Revision as of 15:48, 19 January 2016 edit165.234.184.7 (talk)No edit summary← Previous edit | Latest revision as of 20:13, 9 January 2025 edit undoPete unseth (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users10,868 edits varying degrees of animal rights | ||
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{{Short description|Rights belonging to animals}} | |||
{{other uses|Animal rights (disambiguation)}} | |||
{{About|the philosophy of animal rights|current animal rights around the world|Animal rights by country or territory|a timeline of animal rights|Timeline of animal welfare and rights|other uses|Animal rights (disambiguation)}} | |||
{{Globalize|article|date=July 2012}} | |||
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{{Rights|By claimant}} | |||
{{Infobox | |||
], the 23rd ], revived ] and ] in the 9th century BCE, which led to a radical animal-rights movement in South Asia.<ref>{{cite book|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=YAFPAQAAIAAJ&q=Parshwanatha+animal+rights|title= You are, therefore I am: A declaration of dependence|last1= Kumar|first1= Satish|date= September 2002|publisher= Bloomsbury USA|isbn= 9781903998182}}</ref>]] | |||
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], in his '']'', taught ''ahimsa'' and ] as personal virtues. The plaque in this statue of Valluvar at an animal sanctuary in ] describes the Kural's teachings on ahimsa and ], summing them up with the definition of ].]] | |||
| above = Animal rights | |||
| image1 = ] | |||
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| headerstyle = background-color: #99BADD | |||
| label2 = Description of beliefs | |||
| data2 = ] animals have interests, and those interests ought not to be discriminated against on the basis of ].<ref>Beauchamp (2011b), p. 200.</ref> | |||
| label3 = Early proponents | |||
| data3 = {{nowrap|] {{small|(1851–1939)}}<br/>] {{small|(1878–1963)}}<br/>] {{small|(1882–1927)}}}} | |||
| label4 = Notable academic proponents | |||
| data4 = {{hlist |] |] |] |] |] |] |] |] |] |] |] |] |] |] |] |]}} | |||
| label5 = List | |||
| data5 = ] | |||
| label6 = Key texts | |||
| data6 = {{nowrap|Henry Salt's {{small|(1894)}}<br/> Peter Singer's '']'' {{small|(1975)}}<!--end nowrap:-->}}<br/>Tom Regan's '']'' {{small|(1983)}}<br/>Carol J Adams's ''The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory'' {{small|(1990)}}<br/>Gary Francione's '']'' {{small|(1995)}} | |||
| label7 = Portal | |||
| data7 = {{portal-inline|Animal rights}} | |||
}} | |||
{{Rights |By claimant}} | |||
'''Animal rights''' is the |
'''Animal rights''' is the ] according to which many or all ] have ] independent of their ] to humans, and that their most basic interests—such as avoiding ]—should be afforded the same consideration as similar interests of human beings.<ref>DeGrazia (2002), ch. 2; Taylor (2009), ch. 1.</ref> The ] is often used to reach this conclusion. This argument holds that if marginal human beings such as infants, senile people, and the ] disabled are granted moral status and negative rights, then nonhuman animals must be granted the same moral consideration, since animals do not lack any known morally relevant characteristic that marginal-case humans have. | ||
*For speciesism and fundamental protections, see Waldau (2011). | |||
*For food, clothing, research subjects or entertainment, see Francione (1995), p. 17.</ref> | |||
Broadly speaking, and particularly in popular discourse, the term "animal rights" is often used synonymously with "animal protection" or "animal liberation". More narrowly, "animal rights" refers to the idea that many animals have fundamental rights to be treated with respect as individuals—], ], and ] from torture—that may not be overridden by considerations of aggregate welfare.<ref>Taylor (2009), ch. 3.</ref> | |||
Advocates approach the issue from a variety of perspectives. The ] view is that animals have moral rights, which the pursuit of incremental reform may undermine by encouraging human beings to feel comfortable with using them. ]'s abolitionist position promotes ethical veganism. He argues that animal rights groups that pursue welfare concerns, such as ] (PETA), risk making the public feel comfortable about its use of animals. He calls such groups "the new welfarists." PETA argues that Francione's criticism does little to help alleviate the suffering of individual animals and also trivializes the efforts of workers in the field who handle cruelty cases. It also creates divisiveness within the animal liberation movement instead of focusing on shared goals.<ref> PETA.org</ref> ], as a ], argues that at least some animals are "subjects-of-a-life", with beliefs, desires, memories, and a sense of their own future, who must be treated as ends in themselves, not as means to an end.<ref>Singer (1975); Regan (1983), p. 243. | |||
*For protectionism and abolitionism, see Francione and Garner (2010), pp. 1ff, 103ff, 175ff.</ref> | |||
] is the theory that sentient individuals are the subject of moral concern and therefore are deserving of rights. ] seek incremental reform in how animals are treated, with a view to ending animal use entirely, or almost entirely. This position is represented by the philosopher ]. As a ], Singer's focus is not on moral rights, but on the argument that animals have interests—particularly an interest in not suffering—and that there is no moral or logical reason not to award those interests ]. Multiple cultural traditions around the world—such as ], ], and ]—also espouse some forms of animal rights. | |||
Many animal rights advocates oppose assigning moral value and fundamental protections on the basis of species membership alone.<ref>Compare for example similar usage of the term in 1938: {{cite book | |||
In parallel to the debate about moral rights, ] is now widely taught in law schools in North America, and several prominent legal scholars{{who|date=January 2013}} support the extension of basic legal rights and ]hood to at least some animals. The animals most often considered in arguments for personhood are ]s and ]s. This is supported by some animal rights academics because it would break through the species barrier, but opposed by others because it predicates moral value on mental complexity, rather than on ] alone.<ref>For animal law courses in North America, see , ], accessed July 12, 2012. | |||
| year = 1938 | |||
*For a discussion of animals and personhood, see Wise (2000), pp. 4, 59, 248ff; Wise (2004); Posner (2004); . | |||
| title = The American Biology Teacher | |||
*For the arguments and counter-arguments about awarding personhood only to great apes, see Garner (2005), p. 22. | |||
| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=gQbbAAAAMAAJ | |||
*Also see ] (February 20, 2000). , ''The New York Times''.</ref> | |||
| publisher = National Association of Biology Teachers | |||
| volume = 53 | |||
| page = 211 | |||
| access-date = 16 April 2021 | |||
| quote = The foundation from which these behaviors spring is the ideology known as speciesism. Speciesism is deeply rooted in the widely-held belief that the human species is entitled to certain rights and privileges.}}</ref> They consider this idea, known as ], a prejudice as irrational as any other,<ref>Horta (2010).</ref> and hold that animals should not be considered property or used as food, clothing, entertainment, or ] merely because they are not human.<ref>That a central goal of animal rights is to eliminate the property status of animals, see Sunstein (2004), p. 11ff. | |||
* For speciesism and fundamental protections, see Waldau (2011). | |||
* For food, clothing, research subjects or entertainment, see Francione (1995), p. 17.</ref> Cultural traditions such as ], ], ], ], ], and ] also espouse varying forms of animal rights. | |||
In parallel to the debate about moral rights, North American law schools now often teach ],<ref name="Animal law courses">{{Cite web|title= Animal Law Courses|url= https://aldf.org/article/animal-law-courses/|website= ]|access-date= 2020-12-13|archive-date= 2020-12-04|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20201204203520/https://aldf.org/article/animal-law-courses/|url-status= live}}</ref> and several legal scholars, such as ] and ], support extending basic legal rights and ]hood to nonhuman animals. The animals most often considered in arguments for personhood are ]. Some animal-rights academics support this because it would break the species barrier, but others oppose it because it predicates moral value on mental complexity rather than ] alone.<ref>For animal-law courses in North America, see {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100613170018/http://aldf.org/article.php?id=445 |date=2010-06-13 }}, ]. Retrieved July 12, 2012. | |||
Critics of animal rights argue that animals are unable to enter into a ], and thus cannot be possessors of rights, a view summed up by the philosopher ], who writes that only humans have duties, and therefore only humans have rights.<ref name=Scruton/> A parallel argument, known as the ] position, is that animals may be used as resources so long as there is no unnecessary suffering; they may have some moral standing, but they are inferior in status to human beings, and insofar as they have interests, those interests may be overridden, though what counts as necessary suffering or a legitimate sacrifice of interests varies considerably.<ref>Garner (2005), pp. 11, 16. | |||
* For a discussion of animals and personhood, see Wise (2000), pp. 4, 59, 248ff; Wise (2004); Posner (2004); {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080614152221/http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-257091/animal-rights |date=2008-06-14 }}. | |||
*Also see Frey (1980); and for a review of Frey, see .</ref> Certain forms of animal rights activism, such as the destruction of ] and ] by the ], have also attracted criticism, including from within the ] itself,<ref>Singer (2000), pp. 151–156.</ref> as well as prompted reaction from the ] with the enactment of the "Animal Enterprise Protection Act (amended in 2006 by the ])".<ref> The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Second Edition edited by Gus Martin - SAGE, Jun 15, 2011 - page 47</ref> | |||
* For the arguments and counter-arguments about awarding personhood only to great apes, see Garner (2005), p. 22. | |||
* Also see ] (February 20, 2000). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170501195553/https://www.nytimes.com/books/00/02/20/reviews/000220.20sunstet.html |date=2017-05-01 }}, ''The New York Times''.</ref> {{As of |2019 | November}}, 29 countries had enacted ]; ] granted captive ]s basic human rights in 2014.<ref>{{cite web|url= http://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/23/world/americas/feat-orangutan-rights-ruling/|title= Argentine orangutan granted unprecedented legal rights|last1= Giménez|first1= Emiliano|date= January 4, 2015|website= edition.cnn.com|publisher= ]|access-date= April 21, 2015|archive-date= April 3, 2021|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20210403030759/https://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/23/world/americas/feat-orangutan-rights-ruling/|url-status= live}}</ref> Outside of ], animal-rights discussions most often address the status of ]s (compare ]). Other animals (considered less sentient) have gained less attention—] relatively little<ref> | |||
{{cite book | |||
| last1 = Cohen | |||
| first1 = Carl | |||
| author-link1 = Carl Cohen (philosopher) | |||
| last2 = Regan | |||
| first2 = Tom | |||
| author-link2 = Tom Regan | |||
| title = The Animal Rights Debate | |||
| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=JPHtAAAAMAAJ | |||
| series = Point/Counterpoint: Philosophers Debate Contemporary Issues Series | |||
| year = 2001 | |||
| location = Lanham, Maryland | |||
| publisher = Rowman & Littlefield Publishers | |||
| publication-date = 2001 | |||
| page = 47 | |||
| isbn = 9780847696628 | |||
| access-date = 16 April 2021 | |||
| quote = Too often overlooked in the animal world, according to Sapontzis, are insects that have interests, and therefore rights. | |||
}} | |||
</ref> (outside ]) and animal-like ] hardly any.<ref> | |||
The concept of "bacteria rights" can appear coupled with disdain or irony: | |||
{{cite book | |||
| last1 = Pluhar | |||
| first1 = Evelyn B. | |||
| author-link1 = Evelyn Pluhar | |||
| chapter = Human "superiority" and the argument from marginal cases | |||
| title = Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals | |||
| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=S4VyLcBzek0C | |||
| series = Book collections on Project MUSE | |||
| year = 1995 | |||
| location = Durham, North Carolina | |||
| publisher = Duke University Press | |||
| publication-date = 1995 | |||
| page = 9 | |||
| isbn = 9780822316480 | |||
| access-date = 16 April 2021 | |||
| quote = For example, in an editorial entitled 'Animal Rights Nonsense,' ... in the prestigious science journal ''Nature'', defenders of animal rights are accused of being committed to the absurdity of 'bacteria rights.' | |||
}} | |||
</ref> The vast majority of animals have no legally recognised rights.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Jakopovich|first=Daniel|date=2021|title=The UK's Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill Excludes the Vast Majority of Animals: Why We Must Expand Our Moral Circle to Include Invertebrates|url=https://onlineacademiccommunity.uvic.ca/asri/2021/10/17/the-uks-animal-welfare-sentience-bill-excludes-the-vast-majority-of-animals-why-we-should-expand-our-moral-circle-to-include-invertebrates|journal=Animals & Society Research Initiative, University of Victoria, Canada|access-date=2022-06-18|archive-date=2022-11-29|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221129010538/https://onlineacademiccommunity.uvic.ca/asri/2021/10/17/the-uks-animal-welfare-sentience-bill-excludes-the-vast-majority-of-animals-why-we-should-expand-our-moral-circle-to-include-invertebrates/|url-status=live}}</ref> | |||
Critics of animal rights argue that nonhuman animals are unable to enter into a ], and thus cannot have rights, a view summarised by the philosopher ], who writes that only humans have duties, and therefore only humans have rights.<ref name=Scruton/> Another argument, associated with the ] tradition, maintains that animals may be used as resources so long as there is no unnecessary suffering;<ref name="Ethical">{{cite journal| author1= Liguori, G.| display-authors= etal| year= 2017| title= Ethical Issues in the Use of Animal Models for Tissue Engineering: Reflections on Legal Aspects, Moral Theory, 3Rs Strategies, and Harm-Benefit Analysis| journal= Tissue Engineering Part C: Methods| volume= 23| issue= 12| pages= 850–862| doi= 10.1089/ten.TEC.2017.0189| pmid= 28756735| s2cid= 206268293| url= https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/51950145/ten.tec.2017.0189.pdf| access-date= 2019-07-12| archive-date= 2020-09-15| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20200915060144/https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/51950145/ten.tec.2017.0189.pdf| url-status= live}}</ref> animals may have some moral standing, but any interests they have may be overridden in cases of comparatively greater gains to aggregate welfare made possible by their use, though what counts as "necessary" suffering or a legitimate sacrifice of interests can vary considerably.<ref>Garner (2005), pp. 11, 16. | |||
Background factors, such as ], ], type and level of ], and ], may condition one's attitudes towards the nature, moral significance, and rights of animals.{{citation needed|date=January 2015}} | |||
*Also see Frey (1980); and for a review of Frey, see {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160219072849/http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1154902/pdf/jmedeth00155-0044.pdf |date=2016-02-19 }}.</ref> Certain forms of animal-rights activism, such as the destruction of ] and of ] by the ], have attracted criticism, including from within the ] itself,<ref>Singer (2000), pp. 151–156.</ref> and prompted the ] to enact laws, including the ], allowing the prosecution of this sort of activity as ].<ref> | |||
{{Cite book | |||
|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=I_jh4VBi_HYC | |||
|title= The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Second Edition | |||
|first= Gus|last= Martin|date= 15 June 2011 | |||
|publisher= SAGE|via= Google Books|isbn= 9781412980166 | |||
}} | |||
</ref> | |||
==History== | |||
==Historical development in the West== | |||
{{Main|History of animal rights}}The concept of ] dates to ],<ref>{{cite book | last = Tähtinen | first = Unto | title = Ahimsa. Non-Violence in Indian Tradition | date = 1976 | location = London | pages = 2–3 (English translation: Schmidt p. 631) | isbn = 0-09-123340-2 }}</ref> with roots in early ] and ] history,<ref name="Grant">{{cite book |last1=Grant |first1=Catharine |title=The No-nonsense Guide to Animal Rights |url=https://archive.org/details/nononsenseguidet0000gran |url-access=registration |date=2006 |location=New Internationalist |isbn=9781904456407 |page= |language=en|quote=These religions emphasize ''ahimsa'', which is the principle of non-violence towards all living things. The first precept is a prohibition against the killing of any creature. The Jain, Hindu and Buddhist injunctions against killing serve to teach that all creatures are spiritually equal.}}</ref><ref name="BBC2019">{{cite web |title=Animal rights |url=https://www.bbc.com/bitesize/guides/z3ygjxs/revision/5 |publisher=] |access-date=17 March 2019 |language=en |quote=The main reason for Hindu respect for animal rights is the principle of ahimsa. According to the principle of ahimsa, no living thing should be harmed. This applies to humans and animals. The Jains' belief system takes the principle of ahimsa regarding animals so seriously that as well as being strict vegetarians, some followers wear masks to prevent them breathing in insects. They may also sweep paths with a small broom to make sure they do not tread on any living creatures. |archive-date=8 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210308062719/https://www.bbc.com/bitesize/guides/z3ygjxs/revision/5 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref name="Mohitdagoat">{{cite book |last1=Owen |first1=Marna A. |title=Animal Rights: Noble Cause Or Needless Effort? |date=2009 |publisher=Twenty-First Century Books |isbn=9780761340829 |page= |language=en |url=https://archive.org/details/animalrightsnobl0000owen/page/12 }}</ref> while Eastern, African, and Indigenous peoples also have rich traditions of animal protection.{{cn|date=July 2024}} In the Western world, ] viewed animals as lacking reason<ref name=EB3>"." ''Encyclopædia Britannica''. 2007.</ref> and existing for human use, though other ancient philosophers believed animals deserved gentle treatment.{{cn|date=July 2024}} Major religious traditions, chiefly ], opposed animal cruelty. While scholars like ] saw animals as unconscious automata,<ref>Waddicor, M. H., ''Montesquieu and the Philosophy of Natural Law'' (]: ], 1970), {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214230/https://books.google.com/books?id=sLooBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA63|date=16 August 2021}}.</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=23 December 1995 |title=''Animal Consciousness'', No. 2. Historical background |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/#hist |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080906181245/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/#hist |archive-date=6 September 2008 |access-date=16 December 2014 |publisher=Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy}}</ref><ref>Parker, J. V., ''Animal Minds, Animal Souls, Animal Rights'' (]: ], 2010), p. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214246/https://books.google.com/books?id=Sh2AQTDV5DQC&pg=PA16|date=16 August 2021}}, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214245/https://books.google.com/books?id=Sh2AQTDV5DQC&pg=PA88|date=16 August 2021}}, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214239/https://books.google.com/books?id=Sh2AQTDV5DQC&pg=PA99|date=16 August 2021}}.</ref> and ] denied direct duties to animals,<ref>] (1785). '']''</ref> ] emphasized their capacity to suffer.<ref name=":2">Bentham, Jeremy. 1780. "". pp. 307–335 in '']''. London: T. Payne and Sons.</ref>{{Rp|309n}} The publications of ] eventually eroded the Cartesian view of animals.<ref>Spencer, J., {{"'}}Love and Hatred are Common to the Whole Sensitive Creation': Animal Feeling in the Century before Darwin," in A. Richardson, ed., ''After Darwin: Animals, Emotions, and the Mind'' (Amsterdam and New York: ], 2013), | |||
{{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214237/https://books.google.com/books?id=3imLAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA37|date=16 August 2021}}.</ref>{{rp|37}} Darwin noted the mental and emotional continuity between humans and animals, suggesting the possibility of animal suffering.<ref>{{Cite book |author=Workman, L. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rz8dBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT177 |title=Charles Darwin: The Shaping of Evolutionary Thinking |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |year=2013 |isbn=978-1-137-31323-2 |page=177 |author-link=Lance Workman |access-date=19 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816214235/https://books.google.com/books?id=rz8dBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT177 |archive-date=16 August 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref>{{rp|177}} The ] movement emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Franco|first=Nuno Henrique|date=2013-03-19|title=Animal Experiments in Biomedical Research: A Historical Perspective|journal=Animals|volume=3|issue=1|pages=238–273| doi=10.3390/ani3010238| issn=2076-2615| pmc=4495509| pmid=26487317| doi-access=free}}</ref> driven significantly by women.<ref name="Ross 2014">{{cite journal|author=Ross, Karen|year=2014|title=Winning Women's Votes: Defending Animal Experimentation and Women's Clubs in New York, 1920–1930|journal=New York History|volume=95|issue=1|pages=26–40|doi=10.1353/nyh.2014.0050 }}</ref> From the 1970s onward, growing scholarly and activist interest in animal treatment has aimed to raise awareness and reform laws to improve animal rights and human–animal relationships.{{cn|date=July 2024}} | |||
==In religion== | |||
===Moral status and animals in the ancient world=== | |||
{{See also|Animals in Islam|Christianity and animal rights|Animal rights in Jainism, Hinduism, and Buddhism}} | |||
{{main|Moral status of animals in the ancient world}} | |||
] argued that animals lacked reason (''logos''), and placed humans at the top of the natural world.<ref name=Sorabji7/>]] | |||
