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In Buddhism, the term anattā (Pali) or anātman (Sanskrit) refers to 22 named phenomena which are not to be confused with or as the attan (Skt. Atman). The doctrinal Buddhist term Anatman (Sanskrit), or Anatta (Pali) is an adjective in sutra used to refer to the nature of phenomena as being devoid of the Soul, that being the ontological and uncompounded subjective Self (atman) which is the “light (dipam), and only refuge” .

Of the 662 occurrences of the term Anatta in the Nikayas, its usage is restricted to referring to 22 nouns (forms, feelings, perception, experiences, consciousness, the eye, eye-consciousness, desires, mentation, mental formations, ear, nose, tongue, body, lusts, things unreal, etc.), all phenomenal, as being Selfless (anatta). Contrary to countless many commentaries written outside the scope of Buddhist doctrine, there is no “Doctrine of anatta/anatman” mentioned anywhere in the sutras, rather anatta is used only to refer to impermanent things/phenomena as other than the Soul, to be anatta, or Self-less (an-atta).

The supposition, while popular and common, that anatta is a denial of the Atman or Soul by or within Buddhism, is wholly without any basis in doctrine whatsoever.

Anatta in the Nikayas

The ancient Indian word for self or essence is attā (Pāli) or ātman (Sanskrit), and is often thought to be an eternal substance that persists despite death. Hence the term anatta is often interpreted as referring to the denial of a self or essence. Anatta is used in the early Buddhist texts as a strategy to view the perception of self as conditioned processes (or even an action) instead of seeing it as an entity or an essence.


Anatta nowhere in the Nikayas is used as a denial of the Atman (skt: atman, pali: attan), as such:

At one time in Savatthi, the venerable Radha seated himself and asked of the Blessed Lord Buddha: “Anatta, anatta I hear said venerable. What pray tell does Anatta mean?” “Just this Radha, form is not the Soul, sensations are not the Soul, perceptions are not the Soul, assemblages are not the Soul, consciousness is not the Soul. Seeing thusly, this is the end of birth, the Brahman life has been fulfilled, what must be done has been done.”

Anatta is never used in standalone anywhere in doctrine. All 662 occurrences of the term are qualifiers of phenomena as being "na me so atta" (not my soul). As such the personal conjecture of religious Buddhism is often wholly contradictory to doctrine.

The Buddhist term Anatman (Sanskrit), or Anatta (Pali) is an adjective in sutra used to refer to the nature of phenomena as being devoid of the Soul, that being the ontological and uncompounded subjective Self (atman) which is the “light (dipam), and only refuge” . Of the 662 occurrences of the term Anatta in the Nikayas, its usage is restricted to referring to 22 nouns (forms, feelings, perception, experiences, consciousness, the eye, eye-consciousness, desires, mentation, mental formations, ear, nose, tongue, body, lusts, things unreal, etc.), all phenomenal, as being Selfless (anatta). Contrary to countless many popular (=profane, or = consensus, from which the truth can ‘never be gathered’) books (as Buddhologist C.A.F. Davids has deemed them ‘miserable little books’) written outside the scope of Buddhist doctrine, there is no “Doctrine of anatta/anatman” mentioned anywhere in the sutras, rather anatta is used only to refer to impermanent things/phenomena as other than the Soul, to be anatta, or Self-less (an-atta).

Specifically in sutra, anatta is used to describe the temporal and unreal (metaphysically so) nature of any and all composite, consubstantial, phenomenal, and temporal things, from macrocosmic to microcosmic, be it matter as pertains the physical body, the cosmos at large, including any and all mental machinations which are of the nature of arising and passing. Anatta in sutra is synonymous and interchangeable with the terms dukkha (suffering) and anicca (impermanent); all three terms are often used in triplet in making a blanket statement as regards any and all phenomena. Such as: “All these aggregates are anicca, dukkha, and anatta.” It should be further noted that, in doctrine, that the only noun which is branded permanent (nicca), is obviously and logically so, the noun attan , such as passage (SN 1.169).

     Anatta refers specifically and only to the absence of the permanent soul as pertains any or all of the psycho-physical (namo-rupa) attributes, or khandhas (skandhas, aggregates). Anatta/Anatman in the earliest existing Buddhist texts, the Nikayas, is an adjective, (A is anatta, B is anatta, C is anatta). The commonly (=profane, consensus, herd-views) held belief to wit that: “Anatta means no-soul, therefore Buddhism taught that there was no soul” is an irrational absurdity which cannot be found or doctrinally substantiated by means of the Nikayas, the suttas (Skt. Sutras), of Buddhism.

