Misplaced Pages

Iran–Iraq War: Difference between revisions

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.
Browse history interactively← Previous editContent deleted Content addedVisualWikitext
Revision as of 21:12, 17 May 2009 edit71.193.85.230 (talk) →U.S. green light for Iraq← Previous edit Latest revision as of 19:42, 10 January 2025 edit undoAugmented Seventh (talk | contribs)Extended confirmed users13,304 edits Undid spelling revision 1268636379 by 2A02:C7C:46D2:2200:41D8:F447:AC48:8421 (talk)Tags: Undo Mobile edit Mobile web edit Advanced mobile edit 
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Short description|1980–1988 war in West Asia}}
{{POV-check|date=January 2009}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=December 2024}}{{EngvarB|date = November 2020}}
{{Infobox Military Conflict
{{very long|words=26,000|date=April 2024}}
|conflict=Iran-Iraq War
{{Infobox military conflict
|date= 22 September 1980 – 20 August 1988
| conflict = Iran–Iraq War
|partof=
| partof = the ], ] of the ], ], and ]
|image=]
| image = {{multiple image|border=infobox|perrow=2/2/2|total_width=300px
|caption=Iranian soldier with gas mask in the battlefield
| image1 = Children_In_iraq-iran_war4_(cropped).jpg
|place=], Iranian-Iraqi border
| alt1 =
|result= Ceasefire
| image2 = Chemical weapon1.jpg
|territory=]; observed by ] based on UN Resolution 619
| alt2 =
|combatant1={{flagcountry|Iran}}<br />
| image3 = USS Stark edit.jpg
] ]<br />
| alt3 =
] ]<br />
| image4 = Mersad.jpg
] ]<br />
| alt4 =
] ]
| image5 = Khorramshahr POWs crop.jpg
|combatant2={{flagicon|Iraq|1963}} ]&sup1;<br />
| alt5 =
]<br />] ] Soldiers and volunteers from different ] countries<ref name="Lesch1979">{{citation
| image6 = 152_mm_howitzer_D-20_belong_to_Military_of_Iran.jpg
| title = 1979: The Year That Shaped the Modern Middle East
| first = David W. |last= Lesch
| page = 85
| publisher = Westview Press
| year =2001}}</ref>
], ]<ref></ref><ref><blockquote><small>''"He then makes an oblique reference to the fact that Ghassemlou and his party had collaborated with Saddam Hussein during Iraq's war against Iran"''</small></blockquote></ref><br />
{{flagicon|United States}} ]<br />
|commander1={{flagicon|Iran}} ]<br />{{flagicon|Iran}} ]<br />{{flagicon|Iran}} ]<br />{{flagicon|Iran}} ]<br />{{flagicon|Iran}} ] {{KIA}}<br />{{flagicon|Kurdistan}} ]<br />
|commander2={{flagicon|Iraq|1963}} ]<br />{{flagicon|Iraq|1963}} ]
|strength1=305,000 soldiers,<br />400,000 to 700,000; meaning ±550,000 ] and ] militia,<br />900 tanks,<br />1,000 armored vehicles,<br />1,000 artillery pieces,<br />65+ aircraft,<br />60+ helicopters<ref name="LOCFRD-Iran">{{citation
| url = http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/irtoc.html
| author = Federal Research Division
| title = Country Study: Iran
| publisher = Library of Congress}}</ref>
|strength2=250,000 in 1980,<br />1,250,000 by 1988,<br />5,000 tanks,<br />4,000 armored vehicles,<br />7,330 artillery pieces,<br />500+ aircraft,<br />150+ helicopters<ref name="GlobalSecIIWar">{{citation
| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm
| title =Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)
| publisher = Globalsecurity.org (John Pike)
}}</ref>
|casualties1= <ref> Hamshahri Newspaper</ref><ref> from the website of Iranian journalist and activist Emadeddin Baghi</ref> 1,000,000 KIA<ref>{{cite web|url=http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm#Iran-Iraq |title=Twentieth Century Atlas - Death Tolls |publisher=Users.erols.com |date= |accessdate=2009-03-01}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=John Pike |url=http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm |title=Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) |publisher=Globalsecurity.org |date= |accessdate=2009-03-01}}</ref><ref name="encyclopedia1">{{cite encyclopedia|url=http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761580640_2/Iran-Iraq_War.html |title=Iran-Iraq War - MSN Encarta |publisher=Encarta.msn.com |date=1988-08-20 |accessdate=2009-03-01}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war3.php |title=Iran Chamber Society: History of Iran: Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 |publisher=Iranchamber.com |date= |accessdate=2009-03-01}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_iraniraq.html |title=Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988 |publisher=Historyofwar.org |date= |accessdate=2009-03-01}}</ref>