The 21st-century debates about animals can be traced back to the ancient world, and the idea of a divine hierarchy. In the '']'' 1:26 (5th or 6th century BCE), ] is given "dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." Dominion need not entail property rights, but it has been interpreted, by some, over the centuries to imply ownership.<ref>Francione (1995), p. 36.</ref> However, ] writes that "''dominion'' does not entail or allow abuse any more than does dominion a parent enjoys over a child."<ref name="Rollin">{{cite book|last=Rollin|first=Bernard E.|title=Animal Rights and Human Morality|accessdate=3 December 2014|publisher=]|isbn=978-1-61592-211-6|page=117}}</ref> Rollin further states that the ] requirement promulgated in the ] "required that animals be granted a day of rest along with humans. Correlatively, the Bible forbids 'plowing with an ox and an ass together' (Deut. 22:10–11). According to the rabbinical tradition, this prohibition stems from the hardship that an ass would suffer by being compelled to keep up with an ox, which is, of course, far more powerful. Similarly, one finds the prohibition against 'muzzling an ox when it treads out the grain' (Deut. 25:4–5), and even an environmental prohibition against destroying trees when besieging a city (Deut. 20:19–20). These ancient regulations, virtually forgotten, bespeak of an eloquent awareness of the status of animals as ends in themselves", a point also corroborated by ].<ref name="Rollin"/><ref name="Phelps2002">{{cite book|last=Phelps|first=Norm|title=Animal Rights According to the Bible|accessdate=3 December 2014|year=2002|publisher=Lantern Books|isbn=978-1-59056-009-9|page=70|quote=The Bible's most important reference to the sentience and will of nonhuman animals is found in Deuteronomy 25:4, which became the scriptural foundation of the rabbinical doctrine of ''tsar ba'ale chayim'', "the suffering of the living," which makes relieving the suffering of animals a religious duty for Jews. "You shall not muzzle the ox while he is threshing." The point of muzzling the ox was to keep him from eating any of the grain that he was threshing. The point of the commandment was the cruelty of forcing an animal to work for hours at a time with his face only inches from delicious food while not allowing him to eat any of it. From time immemorial, Jew have taken great pride in the care they provide their animals.}}</ref> | |||
For some the basis of animal rights is in religion or ] (or in general ]), with some religions banning killing any animal. In other religions animals are considered ]. ] and ] societies abandoned animal sacrifice and embraced ] from the 3rd century BCE.<ref name="Garner 2005, pp. 21–22">Garner (2005), pp. 21–22.</ref> One of the most important sanctions of the ], Hindu, and Buddhist faiths is the concept of ], or refraining from the destruction of life<!-- (], p. 234)-->. According to Buddhism, humans do not deserve preferential treatment over other living beings.<ref name="Grant">{{cite book |last1=Grant |first1=Catharine |title=The No-nonsense Guide to Animal Rights |url=https://archive.org/details/nononsenseguidet0000gran |url-access=registration |date=2006 |location=New Internationalist |isbn=9781904456407 |page= |language=en|quote=These religions emphasize ''ahimsa'', which is the principle of non-violence towards all living things. The first precept is a prohibition against the killing of any creature. The Jain, Hindu and Buddhist injunctions against killing serve to teach that all creatures are spiritually equal.}}</ref> The ] interpretation of this doctrine prohibits the killing of any living being.<ref name="Grant" /> These Indian religions' dharmic beliefs are reflected in the ancient Indian works of the ] and ], which contain passages that extend the idea of nonviolence to all living beings.<ref>{{cite web | url = https://ivu.org/congress/wvc57/souvenir/tamil.html | title = Vegetarianism in Tamil Literature | last = Meenakshi Sundaram | first = T. P. | date = 1957 | website = 15th World Vegetarian Congress 1957 | publisher = International Vegetarian Union (IVU) | access-date = 17 April 2022 | quote = Ahimsa is the ruling principle of Indian life from the very earliest times. ... This positive spiritual attitude is easily explained to the common man in a negative way as "ahimsa" and hence this way of denoting it. Tiruvalluvar speaks of this as "kollaamai" or "non-killing." | archive-date = 22 January 2022 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220122033037/https://ivu.org/congress/wvc57/souvenir/tamil.html | url-status = live }}</ref> | |||
The philosopher and mathematician, ] (c. 580–c. 500 BCE), urged respect for animals, believing that human and nonhuman souls were ] from human to animal, and vice versa.<ref>Steiner (2005), p. 47; Taylor (2009), p. 37.</ref> Against this, ] (384–322 BCE), student to the philosopher ], argued that nonhuman animals had no interests of their own, ranking them far below humans in the ]. He was the first to create a taxonomy of animals; he perceived some similarities between humans and other species, but argued for the most part that animals lacked reason (''logos''), reasoning (''logismos''), thought (''dianoia'', ''nous''), and belief (''doxa'').<ref name=Sorabji7>Sorabji (1993), p. 12ff.; .</ref> ] (c. 371 – c. 287 BCE), one of Aristotle's pupils, argued that animals also had reasoning (''logismos''), he opposed eating meat on the grounds that it robbed them of life and was therefore unjust.<ref name=Taylor35>Taylor (2009), p. 37.</ref><ref>Sorabji (1993) p. 45 ff.</ref> Theophrastus did not prevail; ] writes that current attitudes to animals can be traced to the heirs of the Western Christian tradition selecting the hierarchy that Aristotle sought to preserve.<ref name="Sorabji7"/> | |||
In Islam, animal rights were recognized early by the ]. This recognition is based on both the ] and the ]. The Qur'an contains many references to animals, detailing that they have souls, form communities, communicate with God, and worship Him in their own way. ] forbade his followers to harm any animal and asked them to respect animals' rights.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/islamethics/animals_1.shtml|title=BBC - Religions - Islam: Animals|publisher=bbc.co.uk|access-date=2019-12-20|archive-date=2020-02-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200204062925/http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/islamethics/animals_1.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref> Nevertheless, Islam does allow eating of certain species of animals. | |||
] (2011) writes that the most extensive account in antiquity of how animals should be treated was written by the Neoplatonist philosopher ] (234–c. 305 CE), in his ''On Abstinence from Animal Food'', and ''On Abstinence from Killing Animals''.<ref>Beauchamp (2011a), pp. 4–5. | |||
*Porphyry. , translated by Thomas Taylor, Animal Rights Library. | |||
*Also see Clark (2011), pp. 37–38.</ref> | |||
According to ], all animals, from the smallest to the largest, are cared for and loved. According to the Bible, "All these animals waited for the Lord, that the Lord might give them food at the hour. The Lord gives them, they receive; The Lord opens his hand, and they are filled with good things."<ref>Proverbs 30:24 and NW; Psalm 104:24, 25, 27, 28</ref> It further says ] "gave food to the animals, and made the crows cry."<ref>Ps 147:9</ref> | |||
===17th century: Animals as automata=== | |||
====Early animal protection laws in Europe==== | |||
<!---] was the Shogun of Japan from 1680 until 1709 and enacted animal rights, protecting especially d ogs. Wiki community, Please make a pretty wiki article about this subject--->According to ], the first known animal protection legislation in Europe was passed in Ireland in 1635. It prohibited pulling wool off sheep, and the attaching of ploughs to horses' tails, referring to "the cruelty used to beasts."<ref>''The Statutes at Large''. Dublin, 1786, cited in Ryder (2000), p. 49.</ref> In 1641 the first legal code to protect domestic animals in North America was passed by the ].<ref name=Francione7/> The colony's constitution was based on '']'' by the Reverend ] (1578–1652), an English lawyer, ] clergyman, and University of Cambridge graduate. Ward's list of "rites" included rite 92: "No man shall exercise any Tirrany or Crueltie toward any brute Creature which are usually kept for man's use." Historian ] (1989) writes that, at the height of René Descartes' influence in Europe—and his view that animals were simply automata—it is significant that the New Englanders created a law that implied animals were not unfeeling machines.<ref name=Nash19>Nash (1989), p. 19.</ref> | |||
The Puritans passed animal protection legislation in England too. Kathleen Kete writes that animal welfare laws were passed in 1654 as part of the ordinances of the ]—the government under ] (1599–1658), which lasted from 1653 to 1659, following the ]. Cromwell disliked blood sports, which included ], ], ], ] and bull running, said to tenderize the meat. These could be seen in villages and fairgrounds, and became associated with idleness, drunkenness, and gambling. Kete writes that the Puritans interpreted the biblical dominion of man over animals to mean responsible stewardship, rather than ownership. The opposition to blood sports became part of what was seen as Puritan interference in people's lives, and the animal protection laws were overturned during the ], when ] was returned to the throne in 1660.<ref name=Kete2>Kete (2002), p. 19 ff.</ref> | |||
====René Descartes==== | |||
]'s ideas about animals remained influential into the 20th century.<ref name=Midgley1999/>]] | |||
{{rquote|right| eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear nothing, know nothing. — ] (1638–1715)<ref name=Malebranche>Harrison (1992).</ref>}} | |||
The great influence of the 17th century was the French philosopher, ] (1596–1650), whose ] (1641) informed attitudes about animals well into the 20th century.<ref name=Midgley1999/> Writing during the ], Descartes proposed a ] of the universe, the aim of which was to show that the world could be mapped out without allusion to subjective experience.<ref name=Cottingham>Cottingham (1995), pp. 188–192.</ref> | |||
{{rquote|right|Hold then the same view of the dog which has lost his master, which has sought him in all the thoroughfares with cries of sorrow, which comes into the house troubled and restless, goes downstairs, goes upstairs; goes from room to room, finds at last in his study the master he loves, and betokens his gladness by soft whimpers, frisks, and caresses. | |||
There are barbarians who seize this dog, who so greatly surpasses man in fidelity and friendship, and nail him down to a table and dissect him alive, to show you the mesaraic veins! You discover in him all the same organs of feeling as in yourself. Answer me, ], has Nature arranged all the springs of feeling in this animal to the end that he might not feel? — ] (1694–1778)<ref>"Bêtes, ''Dictionnaire Philosophique''.</ref>}} | |||
His mechanistic approach was extended to the issue of animal ]. Mind, for Descartes, was a thing apart from the physical universe, a ], linking human beings to the mind of God. The nonhuman, on the other hand, were for Descartes nothing but complex ], with no souls, minds, or reason.<ref name=Midgley1999>Midgley, Mary (May 24, 1999). , ''The New Statesman''.</ref> | |||
===Treatment of animals as man's duty towards himself=== | |||
====John Locke, Immanuel Kant==== | |||
Against Descartes, the British philosopher ] (1632–1704) argued, in ''Some Thoughts Concerning Education'' (1693), that animals did have feelings, and that unnecessary cruelty toward them was morally wrong, but that the right not to be harmed adhered either to the animal's owner, or to the human being who was being damaged by being cruel. Discussing the importance of preventing children from tormenting animals, he wrote: "For the custom of tormenting and killing of beasts will, by degrees, harden their minds even towards men."<ref>Locke (1693).</ref> | |||
Locke's position echoed that of ] (1225–1274). ] writes that the argument can be found at ] (9:9–10), when ] asks: "Is it for oxen that God is concerned? Does he not speak entirely for our sake? It was written for our sake." Christian philosophers interpreted this to mean that humans had no direct duty to nonhuman animals, but had a duty only to protect them from the effects of engaging in cruelty.<ref>Waldau (2001), p. 9.</ref> | |||
The German philosopher ] (1724–1804), following Aquinas, opposed the idea that humans have direct duties toward nonhumans. For Kant, cruelty to animals was wrong only because it was bad for humankind. He argued in 1785 that "cruelty to animals is contrary to man's duty to ''himself'', because it deadens in him the feeling of sympathy for their sufferings, and thus a natural tendency that is very useful to morality in relation to other ''human beings'' is weakened."<ref name=Kant1785>Kant (1785), part II, paras 16 and 17.</ref> | |||
===18th century: Centrality of sentience=== | |||
] argued for the inclusion of animals in ].]] | |||
====Jean-Jacques Rousseau==== | |||
] (1712–1778) argued in '']'' (1754) for the inclusion of animals in ] on the grounds of ]: "By this method also we put an end to the time-honored disputes concerning the participation of animals in natural law: for it is clear that, being destitute of intelligence and liberty, they cannot recognize that law; as they partake, however, in some measure of our nature, in consequence of the sensibility with which they are endowed, they ought to partake of natural right; so that mankind is subjected to a kind of obligation even toward the brutes. It appears, in fact, that if I am bound to do no injury to my fellow-creatures, this is less because they are rational than because they are sentient beings: and this quality, being common both to men and beasts, ought to entitle the latter at least to the privilege of not being wantonly ill-treated by the former."<ref>Rousseau (1754), quoted in Midgley (1984), p. 62.</ref> | |||
In his treatise on education, '']'' (1762), he encouraged parents to raise their children on a vegetarian diet. He believed that the food of the culture a child was raised eating, played an important role in the character and disposition they would develop as adults. "For however one tries to explain the practice, it is certain that great meat-eaters are usually more cruel and ferocious than other men. This has been recognized at all times and in all places. The English are noted for their cruelty while the Gaures are the gentlest of men. All savages are cruel, and it is not their customs that tend in this direction; their cruelty is the result of their food." | |||
====Jeremy Bentham==== | |||
]: "The time will come, when humanity will extend its mantle over every thing which breathes."<ref>Bentham (1781), Part III.</ref>]] | |||
Four years later, one of the founders of modern utilitarianism, the English philosopher ] (1748–1832), although opposed to the concept of ], argued that it was the ability to suffer that should be the benchmark of how we treat other beings. If rationality were the criterion, he argued, many humans, including infants and the disabled, would also have to be treated as though they were things.<ref name=Benthall>, p. 1.</ref> He did not conclude that humans and nonhumans had equal moral significance, but argued that the latter's interests should be taken into account. He wrote in 1789, just as African slaves were being ]: | |||
<blockquote>The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the ] of the skin, or the termination of the '']'' are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they ''reason''?, nor Can they ''talk''? but, Can they ''suffer?''<ref name=Bentham>Bentham (1789), quoted in Garner (2005), pp. 12—13.</ref></blockquote> | |||
For Bentham, morals and legislation can be described scientifically, but such a description requires an account of human nature. Just as nature is explained through reference to the laws of physics, so human behavior can be explained by reference to the two primary motives of pleasure and pain; this is the theory of psychological hedonism. | |||
There is, Bentham admits, no direct proof of such an analysis of human motivation—though he holds that it is clear that, in acting, all people implicitly refer to it. At the beginning of the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham writes: | |||
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. | |||
===19th century: Emergence of ''jus animalium''=== | |||
{{Further|Badger baiting|Bull baiting|Cockfighting}} | |||
], one of the rural sports campaigners sought to ban from 1800 onwards]] | |||
The 19th century saw an explosion of interest in animal protection, particularly in England. Debbie Legge and Simon Brooman write that the educated classes became concerned about attitudes toward the old, the needy, children, and the insane, and that this concern was extended to nonhumans. Before the 19th century, there had been prosecutions for poor treatment of animals, but only because of the damage to the animal as property. In 1793, for example, John Cornish was found not guilty of maiming a horse after pulling the animal's tongue out; the judge ruled that Cornish could be found guilty only if there was evidence of malice toward the owner.<ref name=Legge40>Legge and Brooman (1997), p. 40.</ref> | |||
From 1800 onwards, there were several attempts in England to introduce animal protection legislation. The first was a bill against ], introduced in April 1800 by a Scottish MP, Sir ] (1729–1805). It was opposed ''inter alia'' on the grounds that it was anti-working class, and was defeated by two votes. Another attempt was made in 1802, this time opposed by the Secretary at War, ] (1750–1810), who said the Bill was supported by Methodists and Jacobins who wished to "destroy the Old English character, by the abolition of all rural sports." In 1809, ] (c. 1746–1828) introduced a bill to protect cattle and horses from malicious wounding, wanton cruelty, and beating. He told the House of Lords that animals had protection only as property: "They have no rights. that defect in the law which I seek to remedy." The Bill was passed by the Lords, but was opposed in the Commons by Windham, who said it would be used against the "lower orders" when the real culprits would be their employers.<ref>Phelps (2007), pp. 96–98. | |||
*''Speeches in Parliament, of the Right Honourable William Windham. Volume I''. Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown (1812), pp. 303, 340–356.</ref> | |||
==== Martin's Act ==== | |||
{{rquote|right|''If I had a donkey wot wouldn't go,''<br> | |||
''D' ye think I'd wollop him? No, no, no!''<br> | |||
''But gentle means I'd try, d' ye see,''<br> | |||
''Because I hate all cruelty.''<br> | |||
''If all had been like me, in fact,''<br> | |||
''There'd ha' been no occasion for ]''.<br/> | |||
— ] song inspired by the prosecution of Bill Burns for cruelty to a donkey.<ref name=RSPCAhistory/>}} | |||
] | |||
{{further|wikisource:Martin's Act 1822}} | |||
In 1821, the Treatment of Horses bill was introduced by Colonel ] (1754–1834), MP for Galway in Ireland, but it was lost among laughter in the House of Commons that the next thing would be rights for asses, dogs, and cats.<ref name=Legge41>Legge and Brooman (1997), p. 41.</ref> Nicknamed "Humanity Dick" by George IV, Martin finally succeeded in 1822 with his "Ill Treatment of Horses and Cattle Bill"—or "Martin's Act", as it became known—which was the world's first major piece of animal protection legislation. It was given royal assent on June 22 that year as '']'', and made it an offence, punishable by fines up to five pounds or two months imprisonment, to "beat, abuse, or ill-treat any horse, mare, gelding, mule, ass, ox, cow, heifer, steer, sheep or other cattle."<ref name=Legge40>Legge and Brooman 1997, p. 40.</ref> | |||
Legge and Brooman argue that the success of the Bill lay in the personality of "Humanity Dick", who was able to shrug off the ridicule from the House of Commons, and whose sense of humour managed to capture the House's attention.<ref name=Legge40/> It was Martin himself who brought the first prosecution under the Act, when he had Bill Burns, a ]—a street seller of fruit—arrested for beating a donkey, and paraded the animal's injuries before a reportedly astonished court. Burns was fined, and newspapers and music halls were full of jokes about how Martin had relied on the testimony of a donkey.<ref name=Phelps100>Phelps 2007, pp. 98–100.</ref> | |||
Other countries followed suit in passing legislation or making decisions that favoured animals. In 1822, the courts in New York ruled that wanton cruelty to animals was a misdemeanor at common law.<ref name=Francione7>Francione 1996, p. 7.</ref> In France in 1850, ] succeeded in having the ''Loi Grammont'' passed, outlawing cruelty against domestic animals, and leading to years of arguments about whether bulls could be classed as domestic in order to ban bullfighting.<ref>McCormick, John. Bullfighting: Art, Technique and Spanish Society''. Transaction Publishers, 1999, p. 211.</ref> The state of Washington followed in 1859, New York in 1866, California in 1868, and Florida in 1889.<ref name=Legge50>Legge and Brooman (1997), p. 50.</ref> In England, a series of amendments extended the reach of the 1822 Act, which became the ], outlawing cockfighting, baiting, and dog fighting, followed by another ], and ]. | |||
====Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals==== | |||
{{rquote|right|At a meeting of the Society instituted for the purpose of preventing cruelty to animals, on the 16th day of June 1824, at Old Slaughter's Coffee House, ]: ] Esqr, MP, in the Chair, | |||
It was resolved: | |||
That a committee be appointed to superintend the Publication of Tracts, Sermons, and similar modes of influencing public opinion, to consist of the following Gentlemen: | |||
Sir ] MP, A Warre Esqr. MP, ] Esqr. MP, ] Esqr., Revd. A Broome, Revd. G Bonner, Revd G A Hatch, A E Kendal Esqr., ] Esqr., ] Esqr., Dr. Henderson. | |||
Resolved also: | |||
That a Committee be appointed to adopt measures for Inspecting the Markets and Streets of the Metropolis, the Slaughter Houses, the conduct of Coachmen, etc.- etc, consisting of the following Gentlemen: | |||
T F Buxton Esqr. MP, ] Esqr., MP, ], L B Allen Esqr., C C Wilson Esqr., Jno. Brogden Esqr., Alderman Brydges, A E Kendal Esqr., E Lodge Esqr., J Martin Esqr. T G Meymott Esqr. | |||
A. Broome, | |||
Honorary Secretary<ref name=Phelps100/>}} | |||
{{Further|Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals}} | |||
Richard Martin soon realized that magistrates did not take the Martin Act seriously, and that it was not being reliably enforced. Several members of parliament decided to form a society to bring prosecutions under the Act. The Reverend Arthur Broome, formerly of ] and recently appointed the vicar of Bromley-by-Bow, arranged a meeting in Old Slaughter's Coffee House in ], a London café frequented by artists and actors. The group met on June 16, 1824, and included a number of MPs: Richard Martin, Sir ] (1765–1832), Sir ] (1786–1845), ] (1759–1833), and Sir ] (1792–1861), who had been an MP, and who became one again in 1826. They decided to form a "Society instituted for the purpose of preventing cruelty to animals"; the ], as it became known. It determined to send men to inspect slaughterhouses, ], where livestock had been sold since the 10th century, and to look into the treatment of horses by coachmen.<ref name=RSPCAhistory>Anonymous (1972). , reproduced by the Animal Legal and Historical Center, Michigan State University College of Law, retrieved March 25, 2008.</ref> The Society became the Royal Society in 1840, when it was granted a royal charter by Queen Victoria, herself strongly opposed to ].<ref name=Legge47>Legge and Brooman 1997, p. 47. | |||
*, ''Time'' magazine, January 26, 1970.</ref> | |||