     The Pali compound term and noun for “no soul” is natthatta (literally “there is not/no+atta’), not the term anatta, and is mentioned at Samyutta Nikaya 4.400, where Gotama was asked if there “was no- soul (natthatta)”, to which Gotama equated this position to be a Nihilistic heresy (ucchedavada). Common throughout Buddhist sutra (and Vedanta as well) is the denial of psycho-physical attributes of the mere empirical self to be the Soul, or confused with same. The Buddhist paradigm (and the most common repeating passage in sutta) as regards phenomena is “Na me so atta” (this/these are not my soul), this most common utterance of Gotama the Buddha in the Nikayas, where “na me so atta” = Anatta/Anatman. In sutta, to hold the view that there was “no-Soul” (natthatta) is = natthika (nihilist). Buddhism differs from the “nothing-morist” (Skt. Nastika, Pali natthika) in affirming a spiritual nature that is not in any wise, but immeasurable, inconnumerable, infinite, and inaccessible to observation; and of which, therefore, empirical science can neither affirm nor deny the reality thereof of him who has ‘Gone to That” (tathatta). It is to the Spirit (Skt. Atman, Pali attan) as distinguished from oneself (namo-rupa/ or khandhas, mere self as = anatta) i.e., whatever is phenomenal and formal (Skt. and Pali nama-rupa, and savinnana-kaya) “name and appearance”, and the “body with its consciousness”. ‘Nonbeing (asat, natthiti both of this positions are existential antinomies, and heresies of annihilationism])’”. In contrast it has been incorrectly asserted that affirmation of the atman is = sassatavada (conventionally deemed ‘eternalism’). However the Pali term sasastavada is never associated with the atman, but that the atman was an agent (karmin) in and of samsara which is subject to the whims of becoming (bhava), or which is meant kammavada (karma-ism, or merit agencyship); such as sassatavada in sutta = “atta ca so loka ca” (the atman and the world ), or: ‘Being (sat, atthiti both are heresies of perpetualism]). Sasastavada is the wrong conception that one is perpetually (sassata) bound within samsara and that merit is the highest attainment for either this life or for the next. The heretical antinomy to nihilism (vibhava, or = ucchedavada) is not, nor in sutta, the atman, but bhava (becoming, agencyship). Forever, or eternal becoming is nowhere in sutta identified with the atman, which is “never an agent (karmin)”, and “has never become anything” (=bhava). These antinomies of bhava (sassatavada) and vibhava (ucchedavada) both entail illogical positions untenable to the Vedantic or Buddhist atman; however the concept of “eternalism” as = atman has been the fallacious secondary crutch for supporting the no-atman commentarialists position on anatta implying = there is no atman. 

Karma and Anatta

Skillful action

Because most philosophers focus on asserting or rejecting a self, when people approach Buddhism, they assume it is answering the same questions. Thus they approach the Dhamma with the assumption that anatta is the basic framework, and wonder how karma could ever fit into such a framework. But this brings assumptions that have no bearing on the Buddha's way of teaching. The Buddha's central teaching framework was karma. Anatta is just one of the strategies that fit into this framework.

Moral responsibility

The Buddha criticized two main theories of moral responsibility: the doctrine that posited an unchanging Self as a subject, which he calls "atthikavāda", and the doctrine that did not do so, and instead denied moral responsibility, which he calls "natthikavāda". Instead, the Buddha repeatedly asserted that there are skillful and unskillful actions, and that the distinction between them is universal. In the Buddha's framework of karma, the perception of self is only skillful to the extent that it brings about right view regarding actions, and motivates one to choose skillful actions.