Economic loss of more than US$500 billion<ref name="encyclopedia1"/>|casualties2=200,000 KIA {{Fact|date=January 2009}}
Economic loss of more than US$500 billion<ref name="encyclopedia1"/>|notes=&sup1; With support from the ], France, ], ], Denmark, the United States, and other Arab, ] and ] countries for Iraq.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0825449.html |title=Iran-Iraq War |publisher=Infoplease.com |date=1980-09-22 |accessdate=2009-03-01}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/arabs/iraniraq.html |title=The Iran-Iraq War |publisher=Jewishvirtuallibrary.org |date= |accessdate=2009-03-01}}</ref>
}} }}
| image_size =
{{Campaignbox Iran-Iraq War}}
| caption = '''Top-left to bottom-right''': {{flatlist|
{{Campaignbox Persian Gulf Wars}}
* An Iranian ] on the frontlines
The '''Iran–Iraq War''', also known as the '''Imposed War''' (جنگ تحمیلی, ''Jang-e-tahmīlī'') and '''Holy Defense''' (دفاع مقدس, ''Defā'-e-moghaddas'') in Iran, and '''Saddām's''' ''']''' (قادسيّة صدّام, ''Qādisiyyat Ṣaddām'') in Iraq, and the '''The First war of the Gulf''' (حرب الخليج الأولى ''Ḥarb al-Khalīj al-'Ūlā'') in the ] (the ] - ] ] being the Second Gulf War), was a ] between the armed forces of ] and ] lasting from September 1980 to August 1988.
* An Iranian soldier in a trench wearing a gas mask to guard against ]
* The {{USS|Stark}} listing to port after ] by an Iraqi ] missile
* Burned-out vehicles in the aftermath of ]
* Iraqi prisoners of war after the ] by Iranian forces
* The ] being used by the Iranian Army
}}
| date = ] – 20 August 1988<br />({{Age in years, months, weeks and days|month1=09|day1=22|year1=1980|month2=08|day2=20|year2=1988}})
| place = {{flatlist|
*]
*]{{efn|Also: ], ], ], ] and ].}}}}
| territory = '']''{{efn|After the war concluded, Iraq continued to maintain control over the entire Shatt al-Arab and other Iranian territories it had occupied along the border, covering an area of 9,600&nbsp;km<sup>2</sup>. It was not until 16 August 1990 that Iraq agreed to return these occupied territories back to Iran and to divide sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. This restored the border to the terms established by the ].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Malovany|first=Pesach|title=Wars of Modern Babylon: A History of the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 2003|publisher=University Press of Kentucky|year=2017|isbn=9780813169453|pages=443}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Coll|first=Steve|date=15 August 1990|title=Saddam offers to conclude full peace with Iran|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/08/16/saddam-offers-to-conclude-full-peace-with-iran/6b87c9d2-e36f-454e-a103-09c112c6f546/|access-date=8 June 2024|newspaper=The Washington Post|archive-date=9 June 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230609225730/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/08/16/saddam-offers-to-conclude-full-peace-with-iran/6b87c9d2-e36f-454e-a103-09c112c6f546/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Britannica Iran–Iraq War"/>}}