From 1824 onwards, several books were published, analyzing animal rights issues, rather than protection alone. ] (1783/4–1865), one of the men who attended the first meeting of the SPCA, published ''Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes'' (1824), arguing that every living creature, human and nonhuman, has more right to the use of its own body than anyone else has to use it, and that our duty to promote happiness applies equally to all beings. ] (1849–1912), head of the ] at the University of Oxford, argued in ''Rights of an Animal'' (1879) that animals have the same natural right to life and liberty that human beings do, disregarding Descartes' mechanistic view—or what he called the "Neo-Cartesian snake"—that they lack consciousness.<ref name=Taylor62>Taylor (2009), p. 62. | |||
*Nicholson, Edward. (1879), chapter 6.{{Dead link|date=September 2012}}</ref> Other writers of the time who explored whether animals might have natural (or moral) rights were ] (1831–1917), ] (1838–1914), and J. Howard Moore (1862–1916), an American zoologist and author of ''The Universal Kinship'' (1906) and ''The New Ethics'' (1907).<ref name=Nash137>Nash 1989, p. 137.</ref> | |||
====Arthur Schopenhauer==== | |||
] argued in 1839 that the view of cruelty as wrong only because it hardens humans was "revolting and abominable".<ref name=Schopenhauer96>Schopenhauer, Arthur. '']''. This edition Hackett Publishing, 1998, p. 96.</ref>]] | |||
The development in England of the concept of animal rights was strongly supported by the German philosopher, ] (1788–1860). He wrote that Europeans were "awakening more and more to a sense that beasts have rights, in proportion as the strange notion is being gradually overcome and outgrown, that the animal kingdom came into existence solely for the benefit and pleasure of man." He stopped short of advocating vegetarianism, arguing that, so long as an animal's death was quick, men would suffer more by not eating meat than animals would suffer by being eaten. Nevertheless, he applauded the animal protection movement in England—"To the honor, then, of the English, be it said that they are the first people who have, in downright earnest, extended the protecting arm of the law to animals."<ref>Phelps 2007, p. 153–154. | |||
*Schopenhauer wrote in ''The Basis of Morality'': "It is asserted that beasts have no rights ... that 'there are no duties to be fulfilled towards animals.' Such a view is one of revolting coarseness, a barbarism of the West, whose source is Judaism." A few passages later, he called the idea that animals exist for human benefit a "Jewish stence." See Phelps, ''op cit''.</ref> He also argued against the dominant ]ian idea that animal cruelty is wrong only insofar as it brutalizes humans: | |||
<blockquote>Thus, because Christian morality leaves animals out of account ... they are at once outlawed in philosophical morals; they are mere "things," mere ''means'' to any ends whatsoever. They can therefore be used for vivisection, hunting, coursing, bullfights, and horse racing, and can be whipped to death as they struggle along with heavy carts of stone. Shame on such a morality that is worthy of pariahs, ]s, and ], and that fails to recognize the eternal essence that exists in every living thing ...<ref name=Schopenhauer96/></blockquote> | |||
====Charles Darwin==== | |||
] wrote in 1837: "Do not slave holders wish to make the black man other kind?"]] | |||
] writes that ]'s (1809–1882) '']'' (1859)—which presented the ] by ]—revolutionized the way humans viewed their relationship with other species. Not only did human beings have a direct kinship with other animals, but the latter had social, mental and moral lives too, Darwin argued.<ref name=Rachels2009/> He wrote in his ''Notebooks'' (1837): "Animals – whom we have made our slaves we do not like to consider our equals. – Do not slave holders wish to make the black man other kind?"<ref>Darwin (1837), quoted in Redclift (2010), p. 199.</ref> Later, in '']'' (1871), he argued that "There is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties", attributing to animals the power of reason, decision making, memory, sympathy, and imagination.<ref name=Rachels2009>Rachels (2009), pp. 124–126; Beauchamp (2009), pp. 248–249.</ref> | |||
Rachels writes that Darwin noted the moral implications of the cognitive similarities, arguing that "humanity to the lower animals" was one of the "noblest virtues with which man is endowed." He was strongly opposed to any kind of cruelty to animals, including setting traps. He wrote in a letter that he supported ] for "real investigations on physiology; but not for mere damnable and detestable curiosity. It is a subject which makes me sick with horror ..." In 1875 he testified before a Royal Commission on Vivisection, lobbying for a bill to protect both the animals used in vivisection, and the study of physiology. Rachels writes that the animal rights advocates of the day, such as Frances Power Cobbe, did not see Darwin as an ally.<ref name=Rachels2009/> | |||
====Friedrich Nietzsche==== | |||
] | |||
Avoiding utilitarianism, ] found other reasons to defend animals. He argued that "The sight of blind suffering is the spring of the deepest emotion."<ref>Animal Rights: A Historical Anthology. By ], Paul A. B. Clarke</ref> He once wrote: "For man is the cruelest animal. At tragedies, bull-fights, and crucifixions hath he hitherto been happiest on earth; and when he invented his hell, behold, that was his heaven on earth."<ref>The Selected Writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. ISBN 978-1-60459-332-7 Wilder Publications 2008-04-21</ref> Throughout his writings, he speaks of the human being as an animal.<ref>http://www.sciy.org/2010/06/10/6286/</ref> | |||
====American SPCA, Frances Power Cobbe, Anna Kingsford==== | |||
] founded two of the first anti-vivisection groups.]] | |||
], one of the first English women to graduate in medicine, published ''The Perfect Way in Diet'' (1881), advocating vegetarianism.]] | |||
The first animal protection group in the United States, the ] (ASPCA), was founded by ] in April 1866. Bergh had been appointed by President Abraham Lincoln to a diplomatic post in Russia, and had been disturbed by the mistreatment of animals he witnessed there. He consulted with the president of the RSPCA in London, and returned to the United States to speak out against bullfights, cockfights, and the beating of horses. He created a "Declaration of the Rights of Animals", and in 1866 persuaded the New York state legislature to pass anti-cruelty legislation and to grant the ASPCA the authority to enforce it.<ref></ref> | |||
In 1875, the Irish social reformer ] (1822–1904) founded the Society for the Protection of Animals Liable to Vivisection, the world's first organization opposed to animal research, which became the ]. In 1880, the English feminist ] (1846–1888) became one of the first English women to graduate in medicine, after studying for her degree in Paris, and the only student at the time to do so without having experimented on animals. She published ''The Perfect Way in Diet'' (1881), advocating vegetarianism, and in the same year founded the Food Reform Society. She was also vocal in her opposition to experimentation on animals.<ref>Rudacille (2000), pp. 31, 46. | |||
*Also see Vyvyan (1969).</ref> In 1898, Cobbe set up the ], with which she campaigned against the use of dogs in research, coming close to success with the 1919 Dogs (Protection) Bill, which almost became law.<!--add source, plus something about Cobbe/Kingsford disputes--> | |||
Ryder writes that, as the interest in animal protection grew in the late 1890s, attitudes toward animals among scientists began to harden. They embraced the idea that what they saw as ]—the attribution of human qualities to nonhumans—was unscientific. Animals had to be approached as physiological entities only, as ] wrote in 1927, "without any need to resort to fantastic speculations as to the existence of any possible subjective states." It was a position that hearkened back to Descartes in the 17th century, that nonhumans were purely mechanical, with no rationality and perhaps even no consciousness.<ref name=Ryder5>Ryder (2000), pp. 5–6.</ref> | |||
====John Stuart Mill==== | |||
] (1806–1873), the English philosopher, also argued that utilitarianism must take animals into account, writing in 1864:{{verify source|type=year|date=November 2012}} "Nothing is more natural to human beings, nor, up to a certain point in cultivation, more universal, than to estimate the pleasures and pains of others as deserving of regard exactly in proportion to their likeness to ourselves. ... Granted that any practice causes more pain to animals than it gives pleasure to man; is that practice moral or immoral? And if, exactly in proportion as human beings raise their heads out of the slough of selfishness, they do not with one voice answer 'immoral,' let the morality of the principle of utility be for ever condemned."<ref>Garner (2005), p. 12; .</ref> | |||
====Henry Salt==== | |||
In 1894, ] (1851–1939), a former master at ], who had set up the Humanitarian League to lobby for a ban on hunting the year before, published ''Animals' Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress''.<ref>Taylor (2009), p. 62.</ref> He wrote that the object of the essay was to "set the principle of animals' rights on a consistent and intelligible footing."<ref name=Salt1/> Concessions to the demands for ''jus animalium'' had been made grudgingly to date, he wrote, with an eye on the interests of animals ''qua'' property, rather than as rights bearers: | |||
<blockquote>Even the leading advocates of animal rights seem to have shrunk from basing their claim on the only argument which can ultimately be held to be a really sufficient one—the assertion that animals, as well as men, though, of course, to a far less extent than men, are possessed of a distinctive individuality, and, therefore, are in justice entitled to live their lives with a due measure of that "restricted freedom" to which Herbert Spencer alludes.<ref name=Salt1>. Salt cited Spencer's definition of rights: "Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal liberty of any other man ... Whoever admits that each man must have a certain restricted freedom, asserts that it is right he should have this restricted freedom ... And hence the several particular freedoms deducible may fitly be called, as they commonly are called, his rights."</ref></blockquote> | |||
He argued that there was no point in claiming rights for animals if those rights were subordinated to human desire, and took issue with the idea that the life of a human might have more moral worth. " notion of the life of an animal having 'no moral purpose,' belongs to a class of ideas which cannot possibly be accepted by the advanced humanitarian thought of the present day—it is a purely arbitrary assumption, at variance with our best instincts, at variance with our best science, and absolutely fatal (if the subject be clearly thought out) to any full realization of animals' rights. If we are ever going to do justice to the lower races, we must get rid of the antiquated notion of a 'great gulf' fixed between them and mankind, and must recognize the common bond of humanity that unites all living beings in one universal brotherhood."<ref name=Salt1/> | |||
===20th century: Animal rights movement=== | |||
====Brown Dog Affair, Lizzy Lind af Hageby==== | |||
{{main|Brown Dog affair}} | |||
] (centre, seated) in 1913]] | |||
In 1902, ] (1878–1963), a Swedish feminist, and a friend, Lisa Shartau, traveled to England to study medicine at the London School of Medicine for Women, intending to learn enough to become authoritative anti-vivisection campaigners. In the course of their studies, they witnessed several animal experiments, and published the details as ''The Shambles of Science: Extracts from the Diary of Two Students of Physiology'' (1903). Their allegations included that they had seen a brown terrier dog dissected while conscious, which prompted angry denials from the researcher, ], and his colleagues. After ] of the National Anti-Vivisection Society accused Bayliss of having violated the ], Bayliss sued and won, convincing a court that the animal had been anesthetized as required by the Act.<ref name=Mason1997/> | |||
In response, anti-vivisection campaigners commissioned a statue of the dog to be erected in Battersea Park in 1906, with the plaque: "Men and Women of England, how long shall these Things be?" The statue caused uproar among medical students, leading to frequent vandalism of the statue and the need for a 24-hour police guard. The affair culminated in riots in 1907 when 1,000 medical students clashed with police, suffragettes and trade unionists in Trafalgar Square. Battersea Council removed the statue from the park under cover of darkness two years later.<ref name=Mason1997>Mason (1997).</ref> ] (1985) and ] (1998) write that the significance of the affair lay in the relationships that formed in support of the "Brown Dog Done to Death", which became a symbol of the oppression the women's suffrage movement felt at the hands of the male political and medical establishment. Kean argues that both sides saw themselves as heirs to the future. The students saw the women and trade unionists as representatives of anti-science sentimentality, while the women saw themselves as progressive, with the students and their teachers belonging to a previous age.<ref>Lansbury (1985), pp. 152–169; Kean (1998), pp. 142–143.</ref> | |||
====Development of veganism==== | |||
{{main|Veganism|List of vegans}} | |||
Members of the English Vegetarian Society who avoided the use of eggs and animal milk in the 19th and early 20th century were known as strict vegetarians. The International Vegetarian Union cites an article informing readers of alternatives to shoe leather in the Vegetarian Society's magazine in 1851 as evidence of the existence of a group that sought to avoid ]s entirely. There was increasing unease within the Society from the start of the 20th century onwards with regards to egg and milk consumption, and in 1923 its magazine wrote that the "ideal position for vegetarians is abstinence from animal products." ] (1869–1948) argued in 1931 before a meeting of the Society in London that vegetarianism should be pursued in the interests of animals, and not only as a human health issue. He met both Henry Salt and Anna Kingsford, and read Salt's ''A Plea for Vegetarianism'' (1880); Salt wrote in the pamphlet that "a Vegetarian is still regarded, in ordinary society, as little better than a madman."<ref>, p. 7.</ref> In 1944, several members, led by ] (1910–2005), decided to break from the Vegetarian Society over the issue of egg and milk use. Watson coined the term "vegan" for those whose diet included no animal products, and they formed the British ] on November 1 that year.<ref name=Leneman>Leneman (1999) | |||
*Phelps (2007), pp. 163–165. | |||
*Davis, John. , International Vegetarian Union, March 16, 2011. | |||
*, International Vegetarian Union, April 6, 2010.</ref> | |||
====''Tierschutzgesetz''==== | |||
{{Further|Animal protection in Nazi Germany}} | |||
On coming to power in January 1933, the ] passed a comprehensive set of animal protection laws. The laws were similar to those that already existed in England, though more detailed and with severe penalties for breaking them. Arnold Arluke and ] write that the Nazis tried to abolish the distinction between humans and animals, not by treating animals as persons, but by treating persons as animals.<ref name=Arluke1992>Arluke and Sax (1992).</ref> Kathleen Kete writes that it was the worst possible answer to the question of what our relationship with other species ought to be.<ref name=Kete>, citing Arluke and Sax (1992).</ref> | |||
]'', a German satirical magazine, on September 3, 1933, showing lab animals giving the ] to ], after restrictions on ] were announced.]] | |||
In April 1933 they passed laws regulating the slaughter of animals; one of their targets was ]. In November the ''Tierschutzgesetz'', or animal protection law, was introduced, with ] announcing an end to animal cruelty: "''Im neuen Reich darf es keine Tierquälerei mehr geben.''" ("In the new Reich, no more animal cruelty will be allowed.") It was followed in July 1934 by the ''Reichsjagdgesetz'', prohibiting hunting; in July 1935 by the ''Naturschutzgesetz'', environmental legislation; in November 1937 by a law regulating animal transport in cars; and in September 1938 by a similar law dealing with animals on trains.<ref>Sax (2000) p. 114.</ref> Several senior Nazis, including Hitler, ], ], and ], adopted some form of vegetarianism, though by most accounts not strictly.<ref>Proctor (1999), pp. 135–137; Sax (2000), pp. 35, 114.</ref> | |||
Shortly before the ''Tierschutzgesetz'' was introduced, vivisection was first banned, then restricted. Animal research was viewed as part of "Jewish science" and "internationalist" medicine, indicating a mechanistic mind that saw nature as something to be dominated, rather than respected. ] first announced a ban on August 16, 1933, but Hitler's personal physician, Dr. Morrel, persuaded Hitler that this was not in the interests of German research, and in particular defence research.<ref name=Sax112/> The ban was therefore revised three weeks later, when eight conditions were announced under which animal tests could be conducted, with a view to reducing pain and unnecessary experiments.<ref>Uekoetter (2006), pp. 55–56.</ref> Primates, horses, dogs, and cats were given special protection, and licenses to conduct vivisection were to be given to institutions, not to individuals.<ref name=Arluke1992/> The removal of the ban was justified with the announcement: "It is a law of every community that, when necessary, single individuals are sacrificed in the interests of the entire body."<ref name=Sax112/> | |||
Medical experiments were later conducted on Jews and ] children in camps, particularly in ] by Dr. ], and on others regarded as inferior, including prisoners-of-war. Because the human subjects were often in such poor health, researchers feared that the results of the experiments were unreliable, and so human experiments were repeated on animals. Dr Hans Nachtheim, for example, induced ] on human adults and children without their consent by injecting them with ], then repeated the experiments on rabbits to check the results.<ref name=Sax112>Sax (2000), pp. 112–113.</ref> | |||
====Increase in animal use==== | |||
Despite the proliferation of animal protection legislation, animals still had no legal rights. Debbie Legge writes that existing legislation was very much tied to the idea of human interests, whether protecting human sensibilities by outlawing cruelty, or protecting property rights by making sure animals were not damaged. The over-exploitation of fishing stocks, for example, is viewed as harming the environment for people; the hunting of animals to extinction means that humans in the future will derive no enjoyment from them; poaching results in financial loss to the owner, and so on.<ref name="Legge50"/> Notwithstanding the interest in animal welfare of the previous century, the situation for animals arguably deteriorated in the 20th century, particularly after the Second World War. This was in part because of the increase in the numbers used in animal research—300 in the UK in 1875, 19,084 in 1903, and 2.8 million in 2005 (50–100 million worldwide), and a modern annual estimated range of 10 million to upwards of 100 million in the US<ref>, Her Majesty's Stationery Office. | |||
*, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, section 1.6. | |||
*, National Anti-Vivisection Society. | |||
*{{Dead link|date=September 2012}}, Public Monument and Sculpture Association's National Recording Project. | |||
*Singer (1990), p. 37, citing the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment's ''Alternatives to Animal Use in Research, Testing, and Education'', 1986, p. 64.</ref>—but mostly because of the industrialization of farming, which saw billions of animals raised and killed for food on a scale considered impossible before the war.<ref>Ten billion animals are now killed for food every year in the US alone; see Williams and DeMello (2007), p. 73.</ref> | |||
====Development of direct action==== | |||
{{further|Hunt Saboteurs Association|RSPCA Reform Group}} | |||
In the early 1960s in England, support for animal rights began to coalesce around the issue of ]s, particularly hunting deer, ], and otters using dogs, an aristocratic and middle-class English practice, stoutly defended in the name of protecting rural traditions. The psychologist ] – who became involved with the animal rights movement in the late 1960s – writes that the new chair of the ] tried in 1963 to steer it away from confronting members of the hunt, which triggered the formation that year of a ] breakaway group, the Hunt Saboteurs Association. This was set up by a journalist, John Prestige, who had witnessed a pregnant deer being chased into a village and killed by the ]. The practice of sabotaging hunts (for example, by misleading the dogs with scents or horns) spread throughout south-east England, particularly around university towns, leading to violent confrontations when the huntsmen attacked the "sabs".<ref name=Ryder167>Ryder (2000), p. 167ff.</ref> | |||
The controversy spread to the RSPCA, which had arguably grown away from its radical roots to become a conservative group with charity status and royal patronage. It had failed to speak out against hunting, and indeed counted huntsmen among its members. As with the League Against Cruel Sports, this position gave rise to a splinter group, the RSPCA Reform Group, which sought to radicalize the organization, leading to chaotic meetings of the group's ruling Council, and successful (though short-lived) efforts to change it from within by electing to the Council members who would argue from an animal rights perspective, and force the RSPCA to address issues such as hunting, factory farming, and animal experimentation. Ryder himself was elected to the Council in 1971, and served as its chair from 1977 to 1979.<ref name=Ryder167/> | |||
====Formation of the Oxford group==== | |||
{{main|Oxford Group (animal rights)}} | |||
The same period saw writers and academics begin to speak out again in favor of animal rights. ] published ''Animal Machines'' (1964), an influential critique of factory farming, and on October 10, 1965, the novelist ] had an article, "The Rights of Animals", published in ''The Sunday Times''.<ref name="Ryder5"/> She wrote: | |||
<blockquote>The relationship of ] to the other animals is one of unremitting exploitation. We employ their work; we eat and wear them. We exploit them to serve our superstitions: whereas we used to sacrifice them to our gods and tear out their entrails in order to foresee the future, we now sacrifice them to science, and experiment on their entail in the hope—or on the mere off chance—that we might thereby see a little more clearly into the present ... To us it seems incredible that the Greek philosophers should have scanned so deeply into right and wrong and yet never noticed the immorality of slavery. Perhaps 3000 years from now it will seem equally incredible that we do not notice the immorality of our own oppression of animals.<ref name=Ryder5/></blockquote> | |||
<!-- Deleted image removed: ] was a member of the Oxford Group.]] --> | |||
] writes that Harrison's book and Brophy's article led to an explosion of interest in the relationship between humans and nonhumans.<ref name=Garner2004p3>Garner (2004), p. 3ff.</ref> In particular, Brophy's article was discovered in or around 1969 by a group of postgraduate philosophy students at the University of Oxford, Roslind and Stanley Godlovitch (husband and wife from Canada), John Harris, and ], now known as the Oxford Group. They decided to put together a ] to discuss the theory of animal rights.<ref name=Ryder5/> | |||
