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{{Short description|Sectarian/anti-government warfare in American-occupied Iraq}}
{{Current}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=December 2024}}
The '''Iraqi insurgency''' comprises various ] and ] groups who are engaged in a struggle, usually violent, against the ]s (often incorrectly referred to as "foreign occupation forces") and the ]. The insurgency began shortly after the ] and increased during the ] as a new Iraqi government was being established under the auspices of the ]. It has continued during the transitional ].
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict = Iraqi insurgency
| partof = the ]
| image = Iraqi insurgents with guns, 2006.jpg
| image_size =
| caption = Insurgents in northern Iraq, 2006
| date = 1 May 2003 – 18 December 2011<br />({{Age in months, weeks and days|2003-05-01|2011-12-18}})
| place = Iraq
| result = Inconclusive
* ] deteriorates into ]
* 20,000+ additional American soldiers deployed to Iraq to quell violence in ]
* Coalition failure to defeat Iraqi insurgency<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Krepinevich|first1=Andrew F.|last2=Jr|date=2005-09-01|title=How to Win in Iraq|language=en-US|work=Foreign Affairs|issue=September/October 2005|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2005-09-01/how-win-iraq|access-date=2023-10-20|issn=0015-7120}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Georgy|first=Michael|date=2023-03-16|title=Iraqi ambush of Americans made a mockery of 'Mission Accomplished'|language=en|agency=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-ambush-americans-made-mockery-mission-accomplished-2023-03-16/|access-date=2023-10-20}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Mazzetti|first=Mark|date=2004-07-06|title=U.S. Response to Insurgency Called a Failure|work=Los Angeles Times|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-jul-06-fg-counterinsurgency6-story.html|access-date=2023-10-20|language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Cordesman|first=Anthony H.|date=2020-01-02|title=America's Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf|url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf|language=en}}</ref>
* End of American military presence in Iraq with ]
* Continued ]
| combatant1 = {{flag|United States}}<br />{{flag|United Kingdom}}
{{collapsible list
| bullets = yes
| titlestyle = background:transparent;font-weight:normal;text-align:left;
| title = {{flagicon image|Flag of Multi-National Force&nbsp;– Iraq.png}} ]<br />(2003–09)
| {{flag|United States}} (2003–09)
| {{flag|United Kingdom}} (2003–09)
| {{flag|Australia}} (2003–09)
| {{flag|Romania}} (2003–09)
| {{flag|Azerbaijan}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Kuwait}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Estonia}} (2003–09)
| {{flag|El Salvador}} (2003–09)
| {{flag|Bulgaria}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Moldova}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Albania}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Ukraine}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Denmark}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Czech Republic}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|South Korea}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Singapore}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Croatia}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Bosnia and Herzegovina}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|North Macedonia|name=Republic of Macedonia}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Latvia}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Poland}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Kazakhstan}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Mongolia}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Georgia}} (2003–08)
| {{flag|Tonga}} (2004–08)
| {{flag|Japan}} (2004–08)
| {{flag|Armenia}} (2005–08)
| {{flag|Slovakia}} (2003–07)
| {{flag|Lithuania}} (2003–07)
| {{flag|Italy}} (2003–06)
| {{flag|Norway}} (2003–06)
| {{flag|Hungary}} (2003–05)
| {{flag|Netherlands}} (2003–05)
| {{flag|Portugal}} (2003–05)
| {{flag|New Zealand}} (2003–04)
| {{flag|Thailand}} (2003–04)
| {{flag|Philippines}} (2003–04)
| {{flag|Honduras|1949}} (2003–04)
| {{flag|Dominican Republic}} (2003–04)
| {{flag|Spain}} (2003–04)
| {{flag|Nicaragua}} (2003–04)
| {{flag|Iceland}} (2003–unknown)
}}
{{flagdeco|Iraq}} ]
* ]
* ]
* {{flag|Iraqi Kurdistan}}
** ]
]
'''Supported by''':<br />{{flagicon|IRN}} ]<ref>Elaheh Rostami-Povey, ''Iran's Influence: A Religious-Political State and Society in Its Region'', pp. 130–154, Zed Books Ltd, 2010.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Felter_Iranian_Strategy_in_Iraq.pdf|title=Iranian Strategy in Iraq Politics and 'Other Means'|access-date=12 January 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160305151457/http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Felter_Iranian_Strategy_in_Iraq.pdf|archive-date=5 March 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref>
* {{flagicon image|Seal of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army.svg|border=no}} ]
* {{flagicon image|Seal of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.svg|border=no}} ]
{{flag|NATO}}
* {{flagicon image|Seal_of_NATO_Training_Mission_–_Iraq.png}} ]
{{flag|Israel}}<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna3702655|title=U.S. employs Israeli tactics in Iraq|date=13 December 2003|publisher=NBC News|access-date=2023-06-12}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine|last=Hersh|first=Seymour M.|date=21 June 2004|title=As June 30th approaches, Israel looks to the Kurds.|magazine=]|url=https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/06/28/plan-b-2|access-date=12 June 2023}}</ref>{{Sfnp|Bishku|2018|p=63}}<br />{{flag|United Nations}}
* ]
* ]
** ]
| combatant2 = {{flagicon image|Flag_of_the_Ba%27ath_Party.svg}} ''']'''
* {{flagicon image|Fedayeen_Saddam_SSI.svg}} ] (2003 Only)
* ] (from 2007)
** {{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq|1991}} ] (from 2006)
| combatant3 = {{flagicon image|Flag of Jihad.svg}} '''Sunni insurgents'''
* {{flagicon image|Flag of al-Qaeda in Iraq.svg}} ] (2004–06)
* {{flagdeco|ISIL}} ]<ref name="YouTube">{{cite AV media|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2a01Rg2g2Z8#t=745|archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211221/2a01Rg2g2Z8|archive-date=2021-12-21|url-status=live|title=President Barack Obama Speaks With VICE News|date=16 March 2015|via=YouTube}}{{cbignore}}</ref> (from 2006)
* {{flagicon image|Flag of Islamic Army In Iraq.svg}} ]
* {{flagicon image|Flag of Jama'at Ansar al-Sunnah.svg}} ] (2003–07)
*{{flagicon image|Iraqi Islamic Resistance Army.jpg}} Iraqi Islamic Resistance Army
* ]
| combatant4 = {{flagicon image|Shiism arabic blue.svg}} '''Shia insurgents'''
* {{flagicon image|Flag of the Mahdi Army.svg}} ] (2003–2008)
* {{flagicon image|Flag of Promised Day Brigades.svg}} ] (from 2008)
* {{flagicon image|Shiism arabic blue.svg}} ]
* {{flagicon image|Kata'ib Hezbollah sans logo.JPG}} ]
* {{flagicon image|Flag of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (Variant).svg}} ]
* ]
* ]
| commander1 = '''{{flagdeco|United States}} ]'''<br />{{flagdeco|United States}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|United States}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|United States}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|United States}} ]<br />{{Flagdeco|United Kingdom}} ''']'''<br />{{flagdeco|United Kingdom}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|United Kingdom}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Australia}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Australia}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Italy}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Canada}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Spain}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Denmark}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Poland}} ]<br/>{{flagdeco|Iraq}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Iraq}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Iraq}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Iran}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Iran}} ]<br />{{flagdeco|Iran}} ]<br>{{flagicon|Iran}} ]
| commander2 = '''{{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq|1991}} ]{{POW}}]'''<br />{{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq|1991}} ]<br />{{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq|1991}} ]<br />{{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq|1991}} ]<br />{{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq|1991}} ]{{POW}}{{executed}}<br />{{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq|1991}} ]{{POW}}{{executed}}<br />{{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq|1991}} ]{{POW}}<br />{{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq|1991}} ]
| commander3 = '''{{flagicon image|Flag of al-Qaeda in Iraq.svg}} ]{{KIA}}'''<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of al-Qaeda in Iraq.svg}} ]{{KIA}}<br />{{flagdeco|ISIL}} ]{{KIA}}<br />{{flagdeco|ISIL}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of al-Qaeda in Iraq.svg}} ]{{POW}}<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of Islamic Army In Iraq.svg}} Ishmael Jubouri
| commander4 = '''{{flagicon image|Flag of the Mahdi Army.svg}}{{flagicon image|Flag of Promised Day Brigades.svg}} ]'''<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of the Mahdi Army.svg}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of the Mahdi Army.svg}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|Kata'ib Hezbollah sans logo.JPG}}{{flagicon image|Flag of the Mahdi Army.svg}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (Variant).svg}}{{flagicon image|Flag of the Mahdi Army.svg}}]
| strength1 =
| strength2 =
| strength3 =
| casualties1 =
| casualties2 =
| casualties3 =
| notes =
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Iraq War}}
{{Campaignbox Persian Gulf Wars}}
| alt = Two masked Iraqi men with weapons during the insurgency that followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq
}}
<!-- bolding not necessary per ] -->


An '''Iraqi insurgency''' began shortly after the 2003 ] deposed longtime leader ]. It is considered to have lasted until the end of the ] and U.S. withdrawal in 2011. It was followed by a ].
Not all those opposed to the new Iraqi government, the multinational force and/or the reconstruction use violent means; there are various Iraqi groups and political parties advocating peaceful, non-violent resistance. Thus the alternative term "'''Iraqi resistance'''" is favored by some, especially when discussing these groups.


The initial outbreak of violence (the ]) was triggered by the fall and preceded the establishment of the new ] by the ] (MNF–I), which was led by the United States. From around 2004 to May 2007, Iraqi insurgents largely focused their attacks on MNF-I troops,<ref>{{cite web|title=Meeting Resistance: New Doc Follows Iraqis Fighting U.S. Occupation of Their Country|publisher=Democracy Now!|url=http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=07/10/18/1419205|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071113204643/http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=07%2F10%2F18%2F1419205|url-status=dead|archive-date=13 November 2007|access-date=1 August 2008}} "Know Thine Enemy" | New York Times |21 October 2007 "Meeting Resistance is directed by journalists Molly Bingham and Steve Connors. In a video op-ed for the New York Times, they cite Pentagon reports between 2004 and '07 to claim 74% of attacks by Iraqi insurgents target American-led occupation forces. They also cite a recent BBC/ABC poll which found 100% of Iraqis polled disapproved of attacks on Iraqi civilians."</ref> but later shifted to targeting the post-invasion ] as well.
==Composition ==
]s celebrate while riding through the streets of ], May 1, 2004.]]


The insurgents were composed of a ], pro-Saddam ], local Iraqis opposed to the MNF–I and/or the post-Saddam Iraqi government, and a number of ]. The various insurgent groups fought an ] war of ] against the MNF–I and the Iraqi government, while also fighting among themselves.
The Iraqi insurgency is composed of at least a dozen major guerilla organizations and perhaps as many as 40 distinct groups. These groups are subdivided into countless smaller ]. Due to its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi insurgency is difficult to determine. It is often divided by analysts into several main ideological strands, some of which are believed to overlap:
* ], the armed supporters of ];
* ], mostly ] ], who fight for Iraqi independence;
* ] ] who fight to regain the power they held under previous regimes;
* Sunni ], the indigenous armed followers of the ] movement;
* Foreign Islamist fighters, largely driven by the similar Sunni ] doctrine, as well as the remnants of ];
* Militant followers of ] Islamist cleric ] (this group is currently not taking part in the insurgency); and
* Nonviolent resistance groups and political parties.


The insurgency was shaped by ], particularly between ] (~60% of the population) and ] (~35% of the population). By February 2006, the violence escalated into a ], and for the next two years, the MNF–I and the Iraqi government were locked in intense fighting with various militants, who were also targeting each other based on their sectarian affiliations. Many of the militant attacks in American-controlled territories were directed at the ]. Militancy continued amid ], as the federal government tried to establish itself in the country. The civil war and sectarian violence ended in mid-2008, having been quelled by the ].
===Ba'athists===
The Ba'athists include former ] officials, the ], and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence elements and security services, such as the ] and the ]. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist regime to power. The pre-war organization of the Ba'ath Party and its militias as a cellular structure aided the continued pro-Saddam insurgency after the fall of Baghdad, and Iraqi intelligence operatives may have developed a plan for ] war following the toppling of Saddam Hussein from power. Following Saddam's capture, the rhetoric of the Ba'athist insurgents gradually shifted to become either nationalist or Islamist, with the goal of restoring the Ba'ath Party to power as it once was seemingly out of reach. Many former Ba'athists
have adopted an Islamist façade in order to attract more credibility within the country, and perhaps support from outside Iraq. Others, especially following the January 2005 elections, became more interested in political pursuits.


However, after the ] in December 2011, a ] swept through the country, causing thousands of casualties. Two years later, the violence of the new insurgency escalated into the ], largely triggered by the rise of the ].
===Sunni Muslims===
The so-called '']'' from the Sunni Arab regions are drawn from former members of the Iraqi military as well as other Sunnis. Their reasons for opposing the occupation vary between a rejection of the foreign presence as a matter of principle to the failure of the occupation force to fully restore ]s and to quickly restore complete ]. Some Iraqis who have had relatives killed by coalition soldiers may also be involved in the insurgency. Most likely, the majority of the low-level members of the indigenous Sunni insurgency (such as foot soldiers) fall under this broad category. Some of those insurgents pursue the restoration of the power previously held by the Sunni minority in Iraq, who controlled all previous Iraqi regimes since the departure of the British. One former minister in the interim government, ], "launched a new political movement, saying he aimed to give a voice to figures from the 'legitimate Iraqi resistance. The birth of this political bloc is to silence the skeptics who say there is no legitimate Iraqi resistance and that they cannot reveal their political face,' he told a news conference." The coalition supports the development of opposition and resistance by political means.


===Moqtada al-Sadr=== == Background ==
{{Main|2003 invasion of Iraq}}
] in August 2004]]
The ] (20 March – 1 May 2003) began the ], or ''Operation Iraqi Freedom'', in which a combined force of troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and ] invaded Iraq and toppled the government of ] within 26 days of major combat operations. The invasion phase consisted of a conventionally fought war which concluded with the capture of the Iraq capital ] by U.S. forces.
Supporters of the young ] Islamist ] ] are largely young, unemployed and often ] men from the Shi'a ] areas and slums in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a cities. The Mahdi Army area of operation stretches from ] in the south to the ] section of ] in central Iraq (some scattered Shi'a militia activity has also been reported in ] and ], where Shi'a minorities exist).


Four countries participated with troops during the initial invasion phase, which lasted from 20 March to 15 April 2003. These were the United States (148,000), United Kingdom (45,000), Australia (2,000), and Poland (194). ] were involved in its aftermath. In preparation for the invasion, 100,000 U.S. troops were assembled in ] by 18 February.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/18/sprj.irq.deployment/index.html|title=U.S. has 100,000 troops in Kuwait|publisher=CNN|date=18 February 2003|access-date=1 March 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121108211421/http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/18/sprj.irq.deployment/index.html|archive-date=8 November 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> The United States supplied the majority of the invading forces, but also received support from ] in ].
Sadr was suspected by U.S and Iraqi authorities of ordering the assassination of a returning moderate Shiite cleric, ] ], in Najaf on April 12, 2003. On April 5, 2004, an warrant was issued for Sadr's arrest in connection with this killing; this, in addition to the closing of his newspaper al-Hawza on March 29, the arrrest of one of his aides, and other actions to suppress his movement led to an armed attack by the Mahdi Army in April of 2004. This initial attack in southern Iraq was suppressed by June. A second attack by his militia, centered in a mosque in ], began in August; this was resolved in an agreement brokered by ]. Since that point, Sadr 's opposition to the U.S-led occupation has mainly been in the realm of politics, although the Mahdi Army has been maintained as an organized force. Sadr supporters also continue to engage in peaceful resistance such as the large anti-occupation protests in Baghdad on April 9, 2005.


The invasion was preceded by an ] on the Presidential Palace in Baghdad on 20 March 2003. The following day coalition forces launched an incursion into ] from their massing point close to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. While the special forces launched an amphibious assault from the ] to secure ] and the surrounding petroleum fields, the main invasion army moved into southern Iraq, occupying the region and engaging in the ] on 23 March. Massive air strikes across the country and against Iraqi command and control threw the defending army into chaos and prevented an effective resistance. On 26 March the ] was ] near the northern city of ] where they joined forces with ] rebels and fought several actions against the ] to secure the northern part of the country.
Supporters of Moqtada al-Sadr are driven by a variety of beliefs and grievances which combine both the nationalist and ultra-conservative religious tendencies of the movement. They believe that the U.S. and UK are foreign occupiers and oppressors, that they have failed to live up to their promises, and that ] must eventually be established in Iraq. Al-Sadr's movement also opposes any breakup of Iraq according to ethnic, religious, or other lines.


The main body of coalition forces continued their drive into the heart of Iraq and met with little resistance. Most of the Iraqi military was quickly defeated and Baghdad was occupied on 9 April. Other operations occurred against pockets of the Iraqi army including the capture and occupation of Kirkuk on 10 April, and the attack and capture of ] on 15 April. ] Saddam Hussein and the central leadership went into hiding as the coalition forces completed the occupation of the country.
The Mahdi Army is believed by some sources to number between 3,000 and 10,000 guerrillas.


On 1 May, an end of major combat operations was declared, ending the invasion stage of the Iraq War and beginning the ] period and the Iraqi insurgency against coalition forces.
===Sunni Islamists===


On 23 May 2003, Iraqi military personnel, police and security services were disbanded per ] of the ] under Administrator ], leaving 400,000 soldiers jobless, which Western and Iraqi critics of the U.S. action said provided a ready pool of recruits for Islamist groups and other insurgents that emerged.<ref>{{Cite web|title=US Disbands Iraqi Army, Key Ministries – 2003-05-23|url=https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-2003-05-23-34-us-66851372/375875.html|publisher=Voice of America|date=27 October 2009}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Georgy|first=Michael|date=16 March 2023|title=Iraqi ambush of Americans made a mockery of 'Mission Accomplished'|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-ambush-americans-made-mockery-mission-accomplished-2023-03-16/|agency=Reuters}}</ref> Furthermore, for 10 months Iraq's borders were left open for anyone to come in without even a visa or a passport.<ref>{{Cite news|title=Learning from Fallujah|url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/22220/fallujah.pdf|work=Oxford Research Group|pages=6–7}}</ref>
The ] Islamists are composed of Iraqis belonging to the ] branch of ], which advocates a return to the pure Islam of the time of the ] and opposes any foreign non-Muslim influence. The beliefs of Salafi Islam are roughly similar to the ] sect of nearby ] (of which ] is a member), one difference being that Salafis in Iraq do not usually condone intolerance towards the Shi'a. Hard-line clerics and remaining underground cells of the ] in Iraq have helped provide support for the indigenous ] ] movement. Emerging as the most public
face of this faction of the Iraqi insurgency, and the most influential of the hard-line Salafi clerics, is the founder of the ultra-conservative ], Sheikh ].