| result = Inconclusive{{efn|Iraq claimed victory following a ] aimed at expelling Iranian forces from Iraq which compelled Iran to submit to a ceasefire the same year, and also due to the country becoming the dominant power in the Middle East as a result of the conflict, while Iran also claimed victory for expelling Iraqi forces from Iran following 1982 offensives, despite failing in its later-goal to overthrow the Iraqi government and also despite suffering higher military and economic losses than Iraq.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mylroie|first=Laurie|date=1989|title=Iraq's Changing Role in the Persian Gulf|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45316185|journal=Current History|volume=88|issue=535|pages=89–99|doi=10.1525/curh.1989.88.535.89|jstor=45316185|s2cid=249695060|issn=0011-3530|access-date=21 July 2023|archive-date=21 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230721140817/https://www.jstor.org/stable/45316185|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=2015-09-26|title=The 'beauty' and the horror of the Iran–Iraq war|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34353349|access-date=2023-07-21|publisher=BBC News|language=en-GB|archive-date=14 June 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180614110703/https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34353349|url-status=live}}</ref>}}
| combatant1 = {{flag|Iran|1980}}
| combatant2 = {{flagcountry|Ba'athist Iraq}}
| commander1 = ''']:'''{{plainlist|
* {{flagicon|Iran}} ]
* {{flagicon|Iran}} ]
* {{flagicon|Iran}} ]
* {{flagicon|Iran}} ]}}
| commander2 = '''Main Iraqi leaders:'''{{plainlist|
* {{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq}} ]
* {{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq}} ]
* {{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq}} ]
* {{flagicon|Ba'athist Iraq}} ]}}
| units1 = See ]
| units2 = See ]
| strength1 = '''Start of war:'''<ref name="Pollack, p. 186">Pollack, p.&nbsp;186.</ref><ref name=Razeoux>{{cite book|last1=Razoux|first1=Pierre|title=The Iran–Iraq War|date=2015|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=978-0674915718|pages=515, 540|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FGsuCwAAQBAJ|access-date=29 January 2023|archive-date=17 February 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230217025950/https://books.google.com/books?id=FGsuCwAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref>
<br />110,000–215,000 soldiers
{{Collapsible list
|title = More:
|1,700–2,100 tanks,<ref>Farrokh, Kaveh, 305 (2011)</ref><ref>Pollack, p.&nbsp;187.</ref>
<br />(500–1,150 operable)
<br />1,000–1,900 armoured vehicles,
<br />(1,300 operable)
<br />300–1,100 artillery pieces,<ref>Farrokh, Kaveh, 304 (2011)</ref>
<br />421–485 fighter-bombers,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.imgrumweb.com/post/BoD6JDhArG3|title=The state of the air combat readiness of Iran ... • corporal_historian_23|access-date=9 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181002102353/https://www.imgrumweb.com/post/BoD6JDhArG3|archive-date=2 October 2018|url-status=dead}}</ref>
<br />(200–205 fully operational)
<br />750–835 helicopters
<br />(240 fully operational)
<br />
<br />'''In 1982:'''
<br />350,000 soldiers,
<br />700 tanks,
<br />2,700 armoured vehicles,
<br />400 artillery pieces,
<br />350 aircraft,
<br />700 helicopters
<br />
<br />'''In 1988:'''<ref>Pollack, p.&nbsp;232.</ref><ref>Cordesman, Anthony H. ''The Lessons of Modern War: The Iran–Iraq War.'' Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. Chapter 10: "In fact, Iraq had captured so much equipment that it was able to put on an incredible show on the outskirts of Baghdad. Rather than include all of Iraq's gains, it included the equipment that could either be used immediately or be easily reconditioned. Iraqi sources claimed that since March, Iraq had captured a total of 1,298 tanks, 155 armored infantry fighting vehicles, 512 heavy artillery weapons, 6,196 mortars, 5,550 recoilless rifles and light guns, 8,050 rocket propelled grenades, 60,694 rifles, 322 pistols, 6,156 telecommunications devices, 501 items of heavy engineering equipment, 454 trucks, 1,600 light vehicles and trailers, 16,863 items of chemical defense gear, and 16,863 caskets... After its recent defeats, Iran was virtually defenseless in the south. It was down to less than 200 tanks."</ref><ref name=Razeoux/>
<br />600,000–850,000 soldiers,