Around the same time, Richard Ryder wrote several letters to ''The Daily Telegraph'' criticizing animal experimentation, based on incidents he had witnessed in laboratories. The letters, published in April and May 1969, were seen by Brigid Brophy, who put Ryder in touch with the Godlovitches and Harris. Ryder also started distributing pamphlets in Oxford protesting against experiments on animals; it was in one of these pamphlets in 1970 that he coined the term "]" to describe the exclusion of nonhuman animals from the protections offered to humans.<ref>Waldau (2001), pp. 5, 23–29.</ref> He subsequently became a contributor to the Godlovitches' symposium, as did Harrison and Brophy, and it was published in 1971 as '']''.<ref>Godlovitch, Godlovitch, and Harris (1971); see the Introduction for the reference to the symposium.</ref> | |||
====Publication of ''Animal Liberation''==== | |||
{{main|Animal Liberation (book)}} | |||
In 1970, over lunch in Oxford with fellow student Richard Keshen, a vegetarian, Australian philosopher Peter Singer came to believe that, by eating animals, he was engaging in the oppression of other species. Keshen introduced Singer to the Godlovitches, and in 1973 Singer reviewed their book for ''The New York Review of Books''. In the review, he used the term "animal liberation", writing: | |||
<!-- Deleted image removed: ]'s '']'' (1975)]] --> | |||
<blockquote>We are familiar with Black Liberation, Gay Liberation, and a variety of other movements. With Women's Liberation some thought we had come to the end of the road. Discrimination on the basis of sex, it has been said, is the last form of discrimination that is universally accepted and practiced without pretense ... But one should always be wary of talking of "the last remaining form of discrimination." ... ''Animals, Men and Morals'' is a manifesto for an Animal Liberation movement.<ref name=SingerReview/></blockquote> | |||
On the strength of his review, ''The New York Review of Books'' took the unusual step of commissioning a book from Singer on the subject, published in 1975 as ''Animal Liberation'', now one of the animal rights movement's canonical texts. Singer based his arguments on the principle of utilitarianism – the view, in its simplest form, that an act is right if it leads to the "greatest happiness of the greatest number", a phrase first used in 1776 by Jeremy Bentham.<ref name=SingerReview>{{Dead link|date=September 2012}}. | |||
*Singer (1990), pp. xiv–xv. | |||
*Also see , letter from David Rosinger and reply from Peter Singer, ''The New York Review of Books'', Volume 20, Number 10, June 14, 1973.</ref> He argued in favor of the ], the position that there are no grounds to suppose that a violation of the basic interests of a human—for example, an interest in not suffering—is different in any morally significant way from a violation of the basic interests of a nonhuman.<ref name=Singer5>Singer 1990, p. 5.</ref> Singer used the term "speciesism" in the book, citing Ryder, and it stuck, becoming an entry in the ''Oxford English Dictionary'' in 1989.<ref>Singer (1990), p. 269, footnote 4.</ref> | |||
The book's publication triggered a groundswell of scholarly interest in animal rights. ]'s ''Victims of Science: The Use of Animals in Research'' (1975) appeared, followed by ]'s ''Animal Rights: A Christian Perspective'' (1976), and ]'s ''The Moral Status of Animals'' (1977). A Conference on Animal Rights was organized by Ryder and Linzey at Trinity College, Cambridge, in August 1977. This was followed by ]'s ''Beast And Man: The Roots of Human Nature'' (1978), then ''Animal Rights–A Symposium'' (1979), which included the papers delivered to the Cambridge conference. From 1982 onwards, a series of articles by ] led to his '']'' (1984), in which he argues that nonhuman animals are "subjects-of-a-life", and therefore possessors of moral rights, a work regarded as a key text in animal rights theory.<ref name=Garner2004p3/> Regan wrote in 2001 that philosophers had written more about animal rights in the previous 20 years than in the 2,000 years before that.<ref>Regan (2001), p. 67.</ref> Garner writes that Charles Magel's bibliography, ''Keyguide to Information Sources in Animal Rights'' (1989), contains 10 pages of philosophical material on animals up to 1970, but 13 pages between 1970 and 1989 alone.<ref>Garner (2004), p. 2. | |||
*Also see , ''New Scientist'', January 20, 1990.</ref> | |||
====Founding of the Animal Liberation Front==== | |||
{{main|Animal Liberation Front|Timeline of ALF actions}} | |||
In 1971, a law student, ], formed a branch of the Hunt Saboteurs Association in Luton, later calling it the Band of Mercy after a 19th-century RSPCA youth group. The Band attacked hunters' vehicles by slashing tires and breaking windows, calling it "active compassion". In November 1973, they engaged in their first act of arson when they set fire to a Hoechst Pharmaceuticals research laboratory, claiming responsibility as a "nonviolent guerilla organization dedicated to the liberation of animals from all forms of cruelty and persecution at the hands of mankind."<ref name=Molland70>Molland (2004), pp. 70–74; Monaghan (2000), pp. 160–161.</ref> | |||
Lee and another activist were sentenced to three years in prison in 1974, paroled after 12 months. In 1976 Lee brought together the remaining Band of Mercy activists along with some fresh faces to start a ] movement, calling it the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).<ref name=Molland70/> ALF activists see themselves as a modern ], passing animals removed from farms and laboratories to sympathetic veterinarians, safe houses and sanctuaries.<ref>Best (2004), pp. 23–24.</ref> Some activists also engage in threats, intimidation, and arson, acts that have lost the movement sympathy in mainstream public opinion.<ref>Singer (1998), pp. 151–152.</ref> | |||
The decentralized model of activism is frustrating for law enforcement organizations, who find the networks difficult to infiltrate, because they tend to be organized around friends.<ref>Ben Gunn, former Chief Constable, Cambridge Constabulary, interviewed for "It Could Happen to You," True Spies, BBC Two, November 10, 2002.</ref> In 2005, the US Department of Homeland Security indicated how seriously it takes the ALF when it included them in a list of domestic terrorist threats.<ref>Rood, Justin. , ''Congressional Quarterly'', March 25, 2005.</ref> The tactics of some of the more determined ALF activists are anathema to many animal rights advocates, such as Singer, who regard the movement as something that should occupy the moral high ground. ALF activists respond to the criticism with the argument that, as ] puts it, "Thinkers may prepare revolutions, but bandits must carry them out."<ref name=NewkirkBest341>Newkirk (2004), p. 341./</ref> | |||
From the 1980s through to the early 2000s there was an increased level of violence by animal rights extremist groups directed at individuals and institutions associated with ]. Activist groups involved included the ], the ] and ].<ref>Holder, T. (2014) - , EMBO reports, Volume 15, Issue 6, pages 625–630, June 2014</ref> | |||
====Animal Rights International==== | |||
{{further|Animal protectionism}} | |||
] (1927–1998), a former seaman and civil rights activist, became the most notable of the new animal advocates in the United States. A proponent of gradual change, he formed Animal Rights International in 1974, and introduced the idea of "reintegrative shaming", whereby a relationship is formed between a group of animal rights advocates and a corporation they see as misusing animals, with a view to obtaining concessions or halting a practice. It is a strategy that has been widely adopted, most notably by ].<ref>Francione and Garner (2010), p. 1ff.</ref> | |||
Spira's first campaign was in opposition to the ] in 1976, where cats were being experimented on, research that he persuaded them to stop. His most notable achievement was in 1980, when he convinced the cosmetics company ] to stop using the ], which involves toxicity tests on the skin or in the eyes of animals. He took out a full-page ad in several newspapers, featuring a rabbit with sticking plaster over the eyes, and the caption, "How many rabbits does Revlon blind for beauty's sake?" Revlon stopped using animals for cosmetics testing, donated money to help set up the ], and was followed by other leading cosmetics companies.<ref name=Feder>Feder, Barnaby J. (November 26, 1889). , ''The New York Times''. | |||
*Also see Singer (1998), and Singer (2003).</ref> | |||
===21st century: Developments=== | |||
In 1999, New Zealand passed a new Animal Welfare Act that had the effect of banning experiments on "non-human hominids".<ref name=Waldau2000p108/> | |||
Also in 1999, Public Law 106-152 (Title 18, Section 48) was put into action in the United States. This law makes it a felony to create, sell, or possess videos showing animal cruelty with the intention of profiting financially from them.<ref>http://www.pet-abuse.com/pages/animal_cruelty/crush_videos.php#ixzz2C6yKSljR></ref> | |||
In 2005, the ] banned experiments on apes, unless they are performed in the interests of the individual ape.<ref name=Waldau2000p108/> Also in Austria, the Supreme Court ruled in January 2008 that a chimpanzee (called Matthew Hiasl Pan by those advocating for his ]) was not a person, after the Association Against Animal Factories sought personhood status for him because his custodians had gone bankrupt. The chimpanzee had been captured as a baby in ] in 1982, then smuggled to Austria to be used in pharmaceutical experiments, but was discovered by customs officials when he arrived in the country, and was taken to a shelter instead. He was kept there for 25 years, until the group that ran the shelter went bankrupt in 2007. Donors offered to help him, but under Austrian law only a person can receive personal gifts, so any money sent to support him would be lost to the shelter's bankruptcy. The Association appealed the ruling to the ]. The lawyer proposing the chimpanzee's personhood asked the court to appoint a legal guardian for him and to grant him four rights: the right to life, limited freedom of movement, personal safety, and the right to claim property.<ref>, Associated Press, January 15, 2008. | |||
*Stinson, Jeffrey. , ''USA Today'', July 15, 2008. | |||
*Albertsdottir, Ellen. (Today's animal rights), ''Sydskenskan'', February 5, 2010 ().</ref> | |||
In June 2008, a committee of Spain's national legislature became the first to vote for a resolution to extend limited rights to nonhuman primates. The parliamentary Environment Committee recommended giving chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans the right not to be used in medical experiments or in circuses, and recommended making it illegal to kill apes, except in self-defense, based upon the rights recommended by the ].<ref>Waldau (2011), p. 108. | |||
*McNeil, Donald G. (July 13, 2008). , ''The New York Times''. | |||
*Roberts, Martin (June 25, 2008). , Reuters. | |||
*Glendinning, Lee (July 18, 2008). ''The Guardian'', June 26, 2008 | |||
*Singer, Peter (July 18, 2008). , ''The Guardian''. | |||
*''Time'' magazine (July 18, 2008). .</ref> The committee's proposal has not yet been enacted into law.<ref>, Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Congreso de los Diputados, 23 May 2008, p. 22, accessed March 3, 2010.</ref> | |||
From 2009 onwards, several countries outlawed the use of some or all animals in circuses, starting with ], and followed by several countries in Europe, Scandinavia, the Middle East, and Singapore.<ref>Kelch (2011), p. 216; Waldau (2011), p. 108.</ref> | |||
In 2010, the government in ] passed a motion to outlaw ], the first such ban in Spain.<ref>BBC News (July 28, 2010). .</ref> In 2011, ] sued ] over the captivity of five ]s in ] and ], arguing that the whales were being treated as slaves. It was the first time the ], which outlaws ] and involuntary servitude, was cited in court to protect nonhuman rights. A federal judge dismissed the case in February 2012.<ref>Perry, Tony (February 7, 2011). , ''Los Angeles Times''. | |||
*Associated Press (February 8, 2012). .</ref> | |||
==Indian subcontinent== | |||
===Religions=== | |||
{{Further|Ahimsa in Jainism}} | |||
]. Ahimsa includes kindness and non-violence to nonhuman animals.]] ] writes that both ] and ] societies abandoned animal sacrifice and embraced vegetarianism from the 3rd century BCE. Several kings in India built hospitals for animals, and the emperor ] (304–232 BCE) issued orders against hunting and animal slaughter, in line with '']'', the doctrine of non-violence. Garner writes that ] took this idea further. Jains believe that no living creature should be harmed, and they are known to clear paths in front of them by sweeping them to protect any insect life that may be present.<ref>Garner (2005), pp. 21–22.</ref> | |||
===Legal actions in the 21st century=== | |||
] writes that, in 2000, the High Court in ] used the language of "rights" in relation to circus animals, ruling that they are "beings entitled to dignified existence" under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The ruling said that if human beings are entitled to these rights, animals should be too. The court went beyond the requirements of the Constitution that all living beings should be shown compassion, and said: "It is not only our fundamental duty to show compassion to our animal friends, but also to recognize and protect their rights." Waldau writes that other courts in India and one court in Sri Lanka have used similar language.<ref name=Waldau2000p108>Waldau (2011), p. 108.</ref> | |||
In 2012, the Indian government issued an extensive ban on vivisection in education and research.<ref>http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-04-17/india/31355109_1_cpcsea-control-and-supervision-cruelty</ref> | |||
{{clear}} | |||
==Islam== | |||
] - Animal rights activist. Founder of ] holding a street dog]] | |||
Animal rights were recognized early by the ] (Islamic law). This recognition is based on both the ] and the ]. In the Qur'an, there are many references to animals, detailing that they have souls, form communities, communicate with God and worship Him in their own way. ] forbade his followers to harm any animal and asked them to respect the rights of animals.<ref>http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/islamethics/animals_1.shtml</ref> It is a distinctive characteristic of the Shariah that all animals have legal rights. Othman Llewellyn even argues that Shariah has mechanisms for the full repair of injuries suffered by non-human creatures including their representation in court, assessment of injuries and awarding of relief to them.{{Citation needed|date=September 2013}} The classical Muslim jurist 'Izz ad-Din ibn 'Abd as-Salam, who flourished during the thirteenth century, formulated the following statement of animal rights: | |||
<blockquote>The rights of livestock and animals upon man: these are that he spend on them the provision that their kinds require, even if they have aged or sickened such that no benefit comes from them; that he not burden them beyond what they can bear; that he not put them together with anything by which they would be injured, whether of their own kind or other species, and whether by breaking their bones or butting or wounding; that he slaughters them with kindness when he slaughters them, and neither flay their skins nor break their bones until their bodies have become cold and their lives have passed away; that he not slaughter their young within their sight, but that he isolate them; that he makes comfortable their resting places and watering places; that he puts their males and females together during their mating seasons; that he not discard those which he takes as game; and neither shoots them with anything that breaks their bones nor brings about their destruction by any means that renders their meat unlawful to eat.<ref>{{cite book|last='Abd as-Salam|first='Izz ad-Din|title=Qawaa'id AlAhkaam fi Masaalih AlAnaam|publisher=AlMaktaba AlTijaariya AlKubra|location=Cairo|page=141}}</ref></blockquote> | |||
On the other hand, animal sacrifice is a prominent feature of ]. | |||
==Philosophical and legal approaches== | ==Philosophical and legal approaches== | ||
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{{Further|Consequentialism|Deontological ethics}} | {{Further|Consequentialism|Deontological ethics}} | ||
], Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, is a proponent of the ] to animal rights.]] | ], Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago, is a proponent of the ] to animal rights.]] | ||
The two main philosophical approaches to animal |
The two main philosophical approaches to animal ethics are utilitarian and rights-based. The former is exemplified by ], and the latter by ] and ]. Their differences reflect a distinction philosophers draw between ethical theories that judge the rightness of an act by its consequences (consequentialism/teleological ethics, or utilitarianism), and those that focus on the principle behind the act, almost regardless of consequences (deontological ethics). Deontologists argue that there are acts we should never perform, even if failing to do so entails a worse outcome.<ref>Craig (1988).</ref> | ||
There are a number of positions that can be defended from a consequentalist or deontologist perspective, including the ], represented by ], and the ], which has been examined by Ingmar Persson and ]. The capabilities approach focuses on what individuals require to fulfill their capabilities: Nussbaum (2006) argues that animals need a right to life, some control over their environment, company, play, and physical health.<ref>Nussbaum (2006), pp. 388ff, 393ff; also see Nussbaum (2004), p. 299ff.</ref> | |||
], ], and ] also discuss animal rights in terms of animals being permitted to lead a life appropriate for their kind.<ref>Weir (2009): see Clark (1977); Rollin (1981); Midgley (1984).</ref> Egalitarianism favors an equal distribution of happiness among all individuals, which makes the interests of the worse off more important than those of the better off.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160413170400/http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115834 |date=2016-04-13 }}; Vallentyne (2007).</ref> Another approach, ], holds that in considering how to act we should consider the character of the actor, and what kind of moral agents we should be. ] has suggested an approach to animal rights based on virtue ethics.<ref>Rowlands (2009), p. 98ff; Hursthouse (2000a); Hursthouse (2000b), p. 146ff.</ref> ] has proposed a ] approach.<ref name=Rowlands1998p118/><!--expand Clark, Nussbaum, virtue ethics--> | |||
===Utilitarianism=== | ===Utilitarianism=== | ||
{{ |
{{Further|Equal consideration of interests|Utilitarianism}} | ||
Nussbaum (2004) writes that utilitarianism, starting with ] and ], has contributed more to the recognition of the moral status of animals than any other ethical theory.<ref>Nussbaum (2004), p. 302.</ref> The utilitarian philosopher most associated with animal rights is Peter Singer, professor of bioethics at ]. Singer is not a rights theorist, but {{Citation needed span|text=uses the language of rights to discuss how we ought to treat individuals.|date=October 2023}} He is a ],{{Needs update|date=October 2023|reason=Singer revealed in The Point of View of the Universe (2014) that he is no longer a preference utilitarian.}} meaning that he judges the rightness of an act by the extent to which it satisfies the preferences (interests) of those affected.<ref>For a discussion of preference utilitarianism, see Singer (2011), pp. 14ff, 94ff.</ref> | |||
{{rquote|right|''They talk about this thing in the head; what do they call it?'' ''That's it. What's that got to do with women's rights or Negroes' rights? If my cup won't hold but a pint and yours holds a quart, wouldn't you be mean not to let me have my little half-measure full?'' — ]<ref name=Singer1990p6>Singer (1990), p. 6.</ref>}} | |||
Nussbaum (2004) writes that utilitarianism, starting with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, has contributed more to the recognition of the moral status of animals than any other ethical theory.<ref>Nussbaum (2004), p. 302.</ref> The utilitarian philosopher most associated with animal rights is Peter Singer, professor of bioethics at Princeton University. Singer is not a rights theorist, but uses the language of rights to discuss how we ought to treat individuals. He is a ], meaning that he judges the rightness of an act by the extent to which it satisfies the preferences (interests) of those affected.<ref>For a discussion of preference utilitarianism, see Singer (2011), pp. 14ff, 94ff.</ref> | |||
His position is that there is no reason not to give equal consideration to the interests of human and nonhumans, though his principle of equality does not require identical treatment. A mouse and a man both have an interest in not being kicked, and there are no moral or logical grounds for failing to accord those interests equal weight. Interests are predicated on the ability to suffer, nothing more, and once it is established that a being has interests, those interests must be given equal consideration.<ref name=Singer7>Singer (1990), pp. 7–8.</ref> Singer quotes the English philosopher ] (1838–1900): "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other."<ref name=Singer5/> | His position is that there is no reason not to give equal consideration to the interests of human and nonhumans, though his principle of equality does not require identical treatment. A mouse and a man both have an interest in not being kicked, and there are no moral or logical grounds for failing to accord those interests equal weight. Interests are predicated on the ability to suffer, nothing more, and once it is established that a being has interests, those interests must be given equal consideration.<ref name=Singer7>Singer (1990), pp. 7–8.</ref> Singer quotes the English philosopher ] (1838–1900): "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other."<ref name="Singer5">Singer 1990, p. 5.</ref> | ||
]: interests are predicated on the ability to suffer.]] | ]: interests are predicated on the ability to suffer.]] | ||
Singer argues that equality of consideration is a prescription, not an assertion of fact: if the equality of the sexes were based only on the idea that men and women were equally intelligent, we would have to abandon the practice of equal consideration if this were later found to be false. But the moral idea of equality does not depend on matters of fact such as intelligence, physical strength, or moral capacity. Equality therefore cannot be grounded on the outcome of scientific investigations into the intelligence of nonhumans. All that matters is whether they can suffer.<ref name=Singer1990p4>Singer (1990), p. 4.</ref> | Singer argues that equality of consideration is a prescription, not an assertion of fact: if the equality of the sexes were based only on the idea that men and women were equally intelligent, we would have to abandon the practice of equal consideration if this were later found to be false. But the moral idea of equality does not depend on matters of fact such as intelligence, physical strength, or moral capacity. Equality therefore cannot be grounded on the outcome of scientific investigations into the intelligence of nonhumans. All that matters is whether they can suffer.<ref name=Singer1990p4>Singer (1990), p. 4.</ref> | ||