===Foreign fighters=== == History ==
{{Further|Timeline of the Iraq War}}


=== 2003–2006: initial insurgency ===
These are non-Iraqi Muslims, mostly Arabs from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq, primarily through the porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, to assist the Iraqi insurgency. Many of these fighters are Wahabi fundamentalists who see Iraq as the new "field of ]" in the battle against U.S. forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of ] and the related group ], members of whom are suspected of infiltrating into the Sunni areas of Iraq through the mountainous northeastern border with ], may be involved. The U.S. and its allies point to ]ian-born Al-Qaeda leader ] as the key player in this group. Zarqawi is believed to be the head of an insurgent group called ] ("Monotheism and Holy War"), which according to U.S. estimates numbers in the low hundreds.
{{Main|Iraqi insurgency (2003–2006)}}
{{Further|Ramadi under U.S. military occupation}}
] tanks patrol the streets of ], Iraq in February 2005.]]
The Iraqi insurgency of 2003–06 erupted following the invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein's rule in May 2003. The armed insurgent opposition to the United States-led ] and the post-2003 Iraqi government lasted until early 2006, when it deteriorated into a sectarian civil war, the most violent phase of the Iraq War.


=== 2006–2008: insurgency to civil war ===
The extent of Zarqawi's influence is a source of controversy. The U.S. government describes him as the single most dangerous and capable insurgent operative working against the U.S.-led coalition and its Iraqi allies, responsible for a large number of major ] attacks. There are signs that an increasing rift is developing between supporters of al-Zarqawi, including both foreign guerrillas and some Iraqis who have adopted a hard-line Wahabi philosophy, and the nationalists and more moderate religious elements of the insurgency. The main source of the divide is over the ]s that have inflicted heavy Iraqi civilian casualties, along with disagreements about whether to cooperate with the Shi'a and their insurgency. However, the publicity given to Zarqawi has ensured that he has become an iconic figure to various Sunni Islamist groups, regardless of the actual scope of his influence, by much the same process that has made ] a symbol of the causes of various Islamist groups following the events of September 11th, 2001.
{{Main|Iraqi Civil War (2006–2008)}}
] and its provinces on 7 April 2007]]
Following the U.S.-launched 2003 invasion of Iraq, the situation deteriorated, and by 2007, the ] between Iraqi ] and ] factions was described by the ] as having elements of a civil war.<ref>{{cite news|title=Elements of 'civil war' in Iraq|quote=A US intelligence assessment on Iraq says "civil war" accurately describes certain aspects of the conflict, including intense sectarian violence.|date=2 February 2007|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/middle_east/6324767.stm|publisher=BBC News|access-date=2 January 2010}}</ref> In a 10 January 2007 address to the American people, President ] stated that "80% of Iraq's sectarian violence occurs within {{convert|30|mi|km}} of the capital. This violence is splitting ] into sectarian ]s, and shaking the confidence of all Iraqis."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html|title=President's Address to the Nation|publisher=The White House|date=10 January 2007|access-date=1 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110501145439/http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html|archive-date=1 May 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> Two polls of Americans conducted in 2006 found that between 65% and 85% believed Iraq was in a civil war;<ref name=IraqPoll1>{{cite news|url=http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/09/28/poll.iraq/index.html|title=Poll: Nearly two-thirds of Americans say Iraq in civil war|date=28 September 2006|publisher=CNN|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141129114323/http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/09/28/poll.iraq/index.html|archive-date=29 November 2014|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=IraqPoll2>{{Cite web|url=http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/dec06iraq.pdf|title=12/06 CBS: 85% of Americans now characterize the situation in Iraq as a Civil War|publisher=]|access-date=26 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171018164433/http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/dec06iraq.pdf|archive-date=18 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> however, a similar poll of Iraqis conducted in 2007 found that 61% did not believe that they were in a civil war.<ref name="TimesPoll">{{cite news|url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article1530762.ece|title=Iraqis: life is getting better|newspaper=The Times|date=18 March 2007|location=London|first=Marie|last=Colvin|access-date=30 April 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110429095521/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article1530762.ece|archive-date=29 April 2011|url-status=dead}}</ref>


In October 2006, the ] (UNHCR) and the ] estimated that more than 370,000 Iraqis had been displaced since the 2006 ] of the ], bringing the total number of Iraqi ]s to more than 1.6 million.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/452fa9954.html|title=UNHCR worried about effect of dire security situation on Iraq's displaced|publisher=United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)|access-date=26 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141129042719/http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/452fa9954.html|archive-date=29 November 2014|url-status=live}}</ref> By 2008, the UNHCR raised the estimate of refugees to a total of about 4.7 million (~16% of the population). The number of refugees estimated abroad was 2 million (a number close to ] projections<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iraq/|title=The World Factbook|access-date=26 April 2013}}</ref>) and the number of internally displaced people was 2.7 million.<ref name=UNHCR-04084> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080905005407/http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=briefing&id=4816ef534 |date=5 September 2008}}. Published 29 April 2008. Retrieved 20 May 2008.</ref> The estimated number of orphans across Iraq has ranged from 400,000 (according to the Baghdad Provincial Council), to five million (according to Iraq's anti-corruption board). A ] report from 2008 placed the number of orphans at about 870,000.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121217151042/http://gorillasguides.com/2007/12/15/5-million-orphans/ |date=17 December 2012}} English translation of Aswat Al Iraq newspaper 15 December 2007</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://mawtani.al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/iii/features/iraqtoday/2012/03/27/feature-01|title=Draft law seeks to provide Iraqi orphans with comprehensive support &#124; Mawtani|date=12 January 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130112045604/http://mawtani.al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/iii/features/iraqtoday/2012/03/27/feature-01|archive-date=12 January 2013}}</ref> The ] has also stated that Iraq's humanitarian situation remains among the most critical in the world, with millions of Iraqis forced to rely on insufficient and poor-quality water sources.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/iraq-report-170308/$file/ICRC-Iraq-report-0308-eng.pdf|title=Search results – Resource centre|work=International Committee of the Red Cross|access-date=26 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090907182444/http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/iraq-report-170308/$file/ICRC-Iraq-report-0308-eng.pdf|archive-date=7 September 2009|url-status=live}}</ref>
Usage of the term "foreign fighters" has received criticism as being US-centric because taken literally, the term would encompass coalition forces. Zarqawi himself has taken to taunting the American occupiers about the irony of the term: "Who is the foreigner, O cross worshippers? You are the ones who came to the land of the Muslims from your distant corrupt land." (Communiqué of ] ] ). Zarqawi's group has since announced the formation of the Ansar platoon, a squad of Iraqi suicide bombers, which an AP writer called "an apparent bid to deflect criticism that most suicide bombers in Iraq are foreigners."


According to the ], produced by ] magazine and the ], ] was one of the world's top 5 unstable states from 2005 to 2008.<ref>
While it is not known how many of those resisting the U.S. occupation in Iraq are not Iraqi, it is generally agreed that foreign fighters make up a small percentage of the insurgency. Major General Joseph Taluto, head of the 42nd Infantry Division, said that "99.9 per cent" of captured insurgents are Iraqi. This estimate is bolstered by the Pentagon's own figures; in an analysis of over 1,000 insurgents captured in Fallujah, U.S. Ground Commander General George Casey found only 15 non-Iraqis.
* {{cite web|url=http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=103&Itemid=325|title=Failed States list 2005|publisher=Fund for Peace|access-date=24 June 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080619230117/http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=103&Itemid=325|archive-date=19 June 2008}}
* {{cite web|url=http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=104&Itemid=324|title=Failed States list 2006|publisher=Fund for Peace|access-date=24 June 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080223095751/http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=104&Itemid=324|archive-date=23 February 2008}}
* {{cite web|url=http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366|title=Failed States list 2007|publisher=Fund for Peace|access-date=19 June 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070620194359/http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366|archive-date=20 June 2007}}
* {{cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350&page=1|title=Failed States list 2008|publisher=Fund for Peace|access-date=24 June 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080626091706/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350&page=1|archive-date=26 June 2008}}</ref> A poll of top U.S. foreign policy experts conducted in 2007 showed that over the next 10 years, just 3% of experts believed the U.S. would be able to rebuild Iraq into a "beacon of democracy" and 58% of experts believed that Sunni-Shiite tensions would dramatically increase in the Middle East.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070820/pl_nm/security_usa_bush_dc;_ylt=Au59xROu4wsVd5s8u2fll42s0NUE|title=U.S. foreign policy experts oppose surge}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/images/TI3_Final_Results.doc|title=Foreign Policy: Terrorism Survey III (Final Results)|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071031172626/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/images/TI3_Final_Results.doc|archive-date=31 October 2007}}</ref>


In June 2008, the ] reported that "the security, political and economic trends in Iraq continue to be positive; however, they remain fragile, reversible and uneven."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Master_16_June_08_%20FINAL_SIGNED%20.pdf|work=US Department of Defense|date=June 2008|title=Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080625062302/http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Master_16_June_08_%20FINAL_SIGNED%20.pdf|archive-date=25 June 2008}}</ref> In July 2008, the ] recommended that the U.S. Government should "develop an updated strategy for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself".<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08837.pdf|title=US Government Accountability Office (June 2008): Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq|access-date=26 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120330215141/http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08837.pdf|archive-date=30 March 2012|url-status=dead}}</ref> Steven Simon, a Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the ], wrote in May 2008 that "the recent short-term gains" had "come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq."<ref>{{cite magazine|url=http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html|magazine=Council on Foreign Relations|title=The Price of the Surge|first=Steven|last=Simon|date=May 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081218232810/http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html|archive-date=18 December 2008}}</ref>
There are many other historical guerrilla wars in which foreign fighters played an important role. It should be noted that many of the US-backed guerrillas fighting the ]-backed government and Soviet occupation of ] in the 1980s were not Afghans--many were Arab Islamists recruited outside Afghanistan.


After Iraqi security forces took the lead in security operations on 30 June 2009, Iraq experienced a "dramatic reduction in war-related violence of all types ..., with civilian and military deaths down by 80 to 90 percent compared with the same period in 2008."<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html|title=General Lays Out Pace of Iraq Pullout|work=The New York Times|date=10 December 2009|access-date=22 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170227161327/http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/13/world/middleeast/13iraq.html|archive-date=27 February 2017|url-status=live|last1=Nordland|first1=Rod}}</ref>
===Non-violent groups===
Apart from the armed insurgency, there are important non-violent groups that resist the foreign occupation through other means. The '']'' set up by Sheikh ] includes a broad range of religious, ethnic, and political currents united by their opposition to the occupation. Although it does not reject armed insurgency, which it regards as any nation's right, it favors non-violent politics and criticizes the formation of militias. It opposes institutions designed to implement American plans, such as the ] government and the U.S.-organized national conference designed as the antecedent to a ].


=== 2008–2011: low-level insurgency ===
Although the ] enforced a 1987 law banning unions in public enterprises, ]s such as the '']'' (IFTU) and Iraq's '']'' have also mounted effective anti-occupation opposition. . Trades unions have, however, themselves been subject to attacks from the insurgency. ] of the IFTU was assassinated under circumstances that pointed to a Ba'athist insurgency group on the 3rd of January 2005. No trades unions support the armed insurgency.
{{Main|2008 in Iraq|2009 in Iraq|2010 in Iraq|2011 in Iraq}}
{{Expand section|date=January 2016}}
In 2010, the low point for the al-Qaeda effort in Iraq, car bombings declined to an average of ten a month and multiple-location attacks occurred only two or three times a year.


== Aftermath ==
Another union federation, the General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE) opposes the occupation and calls for immediate withdrawal but was neutral on participation in the election. Whereas the GUOE wants all foreign troops out immediately, both the IFTU and the Workers Councils call for replacement of US and British forces with neutral forces from the UN, the Arab League and other nations as a transition. Many unions see the war as having two dimensions: military and economic. The GUOE has won strikes against both the Governing Council for pay raises and against ] over the use of foreign workers.


=== 2011–2013: American withdrawal and renewed insurgency ===
==Insurgency tactics==
{{Main|Iraqi insurgency (2011–2013)}}
Insurgent tactics vary widely, as well as the targets. Jihadist elements of the insurgency favor the use of car bombs, kidnappings, hostage-taking, shootings and other types of attacks to target Iraqi "collaborators" and U.S. forces with little regard for civilian casualties. Other groups claim to target their attacks on U.S forces and avoid the targeting of civilians.
{{Expand section|date=April 2013}}
The Iraqi attacks since ]<ref name=latimes2701>{{cite news|title=Suicide bomber kills 32 at Baghdad funeral march|url=https://www.foxnews.com/world/suicide-bomber-kills-32-at-baghdad-funeral-march/|agency=Associated Press|publisher=Fox News|access-date=22 April 2012|date=27 January 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120306053129/http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/01/27/car-bombing-kills-26-in-baghdad/|archive-date=6 March 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> relates to the last stage of violent terror activities engaged by Iraqi, primarily radical Sunni and Shia insurgent groups against the central government and the sectarian warfare between various factions within Iraq in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal. The events of post-U.S. withdrawal violence succeeded the previous insurgency in Iraq (prior to 18 December 2011), but have showed increasingly violent patterns,<ref name=alarabiya2902>{{cite web|url=http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/29/197696.html|title=As bombs hit Baghdad, Iraq says about 69, 263 people killed between 2004 and 2011|publisher=Al Arabiya|date=29 February 2012|access-date=7 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130910171312/http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/02/29/197696.html|archive-date=10 September 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref> raising concerns that the surging violence might slide into another civil war.<ref name=latimes2701/>


== Militant organizations ==
For most attacks, the Iraqi guerrillas operate in small teams of 5-10 men in order to maintain
The Iraqi ] is composed of at least a dozen major organizations and perhaps as many as 40 distinct groups. These groups are subdivided into countless smaller ]. The Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that less than 10% of insurgents are non-Iraqi foreign fighters.<ref name="guardian.co.uk">{{cite news|first1=Brian|last1=Whitaker|first2=Ewen|last2=MacAskill|title=Report attacks 'myth' of foreign fighters|work=The Guardian|date=23 September 2005|url=https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1576666,00.html|access-date=21 October 2007}}</ref> According to the Chief of the British General Staff, General Sir ], speaking in September 2007,
mobility and escape detection. Larger attacks involving as many as 150 men have appeared on occasion
since ], ] (although large units had also appeared in a few instances beforehand, such as a battle near the ]n border town of ] on ], ] and a large ambush of a U.S. convoy in the town of ] on ], ]).


{{Blockquote|The militants (and I use the word deliberately because not all are insurgents, or terrorists, or criminals; they are a mixture of them all) are well armed – probably with outside help, and probably from Iran. By motivation, essentially, and with the exception of the ] element who have endeavoured to exploit the situation for their own ends, our opponents are Iraqi Nationalists, and are most concerned with their own needs – jobs, money, security – and the majority are not bad people.<ref name=Speech>{{cite web|title=Address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies|date=21 September 2007|publisher=]|url=http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/ChiefStaff/20070921AddressToTheInternationalInstituteForStrategicStudies.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071009194854/http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/ChiefStaff/20070921AddressToTheInternationalInstituteForStrategicStudies.htm|archive-date=9 October 2007}}</ref>}}
All of the following methods of attack are designed to allow insurgent teams to strike quickly and escape detection afterwards.


]
===Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)===
Because of its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi insurgency is difficult to determine, but the main groupings are:
]
* ], the supporters of ]'s former administration including army or intelligence officers, whose ideology is a variant of ].
* ], Iraqis who believe in a strong version of Iraqi ]. These policies may not necessarily espouse a ] ideology, but rather advocate the country's ] including ] and ]. Historical figures of this movement include the pre-Ba'athist leader of Iraq ] and his government.
* Iraqi ] ], the indigenous armed followers of the Salafi movement, as well as any remnants of the ] ]: individuals with a Salafi-only policy opposed to non-Salafis though not aligned to one specific ethnic group. Though opposed to the U.S.-led invasion, these groups are not wholly sympathetic towards the former Ba'ath Party as its members included non-Salafis.
* ] militias, including the southern, ]-linked ], the ], and the central-Iraq followers of ]. These groups neither advocate the dominance of a single ethnic group, nor the traditional ideologies behind the Iraqi state (e.g. these particular Shi'as do not support the capture of Khuzestan or other border areas with Iran, but rather promote warm relations with Iran's Shi'a government).
* Foreign Islamist volunteers, including those often linked to ] and largely driven by the Salafi/Wahhabi doctrine (the two preceding categories are often lumped as "]ists");
* Possibly some socialist revolutionaries (such as the ], which claimed one attack in 2007).
* ] groups and political parties (not part of the armed insurgency).


=== Arab nationalists ===
Many Iraqi guerrilla attacks against coalition targets have taken the form of attacks on convoys and patrols using ]s, or IEDs. These explosive devices, made from former Iraqi military armaments and/or home-made materials, are concealed or camouflaged along main roads and detonated when a convoy or patrol passes. The method of detonation has varied as the U.S has adapted to insurgent tactics; originally using simple wires, U.S forces later became skilled as observing such devices and cell-phone signals and garage-door openers were used. These signals were eventually encrypted to avoid jamming by U.S devices and, more recently, infrared lasers have been used. 155 ] ] shells rigged with ]s have been the most commonly used, but the bombs have also gradually become larger as U.S forces add more armor to their vehicles.
==== Ba'athists and pro-Saddamists ====
{{Further|Ba'ath Party (Iraqi-dominated faction)|Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region}}
] flag]]
The Ba'athists include former ] officials, the ], the ] and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence elements and security services, such as the ] and the ]. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist government to power. The pre-war organization of the Ba'ath Party and its militias as a cellular{{Citation needed|date=December 2009}} structure aided the continued pro-Saddam resistance after the fall of Baghdad, and Iraqi intelligence operatives may have developed a plan for ] following the toppling of Saddam Hussein from power.


Following Saddam's capture, the Ba'athist movement largely faded; its surviving factions were increasingly shifting to either nationalist factions (Iraqi, though not Pan-Arab, such as the ideology of the pre-Ba'athist regime), or Islamist (Sunni or Shia, depending on the actual faith of the individual, though Ba'ath Party policy had been secular).
IEDs are often hidden behind roadside rails, on telephone poles, buried in the ground or in piles of
garbage, disguised as rocks or bricks, and even placed inside dead animals. This has emerged as the most lethal and favored method the insurgents have developed to attack coalition forces, and the number of these attacks have steadily increased.