Views on self

Views & speculations on the Soul rejected by Advaita & the Vedas also

What has Buddhism to say of the Self? "That's not my Self" (na me so atta); this, and the term "non Self-ishness" (anatta) predicated of the world and all "things" (sabbe dhamma anatta); Identical with the Brahmanical "of those who are mortal, there is no Self/Soul", (anatma hi martyah ).  “The Soul is the refuge that I have gone unto”. For anatta is not said of the Self/Soul but what it is not. There is never and nowhere in sutra, a ‘doctrine of no-Soul’, but a doctrine of what the Soul is not (form is anatta, feelings are anatta, etc.). It is of course true that the Buddha denied the existence of the mere empirical “self” in the very meaning of “my-self” (this person so-and-so, namo-rupa, an-atta, i.e. Bob, Sue, Larry etc.), one might say in accordance with the command ‘denegat seipsum, ; but this is not what modern and highly unenlightened writers mean to say, or are understood by their readers to say; what they mean to say and do in fact say, is that the Buddha denied the immortal (amata), the unborn (ajata), Supreme-Self (mahatta’), uncaused (samskrta), undying (amara) and eternal (nicca) of the Upanishads. And that is palpably false, for he frequently speaks of this Self, or Spirit (mahapurisha), and nowhere more clearly than in the too often repeated formula 'na me so atta’, “This/these are not my Soul” (na me so atta’= anatta/anatman), excluding body (rupa) and the components of empirical consciousness (vinnana/ nama), a statement to which the words of Sankhara are peculiarly apposite, “Whenever we deny something unreal, is it in reference to something real” ; since it was not for the Buddha, but for the nihilist (natthika), to deny the Soul. For,  “yad anatta….na me so atta, “what is anatta…(means) that is not my Atman”; the extremely descriptive illumination of all thing which are Selfless (anattati) would be both meaningless and a waste of much time for Gotama were (as the foolish commentators espousing Buddhism’s denial of the atman) to clarify and simplify his sermons by outright declaring ‘followers, there is no atman!’, however no such passage exists. The Pali for said passage would be: ‘bhikkhave, natthattati!’; and most certainly such a passage would prove the holy grail and boon for the Theravadin nihilists (materialists) who have ‘protesteth too much’ that Buddhism is one in which the atman is rejected, but to no avail or help to their untenable views and position by the teachings themselves. 
   Outside of going into the doctrines of later schisms of Buddhism, such as Sarvastivada, Theravada, Vajrayana, Madhyamika, and lastly Zen, the oldest existing texts (Nikayas) of Buddhism which predate all these later schools of Buddhism , anatta is never used pejoratively in any sense in the Nikayas by Gotama the Buddha, who himself has said:  “Both formerly and now, I’ve never been a nihilist (vinayika), never been one who teaches the annihilation of a being, rather taught only the source of suffering (that being avijja, or nescience/agnosis), and its ending (avijja).” Further investigation into negative theology is the reference by which one should be directed as to a further understanding of this 'negative' methodology which the term anatta illuminates. It should be noted with great importance that the founder of Advaita Vedanta, Samkara used the term anatman lavishly in the exact same manner as does Buddhism, however in all of time since his passing, none have accused Samkara of espousing a denial of the Atman. Such as: “Atma-anatma vivekah kartavyo bandha nuktaye”-“The wiseman should discriminate between the Atman and the non-Atman (anatman) in order to be liberated.” , “Anatman cintanam tyaktva kasmalam duhkah karanam, vintayatmanam ananda rupam yan-mukti karanam.”-”Give up all that is non-Atman (anatman), which is the cause of all misery, think only of the Atman, which is blissful and the locus of all liberation.” , “Every qualifying characteristic is, as the non-Atman (anatman), comparable to the empty hand.” , “the intellect, its modifications, and objects are the non-Atman (anatman).” , “The gain of the non-Atman (anatman) is no gain at all. Therefore one should give up the notion that one is the non-Atman (anatman).” . In none of the Buddhist suttas is there support for "there is no-atman" theories of anatta . The message is simply to cease regarding the very khandhas in those terms by which the notion of atman has, itself, been so easily misconstrued. As has been shown, detaching oneself from the phenomenal desire for the psycho-physical existence was also a central part of Samkara’s strategy. There is, hence, nothing in the suttas that Samkara, the chief proponent of Advaita Vedanta, would have disagreed with.

Existence and Non-existence

When asked about the existence of a self, the Buddha often refused to answer. Instead, he pointed out the drawbacks of thinking in terms of existence and non-existence, and recommended that one view phenomena as arising and passing away, based on impermanent conditions. This means that instead of the question "Is there a self?", it is recommended to ask, "How does the perception of self originate?"

Identity-view

Identity-view is defined as one of the fetters to be abandoned, and a requirement for stream entry. By analyzing the characteristic of not-self as pervading all conditioned phenomena, and removing notions of "self" and "I-making", one is able to attain liberation. The Nikayas describe various views of self to be abandoned, such as "this is mine, this I am, this is my self", "I will be", "I will be this", "I will be otherwise" etc. A few of the suttas even see belief in no self as tied up with the belief in a self. Views of "denial", in the form "I am not this", or "I will not be that", are thus rooted in the same 'I am' attitude; even the view "I do not exist" arises from a preoccupation with 'I'.