Commentators on all sides of the debate now accept that animals suffer and feel pain, although it was not always so. ], professor of philosophy, animal sciences, and biomedical sciences at Colorado State University, writes that Descartes' influence continued to be felt until the 1980s. Veterinarians trained in the US before 1989 were taught to ignore pain, he writes, and at least one major veterinary hospital in the 1960s did not stock narcotic analgesics for animal pain control. In his interactions with scientists, he was often asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" evidence that they could feel pain.<ref name=Rollin117>Rollin (1989), pp. xii, pp. 117–118; .</ref> |
Commentators on all sides of the debate now accept that animals suffer and feel pain, although it was not always so. ], professor of philosophy, animal sciences, and biomedical sciences at Colorado State University, writes that Descartes's influence continued to be felt until the 1980s. Veterinarians trained in the US before 1989 were taught to ignore pain, he writes, and at least one major veterinary hospital in the 1960s did not stock narcotic analgesics for animal pain control. In his interactions with scientists, he was often asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" evidence that they could feel pain.<ref name=Rollin117>Rollin (1989), pp. xii, pp. 117–118; {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200728054434/https://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v8/n6/full/7400996.html |date=2020-07-28 }}.</ref> | ||
Scientific publications have made it clear since the 1980s that the majority of researchers do believe animals suffer and feel pain, though it continues to be argued that their suffering may be reduced by an inability to experience the same dread of anticipation as humans or to remember the suffering as vividly.<ref>Singer (1990), pp. 10–17, citing Stamp Dawkins (1980), Walker (1983), and Griffin (1984); Garner (2005), pp. 13–14.</ref> The ability of animals to suffer, even it may vary in severity, is the basis for Singer's application of equal consideration. The problem of animal suffering, and animal consciousness in general, arose primarily because it was argued that animals ]. Singer writes that, if language were needed to communicate pain, it would often be impossible to know when humans are in pain, though we can observe pain behavior and make a calculated guess based on it. He argues that there is no reason to suppose that the pain behavior of nonhumans would have a different meaning from the pain behavior of humans.<ref>Singer (1990) p. 12ff.</ref> | |||
===Subjects-of-a-life=== | ===Subjects-of-a-life=== | ||
{{ |
{{Further|The Case for Animal Rights}} | ||
]: animals are subjects-of-a-life.]] | ]: animals are subjects-of-a-life.]] | ||
Tom Regan, professor emeritus of philosophy at North Carolina State University, argues in ''The Case for Animal Rights'' (1983) that nonhuman animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life", and as such are bearers of rights.<ref name=Regan243>Regan (1983), p. 243.</ref> He writes that, because the moral rights of humans are based on their possession of certain ] abilities, and because these abilities are also possessed by at least some nonhuman animals, such animals must have the same moral rights as humans. Although only humans act as moral agents, both marginal-case humans, such as infants, and at least some nonhumans must have the status of "moral patients". Moral patients are unable to formulate moral principles, and as such are unable to do right or wrong, even though what they do may be beneficial or harmful. Only moral agents are able to engage in moral action. Animals for Regan have "]" as subjects-of-a-life, and cannot be regarded as a means to an end, a view that places him firmly in the abolitionist camp. His theory does not extend to all animals, but only to those that can be regarded as subjects-of-a-life.<ref name=Regan243/> He argues that all normal mammals of at least one year of age would qualify: | Tom Regan, professor emeritus of philosophy at North Carolina State University, argues in ''The Case for Animal Rights'' (1983) that nonhuman animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life", and as such are bearers of rights.<ref name=Regan243>Regan (1983), p. 243.</ref> He writes that, because the moral rights of humans are based on their possession of certain ] abilities, and because these abilities are also possessed by at least some nonhuman animals, such animals must have the same moral rights as humans. Although only humans act as moral agents, both marginal-case humans, such as infants, and at least some nonhumans must have the status of "moral patients".<ref name=Regan243/> | ||
Moral patients are unable to formulate moral principles, and as such are unable to do right or wrong, even though what they do may be beneficial or harmful. Only moral agents are able to engage in moral action. Animals for Regan have "]" as subjects-of-a-life, and cannot be regarded as a means to an end, a view that places him firmly in the abolitionist camp. His theory does not extend to all animals, but only to those that can be regarded as subjects-of-a-life.<ref name=Regan243/> He argues that all normal mammals of at least one year of age would qualify: | |||
{{Blockquote|... individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests.<ref name=Regan243/>}} | |||
Whereas Singer is primarily concerned with improving the treatment of animals and accepts that, in some hypothetical scenarios, individual animals might be used legitimately to further human or nonhuman ends, Regan believes we ought to treat nonhuman animals as we would humans. He applies the strict ] ideal (which Kant himself applied only to humans) that they ought never to be sacrificed as a means to an end, and must be treated as ends in themselves.<ref>Regan (1983).</ref> | Whereas Singer is primarily concerned with improving the treatment of animals and accepts that, in some hypothetical scenarios, individual animals might be used legitimately to further human or nonhuman ends, Regan believes we ought to treat nonhuman animals as we would humans. He applies the strict ] ideal (which Kant himself applied only to humans) that they ought never to be sacrificed as a means to an end, and must be treated as ends in themselves.<ref>Regan (1983).</ref> | ||
===Abolitionism=== | ===Abolitionism=== | ||
{{ |
{{Further|Abolitionism (animal rights)|Animals, Property, and the Law}} | ||
]: animals need only the right not to be regarded as property.]] | ]: animals need only the right not to be regarded as property.]] | ||
Gary Francione, professor of law and philosophy at Rutgers School |
Gary Francione, professor of law and philosophy at ] in Newark, is a leading abolitionist writer, arguing that animals need only one right, the right not to be owned. Everything else would follow from that ]. He writes that, although most people would condemn the mistreatment of animals, and in many countries there are laws that seem to reflect those concerns, "in practice the legal system allows any use of animals, however abhorrent." The law only requires that any suffering not be "unnecessary". In deciding what counts as "unnecessary", an animal's interests are weighed against the interests of human beings, and the latter almost always prevail.<ref>Francione (1990), pp. 4, 17ff.</ref> | ||
Francione's ''Animals, Property, and the Law'' (1995) was the first extensive jurisprudential treatment of animal rights. In it, Francione compares the situation of animals to the treatment of ], where legislation existed that appeared to protect them |
Francione's ''Animals, Property, and the Law'' (1995) was the first extensive jurisprudential treatment of animal rights. In it, Francione compares the situation of animals to the treatment of ], where legislation existed that appeared to protect them while the courts ignored that the institution of slavery itself rendered the protection unenforceable.<ref>Francione (1995), pp. 4–5.</ref> He offers as an example the United States ], which he describes as an example of symbolic legislation, intended to assuage public concern about the treatment of animals, but difficult to implement.<ref>Francione (1995), p. 208ff.</ref> | ||
He argues that a focus on animal welfare, rather than animal rights, may worsen the position of animals by making the public feel comfortable about using them and entrenching the view of them as property. He calls animal rights groups who pursue animal welfare issues, such as ], the "]", arguing that they have more in common with 19th-century animal protectionists than with the animal rights movement; indeed, the terms "animal protection" and "protectionism" are increasingly favored. His position in 1996 was that there is no animal rights movement in the United States.<ref> | He argues that a focus on animal welfare, rather than animal rights, may worsen the position of animals by making the public feel comfortable about using them and entrenching the view of them as property. He calls animal rights groups who pursue animal welfare issues, such as ], the "]", arguing that they have more in common with 19th-century animal protectionists than with the animal rights movement; indeed, the terms "animal protection" and "protectionism" are increasingly favored. His position in 1996 was that there is no animal rights movement in the United States.<ref> | ||
*Francione and Garner (2010), pp. 1ff, 175ff. | *Francione and Garner (2010), pp. 1ff, 175ff. | ||
*Hall, Lee. , Friends of Animals |
*Hall, Lee. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090508021512/http://www.friendsofanimals.org/programs/animal-rights/interview-with-gary-francione.html |date=May 8, 2009 }}, Friends of Animals. Retrieved February 3, 2011.</ref> | ||
===Contractarianism=== | ===Contractarianism=== | ||
{{ |
{{Further|Social contract}} | ||
], professor of philosophy at the University of Florida, has proposed a contractarian approach, based on the ] and the ]—a "state of nature" thought experiment that tests intuitions about justice and fairness—in ]'s '']'' (1971). In the original position, individuals choose principles of justice (what kind of society to form, and how primary social goods will be distributed), unaware of their individual characteristics—their race, sex, class, or intelligence, whether they are able-bodied or disabled, rich or poor—and therefore unaware of which role they will assume in the society they are about to form. The idea is that, operating behind the veil of ignorance, they will choose a social contract in which there is basic fairness and justice for them no matter the position they occupy. Rawls did not include species membership as one of the attributes hidden from the decision |
], professor of philosophy at the University of Florida, has proposed a contractarian approach, based on the ] and the ]—a "state of nature" thought experiment that tests intuitions about justice and fairness—in ]'s '']'' (1971). In the original position, individuals choose principles of justice (what kind of society to form, and how primary social goods will be distributed), unaware of their individual characteristics—their race, sex, class, or intelligence, whether they are able-bodied or disabled, rich or poor—and therefore unaware of which role they will assume in the society they are about to form.<ref name=Rowlands1998p118>Rowlands (1998), p. 118ff, particularly pp. 147–152.</ref> | ||
The idea is that, operating behind the veil of ignorance, they will choose a social contract in which there is basic fairness and justice for them no matter the position they occupy. Rawls did not include species membership as one of the attributes hidden from the decision-makers in the original position. Rowlands proposes extending the veil of ignorance to include rationality, which he argues is an undeserved property similar to characteristics including race, sex and intelligence.<ref name="Rowlands1998p118"/> | |||
===''Prima facie'' rights theory=== | ===''Prima facie'' rights theory=== | ||
{{ |
{{Further|Prima facie right}} | ||
American philosopher Timothy Garry has proposed an approach that deems nonhuman animals worthy of ''prima facie'' rights. In a philosophical context, a ''prima facie'' (Latin for "on the face of it" or "at first glance") right is one that appears to be applicable at first glance, but upon closer examination may be outweighed by other considerations. In his book ''Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory'', Lawrence Hinman characterizes such rights as "the right is real but leaves open the question of whether it is applicable and overriding in a particular situation".<ref name="Hinman1998p208">Hinman, Lawrence M. Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College, 1998. Print.</ref> The idea that nonhuman animals are worthy of ''prima facie'' rights is to say that, in a sense, animals |
American philosopher Timothy Garry has proposed an approach that deems nonhuman animals worthy of ''prima facie'' rights. In a philosophical context, a ''prima facie'' (Latin for "on the face of it" or "at first glance") right is one that appears to be applicable at first glance, but upon closer examination may be outweighed by other considerations. In his book '']'', ] characterizes such rights as "the right is real but leaves open the question of whether it is applicable and overriding in a particular situation".<ref name="Hinman1998p208">Hinman, Lawrence M. Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College, 1998. Print.</ref> The idea that nonhuman animals are worthy of ''prima facie'' rights is to say that, in a sense, animals have rights that can be overridden by many other considerations, especially those conflicting a human's right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Garry supports his view arguing: | ||
{{Blockquote|... if a nonhuman animal were to kill a human being in the U.S., it would have broken the laws of the land and would probably get rougher sanctions than if it were a human. My point is that like laws govern all who interact within a society, rights are to be applied to all beings who interact within that society. This is not to say these rights endowed by humans are equivalent to those held by nonhuman animals, but rather that if humans possess rights then so must all those who interact with humans.<ref name=Garry2012p6>Garry, Timothy J. Nonhuman Animals: Possessors of Prima Facie Rights (2012), p.6</ref>}} | |||
In sum, Garry suggests that humans have obligations to nonhuman animals; |
In sum, Garry suggests that humans have obligations to nonhuman animals; animals do not, and ought not to, have uninfringible rights against humans. | ||
===Feminism and animal rights=== | ===Feminism and animal rights=== | ||
{{ |
{{Further|Women and animal advocacy|Ethics of care|Feminist ethics}} | ||
] ] has written extensively about the link between feminism and animal rights, starting with ''The Sexual Politics of Meat'' (1990).]] | ] ] has written extensively about the link between feminism and animal rights, starting with ''The Sexual Politics of Meat'' (1990).]] | ||
Women have played a central role in animal advocacy since the 19th century.<ref name="Lansbury et al">Lansbury (1985); Adams (1990); Donovan (1993); Gruen (1993); Adams (1994); Adams and Donovan (1995); Adams (2004); MacKinnon (2004).</ref> The anti-vivisection movement in the 19th and early 20th century in England and the United States was largely run by women, including ], ], ] and ] (1833–1916).<ref>.</ref> Garner writes that 70 per cent of the membership of the Victoria Street Society (one of the anti-vivisection groups founded by Cobbe) were women, as were 70 per cent of the membership of the British RSPCA in 1900.<ref>Garner (2005), p. 141, citing Elston (1990), p. 276.</ref> | Women have played a central role in animal advocacy since the 19th century.<ref name="Lansbury et al">Lansbury (1985); Adams (1990); Donovan (1993); Gruen (1993); Adams (1994); Adams and Donovan (1995); Adams (2004); MacKinnon (2004).</ref> The anti-vivisection movement in the 19th and early 20th century in England and the United States was largely run by women, including ], ], ] and ] (1833–1916).<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200413040407/https://www.jstor.org/stable/4289385 |date=2020-04-13 }}.</ref> Garner writes that 70 per cent of the membership of the Victoria Street Society (one of the anti-vivisection groups founded by Cobbe) were women, as were 70 per cent of the membership of the British RSPCA in 1900.<ref>Garner (2005), p. 141, citing Elston (1990), p. 276.</ref> | ||
The modern animal advocacy movement has a similar representation of women |
The modern animal advocacy movement has a similar representation of women. They are not invariably in leadership positions: during the March for Animals in Washington, D.C., in 1990—the largest animal rights demonstration held until then in the United States—most of the participants were women, but most of the platform speakers were men.<ref name=Garner2005p142>Garner (2005), pp. 142–143.</ref> Nevertheless, several influential animal advocacy groups have been founded by women, including the ] by Cobbe in London in 1898; the ] by ] in 1962; and ], co-founded by ] in 1980. In the Netherlands, ] and ] were elected to parliament in 2006 representing the Parliamentary group for Animals. | ||
The preponderance of women in the movement has led to a body of academic literature exploring feminism and animal rights |
The preponderance of women in the movement has led to a body of academic literature exploring feminism and animal rights, such as feminism and vegetarianism or ], the oppression of women and animals, and the male association of women and animals with nature and emotion, rather than reason—an association that several feminist writers have embraced.<ref name="Lansbury et al"/> ] writes that women and animals serve the same symbolic function in a patriarchal society: both are "the used"; the dominated, submissive "]".<ref>Gruen (1993), p. 60ff.</ref> When the British feminist ] (1759–1797) published '']'' (1792), ] (1758–1835), a Cambridge philosopher, responded with an anonymous parody, ''A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes'' (1792), saying that Wollstonecraft's arguments for women's rights could be applied equally to animals, a position he intended as '']''.<ref>Singer (1990), p. 1.</ref><!--add something about language; treatment of female animals; feminist care ethic; suffragettes--> In her works '']'' (1990) and ''The Pornography of Meat'' (2004), ] focuses in particular on what she argues are the links between the oppression of women and that of non-human animals.<ref name="green2003">{{cite magazine|author-last=Green |author-first=Elizabeth W. |url=http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2003/10/2/fifteen-questions-for-carol-j-adams/ |title=Fifteen Questions For Carol J. Adams |magazine=The Harvard Crimson |date=10 October 2003 |access-date=22 November 2008}}</ref> | ||
===Transhumanism=== | |||
Some ] argue for animal rights, liberation, and "uplift" of animal consciousness into machines.<ref>{{cite web|title=The Ethics of Animal Enhancement|author=George Dvorsky|author-link=George Dvorsky|url=https://ieet.org/index.php/IEET2/more/dvorsky20110729|access-date=2017-04-24|archive-date=2017-04-25|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170425030415/https://ieet.org/index.php/IEET2/more/dvorsky20110729|url-status=live}}</ref> Transhumanism also understands animal rights on a gradation or spectrum with other types of sentient rights, including human rights and the rights of conscious artificial intelligences (posthuman rights).<ref Name="Evans 2015">{{cite journal | last = Evans | first = Woody | author-link = Woody Evans | title = Posthuman Rights: Dimensions of Transhuman Worlds | journal = Teknokultura | volume = 12 | issue = 2 | date = 2015 | doi = 10.5209/rev_TK.2015.v12.n2.49072 | doi-access = free }}</ref> | |||
===Socialism and anti-capitalism=== | |||
According to sociologist ] of ], the struggle for animal liberation must happen in tandem with a more generalized struggle against human oppression and exploitation under global ]. He says that under a more egalitarian ] system, one that would "allow a more just and peaceful order to emerge" and be "characterized by ] and a democratically controlled state and mass media", there would be "much greater potential to inform the public about vital global issues—and the potential for "campaigns to improve the lives of other animals" to be "more abolitionist in nature."{{sfn|Nibert|2013|p=270}} Philosopher ] of the ] states that the animal liberation movement, as characterized by the ] and its various offshoots, "is a significant threat to global capital." {{Blockquote|... Animal liberation challenges large sectors of the capitalist economy by assailing corporate agriculture and pharmaceutical companies and their suppliers. Far from being irrelevant to social movements, animal rights can form the basis for a broad coalition of progressive social groups and drive changes that strike at the heart of capitalist exploitation of animals, people and the earth.{{sfn|Best|2014|p=103}}}} | |||
===Critics=== | ===Critics=== | ||
====R. G. Frey==== | ====R. G. Frey==== | ||
], professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University, is a preference utilitarian |
], professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University, is a preference utilitarian. In his early work, ''Interests and Rights'' (1980), Frey disagreed with Singer—who wrote in ''Animal Liberation'' (1975) that the interests of nonhuman animals must be given equal consideration when judging the consequences of an act—on the grounds that animals have no interests. Frey argues that interests are dependent on desire, and that no desire can exist without a corresponding belief. Animals have no beliefs, because a belief state requires the ability to hold a second-order belief—a belief about the belief—which he argues requires language: "If someone were to say, e.g. 'The cat believes that the door is locked,' then that person is holding, as I see it, that the cat holds the declarative sentence 'The door is locked' to be true; and I can see no reason whatever for crediting the cat or any other creature which lacks language, including human infants, with entertaining declarative sentences."<ref>Frey (1989), p. 40.</ref> | ||
====Carl Cohen==== | ====Carl Cohen==== | ||
], professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan, argues that rights holders must be able to distinguish between their own interests and what is right. "The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked." Cohen rejects Singer's argument that, since a brain-damaged human could not make moral judgments, moral judgments cannot be used as the distinguishing characteristic for determining who is awarded rights. Cohen writes that the test for moral judgment "is not a test to be administered to humans one by one", but should be applied to the capacity of members of the species in general.<ref>. | ], professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan, argues that rights holders must be able to distinguish between their own interests and what is right. "The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked." Cohen rejects Singer's argument that, since a brain-damaged human could not make moral judgments, moral judgments cannot be used as the distinguishing characteristic for determining who is awarded rights. Cohen writes that the test for moral judgment "is not a test to be administered to humans one by one", but should be applied to the capacity of members of the species in general.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111127200740/http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf |date=2011-11-27 }}. Cohen and Regan (2001).</ref> | ||