As the goal of restoring the Ba'ath Party to power was seemingly out of reach, the alternative solution appeared to be to join forces with organisations who opposed the U.S.-led invasion. Many former Ba'athists had adopted an ] façade to attract more credibility within the country, and perhaps gain support from outside Iraq. Others, especially following the January 2005 elections, became more interested in politics.<!-- commented out because image was deleted: ] -->
===Ambushes===
],], March 31, 2004]]


The fall of Baghdad effectively ended the existence of the ] as an organized paramilitary. Several of its members died during the war. A large number survived, however, and were willing to carry on the fight even after the fall of Saddam Hussein from power. Many former members joined guerrilla organizations that began to form to resist the U.S-led coalition in Iraq. Some Fedayeen members fled to Syria. By June, an insurgency was underway in central and northern Iraq, especially in an area known as the ]. Some units of the Fedayeen also continued to operate independently of other insurgent organizations in the Sunni areas of Iraq. On 30 November 2003, a U.S. convoy traveling through the town of ] in the ] was ambushed by over 100 Iraqi guerillas, reportedly wearing trademark Fedayeen Saddam uniforms.
In addition, Iraqi guerrillas have frequently launched ]es of U.S. convoys and patrols, along with those of Iraqi security forces, using ] ]s and rocket-propelled grenades. Soft-skinned ]s have been the most commonly targeted. The congested and constricted terrain of the urban areas, and in the rural areas, palm groves and other crops, offer cover and concealment for insurgents launching ambushes. These attacks are usually broken off before support can be called in, in traditional guerrilla fashion. Direct ambushes of U.S forces have declined, however, to avoid insurgent casualties as U.S defenses improve (armored Humvees and tanks are unaffected by insurgent AK-47 fire).


Following the execution of ], Deputy Leader of the Iraqi-cell of the ] and former Vice President of Iraq ] became a leading candidate to succeed him as Leader of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. Ad-Douri had taken over the running of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party following Saddam Hussein's capture in 2003 and had been endorsed by a previously unknown group calling itself ].<ref> '']'', 31 December 2006</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1167467631042&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull|title=Jordan Baathists pledge loyalty to Saddam deputy|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110917213547/http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1167467631042&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull|archive-date=17 September 2011|newspaper=]|date=31 January 2006|url-status=dead}}</ref> On 3 January 2007 the website of the banned Iraqi Ba'ath Party confirmed that he was new leader of the party.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070116202139/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6226977.stm |date=16 January 2007}} ], 3 January 2007</ref><ref name=autogenerated3>{{cite web|url=http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-28895025_ITM|title=Wanted: the iceman: the last of Saddam's inner circle still at liberty continues to taunt his would-be captors with frequent sightings and leads a ruthless band of Ba'athist insurgents|work=Access My Library|date=1 December 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070109072329/http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-28895025_ITM|archive-date=9 January 2007}}</ref>
US casualties from mines or improvised explosives has risen to 70%.


Increasing Syrian influence in the Iraqi Ba'ath Party may well have a major effect on result in a fragmentation of Ba'athist parts of the insurgency.<ref name=autogenerated2> '']'', 1 January 2007</ref>
Ambushes against the poorly protected Iraqi police and security forces, however, have proven very lethal. There have been isolated cases of larger ambushes, such as an attack on a coalition convoy in ] on ], ] that involved 100 fighters and a massive ambush of a coalition convoy in ] on ], ] by Mahdi Army ] numbering over 1,000 men.


==== Iraqi nationalists (non-Ba'athist) ====
===Mortar and rocket strikes===
<!-- unsourced image removed: ] members with ]]] --><!-- unsourced image removed: ] members with ] giving Korea 24 hours to withdraw Korean troops out of Iraq]] -->Iraqi nationalists are mostly drawn from the Arab regions. Their reasons for opposing the Coalition vary from a rejection of the Coalition presence as a matter of principle to the failure of the multinational forces to fully restore ] and to quickly restore complete ].
]


One notable leader of the insurgency among nationalist Sunni is former aide to Saddam Hussein and a former ] Organiser ] who has been crossing the border between Iraq and Syria disbursing funds, smuggling weaponry and organising much of the fighting in the central area of Iraq.<ref name=autogenerated3 /><ref name=autogenerated2 />
Another common form of attack involves hit-and-run ] or rocket strikes on coalition
]s, or locations associated with the Iraqi government or a foreign presence. Insurgents fire a few mortar rounds or rockets and quickly escape before their ] can be identified and effective counter-fire directed. Insurgents use urban areas heavily populated by civilians as firing positions to discourage counter-fire, and in the countryside, ]s and ]s are used for concealment.


One former minister in the interim government, ], announced the launch in 2005 of "a new political movement, saying he aimed to give a voice to figures from the legitimate Iraqi resistance. 'The birth of this political bloc is to silence the skeptics who say there is no legitimate Iraqi resistance and that they cannot reveal their political face,' he told a news conference."<ref>. aljazeerah.info News archives {{Dead link|date=June 2016|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> It is unclear what became of this movement.
This method is very ] and rarely hits the intended ], since the guerrillas don't have time to aim properly, but casualties are still periodically inflicted by incoming mortar rounds and ]s. Improvised multiple-rocket launchers have also been used to target specific buildings in urban areas.


===Attacks on helicopters=== === Shia militias ===


==== Government inefficacy and Iranian support ====
Since the beginning of ], ], ]s have also been increasingly targeted.
The Shia militias have presented ] with perhaps the greatest conundrum of his administration given ] of ]. American officials have pressed him hard to disarm the militias and rid the state security forces of their influence.<ref name=newyorktimes-10-20>{{cite news|title=Attack on Iraqi City Shows Militia's Power|date=20 October 2006|newspaper=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/20/world/middleeast/21iraqcnd.html?ex=1318996800&en=a542d37a1dff56f9&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss|first=Kirk|last=Semple|access-date=27 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091123133459/http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/20/world/middleeast/21iraqcnd.html?ex=1318996800&en=a542d37a1dff56f9&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss|archive-date=23 November 2009|url-status=live}}</ref>
The insurgents, often concealed in palm groves, lie in wait for the helicopters and then, usually, attack the helicopter from the rear. The weapons used include rocket-propelled grenades and heat-seeking shoulder fired missiles such as the ], ], and in one case the ]. Countermeasures taken by helicopter pilots, such as flying very low at a high speed, have considerably reduced the number of helicopters shot down by reducing the accuracy of the heat-seeking missiles and rocket-propelled grenades.


A 2008 report by the ] at ] based on reports from the interrogations of dozens of captured Shia fighters described an Iranian-run network smuggling Shia fighters into Iran where they received training and weapons before returning to Iraq.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/world/middleeast/19intel.html|work=The New York Times|title=Documents Say Iran Aids Militias From Iraq|first=Mark|last=Mazzetti|date=19 October 2008|access-date=27 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081210064027/http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/world/middleeast/19intel.html|archive-date=10 December 2008|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://ctc.usma.edu/Iran_Iraq.asp|title=Combating Terrorism Center|publisher=Ctc.usma.edu|access-date=26 March 2010|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100206164118/http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Iran_Iraq.asp|archive-date=6 February 2010}}</ref>
]


===Sabotage=== ==== Badr Organization ====
One major Shia militia in Iraq is the ], the military wing of the ]. The group is currently based in ], and is also active in areas throughout southern Iraq. The group was formed by the Iranian Government to fight the Saddam Hussein-controlled Iraq during the ]. Originally, the group consisted of Iraqi exiles who were banished from Iraq during the reign of Saddam Hussein. After the war ended in 1988, the organization remained in Iran until Saddam Hussein was overthrown during the ]. Following the invasion, the brigade then moved into Iraq, became members of the new Iraq Army, and aided coalition forces in insurgents.
Insurgent ]s have also repeatedly assaulted the Iraqi ]. Guerrillas, using either rocket-propelled ]s or ]s, regularly destroy portions of ] ] in northern Iraq, and had expanded to southern Iraq by ], ]. This sabotage hampers the activities of the Iraqi government and the foreign occupation forces by reducing oil revenues. Among the reasons the insurgency gives for sabotage is to prevent supposed ] of Iraq's hydrocarbon reserves. Efforts to bring oil production back to pre-war levels have been repeatedly frustrated by these attacks.


Colonel Derek Harvey told Reuters "that the U.S. military detained Badr assassination teams possessing target lists of Sunni officers and pilots in 2003 and 2004 but did not hold them. Harvey said his superiors told him that 'this stuff had to play itself out' – implying that revenge attacks by returning Shi'ite groups were to be expected. He also said Badr and ISCI offered intelligence and advice to U.S. officials on how to navigate Iraqi politics."<ref>Ned Parker, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170704005248/http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/mideast-crisis-iraq-militias/ |date=4 July 2017}} Reuters, 14 December 2015</ref>
There have also been allegations of attacks on ] ]s and the ] by the Iraqi insurgents, although there is controversy as to whether the incidents in question did indeed represent intended sabotage.


In a letter published by the Coalition in February 2004, an insurgent believed to be Zarqawi wrote that jihadis should start an open sectarian war so that Sunnis would mobilize against what would otherwise be a secret war being waged by Shia. The author only specifically pointed to assassinations carried out by the Badr Brigade as an example of this secret war.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180422235817/https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm |date=22 April 2018}} State Dept. archives</ref>
] in Baquba, north of Baghdad, which left a scene of carnage in its wake, mostly among civilians.]]
] in which a pick-up truck loaded with explosives is detonated at a checkpoint at what appears to be an oil-related facility.]]


In December 2005, the group and their leaders in the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq participated in ], under the pro-Shiite coalition known as the ], and managed to get 36 members into the Iraqi Parliament.
===Suicide bombers===
Since ], ], as the U.S-led coalition forces gradually strengthened their defenses, ] have been increasingly used as weapons by guerrilla forces. The ]s, known in the military as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, have emerged as one of their most effective weapons, along with the roadside improvised explosive devices. They are often driven by suicide bombers and directed against targets such as Iraqi police stations, recruiting centers for the security services, and U.S convoys. They have a number of benefits for the insurgency: they deliver a large amount of firepower and inflict large amounts of casualties at little cost to the attackers. However, large numbers of Iraqi civilians are usually killed in such attacks (see below).


The Badr organization supports the government of Nouri Al-Maliki.
Suicide bombers invariably violate the laws and customs of war that combatants should not claim the status of non-combatants. They also generally violate ] to the ] which states non-uniformed guerrillas must bear their arms openly during military opperations. Legally this is classified as perfidy which is a war crime because it increases the risk that opposing forces may kill civilians by mistake. Suicide bombers are not unique in not wearing uniforms and not openly carrying weapons but their tactic depends to a far greater extent on their feigning the status of non-combatant.


==== Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army ====
===Non-military and civilian targets===
Supporters of the young Shi'a ] ] are largely impoverished men from the Shi'a urban areas and slums in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a cities.<ref name=al-Sadr_supporter_demographics>{{cite news|first=Jack|last=Fairweather|title=Sadr City slum divided over firebrand cleric as calm returns|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/04/14/wirq214.xml|archive-url=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20171014073658/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/?xml=/news/2004/04/14/wirq214.xml|url-status=dead|archive-date=14 October 2017|work=The Telegraph|publisher=Telegraph Group|date=14 April 2004|access-date=6 October 2006|location=London}}</ref> The ] area of operation stretches from ] in the south to the ] section of ] in central Iraq (some scattered Shi'a militia activity has also been reported in ] and ], where Shi'a minorities exist).{{Citation needed|date=August 2007}}
There have also been many attacks on non-military and civilian targets, beginning in earnest in ] ] and steadily increasing since then. These include the ] of Iraqis cooperating with the ] and the Governing Council--considered ] by the guerrillas, and suicide bombings targeting the ], the ]ian ], ] ]s and civilians, the ], ]ish political parties, the president of the Iraqi Governing Council, hotels, ] churches, diplomats and a restaurant. Armed and unarmed Iraqi ] and ] are also targeted, who are also considered collaborators. It has been argued that armed Iraqi "collaborationist" soldiers and police could be considered combatants in the guerrilla war with the insurgents. Sometimes they are killed in ambushes and sometimes in execution-style killings. Militants have targeted ] working for the coalition as well as other non-coalition support personnel.


During his group's active militant phase, Al-Sadr enjoyed wide support from the Iraqi people according to some polls. A poll by the ] found that 32% of Iraqis "strongly supported" him and another 36% "somewhat supported" him, making him the second most popular man in Iraq, behind only Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani.{{Citation needed|date=August 2007}} The Mahdi Army is believed to have around 60,000 members.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/10/AR2007011002581_pf.html|title=Intensified Combat on Streets Likely|work=The Washington Post|date=11 January 2007|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110428213841/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/10/AR2007011002581_pf.html|archive-date=28 April 2011|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Nasrawi|first=Salah|url=http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/iraq/2003467318_iraqsaudi08.html|title=The Seattle Times: Iraq: Saudis reportedly funding insurgents|publisher=Seattletimes.nwsource.com|date=8 December 2006|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110524115849/http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/iraq/2003467318_iraqsaudi08.html|archive-date=24 May 2011|url-status=live}}</ref>
Some have labelled security contractors as ], classifying them as non-civilians, arguing that many are armed and take park in the conflict. Others point out that private contractors frequently carry out entirely civilian functions, such as protecting Iraqi infrastructure and Iraqi-elected representatives, and do not plan or execute offensive military operations.


After the December 2005 elections in Iraq, Al-Sadr's party got 32 new seats giving him substantial political power in the divided Iraqi Parliament. In January 2006, he used these seats to swing the vote for prime minister to ], giving Al-Sadr a legitimate stake in the new Iraqi government and allying Al-Jaafari with the cleric.
The origin of the large-scale bombings is considered by many observers to most likely be foreign fighters, former Iraqi secret service operatives, or a combination of the two. It is believed that most of the actual suicide attackers are from outside Iraq, although they most likely are facilitated by Iraqis. The network of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is frequently blamed by the U.S and the Iraqi government for suicide attacks on non-military targets.


On 27 November 2006, a senior American intelligence official told reporters that the Iranian-backed group ] had been training members of the ]. The official said that 1,000 to 2,000 fighters from the Mahdi Army and other Shia militias had been trained by Hezbollah in ], and a small number of Hezbollah operatives have also visited Iraq to help with training. ] has facilitated the link between Hezbollah and the Shia militias in Iraq, the official said. "There seems to have been a strategic decision taken sometime over late winter or early spring by ], ], along with their partners in ait Lebanese Hezbollah, to provide more support to Sadr to increase pressure on the U.S.," the American intelligence official said.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/28/world/middleeast/28military.html?_r=1&oref=slogin|title=Hezbollah Said to Help Shia Army in Iraq|first1=Michael R.|last1=Gordon|first2=Dexter|last2=Filkins|newspaper=The New York Times|date=27 November 2006|access-date=22 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160725050413/http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/28/world/middleeast/28military.html?_r=1&oref=slogin|archive-date=25 July 2016|url-status=live}}</ref>
Coalition officials and some analysts suspect that the aim of these attacks is to sow chaos and sectarian discord. Coalition officials point to an intercepted letter suspected to be from ], in which he makes the case for attacking Shi'a in order to provoke an anti-Sunni backlash and thereby galvanize the Sunni population in support of the insurgents, as evidence. While hardcore Wahabi ''mujahideen'' among the insurgency may indeed desire a sectarian war, other insurgents (both Sunni and Shiite) charge that the coalition is attempting to instill a fear of civil war as part of a ] ].


=== Foreign participants ===
===Assassinations and kidnappings===
When ] in December 2003, several documents were found in his possession. One particular document, which was apparently written after he lost power, appeared to be a directive to his Ba'athist loyalists warning them to be wary of ] ] and other foreign Arabs entering the country to join the insurgency. The directive supposedly shows Saddam having concerns that foreign fighters would not share the same objectives as Ba'ath loyalists (i.e. the eventual return of Saddam to power and the restoration of his regime). A U.S. official commenting on the document stressed that while Saddam urged his followers to be cautious in their dealings with other Arab fighters, he did not order them to avoid contact or rule out co-operation. ], a Washington counter-terrorism expert stated that the existence of the document underscores the fact that "this is an insurgency cut of many different cloths... everybody's jockeying for their position of power in the future Iraq." Many experts believe that fighters from other countries who have flocked to Iraq to join the insurgents are motivated by animosity toward the United States and the desire to install an Islamic state in place of the ]'s secular ].<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080428222223/http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/01/15/1073877963219.html |date=28 April 2008}}, '']'', 16 January 2004.</ref>
] of local and government officials, translators for coalition forces, employees at coalition bases, informants, and other (so-called) collaborators has been a regular occurrence. Assassinations have taken place in a variety of ways, from close-range ]s fire and ]s to ] ]s ramming convoys.


Foreign fighters are mostly Arabs from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq, primarily through the porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, to assist the Iraqi insurgency. Many of these fighters are ] fundamentalists who see Iraq as the new "field of ]" in the battle against U.S. forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of ] and the related group ] are suspected of infiltrating into the Sunni areas of Iraq through the mountainous northeastern border with ]. The United States and its allies point to Jordanian-born Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader ] as the key player in this group. Zarqawi was considered the head of an insurgent group called ] ("Monotheism and Holy War") until his death on 7 June 2006, which according to U.S. estimates numbers in the low hundreds.
]ping, and in some cases, ]s, have emerged as another insurgent tactic since April. Foreign civilians have borne the brunt of the kidnappings, although U.S military personnel have also been targeted. After kidnapping the victim, the insurgents typically make some sort of ] of the government of the hostage's nation and give a time limit for the demand to be carried out, often 72 ]s. Beheading is often threatened if the government fails to heed the wishes of the hostage takers. Several individuals, including an American civilian (]) and a South Korean (]), among others, have been beheaded. In many cases, tapes of the beheadings are distributed for ] purposes. 80% of hostages taken by insurgents, however, have been peacefully released. The number of insurgent kidnappings has gradually diminished over the past year.


Usage of the term "foreign fighters" has received criticism as being Western-centric because, taken literally, the term would encompass all non-Iraqi forces, including Coalition forces.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050421233325/http://www.countercurrents.org/iraq-fisk301003.htm |date=21 April 2005}} by Robert Fisk. Democracy Now, 30 October 2003.</ref> Zarqawi has taken to taunting the American forces about the irony of the term: "Who is the foreigner, O cross worshippers? You are the ones who came to the land of the Muslims from your distant corrupt land." (Communiqué of 10 May 2005).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0505/zarqawi0505-11.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050929211423/http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0505/zarqawi0505-11.pdf|archive-date=29 September 2005|title=Communiqué from "Al-Qaida's Jihad Committee in Mesopotamia" (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi)}}</ref> Zarqawi's group has since announced the formation of the Ansar platoon, a squad of Iraqi suicide bombers, which an AP writer called "an apparent bid to deflect criticism that most suicide bombers in Iraq are foreigners."<ref>, ], 21 June 2005.</ref>
The goal of the kidnappings appears mainly to be to ] foreign civilians into immobilization and to attract ] attention and possibly inspire recruits. Almost all of the kidnappings have been conducted by radical Sunni groups on the fringe of the insurgency. The ], as well as the nationalist and more moderate religious elements of the Sunni insurgency, have rejected kidnapping as a legitimate tactic.