When demanded that the Buddha address the question of'"who", as in "who feels" or "who is reborn", he often responded with a description of dependent origination, stating that the question of "who" brings with it assumptions that are incorrect.

Wrong self-views

There are three ways in which self views could be conceived and all three are said to be wrong views. A wrong view is not wrong because it is factually incorrect, but because it leads to dukkha.

  1. The first is the view that "this is the self," which refers to identity view with regard to something, or passing blind judgement on the intrinsic quality of oneself.
  2. The second is the view that "the self is contained in something else," which refers to identity view as contained in something else.
  3. The third is the view that "the self possesses something else," which refers to the self possessing an entity such as a body.

All these views types of identity view fetter one to samsāra, and it is for this reason that they are wrong views.

Eternalism and annihilationism

While the concept of jiva in Hinduism and Jainism is distinct from the Buddhist concept of a self, certain concepts of jiva are seen to contradict the notion of anatta. Eternalism, or the idea that there is a soul or jiva distinct from the body, raises the question of the existence of an eternal self, which the Buddha did not teach. Annihilationism, or the idea that the soul and the body are the same, implies the existence of a temporary self that is later destroyed upon death, which the Buddha also did not teach.

Anatman in Mahayana Buddhism

There are many different views of Anatta (Chinese: 無我; pinyin: wúwǒ; Japanese: 無我 muga) within various Mahayana schools.

Madhyamaka

Main article: Madhyamaka

While commenting on Āryadeva, Candrakīrti defines anatta as follows:

Ātman is an essence of things that does not depend on others; it is an intrinsic nature. The non-existence of that is selflessness.

— Bodhisattvayogacaryācatuḥśatakaṭikā 256.1.7

Buddhapālita adds, while commenting on Nagārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā:

What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. Unskilled persons whose eye of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then generate attachment and hostility with regard to them.

— Buddhapālita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti P5242,73.5.6-74.1.2

Tathagatagarbha Sutras

The Tathāgatagarbha sūtras declare the existence of "atman," which in these scriptures is equated with buddha-nature. The Mahaparinirvana Sutra, a long and highly composite Mahayana scripture, refers to the Buddha using the term "Self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics. From this, it continues:

The Buddha-nature is in fact not the self. For the sake of sentient beings, I describe it as the self.

The Ratnagotravibhāga, a related text, points out that the teaching of the tathagatagarbha is intended to win sentient beings over to abandoning "affection for one's self" - one of the five defects caused by non-Buddhist teaching. Youru Wang notes similar language in the Lankavatara Sutra, then writes:

Noticing this context is important. It will help us to avoid jumping to the conclusion that tathagatagarbha thought is simply another case of metaphysical imagination.

According to some scholars, the Buddha-nature discussed in these sutras does not represent a substantial self (atman); rather, it is a positive language and expression of śūnyatā "emptiness" and represents the potentiality to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices. Other scholars do in fact detect leanings towards monism in these tathagatagarbha references.

Relation to Vedic and Hindu philosophy

The pre-Buddhist upanishads of Hinduism link atman to the feeling "I am." The Chandogya Upanishad, for example does, and it sees Self as underlying the whole world, being "below," "above," and in the four directions. In contrast, the arhat says, "Above, below, everywhere set free, not considering 'this I am.'"

While the pre-Buddhist Upanishads link the Self to the attitude "I am," others like the post-Buddhist Maitrayaniya Upanishad hold that only the defiled individual self, rather than the universal self, thinks "I am this" or "I am that". According to Peter Harvey, "This is very reminiscent of Buddhism, and may well have been influenced by it to divorce the universal Self from such egocentric associations."