*Cohen and Regan (2001).</ref> | |||
====Richard Posner==== | ====Richard Posner==== | ||
]: "facts will drive equality."<ref name=Posner/>]] | ]: "facts will drive equality."<ref name=Posner/>]] | ||
Judge ] of the ] debated the issue of animal rights in 2001 with Peter Singer.<ref>.</ref> Posner posits that his ] tells him "that human beings prefer their own. If a dog threatens a human infant, even if it requires causing more pain to the dog to stop it, than the dog would have caused to the infant, then we favour the child. It would be monstrous to spare the dog."<ref name=Posner>; , courtesy link on utilitarian.net. | Judge ] of the ] debated the issue of animal rights in 2001 with Peter Singer.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170914200057/http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/dialogues/features/2001/animal_rights/_2.html |date=September 14, 2017 }}.</ref> Posner posits that his ] tells him "that human beings prefer their own. If a dog threatens a human infant, even if it requires causing more pain to the dog to stop it, than the dog would have caused to the infant, then we favour the child. It would be monstrous to spare the dog."<ref name=Posner> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110821030817/http://www.slate.com/id/110101/entry/110129/ |date=August 21, 2011 }}; {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150509122917/http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/interviews-debates/200106--.htm |date=2015-05-09 }}, courtesy link on utilitarian.net. | ||
*Also see Posner (2004).</ref> | *Also see Posner (2004).</ref> | ||
Singer challenges this by arguing that formerly unequal rights for gays, women, and certain races were justified using the same set of intuitions. Posner replies that equality in civil rights did not occur because of ethical arguments, but because facts mounted that there were no morally significant differences between humans based on race, sex, or sexual orientation that would support inequality. If and when similar facts emerge about humans and animals, the differences in rights will erode too. But facts will drive equality, not ethical arguments that run contrary to instinct, he argues. Posner calls his approach "soft utilitarianism", in contrast to Singer's "hard utilitarianism". He argues: | Singer challenges this by arguing that formerly unequal rights for gays, women, and certain races were justified using the same set of intuitions. Posner replies that equality in civil rights did not occur because of ethical arguments, but because facts mounted that there were no morally significant differences between humans based on race, sex, or sexual orientation that would support inequality. If and when similar facts emerge about humans and animals, the differences in rights will erode too. But facts will drive equality, not ethical arguments that run contrary to instinct, he argues. Posner calls his approach "soft utilitarianism", in contrast to Singer's "hard utilitarianism". He argues: | ||
{{Blockquote|The "soft" utilitarian position on animal rights is a moral intuition of many, probably most, Americans. We realize that animals feel pain, and we think that to inflict pain without a reason is bad. Nothing of practical value is added by dressing up this intuition in the language of philosophy; much is lost when the intuition is made a stage in a logical argument. When kindness toward animals is levered into a duty of weighting the pains of animals and of people equally, bizarre vistas of social engineering are opened up.<ref name=Posner/>}} | |||
]: rights imply obligations.]] | ]: rights imply obligations.]] | ||
====Roger Scruton==== | ====Roger Scruton==== | ||
], the British philosopher, |
], the British philosopher, argued that rights imply obligations. Every legal privilege, he wrote, imposes a burden on the one who does not possess that privilege: that is, "your right may be my duty." Scruton therefore regarded the emergence of the animal rights movement as "the strangest cultural shift within the liberal worldview", because the idea of rights and responsibilities is, he argued, distinctive to the human condition, and it makes no sense to spread them beyond our own species.<ref name=Scruton/> | ||
*Scruton (1998).</ref> | |||
He accused animal rights advocates of "pre-scientific" ], attributing traits to animals that are, he says, ]-like, where "only man is vile." It is within this fiction that the appeal of animal rights lies, he argued. The world of animals is non-judgmental, filled with dogs who return our affection almost no matter what we do to them, and cats who pretend to be affectionate when, in fact, they care only about themselves. It is, he argued, a fantasy, a world of escape.<ref name=Scruton>{{cite magazine |last=Scruton |first=Roger |author-link=Roger Scruton |date=Summer 2000 |title=Animal Rights |url=http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_3_urbanities-animal.html |magazine=City Journal |location=New York |publisher=Manhattan Institute for Policy Research |access-date=2005-12-04 |archive-date=2016-03-03 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303191520/http://www.city-journal.org/html/10_3_urbanities-animal.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> | |||
==Continuity between humans and nonhuman animals== | |||
], a nonhuman great ape]] | |||
Scruton singled out ], a prominent Australian philosopher and animal-rights activist, for criticism. He wrote that Singer's works, including '']'', "contain little or no philosophical argument. They derive their radical moral conclusions from a vacuous utilitarianism that counts the pain and pleasure of all living things as equally significant and that ignores just about everything that has been said in our philosophical tradition about the real distinction between persons and animals."<ref name=Scruton/> | |||
]ary studies have provided explanations of ] in humans and nonhuman animals, and suggest similarities between humans and some nonhumans.<ref>Lawrence (2004) Animal Acts: Configuring the Human in Western History. Journal of Popular Culture, 37(3), 555</ref> Scientists such as ] and ] believe in the capacity of nonhuman ], humans' closest relatives, to possess rationality and self-awareness.<ref>The Great Ape Project: Equality beyond humanity. 1993. Fourth Estate publishing, London, England.</ref> In 2010, research led by psychologist ] and zoologist Lori Marino was presented to a conference in San Diego, suggesting that ]s are second in intelligence only to human beings, and concluded that they should be regarded as nonhuman persons. Marino used ] scans to compare the dolphin and primate brain; she said the scans indicated there was "psychological continuity" between dolphins and humans. Reiss's research suggested that dolphins are able to solve complex problems, use tools, and pass the ], using a mirror to inspect parts of their bodies.<ref>{{Cite journal | |||
| last1 = Reiss | first1 = D. | |||
| title = Dolphin Research: Educating the Public | |||
| doi = 10.1126/science.332.6037.1501-b | |||
| journal = Science | |||
| volume = 332 | |||
| issue = 6037 | |||
| pages = 1501 | |||
| year = 2011 | |||
| pmid = 21700853 | |||
| pmc = | |||
}}</ref><ref>Leake, Jonathan (January 3, 2010). , ''The Sunday Times''.</ref> | |||
] countered this view of rights by distinguishing moral agents and moral patients.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.thevegetariansite.com/ethics_regan.htm|title=Tom Regan: The Case For Animal Rights|website=The Vegetarian Site|access-date=November 2, 2019|archive-date=November 2, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191102054417/https://www.thevegetariansite.com/ethics_regan.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>{{unreliable source?|WP:QUESTIONABLE|date=March 2021}} | |||
Studies have established links between interpersonal violence and animal cruelty.<ref>Frank R. Ascione, Phil Arkow Child abuse, domestic violence, and animal abuse: linking the circles of compassion for prevention and intervention ISBN 1-55753-142-0</ref><ref>Randall Lockwood, Frank R. Ascione. Cruelty to Animals and Interpersonal Violence. Purdue University Press 1998</ref> | |||
{{clear}} | |||
== |
==Public attitudes== | ||
According to a 2000 paper by Harold Herzog and Lorna Dorr, previous academic surveys of attitudes toward animal rights tended to have small sample sizes and non-representative groups.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Herzog |first1=Harold |last2=Dorr |first2=Lorna |date=2000 |title=Electronically Available Surveys of Attitudes Toward Animals |journal=Society & Animals |volume=10 |issue=2}}</ref> But a number of factors appear to correlate with people's attitudes about the treatment of animals and animal rights. These include gender, age, occupation, religion, and level of education. There is also evidence suggesting that experience with ] may be a factor in people's attitudes.<ref name="SignalAndTaylor2006">{{cite journal |last1=Apostol |first1=L. |last2=Rebega |first2=O.L. |last3=Miclea |first3=M. |date=2013 |title=Psychological and Socio-Demographic Predictors of Attitudes towards Animals |journal=Social and Behavioural Sciences |issue=78 |pages=521–525}}</ref> | |||
According to some studies, women are more likely to empathize with the cause of animal rights than men.<ref name="SignalAndTaylor2006" /><ref>{{cite journal |last=Herzog |first=Harold |date=2007 |title=Gender Differences in Human-Animal Interactions: A Review |journal=Anthrozoös|volume=20 |issue=1 |pages=7–21|doi=10.2752/089279307780216687 |s2cid=14988443 }}</ref> A 1996 study suggested that factors that may partially explain this discrepancy include attitudes towards ] and science, scientific literacy, and the presence of a greater emphasis on "nurturance or compassion" among women.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Pifer |first=Linda |date=1996 |title=Exploring the Gender Gap in Young Adults' Attitudes about Animal Research |journal=Society and Animals |volume=4 |issue=1 |pages=37–52 |doi=10.1163/156853096X00034 |pmid=11654528 |url=http://www.animalsandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/pifer1.pdf |access-date=2021-06-04 |archive-date=2021-09-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210917222336/https://www.animalsandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/pifer1.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
According to a paper published in 2000 by Harold Herzog and Lorna Dorr, previous academic surveys of attitudes towards animal rights have tended to suffer from small sample sizes and non-representative groups.<ref>Herzog, Harold; Dorr, Lorna (2000) "Electronically Available Surveys of Attitudes Toward Animals", ''Society & Animals'' 8:2.</ref> However, a number of factors appear to correlate with the attitude of individuals regarding the treatment of animals and animal rights. These include gender, age, occupation, religion, and level of education. There has also been evidence to suggest that prior experience with ] may be a factor in people's attitudes.<ref name="SignalAndTaylor2006">Apostol,L., Rebega, O.L. & Miclea,M. (2013). "Psychological and Socio-Demographic Predictors of Attitudes towards Animals". ''Social and Behavioural Sciences'', 78, pages 521–525.</ref> | |||
A common misconception about animal rights is that its proponents want to grant nonhuman animals the same legal rights as humans, such as the ]. This is false. Rather, the idea is that animals should have rights that accord with their interests (for example, cats have no interest in voting, and so should not have the right to vote).<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/animals/rights/rights_1.shtml|title=Ethics - Animal ethics: Animal rights|website=BBC Online|access-date=February 10, 2022|df=mdy-all|archive-date=March 24, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220324011846/https://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/animals/rights/rights_1.shtml|url-status=live}}</ref> A 2016 study found that support for ] may not be based on cogent philosophical rationales and that more open debate is warranted.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Joffe |first1=Ari R. |last2=Bara |first2=Meredith |last3=Anton |first3=Natalie |last4=Nobis |first4=Nathan |date=2016-03-29 |title=The ethics of animal research: a survey of the public and scientists in North America |journal=BMC Medical Ethics |volume=17 |page=17 |doi=10.1186/s12910-016-0100-x |issn=1472-6939 |pmc=4812627 |pmid=27025215 |df=mdy-all |doi-access=free }}</ref> | |||
Women are more likely to empathize with the cause of animal rights than men.<ref name="SignalAndTaylor2006" /><ref>Herzog, Harold. (2007). "Gender Differences in Human-Animal Interactions: A Review". ''Anthrozoos: A Multidisciplinary Journal of The Interactions of People & Animals''. 20:1. Pages 7–21.</ref> A 1996 study of adolescents by Linda Pifer suggested that factors that may partially explain this discrepancy include attitudes towards ] and science, scientific literacy, and the presence of a greater emphasis on "nurturance or compassion" amongst women.<ref>Pifer, Linda. (1996). "Exploring the Gender Gap in Young Adults' Attitudes about Animal Research". ''Society and Animals''. 4:1. Pages 37–52.</ref> | |||
A 2007 survey |
A 2007 survey that examined whether people who believe in ] are more likely to support animal rights than ] and believers in ] found that this was largely the case; according to the researchers, strong ] and believers in ] were less likely to advocate for animal rights than those who were less fundamentalist in their beliefs. The findings extended previous research, such as a 1992 study that found that 48% of animal rights activists were ] or ].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=DeLeeuwa |first1=Jamie |last2=Galen |first2=Luke |last3=Aebersold |first3=Cassandra |last4=Stanton |first4=Victoria |date=2007 |url=http://www.animalsandsociety.org/assets/library/745_s3.pdf |title=Support for Animal Rights as a Function of Belief in Evolution, Religious Fundamentalism, and Religious Denomination |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130620141651/http://www.animalsandsociety.org/assets/library/745_s3.pdf |archive-date=2013-06-20 |df=mdy-all |journal=Society and Animals |issue=15 |pages=353–363}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Galvin |first1=Shelley L. |last2=Herzog |first2=Harold A. Jr. |date=1992 |title=Ethical Ideology, Animal Rights Activism, And Attitudes Toward The Treatment Of Animals |journal=Ethics & Behavior |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=141–149 |doi=10.1207/s15327019eb0203_1 |pmid=11651362 |url=https://animalstudiesrepository.org/acwp_sata/23 |access-date=2020-08-29 |archive-date=2020-05-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200531171029/https://animalstudiesrepository.org/acwp_sata/23/ |url-status=live }}</ref> A 2019 '']'' study found that those with favorable attitudes toward animal rights also tend to have favorable views of universal healthcare; reducing discrimination against African Americans, the LGBT community, and undocumented immigrants; and expanding welfare to aid the poor.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Park|first1=Yon Soo|last2=Valentino|first2=Benjamin|date=July 26, 2019|title=Who supports animal rights? Here's what we found.|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/26/who-supports-animal-rights-heres-what-we-found/|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=July 26, 2019|df=mdy-all|archive-date=July 26, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190726122439/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/26/who-supports-animal-rights-heres-what-we-found/|url-status=live}}</ref> | ||
Two surveys found that attitudes |
Two surveys found that attitudes toward animal rights tactics, such as ], are very diverse within the animal rights communities. Near half (50% and 39% in two surveys) of activists do not support direct action. One survey concluded, "it would be a mistake to portray animal rights activists as homogeneous."<ref name="SignalAndTaylor2006"/><ref>{{cite journal |title=An attitude survey of animal rights activists |journal=Psychological Science |year=1991 |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=194–196 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9280.1991.tb00131.x |s2cid=145549994 |df=mdy-all|last1=Plous |first1=S. }}</ref> | ||
Even though around 90% of U.S. adults regularly consume meat,<ref>{{Cite web|last1=Berg|first1=Jennifer|last2=Jackson|first2=Chris|date=May 12, 2021|title=Nearly nine in ten Americans consume meat as part of their diet|url=https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/nearly-nine-ten-americans-consume-meat-part-their-diet|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210720111314/https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/nearly-nine-ten-americans-consume-meat-part-their-diet|archive-date=July 20, 2021|access-date=February 13, 2022|website=Ipsos}}</ref> almost half of them appear to support a ban on slaughterhouses: in ]'s 2017 survey of 1,094 U.S. adults' attitudes toward animal farming, 49% "support a ban on factory farming, 47% support a ban on slaughterhouses, and 33% support a ban on animal farming".<ref name="Ettinger">{{cite news |last=Ettinger |first=Jill |date=November 21, 2017 |title=70% of Americans Want Better Treatment for Farm Animals, Poll Finds |url=http://www.organicauthority.com/70-of-americans-want-better-treatment-for-farm-animals-poll-finds/ |newspaper=Organic Authority |access-date=13 February 2022 |archive-date=29 September 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180929115534/http://www.organicauthority.com/70-of-americans-want-better-treatment-for-farm-animals-poll-finds/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="vox 2">{{cite web |last=Piper |first=Kelsey |date=November 5, 2018 |title=California and Florida voters could change the lives of millions of animals on Election Day |url=https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955642/california-florida-voters-animal-welfare-election-day |publisher=] |access-date=13 February 2022 |archive-date=13 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220213174934/https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/17/17955642/california-florida-voters-animal-welfare-election-day |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Reese Anthis|first=Jacy|date=November 20, 2017|title=Animals, Food, and Technology (AFT) Survey 2017|url=https://www.sentienceinstitute.org/animal-farming-attitudes-survey-2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220104070248/https://www.sentienceinstitute.org/animal-farming-attitudes-survey-2017|archive-date=January 4, 2022|access-date=February 13, 2022|website=Sentience Institute|series=Surveys}}</ref> The 2017 survey was replicated by researchers at ], who found similar results: 73% of respondents answered "yes" to the question "Were you aware that slaughterhouses are where livestock are killed and processed into meat, such that, without them, you would not be able to consume meat?"<ref name="food dive">{{cite web|last=Siegner|first=Cathy|date=January 25, 2018|title=Survey: Most consumers like meat, slaughterhouses not so much|url=https://www.fooddive.com/news/survey-most-consumers-like-meat-slaughterhouses-not-so-much/515301/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211102193320/https://www.fooddive.com/news/survey-most-consumers-like-meat-slaughterhouses-not-so-much/515301/|archive-date=November 2, 2021|access-date=February 13, 2022|publisher=Food Dive}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Norwood |first1=Bailey |last2=Murray |first2=Susan |title=FooDS Food Deman Survey, Volume 5, Issue 9: January 18, 2018 |url=http://agecon.okstate.edu/files/january%202018.pdf |access-date=February 13, 2022 |website=Oklahoma State University |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190806000018/http://agecon.okstate.edu/files/january%202018.pdf |archive-date=6 August 2019 |url-status=dead}}</ref> | |||
In the U.S., the ] held many public protest slaughters in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Protesting low prices for meat, farmers killed their animals in front of media representatives. The carcasses were wasted and not eaten. This effort backfired because it angered people to see animals needlessly and wastefully killed.<ref>{{cite thesis |page=19 |url=http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami1050951369 |title=Growing a new agrarian myth: the american agriculture movement, identity, and the call to save the family farm |first=Ryan J. |last=Stockwell |access-date=11 May 2020 |archive-date=15 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230415153833/https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_olink/r/1501/10?clear=10&p10_accession_num=miami1050951369 |url-status=live }}</ref> | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
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==References== | ||
{{Reflist |
{{Reflist}} | ||
== |
==Bibliography== | ||
Books and papers are cited in short form in the footnotes, with full citations here. News and other sources are cited in full in the footnotes. | |||
{{Refbegin|30em}} | |||
{{refbegin|normalfont=yes|indent=yes}} | |||
*{{cite book |author-link=Carol Adams (feminist) |last=Adams |first=Carol J. |date=1996 |title=The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory |publisher=Continuum}} {{ISBN|1501312839}} | |||
*{{cite book |editor-last=Adams |editor1-first=Carol J. |editor2-first=Josephine |editor-link1=Carol Adams (feminist) |editor2-last=Donovan |editor-link2=Josephine Donovan |date=1995 |title=Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations |publisher=Duke University Press}} {{ISBN|0822316552}} | |||
*{{cite book |author-link=Carol Adams (feminist) |last=Adams |first=Carol J. |date=2004 |title=The Pornography of Meat |publisher=Continuum}} {{ISBN|9781590565100}} | |||
*Benthall, Jonathan (2007). , ''Anthropology Today'', volume 23, issue 2, April. | |||
:Arluke, Arnold and Sax, Boria (1992). , ''Anthrozoos: A Multidisciplinary Journal of The Interactions of People & Animals'', Volume 5, Number 1, 1992 , pp. 6–31(26). | |||
*] (1781). ''Principles of Penal Law''. {{ISBN|1379912326}} | |||
:Benthall, Jonathan (2007). , ''Anthropology Today'', volume 23, issue 2, April. | |||
*] (2009). "The Moral Standing of Animals", in ]. ''Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare''. Greenwood. {{ISBN|0313352593}} | |||
:] (1781). ''Principles of Penal Law''. | |||
*] (2011a). "Introduction," in Tom Beauchamp and ] (eds.). ''The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics''. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|019935197X}} | |||
*] (2011b). "Rights Theory and Animal Rights," in Beauchamp and Frey, ''op cit''. {{ISBN|019935197X}} | |||
:___________ (2011a). "Introduction," in Tom Beauchamp and ] (eds.). ''The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics''. Oxford University Press. | |||
*{{cite book |last= Best|first=Steven|date=2014 |title=The Politics of Total Liberation: Revolution for the 21st Century|publisher=] |isbn=978-1137471116|doi=10.1057/9781137440723}} | |||
:___________ (2011b). "Rights Theory and Animal Rights," in Beauchamp and Frey, ''op cit''. | |||