While it is not known how many of those fighting the U.S. forces in Iraq are from outside the country, it is generally agreed that foreign fighters make up a very small percentage of the insurgency. ] ], head of the ], said that "99.9 per cent" of captured Insurgents are Iraqi.<ref>Phil Sands, {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061013015804/http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/05/06/09/168406.html |date=13 October 2006}} 6 September 2005, 06:25 (UAE)</ref> The estimate has been confirmed by the Pentagon's own figures; in one analysis of over 1000 insurgents captured in Fallujah, only 15 were non-Iraqi.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FK20Ak03.html/Middle_East/FK20Ak03.html|title=The Sunni-Shi'ite power play|date=11 October 2004|work=]|author=Pepe Escobar|author-link=Pepe Escobar|access-date=5 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071011113303/http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FK20Ak03.html|archive-date=2007-10-11|url-status=dead}}</ref> According to the '']'', information from military commanders engaging in battles around Ramadi exposed the fact that out of 1300 suspected insurgents arrested in five months of 2005, none were foreign, although ] ] stated that foreigners provided money and logistical support: "The foreign fighters are staying north of the river, training and advising, like the ] were doing in ]"<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060211004819/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2005%2F12%2F04%2Fwirq04.xml&sSheet=%2Fportal%2F2005%2F12%2F04%2Fixportal.html |date=11 February 2006}} Telegraph 3 December 2005</ref>
===Attacks on security forces===
Another insurgent ] that has been increasingly used since ] includes large-scale ]s and ]s on ]s and compounds of Iraqi security forces, whom insurgents view as ]s, involving ]-sized elements or larger, oftentimes up to 150 men. Large-scale attacks have also been occasionally advanced against U.S forces. They have been launched both by Sunni insurgents in cities such as Ramadi, Fallujah, and al-Qaim and Shiite militiamen in cities such as Baghdad, Najaf, and Kufa during the twin uprisings of 2004. Some attacks may combine multiple weapons and tactics at once, such as rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and car bombs. Although these attacks usually fail militarily, they are designed to convey an impression of strength on the part of the guerillas (part of the psychological warfare campaign) and to sow general chaos.


In September 2006, the '']'' reported, "It's true that foreign fighters are in Iraq, such as ]. But they are a small minority of the insurgents, say administration critics. Most Iraqi mujahideen are Sunnis who fear their interests will be ignored under Iraq's Shia-dominated government. They are fighting for concrete, local political goals – not the destruction of America." The paper quoted University of Michigan history professor ]: "If the Iraqi Sunni nationalists could take over their own territory, they would not put up with the few hundred foreign volunteers blowing things up, and would send them away or slit their throats."<ref>Peter Grier, "Is war in Iraq a shield against attacks at home?" ''The Christian Science Monitor'' (18 September 2006) p. 3.</ref> In 2005, the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded that foreign fighters accounted for less than 10% of the estimated 30,000 insurgents and argued that the U.S. and Iraqi Governments were "feeding the myth" that they comprised the backbone of the insurgency.<ref name="guardian.co.uk"/>
== Analysis and polls ==
A great deal of attention has been focused on how much support the guerrillas have among the Iraqi population and on winning hearts and minds. It appears as though the Iraqi insurgency retains a degree of popular support in the Sunni Triangle, especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal nature of the area and its concepts of pride and revenge, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense coalition ] operations have resulted in the opposition of many Sunni Arabs to the occupation.
Polls indicate that the greatest support for the insurgency is in al-Anbar province, a vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western outskirts of Baghdad. This is for a number of reasons; many residents received employment and opportunities from the former regime, the area has a history of strong tribalism and suspicion of outsiders, it is religiously conservative, and it has seen civilian casualties from coalition counter-insurgency operations.


Despite the low numbers of foreign fighters their presence has been confirmed in several ways and Coalition forces believe the majority of suicide bombings are believed to be carried out by non-Iraqi foreigners. ], a Middle East expert with the ],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ecssr.ac.ae/CDA/en/ProfileBank/ViewProfile/0,1421,1250-00,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080428105410/http://www.ecssr.ac.ae/CDA/en/ProfileBank/ViewProfile/0%2C1421%2C1250-00%2C00.html|archive-date=28 April 2008|title=View Profile|publisher=ECSSR|access-date=26 March 2010|url-status=dead}}</ref> stated in June 2005: "I still think 80 percent of the Insurgents, the day-to-day activity, is Iraqi – the roadside bombings, mortars, direct weapons fire, rifle fire, automatic weapons fire... the foreign fighters attract the headlines with the suicide bombings, no question."<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/w-me/2005/jun/30/063006836.html|title=Foreigners Blamed for Iraq Suicide Attacks|newspaper=Las Vegas Sun|date=30 June 2005|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930030154/http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/w-me/2005/jun/30/063006836.html|archive-date=30 September 2007}}</ref>
Some observers, such as political scientist ], believe that the major division in Iraq is not between religious/ethnic groups nor between the general population and violent groups, but between those who collaborate with the foreign occupation and those who resist it.


In September 2005, Iraqi and U.S. forces conducted a counter-insurgency operation in the predominantly ] town of ]. According to an ], report, an Iraqi Army Captain claimed that Iraqi forces arrested 150 non-Iraqi Arabs (Syria, Sudan, Yemen and Jordan) in the operation;<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna9173345|title=AP report|publisher=MSNBC|date=8 September 2005|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110520143256/http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9173345/from/RL.1/|archive-date=20 May 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> the American army claimed 20% of arrests were foreign combatants,<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070604054806/http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/09/mil-050911-rferl03.htm |date=4 June 2007}}, Radio Free Iraq</ref>{{better source needed|date=April 2023}} while ] on ] confirmed that foreign combatants were present.<ref>, PBS, 21 September 2005</ref> However, not all accounts of the battle mention these arrests,<ref>For example, this {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171020122317/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/10/AR2005091001308_pf.html |date=20 October 2017}} doesn't, although, this {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171020122319/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/02/AR2005090202250.html |date=20 October 2017}} refers to foreign fighters amongst the insurgents in Tal Afar.</ref> and U.S. Army commander Colonel ] said the "vast majority" of Insurgents captured there were "Iraqis and not foreigners."<ref name="english.aljazeera.net">{{cite web|url=http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/FFFE08A7-D75C-45F5-AB51-206EA2D48668.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051219024830/http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/FFFE08A7-D75C-45F5-AB51-206EA2D48668.htm|archive-date=19 December 2005|title=Iraqi troops sweep through Tal Afar|date=11 September 2005}}</ref> Iraqi journalist Nasir Ali claimed that there were "very few foreign combatants" in Tal Afar and charged "Every time the US army and the Iraqi government want to destroy a specific city, they claim it hosts Arab fighters and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."<ref name="english.aljazeera.net"/>
Outside the Sunni Triangle and in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, violence is largely eschewed. Many, however, especially in the Shiite community, although supportive of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, are very unhappy with the occupation. Farther north in the Kurdish areas, there is a great deal of pro-American sentiment and an almost unanimous distaste for anti-coalition violence. The situation is more complicated in the Shiite regions. Support for violent insurgency is notably less enthusiastic in the Shiite than the Sunni community since the Shiites, like the Kurds, saw persecution under the Ba'ath regime and from the Sunnis. Shiites have also been influenced by a moderate clerical establishment under Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that has advocated a political solution. However, Moqtada al-Sadr (a radical Shiite cleric who has advocated violent insurgency) has drawn support from a portion of the Shiite community, mainly young and unemployed men in urban areas. Sadr's support varies region by region; while likely drawing under 10% support in Najaf (a stronghold of the clerical establishment which was occupied by Sadr's militia and has been the scene of some of the heaviest fighting), some polls have indicated Sadr's support among the Shiites of Baghdad may be as high as 50%. This support did not translate into direct electoral winnings for Sadr supporters during the January 2005 elections, however.


There are allegations that the U.S. government has attempted to inflate the number of foreign fighters in order to advance the theory that the insurgency is not a local movement.{{Citation needed|date=September 2007}} U.S. Army Specialist Tony Lagouranis spoke about his job identifying many of the bodies after the assault on ]:
Spontaneous peaceful protests have appeared in Shiite areas against the occupation. The Shiite intellectuals and the upper classes, as well as the inhabitants of rural regions in the south and followers of more moderate clerics such as ], tend to cooperate with the coalition and the Iraqi interim government and participate in peaceful protest instead of violence. Sistani's political pressure is largely credited with enabling the elections of January 2005.


{{blockquote|We had women and children, old men, young boys. So, you know, it's hard to say. I think initially, the reason that we were doing this was they were trying to find foreign fighters. were trying to prove that there were a lot of foreign fighters in Fallujah. So, mainly, that's what we were going for, but most of them really didn't have I.D.'s but maybe half of them had I.D.'s. Very few of them had foreign I.D.'s. There were people working with me who would—in an effort to sort of cook the books, you know they would find a Koran on the guy and the Koran was printed in Algeria, and they would mark him down as an Algerian, or you know guys would come in with a black shirt and khaki pants and they would say, well, this is the Hezbollah uniform and they would mark him down as a Lebanese, which was ridiculous, but—you know... Well, I was only a specialist, so actually, you know, I did say something to the staff sergeant, who was really in charge, and you know, I just got yelled down you know, shot down.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/11/15/1632233|title=Former U.S. Army Interrogator Describes the Harsh Techniques He Used in Iraq, Detainee Abuse by Marines and Navy Seals and Why "Torture is the Worst Possible Thing We Could Do"|work=Democracy Now!|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070711051852/http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05%2F11%2F15%2F1632233|archive-date=11 July 2007}}</ref>}}
Many Shiites and Kurds suffered heavy persecution under the rule of Saddam Hussein's regime, which may cause a reluctance to use violence against Coalition forces. This is in contrast to the more radical Moqtada al-Sadr, who draws his support from the lower classes, the uneducated, and the Shiite urban population. Both united, however, on the United Iraqi Alliance ticket that brought in the largest share of the votes in the January 2005 elections.


==== Foreign fighters' nationality distribution ====
A series of several polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of the Iraqi public further on the insurgency and the Coalition occupation. All of the polls seem to consistently find the following:
In July 2007, the ] reported that 45% of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians and security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15% are from Syria and Lebanon; and 10% are from North Africa. 50% of all Saudi fighters in Iraq come as suicide bombers. In the six months preceding that article, such bombings have killed or injured 4,000 Iraqis.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.html|title=Saudis' role in Iraq insurgency outlined|newspaper=Los Angeles Times|date=July 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090223180041/http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.html|archive-date=23 February 2009}}</ref>


According to a U.S. military press briefing on 20 October 2005, 312 foreign nationals from 27 countries had been captured in Iraq from April to October 2005.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070309144100/http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2007/0105_1430_1601.pdf |date=9 March 2007}}, by Alan B. Krueger, Princeton University and NBER, 30 December 2006.</ref> This represents a component of the Iraqi insurgent movement, which also includes a nationalist movement encompassing over 30 Shia and Sunni militias.
* A large minority, if not a majority, of Sunni Arabs consider armed attacks on U.S forces legitimate and justified resistance.
* The greatest support for resistance is in al-Anbar province.
* The majority of Iraqis disapprove of the presence of coalition forces.
* A majority of both Sunnis and Shiites want an end to the occupation as soon as possible, although Sunnis are opposed to the occupation in somewhat greater margins.


Foreign insurgents captured in Iraq in the 7-month period April–October 2005:
Polls conducted in June 2005 suggest even more anti-occupation sentiment; most alarming to American policymakers is rising support for the insurgency. According to the ''Boston Globe'' (10 June 2005): "a recent internal poll conducted for the US-led coalition found that nearly 45 percent of the population supported the insurgent attacks, making accurate intelligence difficult to obtain. Only 15 percent of those polled said they strongly supported the US-led coalition." Demands for U.S. withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq's Parliament.
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|-
!Nationality
!Number
|-
|{{flagcountry|Egypt}}
|style="text-align:right;"|78
|-
|{{flagcountry|Syria}}
|style="text-align:right;"|66
|-
|{{flagcountry|Sudan}}
|style="text-align:right;"|41
|-
|{{flagcountry|Saudi Arabia}}
|style="text-align:right;"|32
|-
|{{flagcountry|Jordan}}
|style="text-align:right;"|17
|-
|{{flagcountry|United States}}
|style="text-align:right;"|15
|-
|{{flagcountry|Iran}}
|style="text-align:right;"|13
|-
|{{flagcountry|Palestine}}
|style="text-align:right;"|12
|-
|{{flagcountry|Tunisia}}
|style="text-align:right;"|10
|-
|{{flagcountry|Algeria}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 8
|-
|{{flagicon image|Flag of Libya (1977-2011).svg}} ]
|style="text-align:right;"| 7
|-
|{{flagcountry|Turkey}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 6
|-
|{{flagcountry|Lebanon}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 3
|-
|{{flagcountry|India}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 2
|-
|{{flagcountry|Qatar}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 2
|-
|{{flagcountry|UAE}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 2
|-
|{{flagcountry|United Kingdom}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 2
|-
|{{flagcountry|Denmark}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 1
|-
|{{flagcountry|France}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 1
|-
|{{flagcountry|Indonesia}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 1
|-
|{{IRL}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 1
|-
|{{flagcountry|Israel}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 1
|-
|{{flagcountry|Kuwait}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 1
|-
|{{flagcountry|Macedonia}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 1
|-
|{{flagcountry|Morocco}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 1
|-
|{{flagcountry|Somalia}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 1
|-
|{{flagcountry|Yemen}}
|style="text-align:right;"| 1
|-
|Total
|style="text-align:right;"|619
|}


==== Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Sunni jihadists ====
==Scope and size of the insurgency==
{{Further|Al-Qaeda in Iraq}}
The extent of Zarqawi's influence is a source of much controversy. Zarqawi was reported killed in action in March 2004 in "a statement signed by a dozen alleged insurgent groups".<ref>{{cite news|first=Joel|last=Roberts|url=http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/05/iraq/main604191.shtml|title=Rebels: Top Iraq Terrorist Dead, Statement Says Al-Zarqawi Not Behind Recent Bombings Or Letter|publisher=CBS News|date=4 March 2004|access-date=26 March 2010|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091001021221/http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/05/iraq/main604191.shtml|archive-date=1 October 2009}}</ref> His Jordanian family then held a funeral service on his behalf, although no body was recovered and positively identified. Iraqi leaders denied the presence of Zarqawi in Fallujah prior to the U.S. attack on that city in November 2004. Zarqawi's existence was even questioned.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FJ15Ak02.html|title=Zarqawi – Bush's man for all seasons|work=Asia Times|date=15 October 2004|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100314194208/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FJ15Ak02.html|archive-date=14 March 2010|url-status=dead}}</ref>
] in 2006, after his capture by US forces in Iraq]]
Involvement of Zarqawi in significant terrorist incidents was not usually proven, although his group often claimed it perpetrated bombings. As al-Qaeda is an "opt-in" group (meaning everyone who agrees to some basic Wahhabi moral tenets and the fundamental goals may consider himself a member), it is most likely that "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" is a loose association of largely independent cells united by a common strategy and vision, rather than a unified organization with a firm internal structure.{{Citation needed|date=August 2007}}


On 8 June 2006, Iraqi officials confirmed Zarqawi was killed by two 500&nbsp;lb laser-guided bombs dropped from an ] the previous evening.{{Citation needed|date=August 2007}} ], an Egyptian who was trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan took his place.{{Citation needed|date=August 2007}}
The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in the cities and countryside along the Euphrates River from the Syrian border town of al-Qaim through Ramadi and Fallujah to ], as well as along the Tigris river from Baghdad north to Tikrit. Heavy guerilla activity also takes place in around the cities of Mosul and Tal Afar in the north, as well as the "Triangle of Death" south of Baghdad, which includes the cities of Iskandariya, Mahmudiya, Latifiya, and Yusufiya. Lesser activity takes place in several other areas of the country. The insurgency is believed to maintain a key supply line stretching from Syria through al-Qaim and along the Euphrates to Baghdad and central Iraq, the Iraqi equivalent of the Ho Chi Minh trail. A second "ratline" (the U.S term)
runs from the Syrian border through Tal Afar to Mosul.
Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas varies by group and fluctuates under changing political climate, the latest assessments put the present number at between 12,000 and 20,000 hardcore fighters, along with numerous supporters and facilitators throughout the Sunni Arab community. At various points U.S forces provided estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions. A few are provided here (although these numbers almost certainly have fluctuated):


A document<ref>{{cite news|agency=Associated Press|url=https://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-06-15-zarqawi-text_x.htm|title=Text of a document found in Zarqawi's safe house|work=USA Today|date=15 June 2006|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091203173918/http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-06-15-zarqawi-text_x.htm|archive-date=3 December 2009|url-status=live}}</ref> found in Zarqawi's safe house indicates that the guerrilla group was trying to provoke the U.S. to attack Iran in order to reinvigorate the resistance in Iraq and to weaken American forces in Iraq.<ref>{{cite news|last=Soriano|first=Cesar|url=https://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-06-15-raid-blueprint_x.htm|title=Iraqi leaders: Memo details al-Qaeda plans|work=USA Today|date=15 June 2006|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090227071452/http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-06-15-raid-blueprint_x.htm|archive-date=27 February 2009|url-status=live}}</ref> "The question remains, how to draw the Americans into fighting a war against Iran? It is not known whether American is serious in its animosity towards Iraq, because of the big support Iran is offering to America in its war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Hence, it is necessary first to exaggerate the Iranian danger and to convince America and the west in general, of the real danger coming from Iran...". The document then outlines 6 ways to incite war between the two nations. Iraqi national security adviser ] said the document, shows ] is in "pretty bad shape." He added that "we believe that this is the beginning of the end of al-Qaeda in Iraq."{{Citation needed|date=August 2007}}
*Fallujah (mid-2004): 2,000-5,000 (since a November 2004 operation, the Fallujah insurgency has since been destroyed or dispersed)
*] (December 2003): 2,000
*] (June 2004): 1,000.
*Baghdad (December 2003): 1,000 (this number has may have increased by a significant amount)


Journalist ], detailing her captivity in Iraq, described one of her captors who identified himself as Abdullah Rashid and leader of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq. He told her that; "The Americans were constantly saying that the mujahideen in Iraq were led by foreigners... So, the Iraqi insurgents went to Zarqawi and insisted that an Iraqi be put in charge." She continued by stating; "But as I saw in coming weeks, Zarqawi remained the insurgents' hero, and the most influential member of their council, whatever ]/]'s position... At various times, I heard my captors discussing changes in their plans because of directives from the council and Zarqawi."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0821/p01s01d-woiq.html|title=Hostage: The Jill Carroll Story – Part 6 • Reciting Koranic verses|website=The Christian Science Monitor|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060901234407/http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0821/p01s01d-woiq.html|archive-date=1 September 2006}}</ref>
Guerilla forces control most of the cities and towns of al-Anbar province, with U.S troop numbers in the area (less than 20,000) too small to contest them and with negligible Iraqi security force presence. Ramadi, the capital of the province, is under guerilla control with the exception of about half a dozen small forts operated by ]. al-Qaim, the first stop on an insurgent infiltration route from Syria, also is under rebel control. Fallujah, once the heart of the insurgency and formerly under rebel control, has since been largely leveled and is under a permanent lockdown by U.S forces.
Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, is still one of the most contested regions of the country. Insurgents maintain a campaign of terror over much of the city's population and many Sunni neighborhoods such as Adhamiya are largely under their control. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country, if not the world. Iraqi security and police forces have also been significantly built up in the capital and, despite being constantly targetted, have enjoyed some successes such as the pacification of Haifa Street.