The Upanishadic "Self" in no way differs from the Attan (Soul, Atman) found in the pre-sectarian Nikayas. It should be noted with great importance that the founder of Advaita Vedanta, Samkara used the term anatman lavishly in the exact same manner as does Buddhism, however in all of time since his passing, none have accused Samkara of espousing a denial of the Atman. Such as: “Atma-anatma vivekah kartavyo bandha nuktaye”-“The wiseman should discriminate between the Atman and the non-Atman (anatman) in order to be liberated.” , “Anatman cintanam tyaktva kasmalam duhkah karanam, vintayatmanam ananda rupam yan-mukti karanam.”-”Give up all that is non-Atman (anatman), which is the cause of all misery, think only of the Atman, which is blissful and the locus of all liberation.” , “Every qualifying characteristic is, as the non-Atman (anatman), comparable to the empty hand.” , “the intellect, its modifications, and objects are the non-Atman (anatman).” , “The gain of the non-Atman (anatman) is no gain at all. Therefore one should give up the notion that one is the non-Atman (anatman).” . In none of the Buddhist suttas is there support for "there is no-atman" theories of anatta . The message is simply to cease regarding the very khandhas in those terms by which the notion of atman has, itself, been so easily misconstrued. As has been shown, detaching oneself from the phenomenal desire for the psycho-physical existence was also a central part of Samkara’s strategy. There is, hence, nothing in the suttas that Samkara, the chief proponent of Advaita Vedanta, would have disagreed with.

See also

Notes

  1. Michael Zimmermann, a specialist on the Tathagatagarbha Sutra, sees the notion of an unperishing and eternal self in that early buddha-nature scripture and insists that the compilers of the Tathagatagarbha Sutra 'do not hesitate to attribute an obviously substantialist notion to the buddha-nature of living beings'. Zimmermann also avers that 'the existence of an eternal, imperishable self, that is, buddhahood, is definitely the basic point of the Tathagatagarbha Sutra'. He further indicates that there is no evident interest found in this sutra in the idea of Emptiness (sunyata), saying: 'Throughout the whole Tathagatagarbha Sutra the term sunyata does not even appear once, nor does the general drift of the TGS somehow imply the notion of sunyata as its hidden foundation. On the contrary, the sutra uses very positive and substantialist terms to describe the nature of living beings.'.

References

  1. Many Indian philosophers before, during, and after the Buddha propounded various theories of self. Even the philosophy of Romanticsm involved the assumption that the self is one with the universe, which is a form of self-view.
  2. For example: "If there is no self, then who or what is reborn?"
  3. "Selves & Not-self: The Buddhist Teaching on Anatta", by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/selvesnotself.html
  4. Thai forest monks in the lineage of Ajaan Mun Bhuridatto, including well known monks like Thanissaro Bhikku, and Ajahn Chah.
  5. David Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. The University Press of Hawaii, 1975, page 44.
  6. "Kusala Sutta: Skillful" (AN 2.19), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 4 August 2010, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an02/an02.019.than.html
  7. ^ "Kaccayanagotta Sutta: To Kaccayana Gotta (on Right View)" (SN 12.15), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy Edition), 30 November 2013, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.015.than.html
  8. MN 2 (PTS)
  9. SN 22.81 (PTS)
  10. Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press 1995, pages 39,40.
  11. SN 12.12 (PTS)
  12. SN 12.35 (PTS)
  13. Damien Keown (2004-01-01). "ucchedavāda". Oxfordindex.oup.com. Retrieved 2013-12-04.
  14. SN 12.17 (PTS)
  15. Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy (2010), New York: Oxford University Press.
  16. J. Garfield; Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagārjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika (1995), New York: Oxford University Press.
  17. J. Garfield;Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation (2001), New York: Oxford University Press.
  18. G. Newland; Introduction to Emptiness (2011), Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications
  19. J. Westerhoff; Nagārjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press
  20. ^ Translations from "The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path of Enlightenment", Vol. 3 by Tsong-Kha-Pa, Snow Lion Publications ISBN 1-55939-166-9
  21. Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations.Taylor & Francis, 1989, page 98, see also page 99.
  22. Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations.Taylor & Francis, 1989, page 100. "... it refers to the Buddha using the term "Self" in order to win over non-Buddhist ascetics."
  23. ^ Youru Wang, Linguistic Strategies in Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism: The Other Way of Speaking. Routledge, 2003, page 58.
  24. Heng-Ching Shih,The Significance Of 'Tathagatagarbha' -- A Positive Expression Of 'Sunyata'
  25. Jamie Hubbard, Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu, 2001, pp. 99-100
  26. ^ http://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/Michael-Zimmermann.23.0.html?&L=1
  27. Zimmermann, Michael (2002), A Buddha Within: The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Biblotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica VI, The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University, p. 64
  28. Michael Zimmermann, A Buddha Within, p. 64
  29. Zimmermann, A Buddha Within, p. 81
  30. ^ Peter Harvey, The Selfless Mind. Curzon Press, 1995, page 34.

Bibliography

External links

  • Nirvana Sutra English translation of the Nirvana Sutra by Kosho Yamamoto.
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