasants were very simple people who still had memories of serfdom, which was imposed on them by the Polish Szlachta (Nobility). They believed Pilsudski to be another Polish Magnate, as from the 18th century. Thus, Petlura could not foster more than 30,000 troops.". Marshal Jozef Pilsudski. Messiah and Central European Federalist. Polonica.net article by Patryk Dole
5. Subtelny, O. (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
6. "Fording the Dnipro. The past, present and future of Kyiv's bridges". The Ukrainian observer, issue 193. {{cite news}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)
7. Кузьмин Н.Ф. (1958). Крушение последнего похода Антанты. Moscow. pp. 64–65.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
   Из истории гражданской войны. Т. 3. Moscow. 1961. pp. 266–269.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
   Пшибыльский А. (1931). Войны польского империализма 1918—1921. Russian translation from Polish. Moscow. pp. 152–153.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
   Likely original: Przybylski, Adam (1930). Wojna polska, 1918-1921. (in Polish). Warszawa: Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy. LCCN 55053688.
   above sources cited by Мельтюхов, Михаил Иванович (Mikhail Meltyukhov) (2001). Советско-польские войны. Военно-политическое противостояние 1918—1939 гг. (Soviet-Polish Wars. Politico-Military standoff of 1918-1939). Moscow: Вече (Veche). ISBN 5-699-07637-9.
8. ‘The failures of the Polish army only whipped up its vengeful vandalism. The Polish troops leaving Kiev acted no less savagely. In the city, they damaged the electric power station, the sewerage system, both passenger and cargo railway stations. The governments of Soviet Russia and Ukraine, pointed out in the note of June 11 addressed to the Antanta countries that "the magnificent cathedral of St. Vladimir, this unique pearle of Russian religious architecture and the unique monument with the priceless frescoes by Vasnetsov, was destroyed by the Poles in their retreat only because they to avenge their rage on inanimate objects..."’
   from Meltyukhov, cited above
9. "Kievenergo".
10. "oldkyiv.org.ua".
11. "swrailway.gov.ua".
12. ‘Having burst through the front, Budyonny's cavalry would devesate the enemies rear - burning, killing and looting as they went. These Red cavalrymen inspired an almost numbing sense of fear in their opponents the very names Budyonny and Cossack terrified the Ukrainian population, and they moved into a state of nuetrality or even hostility toward Petliura and the Poles..."’
    from Richard Watt, 1979. Bitter Glory: Poland and its fate 1918-1939. New York: Simon & Shuster. ISBN 0-671-22625-8
13. Courtois, Stephane; Werth, Nicolas; Panne, Jean-Louis; Paczkowki, Andrzej; Bartosek, Karel; Margolin, Jean-Louis (1999). The Black Book of Communism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-07608-7

General

• Lech Wyszczelski (1999). Kijów 1920. Warsaw: Bellona. ISBN 8311089639.
• Norman Davies (2003). White Eagle, Red Star: The Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20. London: Pimlico. ISBN 0712606947.
• Józef Piłsudski (1937–1991). Pisma zbiorowe (Collected Works). Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza (reprint). ISBN 8303030590. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
• Mikhail Tukhachevski (1989). Lectures at Military Academy in Moscow, February 7–10, 1923 in: Pochód za Wisłę. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie. ISBN 8321807771.
• Orest Subtelny (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 0-8020-5809-6.
• Janusz Cisek (1990). Sąsiedzi wobec wojny 1920 roku. Wybór dokumentów. (Neighbours Attitude Towards the War of 1920. A collection of documents, English summary). London: Polish Cultural Foundation Ltd. ISBN 085065212X.
• Isaac Babel (2002). Red Cavalry. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. ISBN 0393324230.

Online references

• Template:Ru icon/Template:Uk icon "Figures of the 20th century. Józef Piłsudski: the Chief who Created a State for Himself," Zerkalo Nedeli (the Mirror Weekly), Feb. 3-9, 2001, available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
• Template:Ru icon "Dramas of Ukrainian-Polish Brotherhood" (documentary film), a review in Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), March 13-19, 1999, available online (in Russian).
• Template:Ru icon Мельтюхов, Михаил Иванович (Mikhail Meltyukhov) (2001). Советско-польские войны. Военно-политическое противостояние 1918—1939 гг. (Soviet-Polish Wars. Politico-Military standoff of 1918-1939). Moscow: Вече (Veche). ISBN 5-699-07637-9..
• Kiev is in the Hands of the Polish Gentry! The Military writing of Leon Trotsky Volume 3: 1920 — The War with Poland
• Postal Telegram No. 2886-a The Military writing of Leon Trotsky Volume 3: 1920 — The War with Poland

• 1920
• Battles of the Polish-Soviet War
• History of Kiev city