==== Schism between foreign fighters and native Iraqi insurgency ====
Insurgents are also vigorously contesting control of the ethnically diverse northern city of ], with much of the city, especially the western Arab half, slipping in and out of their control.
Large-scale terrorist attacks against civilians carried out by foreign fighters, as well as the interpretation of Islam that they attempt to impose on the local population in areas under their control, have increasingly turned Iraqis against them, in some cases breaking out into open fighting between different groups in the insurgency.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28105-2004Oct12.html|title=Insurgent Alliance Is Fraying in Fallujah|work=The Washington Post|date=13 October 2004|access-date=26 March 2010|first=Karl|last=Vick|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110213204746/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28105-2004Oct12.html|archive-date=13 February 2011|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5213863|title=Arab world, Iraq and al-Qaeda &#124; Unfamiliar questions in the Arab air|work=The Economist|date=24 November 2005|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081207092327/http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5213863|archive-date=7 December 2008|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.worldthreats.com/middle_east/Foreign%20Fighters%20Reviled.htm|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130210050711/http://www.worldthreats.com/middle_east/Foreign%20Fighters%20Reviled.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=2013-02-10|title=W O R L D T H R E A T S – Foreign Fighters Now Reviled by Fallujah Residents}}</ref> There are signs that local Islamist insurgent groups have also increasingly caused the population to turn against them.<ref>{{cite news|last=Cole|first=Juan|url=http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/05/22/najaf/index1.html|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120909063437/http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/05/22/najaf/index1.html|url-status=dead|archive-date=9 September 2012|title="Najaf is dying" – Page 2|work=Salon.com|date=22 May 2004|access-date=26 March 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18911-2004May11.html|title=Some in Najaf Protest Sadr|work=The Washington Post|date=12 May 2004|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121106152402/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A18911-2004May11.html|archive-date=6 November 2012|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-ap-iraq-protest,0,2250615.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040512151950/http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-ap-iraq-protest%2C0%2C2250615.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines|archive-date=12 May 2004|title=Thousands March in Iraq Protesting Al-Sadr|date=11 May 2004|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=482652004|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040610184938/http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=482652004|url-status=dead|archive-date=10 June 2004|title=Mystery group wage war on Sadr's militia|work=The Scotsman|access-date=26 March 2010}}</ref>


Opinions differ on how broad this schism is. Terrorism expert ] warned that; "In the run-up to the war, most Iraqis viewed the foreign volunteers who were rushing in to fight against America as troublemakers, and Saddam Hussein's forces reportedly killed many of them."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/stern_terrorism_nyt_082003.htm|title=Jessica Stern in the New York Times: How America Created a Terrorist Haven|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030827151002/http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/stern_terrorism_nyt_082003.htm|archive-date=27 August 2003}}</ref> This opinion contradicts Iraqi scholar ], who says that these foreigners are increasingly welcomed by the public, especially in the former Ba'athist strongholds north of Baghdad.{{Citation needed|date=August 2007}}
==Rate of attacks and Coalition casualties==
''Main article'': ]


While some have noted an alliance of convenience that existed between the foreign fighters and the native Sunni insurgents, there are signs that the foreign militants, especially those who follow Zarqawi, are increasingly unpopular among the native fighters. In the run-up to the December 2005 elections, Sunni fighters were warning al-Qaeda members and foreign fighters not to attack polling stations. One former Ba'athist told Reuters; "Sunnis should vote to make political gains. We have sent leaflets telling al-Qaeda that they will face us if they attack voters." An unnamed Sunni leader was quoted commenting on Zarqawi; "Zarqawi is an American, Israeli and Iranian agent who is trying to keep our country unstable so that the Sunnis will keep facing occupation."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1520703/Abu-Musab-al-Zarqawi.html|title=Abu Musab al-Zarqawi|date=9 June 2006|work=The Telegraph|access-date=5 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180130065652/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1520703/Abu-Musab-al-Zarqawi.html|archive-date=30 January 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>
In the ], ] issue of Newsweek, Fareed Zakaria reports that "insurgents launched 700 attacks against U.S. forces last month, the highest number since the invasion. They are getting more sophisticated, now using shaped charges, which concentrate the blast of a bomb, and infrared lasers, which cannot be easily jammed. They kill enough civilians every week that Iraq remains insecure, and electricity, water and oil are still supplied in starts and stops."


By early 2006, the split between the Sunni groups and the Zarqawi-led foreign fighters had grown dramatically, and Sunni forces began targeting al-Qaeda forces for assassination. One senior intelligence official told the ''Telegraph'' that Zarqawi had fled to Iran as a result of the attacks.<ref>{{cite news|last=Poole|first=Oliver|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/02/06/wirq06.xml|archive-url=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20171014073822/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/?xml=/news/2006/02/06/wirq06.xml|url-status=dead|archive-date=14 October 2017|title=Insurgents turning against al-Qaeda in Iraq|newspaper=The Daily Telegraph|date=6 February 2006|access-date=26 March 2010|location=London}}</ref> In response to al-Qaeda killings in Iraq, Sunni insurgents in al-Anbar province led by former Ba'athist intelligence officer Ahmed Ftaikhan formed an anti-al-Qaeda militia called the Anbar Revolutionaries. All of the militia's core members have relatives who have been killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq, and they have sought to prevent foreign jihadis from entering the country. The group "claims to have killed 20 foreign fighters and 33 Iraqi sympathizers."<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/03/11/wirq11.xml|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071113203255/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2006%2F03%2F11%2Fwirq11.xml|url-status=dead|archive-date=13 November 2007|title=Sunni insurgents 'have al-Zarqawi running for cover'|newspaper=The Daily Telegraph|date=13 March 2010|access-date=26 March 2010|location=London|first=Charles|last=Moore}}</ref> The schism became all the more apparent in when a tape alleged to be from the Mujahedeen Shura Council urged Osama Bin Laden to replace al-Qaeda in Iraq's current head with an Iraqi national. The Mujahedeen Shura Council, however, issued a statement shortly afterwards denying the authenticity of this tape.
] ], ], 1821 U.S. soldiers, 93 British soldiers, 101 soldiers from other nations have died in Iraq. 13,657 U.S. soldiers had been wounded in action. Over 5,000 American soldiers have also deserted.


On 19 July 2007 seven domestic insurgent groups informed journalists in ] that they were forming a united front independent of al-Qaeda.<ref>{{cite news|first=Seumas|last=Milne|url=https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,,2129675,00.html|title=Insurgents form political front to plan for US pullout|newspaper=The Guardian|access-date=26 March 2010|location=London|date=19 July 2007}}</ref>
==History of the Insurgency==
''Main article'': ]


=== Covert Iranian military involvement ===
(This is the latest entry; see the main article for the complete history)
An estimated 150 Iranian intelligence officers, plus members of Iran's ], are believed to be active inside Iraq at any given time.<ref name=wp20070125>Dafna Linzer – {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171012121816/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/25/AR2007012502199.html |date=12 October 2017}} – The Washington Post</ref> For more than a year, U.S. troops have detained and recorded fingerprints, photographs, and DNA samples from dozens of suspected Iranian agents in a catch and release program designed to intimidate the Iranian leadership.<ref name=wp20070125 /> Iranian influence is felt most heavily within the Iraqi Government, the ISF, and Shiite militias.


Although the ] enforced a 1987 law banning unions in public enterprises, trade unions such as the ] (IFTU) and Iraq's ] have also mounted effective opposition to the Coalition.<ref>{{cite web|first=David|last=Bacon|url=http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0407upsurge.html|title=Iraq's Labor Upsurge Wins Support from U.S. Unions|work=FPIF Commentary|date=28 July 2004|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040803074552/http://www.fpif.org/commentary/2004/0407upsurge.html|archive-date=3 August 2004}}</ref> However, no trades unions support the armed insurgents, and unions have themselves been subject to attacks from the insurgents. ] of the IFTU was assassinated under circumstances that pointed to a Ba'athist insurgent group on 3 January 2005.<ref>David Bacon, {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20051025161614/http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=fb8395c4d2b0853d7f8fe2c2017f8f16 |date=25 October 2005}}. News Analysis, Pacific News Service, 26 January 2005.</ref> Another union federation, the ] (GUOE) opposes the Coalition forces in Iraq and calls for immediate withdrawal but was neutral on participation in the election. Whereas the GUOE wants all Coalition troops out immediately, both the IFTU and the ] call for replacement of U.S. and British forces with neutral forces from the UN, the Arab League and other nations as a transition.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://uslaboragainstwar.org/downloads/USLAW%20on%20Iraqi%20Labor.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100327090659/http://uslaboragainstwar.org/downloads/USLAW%20on%20Iraqi%20Labor.pdf|archive-date=27 March 2010|title=USLAW Statement on the Iraqi Labor Solidarity Tour of U.S.|access-date=26 March 2010|url-status=dead}}</ref>
===Announcement of the Government and Renewed Fighting (April-June 2005)===
], 2006.]]
The talks for the new government seemed to continually drag on over the months and a power vacuum began to develop in Baghdad as Allawi waited to hand over power. As the political progress slowed, guerilla attacks also began to gradually rise once more in April. Insurgents began a renewed effort to dispel any beliefs that they were weakening and to discredit the formation of the new government. The attacks inched up until finally, on April 28, the new government, led by Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafarri of the Sistani-backed political party, was announced.


== Tactics ==
The announcement, however, was followed by an explosion of attacks designed to undermine the new government. Car bombings and suicide bombings increased to a level never seen previously in the war, and attacks on U.S troops also increased. As of June 21, at least 1,617 people had been killed by insurgents since the announcement of the government. This includes 169 coalition troops, 527 Iraqi troops, and 931 civilians.
{{Main|Tactics of the Iraqi insurgency}}
The '''tactics of the Iraqi insurgency''' vary widely. The majority of militant elements use ]s (IEDs), car bombs, kidnappings, hostage-taking, shootings, ambushes, sniper attacks, mortar and rocket strikes and other types of attacks to target Iraqis and U.S. forces with little regard for civilian casualties.
]


== Awareness of American public opinion ==
The U.S began stepping up its counterinsurgency operations in response. Operations began to interdict the flow of weapons, personnel, and suicide bombers from the Syrian border to Baghdad in what is the Iraqi equivalent of the Ho Chi Minh trail. U.S. forces swept through the towns of Haditha, Qaim, and Karabila along this Euphrates River route, clearing them of insurgents. They lacked the manpower, however, to establish a permanent presence in the towns, leaving them vulnerable to insurgent re-infiltration as in previous instances.
A single study has compared the number of insurgent attacks in Iraq to supposedly negative statements in the U.S. media, release of public opinion polls, and geographic variations in access to international media by Iraqis. The purpose was to determine if there was a link between insurgent activity and media reports. The researchers' study suggested it may be possible that insurgent attacks spiked by 5 to 10% after increases in the number of negative reports of the war in the media. The authors believe this may possibly be an "emboldenment effect" and speculated that "insurgent groups respond rationally to expected probability of US withdrawal."<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Radha|last1=Iyengar|first2=Jonathan|last2=Monten|title=Is There an "Emboldenment" Effect? Evidence from the Insurgency in Iraq|journal=NBER Working Paper No. 13839|date=March 2008|doi=10.3386/w13839|doi-access=free}}</ref>


== Iraqi public opinion ==
Meanwhile, the Iraqi government launched Operation Lightening, cordoning off Baghdad with 40,000 troops, setting up checkpoints, and conducting house-to-searches. The sweeps effectively hampered insurgent movements, according to officials. Attacks in central Iraq, however, continued unabated despite the sweeps.
A series of several polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of the Iraqi public further on ] and the U.S. presence. Some polls have found the following:
* Polls suggest the majority of Iraqis disapprove of the presence of Coalition forces.<ref name=autogenerated1>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/27/AR2006092701435.html|title=Poll: Iraqis Back Attacks on U.S. Troops|work=The Washington Post|date=27 September 2006|access-date=26 March 2010|first=Barry|last=Schweid|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120508190155/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/27/AR2006092701435.html|archive-date=8 May 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>
* A majority of both Sunnis and Shi'as want an end to the U.S. presence as soon as possible, although Sunnis are opposed to the Coalition soldiers being there by greater margins.<ref>. Zogby International, 28 January 2005.</ref>
* Polls suggest the vast majority of Iraqis support attacks on insurgent groups with 80% supporting US attacks on Al-Qaeda.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080412170054/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7299569.stm |date=12 April 2008}} BBC</ref><ref>{{cite web|first=Gary|last=Langer|url=https://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=7058272&page=1|title=Dramatic Advances Sweep Iraq, Boosting Support for Democracy|publisher=ABC News|location=United States|date=16 March 2009|access-date=7 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120821191154/https://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=7058272&page=1|archive-date=21 August 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>


Directly after the invasion, polling suggested that a slight majority supported the US invasion.<ref> The Indian Express</ref> However polls conducted in June 2005 suggest that there is some sentiment towards Coalition armies being in Iraq. A 2005 poll by British intelligence said that 45% of Iraqis support attacks against Coalition forces, rising to 65% in some areas, and that 82% are "strongly opposed" to the presence of Coalition troops.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/10/23/wirq23.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/10/23/ixworld.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080409123953/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fnews%2F2005%2F10%2F23%2Fwirq23.xml&sSheet=%2Fnews%2F2005%2F10%2F23%2Fixworld.html|archive-date=9 April 2008|title=Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent|work=The Telegraph|date=13 March 2010|access-date=26 March 2010|location=London|first=Charles|last=Moore|url-status=dead}}</ref> Demands for U.S. withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq's Parliament.<ref>Abdel-Wahed Tohmeh, {{Webarchive|url=http://arquivo.pt/wayback/20091001195457/http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&ItemID=8138|date=1 October 2009}}. 22 June 2005.</ref> These results are consistent with a January 2006 poll that found an overall 47% approval for attacks on U.S.-led forces. That figure climbed to 88% among Sunnis. Attacks on Iraqi security forces and civilians, however, were approved of by only 7% and 12% of respondents respectively. Polls conducted between 2005 and 2007 showed 31–37% of Iraqi's wanted US and other Coalition forces to withdraw once security was restored and that 26–35% wanted immediate withdrawal instead.<ref name="WorldPublicOpinion">{{cite web|url=http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/sep06/Iraq_Sep06_rpt.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061005203935/http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/sep06/Iraq_Sep06_rpt.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=5 October 2006|title=The Iraqi Public on the U.S.&nbsp;Presence and the Future of Iraq|publisher=World Public Opinion|date=27 September 2006|access-date=23 November 2008}}</ref><ref name="bbcpoll"> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120727213455/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_03_07_iraqpollnew.pdf |date=27 July 2012}} conducted by D3&nbsp;Systems for the BBC, ABC News, ARD German TV and USA Today. More than 2,000 people were questioned in more than 450 neighbourhoods and villages across all 18&nbsp;provinces of Iraq between 25 February and 5 March 2007. The margin of error is + or&nbsp;– 2.5%.</ref><ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150128065233/https://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/poll/2007/0806oildevt.htm |date=28 January 2015}} (Oil Change International, Institute for Policy Studies, War on Want, PLATFORM and Global Policy Forum)</ref>
==Iraqi Insurgency Organizations==
Major Iraqi guerrilla groups include, but are not
limited to, the following:


A September 2006 poll of both Sunnis and Shias found that 71% of Iraqis wanted the U.S. to leave within a year, with 65% favoring an immediate pullout and 77% voicing suspicion that the U.S. wanted to keep permanent bases in Iraq.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/26/AR2006092601721.html|title=Most Iraqis Favor Immediate U.S. Pullout, Polls Show|work=The Washington Post|date=27 September 2006|access-date=26 March 2010|first=Amit R.|last=Paley|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100419230306/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/26/AR2006092601721.html|archive-date=19 April 2010|url-status=live}}</ref> 61% approved of attacks on U.S. forces.<ref name=autogenerated1 /> A later poll in March 2007<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna17687430|title=poll from March 2007|publisher=MSNBC|date=19 March 2007|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100831112231/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17687430/|archive-date=31 August 2010|url-status=live}}</ref> suggests the percentage of Iraqis who approve of attacks on Coalition forces has dropped to 51%. In 2006 a poll conducted on the Iraqi public revealed that 52% of the ones polled said Iraq was going in the wrong direction and 61% claimed it was worth ousting Saddam Hussein.<ref name="WorldPublicOpinion"/>
*] (''Jaish-i-Mahdi'')
*] (''al-Awda'')
*]
*] ("Monotheism and Holy War")
*]
*]
*] (''ar-Rayat as-Sawda'')
*] (''Jaish Mohammed'')
*] ("] Revolution Brigades," ''Moqawama al-Iraqiya al-Islamiya'')
*]
*]
*Mujahideen Battalions of the [[Salafi|Salafi Group of
Iraq]]
*]


Despite a majority having previously been opposed to the US presence, 60% of Iraqis opposed American troops leaving directly prior to withdrawal, with 51% saying withdrawal would have a negative effect.<ref> The Indian Express</ref><ref> Arab Times {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130116040655/http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/158748/reftab/36/Default.aspx |date=16 January 2013}}</ref>
An English article detailing the many insurgency groups:


== Scope and size of the insurgency ==
==See also==
{{Further|Casualties of the conflict in Iraq since 2003|Iraq Body Count project}}
The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in the cities and countryside along the Euphrates River from the Syrian border town of ] through ] and ] to ], as well as along the Tigris river from Baghdad north to ]. Heavy guerrilla activity also takes place around the cities of Mosul and ] in the north, as well as the "]" south of Baghdad, which includes the "-iya" cities of Iskandariya, Mahmudiya, Latifiya, and Yusufiya. Lesser activity takes place in several other areas of the country. The insurgents are believed to maintain a key supply line stretching from Syria through al-Qaim and along the Euphrates to Baghdad and central Iraq, the Iraqi equivalent of the ]. A second "ratline" runs from the Syrian border through Tal Afar to Mosul.
]
Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas varies by group and fluctuates under changing political climate, the latest assessments put the present number at between 3,000 and 7,000 fighters along with numerous supporters and facilitators throughout the Sunni Arab community. At various points U.S. forces provided estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions. A few are provided here (although these numbers almost certainly have fluctuated):
* Fallujah (mid-2004): 2,000–5,000 In a November 2004 operation, the Fallujah insurgency has been destroyed or dispersed, but had staged a comeback in 2005, albeit not to former strength, in the course of 2005–2008 the remainder of the insurgency was defeated in Fallujah and the rest of Al-Anbar province.
* ] (August 2011): 1,000+
* ] (August 2011 ): 1,000+
* Baghdad (August 2011): 2,000+
Guerilla forces operate in many of the cities and towns of ] province, due to mostly ineffective Iraqi security forces in this area. There was extensive guerrilla activity in ], the capital of the province, as well as ], the first stop on an insurgent movement route between Iraq and Syria. In 2006, reports suggested that the Anbar capital Ramadi had largely fallen under insurgent control along with most of the Anbar region, and that as a result the United States had sent an extra 3,500 marines to reestablish control of the region. In the early part of 2007 the insurgency suffered serious setbacks in Ramadi after they were defeated in the Second Battle of Ramadi in the fall of 2006. With the help of the ], incidents fell from an average of 30 attacks per day in December 2006 to an average of fewer than four in April 2007.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-kidcops7may07,1,648855.story?coll=la-news-a_section|title=A ragtag solution with real results|newspaper=Los Angeles Times|date=7 May 2007|access-date=26 March 2010|first=Chris|last=Kraul|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100605161954/http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-kidcops7may07%2C1%2C648855.story?coll=la-news-a_section|archive-date=5 June 2010}}</ref>


Baghdad is still one of the most violent regions of the country, even after the 2007 troop surge more than two-thirds of the violence that takes place in Iraq happens in Baghdad even though the Iraqi Government is in firm control of the entire city. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country, if not the world. Iraqi security and police forces had also been significantly built up in the capital and, despite being constantly targeted, had enjoyed some successes such as the pacification of ], which however subsequently saw a massive surge of insurgent activity.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://home.bellsouth.net/s/editorial.dll?pnum=1&bfromind=1057&eeid=4934130&_sitecat=1505&dcatid=0&eetype=article&render=y&ac=1&ck=&ch=ne&s=in|title=AT&T|publisher=Home.bellsouth.net|date=1 January 1985|access-date=26 March 2010}}{{Dead link|date=June 2016|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> and after the failed Coalition ] fell under Sunni insurgent control. The U.S. and Iraqi Forces scored many decisive victories in 2007 during the U.S. troops surge when they launched Operation Law and Order and Operation Phantam Thunder which broke the back of the insurgency and has since the saw a mass reduction in violence by 80 percent since then.
* ] - The ongoing insurgency (mostly against Iraqi civilians) during the Iraqi reconstruction serve as a sign of a future sectarian civil war in the country.