*] (1977). ''The Moral Status of Animals''. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|0192830406}} | |||
*] (1986). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111127200740/http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf |date=2011-11-27 }}, ''New England Journal of Medicine'', vol. 315, issue 14, October, pp. 865–870. | |||
*Cohen, Carl and Regan, Tom (2001). ''The Animal Rights Debate''. Rowman & Littlefield. {{ISBN|0847696626}} | |||
*] (ed.) (1988). "] Ethics" and "]." ''Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. | |||
:] (1995). "Descartes, René" in ]. (ed.) ''The Oxford Companion to Philosophy''. Oxford University Press. | |||
*] (2002). ''Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction''. Oxford University Press. | |||
:] (ed.) (1988). "Deontological Ethics" and "Consequentalism," ''Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. | |||
*] (1993). "Animal Rights and Feminist Theory," in ]. ''Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature''. Temple University Press. | |||
*] (1996). ''Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement''. Temple University Press. | |||
*] (1995). ''Animals, Property, and the Law''. Temple University Press. | |||
*] (2008). ''Animals as Persons''. Columbia University Press. | |||
*Francione, Gary and Garner, Robert (2010). ''The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition Or Regulation?'' Columbia University Press. | |||
*Fellenz, Mark R. (2007). ''The Moral Menagerie: Philosophy and Animal Rights''. University of Illinois Press. | |||
*] (1980). ''Interests and Rights: The Case against Animals''. Clarendon Press. | |||
*] (1989). "Why Animals Lack Beliefs and Desires," in Peter Singer and Tom Regan (eds.). ''Animal Rights and Human Obligations''. Prentice Hall. | |||
*] (2004). ''Animals, Politics and Morality''. Manchester University Press. | |||
*] (2005). ''The Political Theory of Animals Rights''. Manchester University Press. | |||
*Giannelli, Michael A. (1985). "Three Blind Mice, See How They Run: A Critique of Behavioral Research With Animals". In M.W. Fox & L.D. Mickley (eds.), Advances in Animal Welfare Science 1985/1986 (pp. 109–164). Washington, DC: The Humane Society of the United States | |||
:] (1993). "Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of the Connection Between Women and Animals", in ]. ''Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature''. Temple University Press. | |||
*] (1993). "Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of the Connection Between Women and Animals", in ]. ''Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature''. Temple University Press. | |||
:Griffin, Donald (1984). ''Animal Thinking''. Harvard University Press. | |||
*Griffin, Donald (1984). ''Animal Thinking''. Harvard University Press. | |||
:Godlovitch, Roslind; Godlovitch Stanley; and Harris John (1971). ''Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-humans''. Victor Gollancz. | |||
* Horta, Oscar (2010). "What Is Speciesism?", ''The Journal of Environmental and Agricultural Ethics'', Vol. 23, No. 3, June, pp. 243–266. | |||
*] (2000a). ''On Virtue Ethics''. Oxford University Press. | |||
: Horta, Oscar (2010). "What Is Speciesism?", ''The Journal of Environmental and Agricultural Ethics'', Vol. 23, No. 3, June, pp. 243–266. | |||
*] (2000b). ''Ethics, Humans and Other Animals''. Routledge. | |||
*Jakopovich, Daniel (2021). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221129010538/https://onlineacademiccommunity.uvic.ca/asri/2021/10/17/the-uks-animal-welfare-sentience-bill-excludes-the-vast-majority-of-animals-why-we-should-expand-our-moral-circle-to-include-invertebrates/ |date=2022-11-29 }}, ''Animals & Society Research Initiative, University of Victoria'', Canada. | |||
:___________ (2000b). ''Ethics, Humans and Other Animals''. Routledge. | |||
*] (1785). '']''. | |||
*] (1995). {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200413040407/https://www.jstor.org/stable/4289385 |date=2020-04-13 }}, ''History Workshop Journal'', No. 40 (Autumn), pp. 16–38. | |||
:] (1998). ''Animal Rights: Political and Social Change in Britain since 1800''. Reaktion Books. | |||
*{{cite book |last=Kelch |first=Thomas G. |date=2011 |title=Globalization and Animal Law |publisher=Kluwer Law International}} | |||
:__________(1995). , ''History Workshop Journal'', No. 40 (Autumn), pp. 16–38. | |||
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*{{cite book |author-link=Paul Waldau |last=Waldau |first=Paul |date=2011 |title=Animal Rights: What Everyone Needs to Know |publisher=Oxford University Press}} | |||
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{{refend}} | {{refend}} | ||
==Further reading== | ==Further reading== | ||
{{Wikiquote}} | {{Wikiquote}} | ||
{{Refbegin|30em}} | |||
{{refbegin|normalfont=yes|indent=yes}} | |||
*] (2002). , The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law. | |||
: |
*, The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law. | ||
*] (ed.) (2009). ''The Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare''. Greenwood. | |||
*, The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law. | |||
*] and Nocella II, Anthony J. (eds). (2004). ''Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals.'' ] | |||
:] (ed.) (2009). ''The Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare''. Greenwood. | |||
*] and Nouët, Jean-Claude (eds.) (1998). ''The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights''. Ligue Française des Droits de l'Animal. | |||
*] (1993). , in Cavalieri, Paola and Singer, Peter (eds.). ''The Great Ape Project''. St. Martin's Griffin. | |||
*] (1997). ''Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases''. University of Illinois Press. | |||
*{{cite book|title=Respecting Animals: A Balanced Approach to Our Relationship with Pets, Food, and Wildlife |year=2018 |first=David S. |last=Favre |publisher=Prometheus |isbn=978-1633884250}} | |||
:Franklin, Julian H. (2005). ''Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy''. University of Columbia Press. | |||
*], "Let them eat oysters" (review of ], ''Animal Liberation Now'', Penguin, 2023, {{ISBN|978 1 84792 776 7}}, 368 pp; and ], ''Justice for Animals'', Simon & Schuster, 2023, {{ISBN|978 1 982102 50 0}}, 372 pp.), '']'', vol. 45, no.19 (5 October 2023), pp. 3, 5–8. The question of animal rights has been approached from a variety of theoretical orientations, including ] and ] ("CA") – none of them satisfactory to reviewer Lorna Finlayson, who teaches philosophy at England's ] and ends up (p. 8) suggesting "think politically about animals: "It ought to be – it is – possible to arrange society differently." (p. 8.) | |||
:] (2003). , ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', July 1, 2003. | |||
*] (2006). ''Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim Cultures''. ]. | |||
:_________ (2011). ''Ethics and Animals''. Cambridge University Press. | |||
*Franklin, Julian H. (2005). ''Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy''. University of Columbia Press. | |||
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:] and Clarke, Paul A. B.(eds.) (1990). ''Animal Rights: A Historic Anthology''. Columbia University Press. | |||
*] (2011). ''Ethics and Animals''. Cambridge University Press. | |||
*Hall, Lee (2006). ''Capers in the Churchyard: Animal Rights Advocacy in the Age of Terror''. Nectar Bat Press. | |||
*] and Clarke, Paul A. B.(eds.) (1990). ''Animal Rights: A Historic Anthology''. Columbia University Press. | |||
:] (2007). ''From Dusk 'til Dawn: An Insider's View of the Growth of the Animal Liberation Movement''. Puppy Pincher Press. | |||
*] (2007). ''From Dusk 'til Dawn: An Insider's View of the Growth of the Animal Liberation Movement''. Puppy Pincher Press. | |||
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*] and Wilson, Keith (eds). (2020). ''''. Lantern Publishing & Media. | |||
:] (2002). ''Animal Rights, Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation''. Rowman and Litterfield. | |||
*] (2012). "The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights or the Creation of a New Equilibrium between Species". Animal Law Review volume 19–1. | |||
:Patterson, Charles (2002). ''Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust''. Lantern. | |||
*] (2002). ''Animal Rights, Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation''. Rowman and Litterfield. | |||
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*{{cite book | editor-last = Nibert | editor-first = David | date = 2017 | title = Animal Oppression and Capitalism | publisher = Praeger Publishing | isbn = 978-1440850738}} | |||
:Regan, Tom and Singer, Peter (eds.) (1976). ''Animal Rights and Human Obligations''. Prentice-Hall. | |||
*Patterson, Charles (2002). ''Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust''. Lantern. | |||
:Spiegel, Marjorie (1996). ''The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery''. Mirror Books. | |||
*] (1990). ''Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism''. Oxford University Press. | |||
:] (2006). "Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust?" ''Ethics and the Environment'' 11 (Spring): 97–132. | |||
*Regan, Tom and Singer, Peter (eds.) (1976). ''Animal Rights and Human Obligations''. Prentice-Hall. | |||
:] (2000). ''Life Force: The World of Jainism''. Asian Humanities Press. | |||
*Spiegel, Marjorie (1996). ''The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery''. Mirror Books. | |||
:Wilson, Scott (2010). "" ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. | |||
*] (2006). "Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust?" ''Ethics and the Environment'' 11 (Spring): 97–132. | |||
{{refend}} | |||
*] (2000). ''Life Force: The World of Jainism''. Asian Humanities Press. | |||
*Wilson, Scott (2010). "" ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. | |||
*Kymlicka, W., Donaldson, S. (2011) ''Zoopolis. A Political Theory of Animal Rights''. Oxford University Press. | |||
{{Refend}} | |||
{{Animal rights|state=expanded}} | {{Animal rights|state=expanded}} | ||
{{Vegetarianism}} | {{Vegetarianism}} | ||
{{Authority control}} | {{Authority control}} | ||
{{Law country lists}} | |||
{{DEFAULTSORT:Animal Rights}} | |||
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Latest revision as of 20:13, 9 January 2025
Rights belonging to animals This article is about the philosophy of animal rights. For current animal rights around the world, see Animal rights by country or territory. For a timeline of animal rights, see Timeline of animal welfare and rights. For other uses, see Animal rights (disambiguation).Part of a series on |
Animal rights |
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Overview |
Movement |
Animal abuse |
Ideas |
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Rights |
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Theoretical distinctions |
Human rights |
Rights by beneficiary |
Other groups of rights |
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Animal rights is the philosophy according to which many or all sentient animals have moral worth independent of their utility to humans, and that their most basic interests—such as avoiding suffering—should be afforded the same consideration as similar interests of human beings. The argument from marginal cases is often used to reach this conclusion. This argument holds that if marginal human beings such as infants, senile people, and the cognitively disabled are granted moral status and negative rights, then nonhuman animals must be granted the same moral consideration, since animals do not lack any known morally relevant characteristic that marginal-case humans have.
Broadly speaking, and particularly in popular discourse, the term "animal rights" is often used synonymously with "animal protection" or "animal liberation". More narrowly, "animal rights" refers to the idea that many animals have fundamental rights to be treated with respect as individuals—rights to life, liberty, and freedom from torture—that may not be overridden by considerations of aggregate welfare.
Many animal rights advocates oppose assigning moral value and fundamental protections on the basis of species membership alone. They consider this idea, known as speciesism, a prejudice as irrational as any other, and hold that animals should not be considered property or used as food, clothing, entertainment, or beasts of burden merely because they are not human. Cultural traditions such as Jainism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shinto, and animism also espouse varying forms of animal rights.
In parallel to the debate about moral rights, North American law schools now often teach animal law, and several legal scholars, such as Steven M. Wise and Gary L. Francione, support extending basic legal rights and personhood to nonhuman animals. The animals most often considered in arguments for personhood are hominids. Some animal-rights academics support this because it would break the species barrier, but others oppose it because it predicates moral value on mental complexity rather than sentience alone. As of November 2019, 29 countries had enacted bans on hominoid experimentation; Argentina granted captive orangutans basic human rights in 2014. Outside of primates, animal-rights discussions most often address the status of mammals (compare charismatic megafauna). Other animals (considered less sentient) have gained less attention—insects relatively little (outside Jainism) and animal-like bacteria hardly any. The vast majority of animals have no legally recognised rights.
Critics of animal rights argue that nonhuman animals are unable to enter into a social contract, and thus cannot have rights, a view summarised by the philosopher Roger Scruton, who writes that only humans have duties, and therefore only humans have rights. Another argument, associated with the utilitarian tradition, maintains that animals may be used as resources so long as there is no unnecessary suffering; animals may have some moral standing, but any interests they have may be overridden in cases of comparatively greater gains to aggregate welfare made possible by their use, though what counts as "necessary" suffering or a legitimate sacrifice of interests can vary considerably. Certain forms of animal-rights activism, such as the destruction of fur farms and of animal laboratories by the Animal Liberation Front, have attracted criticism, including from within the animal-rights movement itself, and prompted the U.S. Congress to enact laws, including the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, allowing the prosecution of this sort of activity as terrorism.
History
Main article: History of animal rightsThe concept of moral rights for animals dates to Ancient India, with roots in early Jain and Hindu history, while Eastern, African, and Indigenous peoples also have rich traditions of animal protection. In the Western world, Aristotle viewed animals as lacking reason and existing for human use, though other ancient philosophers believed animals deserved gentle treatment. Major religious traditions, chiefly Indian or Dharmic religions, opposed animal cruelty. While scholars like Descartes saw animals as unconscious automata, and Kant denied direct duties to animals, Jeremy Bentham emphasized their capacity to suffer. The publications of Charles Darwin eventually eroded the Cartesian view of animals. Darwin noted the mental and emotional continuity between humans and animals, suggesting the possibility of animal suffering. The anti-vivisection movement emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, driven significantly by women. From the 1970s onward, growing scholarly and activist interest in animal treatment has aimed to raise awareness and reform laws to improve animal rights and human–animal relationships.
In religion
See also: Animals in Islam; Christianity and animal rights; and Animal rights in Jainism, Hinduism, and BuddhismFor some the basis of animal rights is in religion or animal worship (or in general nature worship), with some religions banning killing any animal. In other religions animals are considered unclean. Hindu and Buddhist societies abandoned animal sacrifice and embraced vegetarianism from the 3rd century BCE. One of the most important sanctions of the Jain, Hindu, and Buddhist faiths is the concept of ahimsa, or refraining from the destruction of life. According to Buddhism, humans do not deserve preferential treatment over other living beings. The Dharmic interpretation of this doctrine prohibits the killing of any living being. These Indian religions' dharmic beliefs are reflected in the ancient Indian works of the Tolkāppiyam and Tirukkural, which contain passages that extend the idea of nonviolence to all living beings.
In Islam, animal rights were recognized early by the Sharia. This recognition is based on both the Qur'an and the Hadith. The Qur'an contains many references to animals, detailing that they have souls, form communities, communicate with God, and worship Him in their own way. Muhammad forbade his followers to harm any animal and asked them to respect animals' rights. Nevertheless, Islam does allow eating of certain species of animals.
According to Christianity, all animals, from the smallest to the largest, are cared for and loved. According to the Bible, "All these animals waited for the Lord, that the Lord might give them food at the hour. The Lord gives them, they receive; The Lord opens his hand, and they are filled with good things." It further says God "gave food to the animals, and made the crows cry."
Philosophical and legal approaches
Overview
Further information: Consequentialism and Deontological ethicsThe two main philosophical approaches to animal ethics are utilitarian and rights-based. The former is exemplified by Peter Singer, and the latter by Tom Regan and Gary Francione. Their differences reflect a distinction philosophers draw between ethical theories that judge the rightness of an act by its consequences (consequentialism/teleological ethics, or utilitarianism), and those that focus on the principle behind the act, almost regardless of consequences (deontological ethics). Deontologists argue that there are acts we should never perform, even if failing to do so entails a worse outcome.
There are a number of positions that can be defended from a consequentalist or deontologist perspective, including the capabilities approach, represented by Martha Nussbaum, and the egalitarian approach, which has been examined by Ingmar Persson and Peter Vallentyne. The capabilities approach focuses on what individuals require to fulfill their capabilities: Nussbaum (2006) argues that animals need a right to life, some control over their environment, company, play, and physical health.
Stephen R. L. Clark, Mary Midgley, and Bernard Rollin also discuss animal rights in terms of animals being permitted to lead a life appropriate for their kind. Egalitarianism favors an equal distribution of happiness among all individuals, which makes the interests of the worse off more important than those of the better off. Another approach, virtue ethics, holds that in considering how to act we should consider the character of the actor, and what kind of moral agents we should be. Rosalind Hursthouse has suggested an approach to animal rights based on virtue ethics. Mark Rowlands has proposed a contractarian approach.
Utilitarianism
Further information: Equal consideration of interests and UtilitarianismNussbaum (2004) writes that utilitarianism, starting with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, has contributed more to the recognition of the moral status of animals than any other ethical theory. The utilitarian philosopher most associated with animal rights is Peter Singer, professor of bioethics at Princeton University. Singer is not a rights theorist, but uses the language of rights to discuss how we ought to treat individuals. He is a preference utilitarian, meaning that he judges the rightness of an act by the extent to which it satisfies the preferences (interests) of those affected.
His position is that there is no reason not to give equal consideration to the interests of human and nonhumans, though his principle of equality does not require identical treatment. A mouse and a man both have an interest in not being kicked, and there are no moral or logical grounds for failing to accord those interests equal weight. Interests are predicated on the ability to suffer, nothing more, and once it is established that a being has interests, those interests must be given equal consideration. Singer quotes the English philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900): "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other."
Singer argues that equality of consideration is a prescription, not an assertion of fact: if the equality of the sexes were based only on the idea that men and women were equally intelligent, we would have to abandon the practice of equal consideration if this were later found to be false. But the moral idea of equality does not depend on matters of fact such as intelligence, physical strength, or moral capacity. Equality therefore cannot be grounded on the outcome of scientific investigations into the intelligence of nonhumans. All that matters is whether they can suffer.
Commentators on all sides of the debate now accept that animals suffer and feel pain, although it was not always so. Bernard Rollin, professor of philosophy, animal sciences, and biomedical sciences at Colorado State University, writes that Descartes's influence continued to be felt until the 1980s. Veterinarians trained in the US before 1989 were taught to ignore pain, he writes, and at least one major veterinary hospital in the 1960s did not stock narcotic analgesics for animal pain control. In his interactions with scientists, he was often asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" evidence that they could feel pain.
Scientific publications have made it clear since the 1980s that the majority of researchers do believe animals suffer and feel pain, though it continues to be argued that their suffering may be reduced by an inability to experience the same dread of anticipation as humans or to remember the suffering as vividly. The ability of animals to suffer, even it may vary in severity, is the basis for Singer's application of equal consideration. The problem of animal suffering, and animal consciousness in general, arose primarily because it was argued that animals have no language. Singer writes that, if language were needed to communicate pain, it would often be impossible to know when humans are in pain, though we can observe pain behavior and make a calculated guess based on it. He argues that there is no reason to suppose that the pain behavior of nonhumans would have a different meaning from the pain behavior of humans.
Subjects-of-a-life
Further information: The Case for Animal RightsTom Regan, professor emeritus of philosophy at North Carolina State University, argues in The Case for Animal Rights (1983) that nonhuman animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life", and as such are bearers of rights. He writes that, because the moral rights of humans are based on their possession of certain cognitive abilities, and because these abilities are also possessed by at least some nonhuman animals, such animals must have the same moral rights as humans. Although only humans act as moral agents, both marginal-case humans, such as infants, and at least some nonhumans must have the status of "moral patients".