<br />1,500+ tanks,{{NoteTag|Pollack gives the figure as 1,000 for fully operational tanks in April of 1988. Cordesman gives the figure as 1,500+ operational tanks in March 1988 (1,298 were captured by the Iraqis by July 1988, 200 were still in the hands of the Iranians, and an unknown number were destroyed), with an unknown number in workshops.}}
<br />800–1,400 armoured vehicles,
<br />600–900 heavy artillery pieces,
<br />60–80 fighter-bombers,
<br />70–90 helicopters
----
KDP: 45,000 ] (1986–88)<ref name=Razeoux2>{{cite book|last1=Razoux|first1=Pierre|title=The Iran–Iraq War|date=2015|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=978-0674915718|pages=543–544|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FGsuCwAAQBAJ|access-date=29 January 2023|archive-date=17 February 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230217025950/https://books.google.com/books?id=FGsuCwAAQBAJ|url-status=live}}</ref><br />PUK: 12,000 Peshmerga (1986–88)<ref name=Razeoux2/>
}}
| strength2 = '''Start of war:'''<ref name="Pollack, p. 186"/><ref name=Razeoux/>
<br />200,000–210,000 soldiers
{{Collapsible list
|title = More:
|1,750–2,800 tanks,
<br />2,350–4,000 APCs,
<br />1,350–1,400 artillery pieces,
<br /> 295–380 fighter-bombers,
<br /> 300–350 helicopters
<br />
<br />'''In 1982:'''
<br />175,000 soldiers,
<br />1,200 tanks,
<br />2,300 armoured vehicles,
<br />400 artillery pieces,
<br />450 aircraft,
<br /> 180 helicopters
<br />
<br />'''In 1988:'''
<br />800,000–1,500,000 soldiers,<ref name="Pollack, p. 3">Pollack, p.&nbsp;3.</ref><ref name=Razeoux/>
<br />3,400–5,000 tanks,
<br />4,500–10,000 APCs,
<br />2,300–12,000 artillery pieces,
<br />360–900 fighter-bombers,
<br />140–1,000 helicopters
----
KDPI: 30,000 Peshmerga (1980–83)<ref name=Razeoux2/><br />MEK: 15,000 fighters (1981–83, 87–88)<ref name=Razeoux2/>
}}
| casualties1 = '''Military dead:'''
<br />200,000–600,000{{NoteTag|Estimates of Iranian casualties during the Iran–Iraq War vary.<ref name="hiro205" /><ref name="Rajaee1997">{{cite book|last=Rajaee|first=Farhang|title=Iranian Perspectives on the Iran–Iraq War|publisher=University Press of Florida|location=Gainesville|year=1997|page=2|isbn=978-0-8130-1476-0|oclc=492125659}}</ref><ref name="Mikaberidze2011" /><ref>Hammond Atlas of the 20th Century (1999), pp.&nbsp;134–135.</ref><ref name="Dunnigan 1991">Dunnigan, A Quick and Dirty Guide to War (1991)</ref><ref name="Twentieth Century World History 1997">Dictionary of Twentieth Century World History, by Jan Palmowski (Oxford, 1997)</ref><ref name="ReferenceA">Clodfelter, Micheal, Warfare and Armed Conflict: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1618–1991</ref><ref name="Chirot, Daniel 1994">Chirot, Daniel: Modern Tyrants : the power and prevalence of evil in our age (1994)</ref><ref>"B&J": Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, ''International Conflict : A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management 1945–1995'' (1997), p.&nbsp;195.</ref>}}
<br />
{{Collapsible list
| title = More:
| 123,220–160,000 ],
<br /> 60,711 ]<ref name="hiro205">{{cite book|last=Hiro|first=Dilip|author-link=Dilip Hiro|title=The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict|publisher=Routledge|location=New York|year=1991|page=|isbn=978-0-415-90406-3|oclc=22347651|url=https://archive.org/details/longestwariranir00hiro/page/205}}</ref><ref name="Abrahamian2008">{{cite book|last=Abrahamian|first=Ervand|author-link=Ervand Abrahamian|title=A History of Modern Iran|publisher=]|location=Cambridge; New York|year=2008|pages=171–175, 212|isbn=978-0511984402|oclc=171111098}}</ref>
<br /> (Iranian claim)
<br /> 800,000 killed
<br /> (Iraqi claim)<ref name="hiro205" />
<br />