Recent{{when|date=December 2022}} intelligence suggests that the base of foreign paramilitary operations has moved from Anbar to the religiously and ethnically mixed ]. By July 2007 Diyala had fallen under almost total Insurgent control, and had become the headquarters for the Sunni-dominated ], which has issued a proclamation declaring the regional capital Baqubah its capital.
==External links==
=== Middle East ===
* "." ''Al-Zawra'' (Baghdad). ], ].
* Biedermann, Ferry. "." ''Salon.'' ], ], via globalpolicy.
* "." '']'' (UK). ], ].
* "." ''Middle East Online'' (UK). ], ].
* "." ''New York Times.'' ], ].
* "." ''Reuters.'' ], ].
* "." ''Al-Jazeera.'' ], ].
* "." ''Al-Jazeera.'' ], ].
* "." ''Tehran Times.'' ], ].
* "." ''New York Times.'' ], ]. Registration-free copies at
and .
* ]. "." '']'' (Fallujah). ], ].
* Rasan, Dhiya. "." ] (Baghdad). ], ].
* "." ''Detroit Free Press.'' ], ].
* "." ''Mail &amp; Guardian.'' ], ].
* "." ''Knight Ridder Newspapers.'' ], ].
* "." ''Boston Review.'' ], ].


In response to a law allowing for the partitioning of Iraq into autonomous regions, members of the Mutayibeen Coalition ('']''<ref name="memri171006">{{cite web|url=http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1910.htm|title=Islamist Websites Monitor No. 8|publisher=MEMRI|date=17 October 2006|access-date=2 June 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140602195941/http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1910.htm|archive-date=2 June 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref><!-- alternate spelling: "Helf" Alternate trans.: "Mutayibeen Alliance"? Also appears in the ]s "mission statement" as "Pact of the Scented People"? Singular: mutayib -->), a coalition of Sunni insurgent groups including Al Qaeda in Iraq, announced the creation of the ] encompassing parts of 6 of Iraq's 18 provinces on 15 October 2006.<ref name="memri171006"/><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e239159e-5c6a-11db-9e7e-0000779e2340.html|title=/ In depth – Call for Sunni state in Iraq|work=Financial Times|location=London|date=15 October 2006|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080906223355/http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e239159e-5c6a-11db-9e7e-0000779e2340.html|archive-date=6 September 2008|url-status=live}}</ref> Yet another show of defiance came on 18 October when Sunni fighters brazenly paraded in Ramadi. Similar parades were held two days later in several towns across western Iraq, two of which occurred within two miles of U.S. military bases.
===Support for Iraqi Resistance===


By October 2006, small radicalized militias had seemed to overshadow the larger and more organized Sunni groups which had composed the insurgency previously.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/18/AR2006101801865.html|title=Militias Splintering into Radicalized Cells|work=The Washington Post|date=19 October 2006|access-date=26 March 2010|first=Sudarsan|last=Raghavan|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100806072722/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/18/AR2006101801865.html|archive-date=6 August 2010|url-status=live}}</ref> As disagreements emerged in pre-existing groups for reasons ranging from the rift in the Sunni forces between foreign and Iraqi fighters, competition between Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade, and anger over various decisions such as Muqtada al Sadr's agreement to join the political process, dozens of insurgency groups sprung up across the country, though particularly in Baghdad where the U.S. army has listed 23 active militias. Residents have described the capital as being a patchwork of militia run fiefs.{{Citation needed|date=October 2007}} As a result of the insurgency's splintering nature, many established leaders seemed to lose influence.{{Citation needed|date=October 2007}} This was particularly illustrated on 19 October, when members of the Mahdi army briefly seized control of Amarah. The attack, while demonstrating the influence of the Madhi army, is believed to have originated as a result of contention between local units of the Madhi army and the allegedly Badr brigade run security forces, and the timing suggested that neither Al Sadr nor his top commanders had known or orchestrated the offensive.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Burns|first1=John F.|title=Precarious Cease-Fire in Amara Holds|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/world/middleeast/22iraq.html?pagewanted=all|access-date=21 December 2015|date=22 October 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160108081447/http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/world/middleeast/22iraq.html?pagewanted=all|archive-date=8 January 2016|url-status=live}}</ref>
* from .
* Soldz, Stephen. "."
* "" ''Al-Jazeera.''], ].
* Kais al-Rubai, Ali. "." '']'' (Baaqouba). ], ].
* "Sadr urges Iraqis to fight occupation." ''Al-Bawaba'' ], ]. Sources claim negotiations with U.S.-led forces are progressing.
* "Washington Unleashes Bloodbath in Iraq." ''Tehran Times.'' ], ].
* Iraqi Resistance News and Discussion from .
* : A pro-resistance text on a personal website.


At the height of the war, insurgents launched hundreds of attacks each month against Coalition forces. Overtime, insurgency groups moved to more sophisticated methods of attack such as ]s, and ], which cannot be easily jammed. These attacks contributed to the rate of civilian casualties which in turn reduced Iraq's public safety as well as the reliability of infrastructure.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/082205.html|first=Fareed|last=Zakaria|title=Don't Make Hollow Threats|date=22 August 2005|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060317010823/http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/082205.html|archive-date=17 March 2006}}</ref>
=== Editorials ===


As of 29 January 2009 4,235 U.S. soldiers, 178 British soldiers and 139 soldiers from other nations (allied with the coalition) have died in Iraq. 31,834 U.S. soldiers had been wounded.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://icasualties.org/oif/|first1=Pat|last1=Kneisler|first2=Michael|last2=White|author3=Evan D.|publisher=Iraq coalition casualties count|title=Operation Enduring Freedom Fatalities|date=29 January 2007|access-date=23 September 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070922155006/http://icasualties.org/oif/ <!-- bot retrieved archive -->|archive-date=22 September 2007}}</ref> Coalition forces do not usually release death counts. As such, the exact number of insurgents killed by the Coalition or Iraqi forces is unknown. Through September 2007 more than 19,000 insurgents were reported to have been killed in fighting with Coalition forces and tens of thousands of Iraqi "suspected civilians" were captured (including 25,000 detainees in U.S. military custody at the time), according to military statistics released for the first time.<ref>{{cite news|last=Michaels|first=Jim|url=https://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-09-26-insurgents_N.htm|title=19,000 insurgents killed in Iraq since '03|work=USA Today|date=27 September 2007|access-date=26 March 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110428200503/http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-09-26-insurgents_N.htm|archive-date=28 April 2011|url-status=live}}</ref>
* ] .
* "." ''New Straits Times.'' ], ].
* "." ''Al-Bawaba.'' ], ].
* Ritter, Scott. "." ], ].
* ." ], ]. The nature of warfare in Iraq.
* ." ], ]. On Iraq and World War II combat compared.
*


== American-led counter-insurgency operations ==
]
{{Main|Coalition military operations of the Iraq War}}
]
] helicopter showing the killing of people whom the U.S. military regarded as suspected Iraqi insurgents. Date and location: 1 December 2003, near ].<ref>{{Cite web|date=9 January 2004|title=Tape Shows Apache Pilots Firing on Iraqis|url=https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=131481&page=1|publisher=ABC News|location=United States}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|date=6 May 2004|title=Video shows killing of 3 Iraqis by US helicopter|url=https://www.irishtimes.com/news/video-shows-killing-of-3-iraqis-by-us-helicopter-1.1139270|newspaper=The Irish Times}}</ref>]]
]
Over 500 ] operations have been undertaken by the U.S.-led Coalition or the Iraqi government. These include Operation Option North and ] in ], ], ] and Operation All American Tiger throughout Iraq, ] in ] and ] in ] – all in 2003; Operation Market Sweep, ] and ] in ] in 2004; ] in ], ] and ] in Baghdad, ] near ], ] in ] and the ] – all in 2005; ] in Samarra and ] in Baghdad in 2006; and ] in Baghdad, ] in ] and ] throughout Iraq – all in 2007.
]
]
]


== See also ==
]
{{Portal|Iraq|Asia}}
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
'''Chronology:'''
* ]
** ]
** ]
** ]
** ]
** ]
** ]
*** ]
** ]
** ]
** ]

== References ==
{{Reflist}}

==Sources==
* {{Citation|last=Bishku|first=Michael B.|title=Israel and the Kurds: A Pragmatic Relationship in Middle Eastern Politics|year=2018|volume=41|issue=2|publisher=Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies}}

== Further reading ==
* Chehab, Zaki. ''Iraq Ablaze: Inside the Insurgency'', ] & Co Ltd. {{ISBN|1-84511-110-9}}.
*
* Rogers, Paul. ''Iraq and the War on Terror: Twelve Months of Insurgency.'' I.B. Tauris. {{ISBN|1-84511-205-9}}.
* . ]. {{ISBN|0-8014-4452-7}}.
* Enders, David. ''Baghdad Bulletin: Dispatches on the American Occupation'' University of Michigan Press (4 April 2005) {{ISBN|0-472-11469-7}}
* O'Connell, Edward. Bruce R. Pirnie. ''''/ RAND {{ISBN|978-0-8330-4297-2}}.
* ]

== External links ==
{{Commons category|Insurgency in Iraq}}

=== Analysis ===
* Christopher Alexander, Charles Kyle and William McCallister , ] 14 November 2003
* ] "". , 19 July 2005.
* ] '']'' 21 February 2006
* . Compiled by , March 2006. Updated 22 August 2006.
* "". wadinet.de (])

=== News articles ===
* Biedermann, Ferry. "." ''Salon.'' 16 August 2003, via globalpolicy.
* "." ''Middle East Online'' (UK). 23 August 2004.
*

=== Supportive of the insurgents ===
* from .

=== Profiles of insurgent groups ===
* "". ''Washington Post'', 19 March 2006.
*

{{Iraq topics}}
{{Iraq War}}
{{War on Terrorism}}
{{Asia in topic|Terrorism in|IL=Timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict}}
{{Armed Iraqi Groups in the Iraq War and the Iraq Civil War}}
{{Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Iraqi Insurgency}}
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Latest revision as of 08:33, 2 January 2025

Sectarian/anti-government warfare in American-occupied Iraq

Iraqi insurgency
Part of the Iraq War
Two masked Iraqi men with weapons during the insurgency that followed the 2003 invasion of Iraq
Insurgents in northern Iraq, 2006
Date1 May 2003 – 18 December 2011
(8 years, 7 months, 2 weeks and 3 days)
LocationIraq
Result

Inconclusive

Belligerents

 United States
 United Kingdom

MNF–I
(2003–09)

New Iraqi government

Sons of Iraq Supported by:
Iran Iran

 NATO

 Israel
 United Nations

Ba'ath loyalists

Sunni insurgents

Shia insurgents

Commanders and leaders
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
Tommy Franks
Donald Rumsfeld
Robert Gates
Tony Blair
Gordon Brown
David Cameron
John Howard
Kevin Rudd
Silvio Berlusconi
Walter Natynczyk
José María Aznar
Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Aleksander Kwaśniewski
Ayad Allawi
Ibrahim al-Jaafari
Nouri al-Maliki
Ali Khamenei
Mohammad Salimi
Ataollah Salehi
Iran Qasem Soleimani
Ba'athist Iraq Saddam Hussein (POW)
Ba'athist Iraq Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri
Ba'athist Iraq Abid Hamid Mahmud
Ba'athist Iraq Ali Hassan al-Majid
Ba'athist Iraq Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti (POWExecuted
Ba'athist Iraq Taha Yasin Ramadan (POWExecuted
Ba'athist Iraq Tariq Aziz (POW)
Ba'athist Iraq Mohammed Younis al-Ahmed
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
Abu Ayyub al-Masri 
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
Abu Abdullah al-Shafi'i (POW)
Ishmael Jubouri
Muqtada al-Sadr
Abu Deraa
Akram al-Kaabi
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis
Qais al-Khazali
Iraq War (Outline)
Timeline

Invasion (2003)

Post-invasion insurgency (2003–2006)

Civil war (2006–2008)

Insurgency (2008–2011)

List of bombings during the Iraq War
indicates attacks resulting in over 100 deaths
§ indicates the deadliest attack in the Iraq War
This list only includes major attacks.
2003
1st Baghdad
2nd Baghdad
Najaf
3rd Baghdad
1st Nasiriyah
1st Karbala
2004
1st Erbil
Ashoura
1st Basra
1st Mosul
4th Baghdad
5th Baghdad
Karbala & Najaf
1st Baqubah
Kufa
Marez
2005
Suwaira bombing
1st Al Hillah
2nd Erbil
Musayyib
6th Baghdad
7th Baghdad
1st Balad
Khanaqin
2006
Karbala-Ramadi
1st Samarra
8th Baghdad
9th Baghdad
10th Baghdad
2007
11th Baghdad
12th Baghdad
13th Baghdad
14th Baghdad
15th Baghdad
2nd Al Hillah
1st Tal Afar
16th Baghdad
17th Baghdad
2nd & 3rd Karbala
2nd Mosul
18th Baghdad
Makhmour
Abu Sayda
2nd Samarra
19th Baghdad
Amirli
1st Kirkuk
20th Baghdad
21st Baghdad
§ Qahtaniya
Amarah
2008
22nd Baghdad
2nd Balad
23rd Baghdad
4th Karbala
24th Baghdad
Karmah
2nd Baqubah
Dujail
Balad Ruz
2009
25th Baghdad
26th Baghdad
Baghdad-Muqdadiyah
Taza
27th Baghdad
2nd Kirkuk
2nd Tal Afar
28th Baghdad
29th Baghdad
30th Baghdad
2010
31st Baghdad
32nd Baghdad
3rd Baqubah
33rd Baghdad
34th Baghdad
35th Baghdad
1st Pan-Iraq
36th Baghdad
37th Baghdad
2nd Pan-Iraq
38th Baghdad
39th Baghdad
40th Baghdad
2011
41st Baghdad
3rd Pan-Iraq
Karbala-Baghdad
42nd Baghdad
Tikrit
3rd Al Hillah
3rd Samarra
Al Diwaniyah
Taji
4th Pan-Iraq
43rd Baghdad
4th Karbala
44th Baghdad
2nd Basra
45th Baghdad
Persian Gulf Wars

An Iraqi insurgency began shortly after the 2003 American invasion deposed longtime leader Saddam Hussein. It is considered to have lasted until the end of the Iraq War and U.S. withdrawal in 2011. It was followed by a renewed insurgency.

The initial outbreak of violence (the 2003–2006 phase) was triggered by the fall and preceded the establishment of the new Iraqi government by the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF–I), which was led by the United States. From around 2004 to May 2007, Iraqi insurgents largely focused their attacks on MNF-I troops, but later shifted to targeting the post-invasion Iraqi security forces as well.

The insurgents were composed of a diverse mix of private militias, pro-Saddam Ba'athists, local Iraqis opposed to the MNF–I and/or the post-Saddam Iraqi government, and a number of foreign jihadists. The various insurgent groups fought an asymmetric war of attrition against the MNF–I and the Iraqi government, while also fighting among themselves.

The insurgency was shaped by sectarian tensions in Iraq, particularly between Shia Muslims (~60% of the population) and Sunni Muslims (~35% of the population). By February 2006, the violence escalated into a Shia–Sunni civil war, and for the next two years, the MNF–I and the Iraqi government were locked in intense fighting with various militants, who were also targeting each other based on their sectarian affiliations. Many of the militant attacks in American-controlled territories were directed at the Shia-dominated government of Nouri al-Maliki. Militancy continued amid post-invasion Iraqi reconstruction efforts, as the federal government tried to establish itself in the country. The civil war and sectarian violence ended in mid-2008, having been quelled by the American troop surge of 2007.

However, after the American withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, a renewed sectarian and anti-government insurgency swept through the country, causing thousands of casualties. Two years later, the violence of the new insurgency escalated into the Second Iraq War, largely triggered by the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Background

Main article: 2003 invasion of Iraq

The 2003 invasion of Iraq (20 March – 1 May 2003) began the Iraq War, or Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which a combined force of troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland invaded Iraq and toppled the government of Saddam Hussein within 26 days of major combat operations. The invasion phase consisted of a conventionally fought war which concluded with the capture of the Iraq capital Baghdad by U.S. forces.