Moral patients are unable to formulate moral principles, and as such are unable to do right or wrong, even though what they do may be beneficial or harmful. Only moral agents are able to engage in moral action. Animals for Regan have "intrinsic value" as subjects-of-a-life, and cannot be regarded as a means to an end, a view that places him firmly in the abolitionist camp. His theory does not extend to all animals, but only to those that can be regarded as subjects-of-a-life. He argues that all normal mammals of at least one year of age would qualify:
... individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests.
Whereas Singer is primarily concerned with improving the treatment of animals and accepts that, in some hypothetical scenarios, individual animals might be used legitimately to further human or nonhuman ends, Regan believes we ought to treat nonhuman animals as we would humans. He applies the strict Kantian ideal (which Kant himself applied only to humans) that they ought never to be sacrificed as a means to an end, and must be treated as ends in themselves.
Abolitionism
Further information: Abolitionism (animal rights) and Animals, Property, and the LawGary Francione, professor of law and philosophy at Rutgers Law School in Newark, is a leading abolitionist writer, arguing that animals need only one right, the right not to be owned. Everything else would follow from that paradigm shift. He writes that, although most people would condemn the mistreatment of animals, and in many countries there are laws that seem to reflect those concerns, "in practice the legal system allows any use of animals, however abhorrent." The law only requires that any suffering not be "unnecessary". In deciding what counts as "unnecessary", an animal's interests are weighed against the interests of human beings, and the latter almost always prevail.
Francione's Animals, Property, and the Law (1995) was the first extensive jurisprudential treatment of animal rights. In it, Francione compares the situation of animals to the treatment of slaves in the United States, where legislation existed that appeared to protect them while the courts ignored that the institution of slavery itself rendered the protection unenforceable. He offers as an example the United States Animal Welfare Act, which he describes as an example of symbolic legislation, intended to assuage public concern about the treatment of animals, but difficult to implement.
He argues that a focus on animal welfare, rather than animal rights, may worsen the position of animals by making the public feel comfortable about using them and entrenching the view of them as property. He calls animal rights groups who pursue animal welfare issues, such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the "new welfarists", arguing that they have more in common with 19th-century animal protectionists than with the animal rights movement; indeed, the terms "animal protection" and "protectionism" are increasingly favored. His position in 1996 was that there is no animal rights movement in the United States.
Contractarianism
Further information: Social contractMark Rowlands, professor of philosophy at the University of Florida, has proposed a contractarian approach, based on the original position and the veil of ignorance—a "state of nature" thought experiment that tests intuitions about justice and fairness—in John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971). In the original position, individuals choose principles of justice (what kind of society to form, and how primary social goods will be distributed), unaware of their individual characteristics—their race, sex, class, or intelligence, whether they are able-bodied or disabled, rich or poor—and therefore unaware of which role they will assume in the society they are about to form.
The idea is that, operating behind the veil of ignorance, they will choose a social contract in which there is basic fairness and justice for them no matter the position they occupy. Rawls did not include species membership as one of the attributes hidden from the decision-makers in the original position. Rowlands proposes extending the veil of ignorance to include rationality, which he argues is an undeserved property similar to characteristics including race, sex and intelligence.
Prima facie rights theory
Further information: Prima facie rightAmerican philosopher Timothy Garry has proposed an approach that deems nonhuman animals worthy of prima facie rights. In a philosophical context, a prima facie (Latin for "on the face of it" or "at first glance") right is one that appears to be applicable at first glance, but upon closer examination may be outweighed by other considerations. In his book Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, Lawrence Hinman characterizes such rights as "the right is real but leaves open the question of whether it is applicable and overriding in a particular situation". The idea that nonhuman animals are worthy of prima facie rights is to say that, in a sense, animals have rights that can be overridden by many other considerations, especially those conflicting a human's right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Garry supports his view arguing:
... if a nonhuman animal were to kill a human being in the U.S., it would have broken the laws of the land and would probably get rougher sanctions than if it were a human. My point is that like laws govern all who interact within a society, rights are to be applied to all beings who interact within that society. This is not to say these rights endowed by humans are equivalent to those held by nonhuman animals, but rather that if humans possess rights then so must all those who interact with humans.
In sum, Garry suggests that humans have obligations to nonhuman animals; animals do not, and ought not to, have uninfringible rights against humans.
Feminism and animal rights
Further information: Women and animal advocacy, Ethics of care, and Feminist ethicsWomen have played a central role in animal advocacy since the 19th century. The anti-vivisection movement in the 19th and early 20th century in England and the United States was largely run by women, including Frances Power Cobbe, Anna Kingsford, Lizzy Lind af Hageby and Caroline Earle White (1833–1916). Garner writes that 70 per cent of the membership of the Victoria Street Society (one of the anti-vivisection groups founded by Cobbe) were women, as were 70 per cent of the membership of the British RSPCA in 1900.
The modern animal advocacy movement has a similar representation of women. They are not invariably in leadership positions: during the March for Animals in Washington, D.C., in 1990—the largest animal rights demonstration held until then in the United States—most of the participants were women, but most of the platform speakers were men. Nevertheless, several influential animal advocacy groups have been founded by women, including the British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection by Cobbe in London in 1898; the Animal Welfare Board of India by Rukmini Devi Arundale in 1962; and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, co-founded by Ingrid Newkirk in 1980. In the Netherlands, Marianne Thieme and Esther Ouwehand were elected to parliament in 2006 representing the Parliamentary group for Animals.
The preponderance of women in the movement has led to a body of academic literature exploring feminism and animal rights, such as feminism and vegetarianism or veganism, the oppression of women and animals, and the male association of women and animals with nature and emotion, rather than reason—an association that several feminist writers have embraced. Lori Gruen writes that women and animals serve the same symbolic function in a patriarchal society: both are "the used"; the dominated, submissive "Other". When the British feminist Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) published A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), Thomas Taylor (1758–1835), a Cambridge philosopher, responded with an anonymous parody, A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes (1792), saying that Wollstonecraft's arguments for women's rights could be applied equally to animals, a position he intended as reductio ad absurdum. In her works The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (1990) and The Pornography of Meat (2004), Carol J. Adams focuses in particular on what she argues are the links between the oppression of women and that of non-human animals.
Transhumanism
Some transhumanists argue for animal rights, liberation, and "uplift" of animal consciousness into machines. Transhumanism also understands animal rights on a gradation or spectrum with other types of sentient rights, including human rights and the rights of conscious artificial intelligences (posthuman rights).
Socialism and anti-capitalism
According to sociologist David Nibert of Wittenberg University, the struggle for animal liberation must happen in tandem with a more generalized struggle against human oppression and exploitation under global capitalism. He says that under a more egalitarian democratic socialist system, one that would "allow a more just and peaceful order to emerge" and be "characterized by economic democracy and a democratically controlled state and mass media", there would be "much greater potential to inform the public about vital global issues—and the potential for "campaigns to improve the lives of other animals" to be "more abolitionist in nature." Philosopher Steven Best of the University of Texas at El Paso states that the animal liberation movement, as characterized by the Animal Liberation Front and its various offshoots, "is a significant threat to global capital."
... Animal liberation challenges large sectors of the capitalist economy by assailing corporate agriculture and pharmaceutical companies and their suppliers. Far from being irrelevant to social movements, animal rights can form the basis for a broad coalition of progressive social groups and drive changes that strike at the heart of capitalist exploitation of animals, people and the earth.
Critics
R. G. Frey
R. G. Frey, professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University, is a preference utilitarian. In his early work, Interests and Rights (1980), Frey disagreed with Singer—who wrote in Animal Liberation (1975) that the interests of nonhuman animals must be given equal consideration when judging the consequences of an act—on the grounds that animals have no interests. Frey argues that interests are dependent on desire, and that no desire can exist without a corresponding belief. Animals have no beliefs, because a belief state requires the ability to hold a second-order belief—a belief about the belief—which he argues requires language: "If someone were to say, e.g. 'The cat believes that the door is locked,' then that person is holding, as I see it, that the cat holds the declarative sentence 'The door is locked' to be true; and I can see no reason whatever for crediting the cat or any other creature which lacks language, including human infants, with entertaining declarative sentences."
Carl Cohen
Carl Cohen, professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan, argues that rights holders must be able to distinguish between their own interests and what is right. "The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked." Cohen rejects Singer's argument that, since a brain-damaged human could not make moral judgments, moral judgments cannot be used as the distinguishing characteristic for determining who is awarded rights. Cohen writes that the test for moral judgment "is not a test to be administered to humans one by one", but should be applied to the capacity of members of the species in general.
Richard Posner
Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit debated the issue of animal rights in 2001 with Peter Singer. Posner posits that his moral intuition tells him "that human beings prefer their own. If a dog threatens a human infant, even if it requires causing more pain to the dog to stop it, than the dog would have caused to the infant, then we favour the child. It would be monstrous to spare the dog."
Singer challenges this by arguing that formerly unequal rights for gays, women, and certain races were justified using the same set of intuitions. Posner replies that equality in civil rights did not occur because of ethical arguments, but because facts mounted that there were no morally significant differences between humans based on race, sex, or sexual orientation that would support inequality. If and when similar facts emerge about humans and animals, the differences in rights will erode too. But facts will drive equality, not ethical arguments that run contrary to instinct, he argues. Posner calls his approach "soft utilitarianism", in contrast to Singer's "hard utilitarianism". He argues:
The "soft" utilitarian position on animal rights is a moral intuition of many, probably most, Americans. We realize that animals feel pain, and we think that to inflict pain without a reason is bad. Nothing of practical value is added by dressing up this intuition in the language of philosophy; much is lost when the intuition is made a stage in a logical argument. When kindness toward animals is levered into a duty of weighting the pains of animals and of people equally, bizarre vistas of social engineering are opened up.
Roger Scruton
Roger Scruton, the British philosopher, argued that rights imply obligations. Every legal privilege, he wrote, imposes a burden on the one who does not possess that privilege: that is, "your right may be my duty." Scruton therefore regarded the emergence of the animal rights movement as "the strangest cultural shift within the liberal worldview", because the idea of rights and responsibilities is, he argued, distinctive to the human condition, and it makes no sense to spread them beyond our own species.
He accused animal rights advocates of "pre-scientific" anthropomorphism, attributing traits to animals that are, he says, Beatrix Potter-like, where "only man is vile." It is within this fiction that the appeal of animal rights lies, he argued. The world of animals is non-judgmental, filled with dogs who return our affection almost no matter what we do to them, and cats who pretend to be affectionate when, in fact, they care only about themselves. It is, he argued, a fantasy, a world of escape.
Scruton singled out Peter Singer, a prominent Australian philosopher and animal-rights activist, for criticism. He wrote that Singer's works, including Animal Liberation, "contain little or no philosophical argument. They derive their radical moral conclusions from a vacuous utilitarianism that counts the pain and pleasure of all living things as equally significant and that ignores just about everything that has been said in our philosophical tradition about the real distinction between persons and animals."
Tom Regan countered this view of rights by distinguishing moral agents and moral patients.
Public attitudes
According to a 2000 paper by Harold Herzog and Lorna Dorr, previous academic surveys of attitudes toward animal rights tended to have small sample sizes and non-representative groups. But a number of factors appear to correlate with people's attitudes about the treatment of animals and animal rights. These include gender, age, occupation, religion, and level of education. There is also evidence suggesting that experience with pets may be a factor in people's attitudes.
According to some studies, women are more likely to empathize with the cause of animal rights than men. A 1996 study suggested that factors that may partially explain this discrepancy include attitudes towards feminism and science, scientific literacy, and the presence of a greater emphasis on "nurturance or compassion" among women.
A common misconception about animal rights is that its proponents want to grant nonhuman animals the same legal rights as humans, such as the right to vote. This is false. Rather, the idea is that animals should have rights that accord with their interests (for example, cats have no interest in voting, and so should not have the right to vote). A 2016 study found that support for animal testing may not be based on cogent philosophical rationales and that more open debate is warranted.
A 2007 survey that examined whether people who believe in evolution are more likely to support animal rights than creationists and believers in intelligent design found that this was largely the case; according to the researchers, strong Christian fundamentalists and believers in creationism were less likely to advocate for animal rights than those who were less fundamentalist in their beliefs. The findings extended previous research, such as a 1992 study that found that 48% of animal rights activists were atheists or agnostic. A 2019 Washington Post study found that those with favorable attitudes toward animal rights also tend to have favorable views of universal healthcare; reducing discrimination against African Americans, the LGBT community, and undocumented immigrants; and expanding welfare to aid the poor.
Two surveys found that attitudes toward animal rights tactics, such as direct action, are very diverse within the animal rights communities. Near half (50% and 39% in two surveys) of activists do not support direct action. One survey concluded, "it would be a mistake to portray animal rights activists as homogeneous."
Even though around 90% of U.S. adults regularly consume meat, almost half of them appear to support a ban on slaughterhouses: in Sentience Institute's 2017 survey of 1,094 U.S. adults' attitudes toward animal farming, 49% "support a ban on factory farming, 47% support a ban on slaughterhouses, and 33% support a ban on animal farming". The 2017 survey was replicated by researchers at Oklahoma State University, who found similar results: 73% of respondents answered "yes" to the question "Were you aware that slaughterhouses are where livestock are killed and processed into meat, such that, without them, you would not be able to consume meat?"
In the U.S., the National Farmers Organization held many public protest slaughters in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Protesting low prices for meat, farmers killed their animals in front of media representatives. The carcasses were wasted and not eaten. This effort backfired because it angered people to see animals needlessly and wastefully killed.
See also
- Animals portal
- Animal cognition
- Animal consciousness
- Animal–industrial complex
- Animal liberation
- Animal liberation movement
- Animal liberationist
- Animal rights by country or territory
- Animal studies
- Animal suffering
- Animal trial
- Animal Welfare Institute
- Antinaturalism (politics)
- Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness
- Chick culling
- Cruelty to animals
- Critical animal studies
- Deep ecology
- Do Animals Have Rights? (book)
- List of animal rights advocates
- List of songs about animal rights
- Moral circle expansion
- Non-human electoral candidate
- Open rescue
- Plant rights
- Sentientism
- Timeline of animal welfare and rights
- Wild animal suffering
- World Animal Day
References
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- DeGrazia (2002), ch. 2; Taylor (2009), ch. 1.
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- Compare for example similar usage of the term in 1938: The American Biology Teacher. Vol. 53. National Association of Biology Teachers. 1938. p. 211. Retrieved 16 April 2021.
The foundation from which these behaviors spring is the ideology known as speciesism. Speciesism is deeply rooted in the widely-held belief that the human species is entitled to certain rights and privileges.
- Horta (2010).
- That a central goal of animal rights is to eliminate the property status of animals, see Sunstein (2004), p. 11ff.
- For speciesism and fundamental protections, see Waldau (2011).
- For food, clothing, research subjects or entertainment, see Francione (1995), p. 17.
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Cohen, Carl; Regan, Tom (2001). The Animal Rights Debate. Point/Counterpoint: Philosophers Debate Contemporary Issues Series. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 47. ISBN 9780847696628. Retrieved 16 April 2021.
Too often overlooked in the animal world, according to Sapontzis, are insects that have interests, and therefore rights.
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The concept of "bacteria rights" can appear coupled with disdain or irony:
Pluhar, Evelyn B. (1995). "Human "superiority" and the argument from marginal cases". Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Book collections on Project MUSE. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. p. 9. ISBN 9780822316480. Retrieved 16 April 2021.
For example, in an editorial entitled 'Animal Rights Nonsense,' ... in the prestigious science journal Nature, defenders of animal rights are accused of being committed to the absurdity of 'bacteria rights.'
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: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ Grant, Catharine (2006). The No-nonsense Guide to Animal Rights. New Internationalist. p. 24. ISBN 9781904456407.
These religions emphasize ahimsa, which is the principle of non-violence towards all living things. The first precept is a prohibition against the killing of any creature. The Jain, Hindu and Buddhist injunctions against killing serve to teach that all creatures are spiritually equal.
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: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - "Animal rights". BBC. Archived from the original on 8 March 2021. Retrieved 17 March 2019.
The main reason for Hindu respect for animal rights is the principle of ahimsa. According to the principle of ahimsa, no living thing should be harmed. This applies to humans and animals. The Jains' belief system takes the principle of ahimsa regarding animals so seriously that as well as being strict vegetarians, some followers wear masks to prevent them breathing in insects. They may also sweep paths with a small broom to make sure they do not tread on any living creatures.
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Ahimsa is the ruling principle of Indian life from the very earliest times. ... This positive spiritual attitude is easily explained to the common man in a negative way as "ahimsa" and hence this way of denoting it. Tiruvalluvar speaks of this as "kollaamai" or "non-killing."
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Further reading
- Lubinski, Joseph (2002). "Overview Summary of Animal Rights", The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law.
- "Great Apes and the Law", The Animal Legal and Historical Center at Michigan State University College of Law.
- Bekoff, Marc (ed.) (2009). The Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare. Greenwood.
- Best, Steven and Nocella II, Anthony J. (eds). (2004). Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals. Lantern Books
- Chapouthier, Georges and Nouët, Jean-Claude (eds.) (1998). The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights. Ligue Française des Droits de l'Animal.
- Dawkins, Richard (1993). Gaps in the mind, in Cavalieri, Paola and Singer, Peter (eds.). The Great Ape Project. St. Martin's Griffin.
- Dombrowski, Daniel (1997). Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases. University of Illinois Press.
- Favre, David S. (2018). Respecting Animals: A Balanced Approach to Our Relationship with Pets, Food, and Wildlife. Prometheus. ISBN 978-1633884250.
- Finlayson, Lorna, "Let them eat oysters" (review of Peter Singer, Animal Liberation Now, Penguin, 2023, ISBN 978 1 84792 776 7, 368 pp; and Martha Nussbaum, Justice for Animals, Simon & Schuster, 2023, ISBN 978 1 982102 50 0, 372 pp.), London Review of Books, vol. 45, no.19 (5 October 2023), pp. 3, 5–8. The question of animal rights has been approached from a variety of theoretical orientations, including utilitarianism and capabilities approach ("CA") – none of them satisfactory to reviewer Lorna Finlayson, who teaches philosophy at England's University of Essex and ends up (p. 8) suggesting "think politically about animals: "It ought to be – it is – possible to arrange society differently." (p. 8.)
- Foltz, Richard (2006). Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim Cultures. Oneworld Publications.
- Franklin, Julian H. (2005). Animal Rights and Moral Philosophy. University of Columbia Press.
- Gruen, Lori (2003). "The Moral Status of Animals", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 1, 2003.
- Gruen, Lori (2011). Ethics and Animals. Cambridge University Press.
- Hall, Lee (2006). Capers in the Churchyard: Animal Rights Advocacy in the Age of Terror. Nectar Bat Press.
- Linzey, Andrew and Clarke, Paul A. B.(eds.) (1990). Animal Rights: A Historic Anthology. Columbia University Press.
- Mann, Keith (2007). From Dusk 'til Dawn: An Insider's View of the Growth of the Animal Liberation Movement. Puppy Pincher Press.
- McArthur, Jo-Anne and Wilson, Keith (eds). (2020). Hidden: Animals in the Anthropocene. Lantern Publishing & Media.
- Neumann, Jean-Marc (2012). "The Universal Declaration of Animal Rights or the Creation of a New Equilibrium between Species". Animal Law Review volume 19–1.
- Nibert, David (2002). Animal Rights, Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation. Rowman and Litterfield.
- Nibert, David, ed. (2017). Animal Oppression and Capitalism. Praeger Publishing. ISBN 978-1440850738.
- Patterson, Charles (2002). Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. Lantern.
- Rachels, James (1990). Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism. Oxford University Press.
- Regan, Tom and Singer, Peter (eds.) (1976). Animal Rights and Human Obligations. Prentice-Hall.
- Spiegel, Marjorie (1996). The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery. Mirror Books.
- Sztybel, David (2006). "Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust?" Ethics and the Environment 11 (Spring): 97–132.
- Tobias, Michael (2000). Life Force: The World of Jainism. Asian Humanities Press.
- Wilson, Scott (2010). "Animals and Ethics" Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Kymlicka, W., Donaldson, S. (2011) Zoopolis. A Political Theory of Animal Rights. Oxford University Press.
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