<br /> 320,000–500,000 ]<ref name="Mikaberidze2011">{{cite book|last=Mikaberidze|first=Alexander|title=Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia|publisher=ABC-CLIO|location=Santa Barbara, CA|year=2011|page=418|isbn=978-1-59884-336-1|oclc=775759780}}</ref><ref name="PotterSick2006">{{cite book|last1=Potter|first1=Lawrence G.|last2=Sick|first2=Gary|title=Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|location=Basingstoke|year=2006|page=8|isbn=978-1-4039-7609-3|oclc=70230312}}</ref><ref name="Zargar2012">{{cite journal|last1=Zargar|first1=Moosa|last2=Araghizadeh|first2=Hassan|last3=Soroush|first3=Mohammad Reza|last4=Khaji|first4=Ali|title=Iranian casualties during the eight years of Iraq–Iran conflict|journal=Revista de Saúde Pública|volume=41|issue=6|publisher=Faculdade de Higiene e Saúde Pública da Universidade de São Paulo|location=São Paulo|date=December 2012|pages=1065–1066|issn=0034-8910|doi=10.1590/S0034-89102007000600025|pmid=18066475|oclc=4645489824|doi-access=free}}</ref>
<br />40,000–42,875 ]<ref name="PotterSick2006" /><ref name="Zargar2012" />
<br />11,000–16,000 ]<ref name="hiro205" /><ref name="Abrahamian2008" />
<br />
<br /> '''Economic loss:'''
<br /> $627&nbsp;billion<ref name="Rajaee1997" /><ref name="hiro251">{{cite book|last=Hiro|first=Dilip|author-link=Dilip Hiro|title=The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict|publisher=Routledge|location=New York|year=1991|page=|isbn=978-0-415-90406-3|oclc=22347651|url=https://archive.org/details/longestwariranir00hiro/page/251}}</ref>
}}
| casualties2 = '''Military dead:''' <br />
105,000–500,000{{NoteTag|Estimates of Iraqi casualties during the Iran–Iraq War vary.<ref name="PotterSick2006" /><ref name="hiro251" /><ref name="hawaii.edu">{{cite web|url=http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.TAB14.1C.GIF|title=Centi-Kilo Murdering States: Estimates, Sources, and Calculations|work=Power Kills|publisher=University of Hawai'i|last=Rumel|first=Rudolph|access-date=26 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011172148/http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.TAB14.1C.GIF|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Karsh2002" /><ref name="KochLong1997">{{cite book|last1=Koch|first1=Christian|last2=Long|first2=David E.|title=Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century|publisher=Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research|location=Abu Dhabi|year=1997|page=29|isbn=978-1-86064-316-3|oclc=39035954}}</ref><ref name="remembrance">{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary|title=Iran and Iraq remember war that cost more than a million lives|first=Ian|last=Black|newspaper=The Guardian|date=23 September 2010|access-date=14 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170102173349/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary|archive-date=2 January 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>}} <br />
{{Collapsible list
| title = More:
|400,000 ]<ref name="Karsh2002">{{cite book|last=Karsh|first=Efraim|author-link=Efraim Karsh|title=The Iran–Iraq War, 1980–1988|publisher=Osprey Publishing|location=Oxford, England|year=2002|page=89|isbn=978-1-84176-371-2|oclc=48783766}}</ref>
<br /> 70,000 ]<ref name="Mikaberidze2011" /><ref name="Karsh2002" />
<br />
<br />'''Economic loss:'''
<br />$561&nbsp;billion<ref name="Rajaee1997" /><ref name="hiro251" />
}}
| casualties3 = '''Civilian dead:''' 100,000+{{NoteTag|The total 100,000+ civilians killed during the war does not include 50,000–200,000 Kurdish civilians killed in the ].<ref name="hawaii.edu-D">{{cite web|url=http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.TAB15.1D.GIF|title=Lesser Murdering States, Quasi-States, and Groups: Estimates, Sources, and Calculations|work=Power Kills|publisher=University of Hawai'i|last=Rumel|first=Rudolph|access-date=16 May 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121004213140/http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.TAB15.1D.GIF|archive-date=4 October 2012|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="hang">{{cite news|newspaper=]|url=http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/25/Worldandnation/Iraq_to_hang__Chemica.shtml|title=Iraq to hang 'Chemical Ali'|last=Sinan|first=Omar|agency=Associated Press|date=25 June 2007|access-date=9 February 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151017073732/http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/25/Worldandnation/Iraq_to_hang__Chemica.shtml|archive-date=17 October 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> }}<br> '''Total dead:'''<br>450,000{{sfn|Pfetsch|Rohloff|2013|p=154}}–500,000<ref name="Britannica Iran–Iraq War"/>