Four countries participated with troops during the initial invasion phase, which lasted from 20 March to 15 April 2003. These were the United States (148,000), United Kingdom (45,000), Australia (2,000), and Poland (194). Thirty-six other countries were involved in its aftermath. In preparation for the invasion, 100,000 U.S. troops were assembled in Kuwait by 18 February. The United States supplied the majority of the invading forces, but also received support from Kurdish irregulars in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The invasion was preceded by an air strike on the Presidential Palace in Baghdad on 20 March 2003. The following day coalition forces launched an incursion into Basra Province from their massing point close to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. While the special forces launched an amphibious assault from the Persian Gulf to secure Basra and the surrounding petroleum fields, the main invasion army moved into southern Iraq, occupying the region and engaging in the Battle of Nasiriyah on 23 March. Massive air strikes across the country and against Iraqi command and control threw the defending army into chaos and prevented an effective resistance. On 26 March the 173rd Airborne Brigade was airdropped near the northern city of Kirkuk where they joined forces with Kurdish rebels and fought several actions against the Iraqi army to secure the northern part of the country.

The main body of coalition forces continued their drive into the heart of Iraq and met with little resistance. Most of the Iraqi military was quickly defeated and Baghdad was occupied on 9 April. Other operations occurred against pockets of the Iraqi army including the capture and occupation of Kirkuk on 10 April, and the attack and capture of Tikrit on 15 April. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the central leadership went into hiding as the coalition forces completed the occupation of the country.

On 1 May, an end of major combat operations was declared, ending the invasion stage of the Iraq War and beginning the military occupation period and the Iraqi insurgency against coalition forces.

On 23 May 2003, Iraqi military personnel, police and security services were disbanded per Order 2 of the Coalition Provisional Authority under Administrator Paul Bremer, leaving 400,000 soldiers jobless, which Western and Iraqi critics of the U.S. action said provided a ready pool of recruits for Islamist groups and other insurgents that emerged. Furthermore, for 10 months Iraq's borders were left open for anyone to come in without even a visa or a passport.

History

Further information: Timeline of the Iraq War

2003–2006: initial insurgency

Main article: Iraqi insurgency (2003–2006) Further information: Ramadi under U.S. military occupation
U.S. Army M1A2 Abrams tanks patrol the streets of Tal Afar, Iraq in February 2005.

The Iraqi insurgency of 2003–06 erupted following the invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein's rule in May 2003. The armed insurgent opposition to the United States-led multinational force in Iraq and the post-2003 Iraqi government lasted until early 2006, when it deteriorated into a sectarian civil war, the most violent phase of the Iraq War.

2006–2008: insurgency to civil war

Main article: Iraqi Civil War (2006–2008)
Map of the Islamic State of Iraq and its provinces on 7 April 2007

Following the U.S.-launched 2003 invasion of Iraq, the situation deteriorated, and by 2007, the intercommunal violence between Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a factions was described by the National Intelligence Estimate as having elements of a civil war. In a 10 January 2007 address to the American people, President George W. Bush stated that "80% of Iraq's sectarian violence occurs within 30 miles (48 km) of the capital. This violence is splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves, and shaking the confidence of all Iraqis." Two polls of Americans conducted in 2006 found that between 65% and 85% believed Iraq was in a civil war; however, a similar poll of Iraqis conducted in 2007 found that 61% did not believe that they were in a civil war.

In October 2006, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Iraqi government estimated that more than 370,000 Iraqis had been displaced since the 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, bringing the total number of Iraqi refugees to more than 1.6 million. By 2008, the UNHCR raised the estimate of refugees to a total of about 4.7 million (~16% of the population). The number of refugees estimated abroad was 2 million (a number close to CIA projections) and the number of internally displaced people was 2.7 million. The estimated number of orphans across Iraq has ranged from 400,000 (according to the Baghdad Provincial Council), to five million (according to Iraq's anti-corruption board). A UN report from 2008 placed the number of orphans at about 870,000. The Red Cross has also stated that Iraq's humanitarian situation remains among the most critical in the world, with millions of Iraqis forced to rely on insufficient and poor-quality water sources.

According to the Failed States Index, produced by Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace, Iraq was one of the world's top 5 unstable states from 2005 to 2008. A poll of top U.S. foreign policy experts conducted in 2007 showed that over the next 10 years, just 3% of experts believed the U.S. would be able to rebuild Iraq into a "beacon of democracy" and 58% of experts believed that Sunni-Shiite tensions would dramatically increase in the Middle East.

In June 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense reported that "the security, political and economic trends in Iraq continue to be positive; however, they remain fragile, reversible and uneven." In July 2008, the audit arm of the U.S. Congress recommended that the U.S. Government should "develop an updated strategy for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself". Steven Simon, a Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in May 2008 that "the recent short-term gains" had "come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq."

After Iraqi security forces took the lead in security operations on 30 June 2009, Iraq experienced a "dramatic reduction in war-related violence of all types ..., with civilian and military deaths down by 80 to 90 percent compared with the same period in 2008."

2008–2011: low-level insurgency

Main articles: 2008 in Iraq, 2009 in Iraq, 2010 in Iraq, and 2011 in Iraq
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (January 2016)

In 2010, the low point for the al-Qaeda effort in Iraq, car bombings declined to an average of ten a month and multiple-location attacks occurred only two or three times a year.

Aftermath

2011–2013: American withdrawal and renewed insurgency

Main article: Iraqi insurgency (2011–2013)
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (April 2013)

The Iraqi attacks since U.S. withdrawal relates to the last stage of violent terror activities engaged by Iraqi, primarily radical Sunni and Shia insurgent groups against the central government and the sectarian warfare between various factions within Iraq in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal. The events of post-U.S. withdrawal violence succeeded the previous insurgency in Iraq (prior to 18 December 2011), but have showed increasingly violent patterns, raising concerns that the surging violence might slide into another civil war.

Militant organizations

The Iraqi insurgency is composed of at least a dozen major organizations and perhaps as many as 40 distinct groups. These groups are subdivided into countless smaller cells. The Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that less than 10% of insurgents are non-Iraqi foreign fighters. According to the Chief of the British General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, speaking in September 2007,

The militants (and I use the word deliberately because not all are insurgents, or terrorists, or criminals; they are a mixture of them all) are well armed – probably with outside help, and probably from Iran. By motivation, essentially, and with the exception of the Al Qaeda in Iraq element who have endeavoured to exploit the situation for their own ends, our opponents are Iraqi Nationalists, and are most concerned with their own needs – jobs, money, security – and the majority are not bad people.

A roadside bombing in Iraq on 3 August 2005

Because of its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi insurgency is difficult to determine, but the main groupings are:

  • Ba'athists, the supporters of Saddam Hussein's former administration including army or intelligence officers, whose ideology is a variant of Pan-Arabism.
  • Iraqi nationalists, Iraqis who believe in a strong version of Iraqi self-determination. These policies may not necessarily espouse a Pan-Arab ideology, but rather advocate the country's territorial integrity including Kuwait and Khuzestan. Historical figures of this movement include the pre-Ba'athist leader of Iraq Abd al-Karim Qasim and his government.
  • Iraqi Salafi Islamists, the indigenous armed followers of the Salafi movement, as well as any remnants of the Kurdish Ansar al-Islam: individuals with a Salafi-only policy opposed to non-Salafis though not aligned to one specific ethnic group. Though opposed to the U.S.-led invasion, these groups are not wholly sympathetic towards the former Ba'ath Party as its members included non-Salafis.
  • Shi'a militias, including the southern, Iran-linked Badr Organization, the Mahdi Army, and the central-Iraq followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. These groups neither advocate the dominance of a single ethnic group, nor the traditional ideologies behind the Iraqi state (e.g. these particular Shi'as do not support the capture of Khuzestan or other border areas with Iran, but rather promote warm relations with Iran's Shi'a government).
  • Foreign Islamist volunteers, including those often linked to al Qaeda and largely driven by the Salafi/Wahhabi doctrine (the two preceding categories are often lumped as "jihadists");
  • Possibly some socialist revolutionaries (such as the Iraqi Armed Revolutionary Resistance, which claimed one attack in 2007).
  • Non-violent resistance groups and political parties (not part of the armed insurgency).

Arab nationalists

Ba'athists and pro-Saddamists

Further information: Ba'ath Party (Iraqi-dominated faction) and Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region
Ba'ath Party flag

The Ba'athists include former Ba'ath Party officials, the Fedayeen Saddam, the Special Republican Guard and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence elements and security services, such as the Mukhabarat and the Special Security Organization. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist government to power. The pre-war organization of the Ba'ath Party and its militias as a cellular structure aided the continued pro-Saddam resistance after the fall of Baghdad, and Iraqi intelligence operatives may have developed a plan for guerrilla war following the toppling of Saddam Hussein from power.

Following Saddam's capture, the Ba'athist movement largely faded; its surviving factions were increasingly shifting to either nationalist factions (Iraqi, though not Pan-Arab, such as the ideology of the pre-Ba'athist regime), or Islamist (Sunni or Shia, depending on the actual faith of the individual, though Ba'ath Party policy had been secular).

As the goal of restoring the Ba'ath Party to power was seemingly out of reach, the alternative solution appeared to be to join forces with organisations who opposed the U.S.-led invasion. Many former Ba'athists had adopted an Islamist façade to attract more credibility within the country, and perhaps gain support from outside Iraq. Others, especially following the January 2005 elections, became more interested in politics.

The fall of Baghdad effectively ended the existence of the Fedayeen Saddam as an organized paramilitary. Several of its members died during the war. A large number survived, however, and were willing to carry on the fight even after the fall of Saddam Hussein from power. Many former members joined guerrilla organizations that began to form to resist the U.S-led coalition in Iraq. Some Fedayeen members fled to Syria. By June, an insurgency was underway in central and northern Iraq, especially in an area known as the Sunni Triangle. Some units of the Fedayeen also continued to operate independently of other insurgent organizations in the Sunni areas of Iraq. On 30 November 2003, a U.S. convoy traveling through the town of Samarra in the Sunni Triangle was ambushed by over 100 Iraqi guerillas, reportedly wearing trademark Fedayeen Saddam uniforms.

Following the execution of Saddam Hussein, Deputy Leader of the Iraqi-cell of the Iraqi-led Ba'ath Party and former Vice President of Iraq Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri became a leading candidate to succeed him as Leader of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. Ad-Douri had taken over the running of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party following Saddam Hussein's capture in 2003 and had been endorsed by a previously unknown group calling itself Baghdad Citizens Gathering. On 3 January 2007 the website of the banned Iraqi Ba'ath Party confirmed that he was new leader of the party.

Increasing Syrian influence in the Iraqi Ba'ath Party may well have a major effect on result in a fragmentation of Ba'athist parts of the insurgency.

Iraqi nationalists (non-Ba'athist)

Iraqi nationalists are mostly drawn from the Arab regions. Their reasons for opposing the Coalition vary from a rejection of the Coalition presence as a matter of principle to the failure of the multinational forces to fully restore public services and to quickly restore complete sovereignty.

One notable leader of the insurgency among nationalist Sunni is former aide to Saddam Hussein and a former regional Ba'ath Party Organiser Mohammed Younis al-Ahmed al-Muwali who has been crossing the border between Iraq and Syria disbursing funds, smuggling weaponry and organising much of the fighting in the central area of Iraq.

One former minister in the interim government, Ayham al-Samarai, announced the launch in 2005 of "a new political movement, saying he aimed to give a voice to figures from the legitimate Iraqi resistance. 'The birth of this political bloc is to silence the skeptics who say there is no legitimate Iraqi resistance and that they cannot reveal their political face,' he told a news conference." It is unclear what became of this movement.

Shia militias

Government inefficacy and Iranian support

The Shia militias have presented Nouri al-Maliki with perhaps the greatest conundrum of his administration given the capture of Amarah. American officials have pressed him hard to disarm the militias and rid the state security forces of their influence.

A 2008 report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point based on reports from the interrogations of dozens of captured Shia fighters described an Iranian-run network smuggling Shia fighters into Iran where they received training and weapons before returning to Iraq.

Badr Organization

One major Shia militia in Iraq is the Badr Organization, the military wing of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq. The group is currently based in Karbala, Iraq, and is also active in areas throughout southern Iraq. The group was formed by the Iranian Government to fight the Saddam Hussein-controlled Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War. Originally, the group consisted of Iraqi exiles who were banished from Iraq during the reign of Saddam Hussein. After the war ended in 1988, the organization remained in Iran until Saddam Hussein was overthrown during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Following the invasion, the brigade then moved into Iraq, became members of the new Iraq Army, and aided coalition forces in insurgents.

Colonel Derek Harvey told Reuters "that the U.S. military detained Badr assassination teams possessing target lists of Sunni officers and pilots in 2003 and 2004 but did not hold them. Harvey said his superiors told him that 'this stuff had to play itself out' – implying that revenge attacks by returning Shi'ite groups were to be expected. He also said Badr and ISCI offered intelligence and advice to U.S. officials on how to navigate Iraqi politics."

In a letter published by the Coalition in February 2004, an insurgent believed to be Zarqawi wrote that jihadis should start an open sectarian war so that Sunnis would mobilize against what would otherwise be a secret war being waged by Shia. The author only specifically pointed to assassinations carried out by the Badr Brigade as an example of this secret war.

In December 2005, the group and their leaders in the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq participated in parliament elections, under the pro-Shiite coalition known as the United Iraqi Alliance, and managed to get 36 members into the Iraqi Parliament.

The Badr organization supports the government of Nouri Al-Maliki.

Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army

Supporters of the young Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr are largely impoverished men from the Shi'a urban areas and slums in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a cities. The Mahdi Army area of operation stretches from Basra in the south to the Sadr City section of Baghdad in central Iraq (some scattered Shi'a militia activity has also been reported in Baquba and Kirkuk, where Shi'a minorities exist).

During his group's active militant phase, Al-Sadr enjoyed wide support from the Iraqi people according to some polls. A poll by the Iraq Center for Research and Studies found that 32% of Iraqis "strongly supported" him and another 36% "somewhat supported" him, making him the second most popular man in Iraq, behind only Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani. The Mahdi Army is believed to have around 60,000 members.

After the December 2005 elections in Iraq, Al-Sadr's party got 32 new seats giving him substantial political power in the divided Iraqi Parliament. In January 2006, he used these seats to swing the vote for prime minister to Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, giving Al-Sadr a legitimate stake in the new Iraqi government and allying Al-Jaafari with the cleric.

On 27 November 2006, a senior American intelligence official told reporters that the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah had been training members of the Mahdi Army. The official said that 1,000 to 2,000 fighters from the Mahdi Army and other Shia militias had been trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon, and a small number of Hezbollah operatives have also visited Iraq to help with training. Iran has facilitated the link between Hezbollah and the Shia militias in Iraq, the official said. "There seems to have been a strategic decision taken sometime over late winter or early spring by Damascus, Tehran, along with their partners in ait Lebanese Hezbollah, to provide more support to Sadr to increase pressure on the U.S.," the American intelligence official said.

Foreign participants

When Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003, several documents were found in his possession. One particular document, which was apparently written after he lost power, appeared to be a directive to his Ba'athist loyalists warning them to be wary of Islamist mujahideen and other foreign Arabs entering the country to join the insurgency. The directive supposedly shows Saddam having concerns that foreign fighters would not share the same objectives as Ba'ath loyalists (i.e. the eventual return of Saddam to power and the restoration of his regime). A U.S. official commenting on the document stressed that while Saddam urged his followers to be cautious in their dealings with other Arab fighters, he did not order them to avoid contact or rule out co-operation. Bruce Hoffman, a Washington counter-terrorism expert stated that the existence of the document underscores the fact that "this is an insurgency cut of many different cloths... everybody's jockeying for their position of power in the future Iraq." Many experts believe that fighters from other countries who have flocked to Iraq to join the insurgents are motivated by animosity toward the United States and the desire to install an Islamic state in place of the Ba'ath Party's secular regime.

Foreign fighters are mostly Arabs from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq, primarily through the porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, to assist the Iraqi insurgency. Many of these fighters are Wahhabi fundamentalists who see Iraq as the new "field of jihad" in the battle against U.S. forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of Al-Qaeda and the related group Ansar al-Islam are suspected of infiltrating into the Sunni areas of Iraq through the mountainous northeastern border with Iran. The United States and its allies point to Jordanian-born Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the key player in this group. Zarqawi was considered the head of an insurgent group called Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad ("Monotheism and Holy War") until his death on 7 June 2006, which according to U.S. estimates numbers in the low hundreds.

Usage of the term "foreign fighters" has received criticism as being Western-centric because, taken literally, the term would encompass all non-Iraqi forces, including Coalition forces. Zarqawi has taken to taunting the American forces about the irony of the term: "Who is the foreigner, O cross worshippers? You are the ones who came to the land of the Muslims from your distant corrupt land." (Communiqué of 10 May 2005). Zarqawi's group has since announced the formation of the Ansar platoon, a squad of Iraqi suicide bombers, which an AP writer called "an apparent bid to deflect criticism that most suicide bombers in Iraq are foreigners."

While it is not known how many of those fighting the U.S. forces in Iraq are from outside the country, it is generally agreed that foreign fighters make up a very small percentage of the insurgency. Major General Joseph Taluto, head of the 42nd Infantry Division, said that "99.9 per cent" of captured Insurgents are Iraqi. The estimate has been confirmed by the Pentagon's own figures; in one analysis of over 1000 insurgents captured in Fallujah, only 15 were non-Iraqi. According to the Daily Telegraph, information from military commanders engaging in battles around Ramadi exposed the fact that out of 1300 suspected insurgents arrested in five months of 2005, none were foreign, although Colonel John L. Gronski stated that foreigners provided money and logistical support: "The foreign fighters are staying north of the river, training and advising, like the Soviets were doing in Vietnam"

In September 2006, the Christian Science Monitor reported, "It's true that foreign fighters are in Iraq, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. But they are a small minority of the insurgents, say administration critics. Most Iraqi mujahideen are Sunnis who fear their interests will be ignored under Iraq's Shia-dominated government. They are fighting for concrete, local political goals – not the destruction of America." The paper quoted University of Michigan history professor Juan Cole: "If the Iraqi Sunni nationalists could take over their own territory, they would not put up with the few hundred foreign volunteers blowing things up, and would send them away or slit their throats." In 2005, the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded that foreign fighters accounted for less than 10% of the estimated 30,000 insurgents and argued that the U.S. and Iraqi Governments were "feeding the myth" that they comprised the backbone of the insurgency.

Despite the low numbers of foreign fighters their presence has been confirmed in several ways and Coalition forces believe the majority of suicide bombings are believed to be carried out by non-Iraqi foreigners. Kenneth Katzman, a Middle East expert with the Congressional Research Service, stated in June 2005: "I still think 80 percent of the Insurgents, the day-to-day activity, is Iraqi – the roadside bombings, mortars, direct weapons fire, rifle fire, automatic weapons fire... the foreign fighters attract the headlines with the suicide bombings, no question."

In September 2005, Iraqi and U.S. forces conducted a counter-insurgency operation in the predominantly Turkmen town of Tal Afar. According to an AP, report, an Iraqi Army Captain claimed that Iraqi forces arrested 150 non-Iraqi Arabs (Syria, Sudan, Yemen and Jordan) in the operation; the American army claimed 20% of arrests were foreign combatants, while Donald Rumsfeld on PBS confirmed that foreign combatants were present. However, not all accounts of the battle mention these arrests, and U.S. Army commander Colonel H. R. McMaster said the "vast majority" of Insurgents captured there were "Iraqis and not foreigners." Iraqi journalist Nasir Ali claimed that there were "very few foreign combatants" in Tal Afar and charged "Every time the US army and the Iraqi government want to destroy a specific city, they claim it hosts Arab fighters and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."

There are allegations that the U.S. government has attempted to inflate the number of foreign fighters in order to advance the theory that the insurgency is not a local movement. U.S. Army Specialist Tony Lagouranis spoke about his job identifying many of the bodies after the assault on Fallujah:

We had women and children, old men, young boys. So, you know, it's hard to say. I think initially, the reason that we were doing this was they were trying to find foreign fighters. were trying to prove that there were a lot of foreign fighters in Fallujah. So, mainly, that's what we were going for, but most of them really didn't have I.D.'s but maybe half of them had I.D.'s. Very few of them had foreign I.D.'s. There were people working with me who would—in an effort to sort of cook the books, you know they would find a Koran on the guy and the Koran was printed in Algeria, and they would mark him down as an Algerian, or you know guys would come in with a black shirt and khaki pants and they would say, well, this is the Hezbollah uniform and they would mark him down as a Lebanese, which was ridiculous, but—you know... Well, I was only a specialist, so actually, you know, I did say something to the staff sergeant, who was really in charge, and you know, I just got yelled down you know, shot down.

Foreign fighters' nationality distribution

In July 2007, the Los Angeles Times reported that 45% of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians and security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15% are from Syria and Lebanon; and 10% are from North Africa. 50% of all Saudi fighters in Iraq come as suicide bombers. In the six months preceding that article, such bombings have killed or injured 4,000 Iraqis.

According to a U.S. military press briefing on 20 October 2005, 312 foreign nationals from 27 countries had been captured in Iraq from April to October 2005. This represents a component of the Iraqi insurgent movement, which also includes a nationalist movement encompassing over 30 Shia and Sunni militias.

Foreign insurgents captured in Iraq in the 7-month period April–October 2005:

Nationality Number
 Egypt 78
 Syria 66
 Sudan 41
 Saudi Arabia 32
 Jordan 17
 United States 15
 Iran 13
 Palestine 12
 Tunisia 10
 Algeria 8
Libya 7
 Turkey 6
 Lebanon 3
 India 2
 Qatar 2
 United Arab Emirates 2
 United Kingdom 2
 Denmark 1
 France 1
 Indonesia 1
 Ireland 1
 Israel 1
 Kuwait 1
 Macedonia 1
 Morocco 1
 Somalia 1
 Yemen 1
Total 619

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Sunni jihadists

Further information: Al-Qaeda in Iraq

The extent of Zarqawi's influence is a source of much controversy. Zarqawi was reported killed in action in March 2004 in "a statement signed by a dozen alleged insurgent groups". His Jordanian family then held a funeral service on his behalf, although no body was recovered and positively identified. Iraqi leaders denied the presence of Zarqawi in Fallujah prior to the U.S. attack on that city in November 2004. Zarqawi's existence was even questioned.

Mugshot of Ahmed al-Sharaa in 2006, after his capture by US forces in Iraq

Involvement of Zarqawi in significant terrorist incidents was not usually proven, although his group often claimed it perpetrated bombings. As al-Qaeda is an "opt-in" group (meaning everyone who agrees to some basic Wahhabi moral tenets and the fundamental goals may consider himself a member), it is most likely that "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" is a loose association of largely independent cells united by a common strategy and vision, rather than a unified organization with a firm internal structure.

On 8 June 2006, Iraqi officials confirmed Zarqawi was killed by two 500 lb laser-guided bombs dropped from an F-16 the previous evening. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian who was trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan took his place.

A document found in Zarqawi's safe house indicates that the guerrilla group was trying to provoke the U.S. to attack Iran in order to reinvigorate the resistance in Iraq and to weaken American forces in Iraq. "The question remains, how to draw the Americans into fighting a war against Iran? It is not known whether American is serious in its animosity towards Iraq, because of the big support Iran is offering to America in its war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Hence, it is necessary first to exaggerate the Iranian danger and to convince America and the west in general, of the real danger coming from Iran...". The document then outlines 6 ways to incite war between the two nations. Iraqi national security adviser Mowaffak al-Rubaie said the document, shows al-Qaeda in Iraq is in "pretty bad shape." He added that "we believe that this is the beginning of the end of al-Qaeda in Iraq."

Journalist Jill Carroll, detailing her captivity in Iraq, described one of her captors who identified himself as Abdullah Rashid and leader of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq. He told her that; "The Americans were constantly saying that the mujahideen in Iraq were led by foreigners... So, the Iraqi insurgents went to Zarqawi and insisted that an Iraqi be put in charge." She continued by stating; "But as I saw in coming weeks, Zarqawi remained the insurgents' hero, and the most influential member of their council, whatever Nour/Rashid's position... At various times, I heard my captors discussing changes in their plans because of directives from the council and Zarqawi."

Schism between foreign fighters and native Iraqi insurgency

Large-scale terrorist attacks against civilians carried out by foreign fighters, as well as the interpretation of Islam that they attempt to impose on the local population in areas under their control, have increasingly turned Iraqis against them, in some cases breaking out into open fighting between different groups in the insurgency. There are signs that local Islamist insurgent groups have also increasingly caused the population to turn against them.

Opinions differ on how broad this schism is. Terrorism expert Jessica Stern warned that; "In the run-up to the war, most Iraqis viewed the foreign volunteers who were rushing in to fight against America as troublemakers, and Saddam Hussein's forces reportedly killed many of them." This opinion contradicts Iraqi scholar Mustapha Alani, who says that these foreigners are increasingly welcomed by the public, especially in the former Ba'athist strongholds north of Baghdad.

While some have noted an alliance of convenience that existed between the foreign fighters and the native Sunni insurgents, there are signs that the foreign militants, especially those who follow Zarqawi, are increasingly unpopular among the native fighters. In the run-up to the December 2005 elections, Sunni fighters were warning al-Qaeda members and foreign fighters not to attack polling stations. One former Ba'athist told Reuters; "Sunnis should vote to make political gains. We have sent leaflets telling al-Qaeda that they will face us if they attack voters." An unnamed Sunni leader was quoted commenting on Zarqawi; "Zarqawi is an American, Israeli and Iranian agent who is trying to keep our country unstable so that the Sunnis will keep facing occupation."

By early 2006, the split between the Sunni groups and the Zarqawi-led foreign fighters had grown dramatically, and Sunni forces began targeting al-Qaeda forces for assassination. One senior intelligence official told the Telegraph that Zarqawi had fled to Iran as a result of the attacks. In response to al-Qaeda killings in Iraq, Sunni insurgents in al-Anbar province led by former Ba'athist intelligence officer Ahmed Ftaikhan formed an anti-al-Qaeda militia called the Anbar Revolutionaries. All of the militia's core members have relatives who have been killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq, and they have sought to prevent foreign jihadis from entering the country. The group "claims to have killed 20 foreign fighters and 33 Iraqi sympathizers." The schism became all the more apparent in when a tape alleged to be from the Mujahedeen Shura Council urged Osama Bin Laden to replace al-Qaeda in Iraq's current head with an Iraqi national. The Mujahedeen Shura Council, however, issued a statement shortly afterwards denying the authenticity of this tape.

On 19 July 2007 seven domestic insurgent groups informed journalists in Damascus that they were forming a united front independent of al-Qaeda.

Covert Iranian military involvement

An estimated 150 Iranian intelligence officers, plus members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, are believed to be active inside Iraq at any given time. For more than a year, U.S. troops have detained and recorded fingerprints, photographs, and DNA samples from dozens of suspected Iranian agents in a catch and release program designed to intimidate the Iranian leadership. Iranian influence is felt most heavily within the Iraqi Government, the ISF, and Shiite militias.

Although the CPA enforced a 1987 law banning unions in public enterprises, trade unions such as the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and Iraq's Union of the Unemployed have also mounted effective opposition to the Coalition. However, no trades unions support the armed insurgents, and unions have themselves been subject to attacks from the insurgents. Hadi Saleh of the IFTU was assassinated under circumstances that pointed to a Ba'athist insurgent group on 3 January 2005. Another union federation, the General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE) opposes the Coalition forces in Iraq and calls for immediate withdrawal but was neutral on participation in the election. Whereas the GUOE wants all Coalition troops out immediately, both the IFTU and the Workers Councils' call for replacement of U.S. and British forces with neutral forces from the UN, the Arab League and other nations as a transition.

U.S. Army Sgt. McCool shot by an Iraqi insurgent sniper in Ramadi, 2006.

Tactics

Main article: Tactics of the Iraqi insurgency

The tactics of the Iraqi insurgency vary widely. The majority of militant elements use improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, kidnappings, hostage-taking, shootings, ambushes, sniper attacks, mortar and rocket strikes and other types of attacks to target Iraqis and U.S. forces with little regard for civilian casualties.

An armed Iraqi interpreter on patrol with U.S. troops on the streets of Baghdad. They became frequent targets of insurgents during the war.

Awareness of American public opinion

A single study has compared the number of insurgent attacks in Iraq to supposedly negative statements in the U.S. media, release of public opinion polls, and geographic variations in access to international media by Iraqis. The purpose was to determine if there was a link between insurgent activity and media reports. The researchers' study suggested it may be possible that insurgent attacks spiked by 5 to 10% after increases in the number of negative reports of the war in the media. The authors believe this may possibly be an "emboldenment effect" and speculated that "insurgent groups respond rationally to expected probability of US withdrawal."

Iraqi public opinion

A series of several polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of the Iraqi public further on Al Qaeda in Iraq and the U.S. presence. Some polls have found the following:

  • Polls suggest the majority of Iraqis disapprove of the presence of Coalition forces.
  • A majority of both Sunnis and Shi'as want an end to the U.S. presence as soon as possible, although Sunnis are opposed to the Coalition soldiers being there by greater margins.
  • Polls suggest the vast majority of Iraqis support attacks on insurgent groups with 80% supporting US attacks on Al-Qaeda.

Directly after the invasion, polling suggested that a slight majority supported the US invasion. However polls conducted in June 2005 suggest that there is some sentiment towards Coalition armies being in Iraq. A 2005 poll by British intelligence said that 45% of Iraqis support attacks against Coalition forces, rising to 65% in some areas, and that 82% are "strongly opposed" to the presence of Coalition troops. Demands for U.S. withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq's Parliament. These results are consistent with a January 2006 poll that found an overall 47% approval for attacks on U.S.-led forces. That figure climbed to 88% among Sunnis. Attacks on Iraqi security forces and civilians, however, were approved of by only 7% and 12% of respondents respectively. Polls conducted between 2005 and 2007 showed 31–37% of Iraqi's wanted US and other Coalition forces to withdraw once security was restored and that 26–35% wanted immediate withdrawal instead.

A September 2006 poll of both Sunnis and Shias found that 71% of Iraqis wanted the U.S. to leave within a year, with 65% favoring an immediate pullout and 77% voicing suspicion that the U.S. wanted to keep permanent bases in Iraq. 61% approved of attacks on U.S. forces. A later poll in March 2007 suggests the percentage of Iraqis who approve of attacks on Coalition forces has dropped to 51%. In 2006 a poll conducted on the Iraqi public revealed that 52% of the ones polled said Iraq was going in the wrong direction and 61% claimed it was worth ousting Saddam Hussein.

Despite a majority having previously been opposed to the US presence, 60% of Iraqis opposed American troops leaving directly prior to withdrawal, with 51% saying withdrawal would have a negative effect.

Scope and size of the insurgency

Further information: Casualties of the conflict in Iraq since 2003 and Iraq Body Count project

The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in the cities and countryside along the Euphrates River from the Syrian border town of al-Qaim through Ramadi and Fallujah to Baghdad, as well as along the Tigris river from Baghdad north to Tikrit. Heavy guerrilla activity also takes place around the cities of Mosul and Tal Afar in the north, as well as the "Triangle of Death" south of Baghdad, which includes the "-iya" cities of Iskandariya, Mahmudiya, Latifiya, and Yusufiya. Lesser activity takes place in several other areas of the country. The insurgents are believed to maintain a key supply line stretching from Syria through al-Qaim and along the Euphrates to Baghdad and central Iraq, the Iraqi equivalent of the Ho Chi Minh trail. A second "ratline" runs from the Syrian border through Tal Afar to Mosul.

Provincial control of Iraq in September 2011   Coalition control

Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas varies by group and fluctuates under changing political climate, the latest assessments put the present number at between 3,000 and 7,000 fighters along with numerous supporters and facilitators throughout the Sunni Arab community. At various points U.S. forces provided estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions. A few are provided here (although these numbers almost certainly have fluctuated):

  • Fallujah (mid-2004): 2,000–5,000 In a November 2004 operation, the Fallujah insurgency has been destroyed or dispersed, but had staged a comeback in 2005, albeit not to former strength, in the course of 2005–2008 the remainder of the insurgency was defeated in Fallujah and the rest of Al-Anbar province.
  • Samarra (August 2011): 1,000+
  • Baquba (August 2011 ): 1,000+
  • Baghdad (August 2011): 2,000+

Guerilla forces operate in many of the cities and towns of al-Anbar province, due to mostly ineffective Iraqi security forces in this area. There was extensive guerrilla activity in Ramadi, the capital of the province, as well as al-Qa'im, the first stop on an insurgent movement route between Iraq and Syria. In 2006, reports suggested that the Anbar capital Ramadi had largely fallen under insurgent control along with most of the Anbar region, and that as a result the United States had sent an extra 3,500 marines to reestablish control of the region. In the early part of 2007 the insurgency suffered serious setbacks in Ramadi after they were defeated in the Second Battle of Ramadi in the fall of 2006. With the help of the Anbar Salvation Council, incidents fell from an average of 30 attacks per day in December 2006 to an average of fewer than four in April 2007.

Baghdad is still one of the most violent regions of the country, even after the 2007 troop surge more than two-thirds of the violence that takes place in Iraq happens in Baghdad even though the Iraqi Government is in firm control of the entire city. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country, if not the world. Iraqi security and police forces had also been significantly built up in the capital and, despite being constantly targeted, had enjoyed some successes such as the pacification of Haifa Street, which however subsequently saw a massive surge of insurgent activity. and after the failed Coalition Operation Together Forward fell under Sunni insurgent control. The U.S. and Iraqi Forces scored many decisive victories in 2007 during the U.S. troops surge when they launched Operation Law and Order and Operation Phantam Thunder which broke the back of the insurgency and has since the saw a mass reduction in violence by 80 percent since then.

Recent intelligence suggests that the base of foreign paramilitary operations has moved from Anbar to the religiously and ethnically mixed Diyala province. By July 2007 Diyala had fallen under almost total Insurgent control, and had become the headquarters for the Sunni-dominated Islamic State of Iraq, which has issued a proclamation declaring the regional capital Baqubah its capital.

In response to a law allowing for the partitioning of Iraq into autonomous regions, members of the Mutayibeen Coalition (Khalf al-Mutayibeen), a coalition of Sunni insurgent groups including Al Qaeda in Iraq, announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq encompassing parts of 6 of Iraq's 18 provinces on 15 October 2006. Yet another show of defiance came on 18 October when Sunni fighters brazenly paraded in Ramadi. Similar parades were held two days later in several towns across western Iraq, two of which occurred within two miles of U.S. military bases.

By October 2006, small radicalized militias had seemed to overshadow the larger and more organized Sunni groups which had composed the insurgency previously. As disagreements emerged in pre-existing groups for reasons ranging from the rift in the Sunni forces between foreign and Iraqi fighters, competition between Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade, and anger over various decisions such as Muqtada al Sadr's agreement to join the political process, dozens of insurgency groups sprung up across the country, though particularly in Baghdad where the U.S. army has listed 23 active militias. Residents have described the capital as being a patchwork of militia run fiefs. As a result of the insurgency's splintering nature, many established leaders seemed to lose influence. This was particularly illustrated on 19 October, when members of the Mahdi army briefly seized control of Amarah. The attack, while demonstrating the influence of the Madhi army, is believed to have originated as a result of contention between local units of the Madhi army and the allegedly Badr brigade run security forces, and the timing suggested that neither Al Sadr nor his top commanders had known or orchestrated the offensive.

At the height of the war, insurgents launched hundreds of attacks each month against Coalition forces. Overtime, insurgency groups moved to more sophisticated methods of attack such as Explosively formed penetrators, and infrared lasers, which cannot be easily jammed. These attacks contributed to the rate of civilian casualties which in turn reduced Iraq's public safety as well as the reliability of infrastructure.

As of 29 January 2009 4,235 U.S. soldiers, 178 British soldiers and 139 soldiers from other nations (allied with the coalition) have died in Iraq. 31,834 U.S. soldiers had been wounded. Coalition forces do not usually release death counts. As such, the exact number of insurgents killed by the Coalition or Iraqi forces is unknown. Through September 2007 more than 19,000 insurgents were reported to have been killed in fighting with Coalition forces and tens of thousands of Iraqi "suspected civilians" were captured (including 25,000 detainees in U.S. military custody at the time), according to military statistics released for the first time.

American-led counter-insurgency operations

Main article: Coalition military operations of the Iraq War
Video footage taken from the gun camera of an Apache helicopter showing the killing of people whom the U.S. military regarded as suspected Iraqi insurgents. Date and location: 1 December 2003, near al-Taji.

Over 500 counterinsurgency operations have been undertaken by the U.S.-led Coalition or the Iraqi government. These include Operation Option North and Operation Bayonet Lightning in Kirkuk, Operation Desert Thrust, Operation Abilene and Operation All American Tiger throughout Iraq, Operation Iron Hammer in Baghdad and Operation Ivy Blizzard in Samarra – all in 2003; Operation Market Sweep, Operation Vigilant Resolve and Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah in 2004; Operation Matador in Anbar, Operation Squeeze Play and Operation Lightning in Baghdad, Operation New Market near Haditha, Operation Spear in Karabillah and the Battle of Tal Afar – all in 2005; Operation Swarmer in Samarra and Operation Together Forward in Baghdad in 2006; and Operation Law and Order in Baghdad, Operation Arrowhead Ripper in Baqouba and Operation Phantom Strike throughout Iraq – all in 2007.

See also

Chronology:

References

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Sources

  • Bishku, Michael B. (2018), Israel and the Kurds: A Pragmatic Relationship in Middle Eastern Politics, vol. 41, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies

Further reading

External links

Analysis

News articles

Supportive of the insurgents

Profiles of insurgent groups

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