| notes =
| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Iran–Iraq War}} {{Campaignbox Persian Gulf Wars}}{{Campaignbox Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict}}
| combatant1a = {{flagicon image|Former Flag of KDP.svg}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|Flag of PUK.svg}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|Shiite Resistance flag.svg}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|Islamic Dawa Party Flag.svg}} ]<br />{{flag|Hezbollah}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA44808|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090211103949/http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=IA44808|archive-date=11 February 2009|title=The Iranian Roots of Hizbullah|author=Nimrod Raphaeli|date=11 February 2009|website=MEMRI}}</ref><br />] volunteers{{efn|from:
* {{nowrap|{{flagicon|Democratic Republic of Afghanistan}} ]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/428282/Memoires-of-Afghan-volunteers-in-Iran-Iraq-war-published|title=Memoires of Afghan volunteers in Iran–Iraq war published (tehrantimes.com)|date=7 October 2018|access-date=3 February 2021|archive-date=17 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210617061212/https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/428282/Memoires-of-Afghan-volunteers-in-Iran-Iraq-war-published|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/455870/Mohsen-the-Japanese-chronicles-life-of-Afghan-volunteer-fighter|title='Mohsen, the Japanese' chronicles life of Afghan volunteer fighter in Iran–Iraq war (tehrantimes.com)|date=16 December 2020|access-date=3 February 2021|archive-date=7 February 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210207165205/https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/455870/Mohsen-the-Japanese-chronicles-life-of-Afghan-volunteer-fighter|url-status=live}}</ref>}}
* {{flagicon|Iraq|1963}} ]<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkley-center/200918WastnidgeIransShiaDiplomacyReligiousIdentityForeignPolicyIslamicRepublic.pdf|title=Iran's Shia Diplomacy: Religious and Foreign Policy in the Islamic Republic|access-date=30 August 2023|archive-date=6 July 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230706200748/https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkley-center/200918WastnidgeIransShiaDiplomacyReligiousIdentityForeignPolicyIslamicRepublic.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Lebanon}}<ref>{{cite book|last1=Shaery-Eisenlohr|first1=Roschanack|title=Shi'ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities|date=2011|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=9780231144278|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vrpRagljvA4C|access-date=21 March 2023|archive-date=27 April 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230427070936/https://books.google.com/books?id=vrpRagljvA4C|url-status=live}}</ref>}}
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Pakistan}}<ref>Williamson Murray, Kevin M. Woods (2014): ''The Iran–Iraq War. A Military and Strategic History.'' Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-1-107-06229-0}} p. 223</ref>}}
* {{flag|Kuwait}}<ref name="MCUP">{{Cite web|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/article/795830/pdf|title=Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Project Muse)|access-date=30 August 2023|archive-date=9 July 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220709043606/https://muse.jhu.edu/article/795830/pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{Flagcountry|Bahrain}}<ref name="MCUP"/>
* {{flag|India}}<ref name="MCUP"/>
}}
| combatant2a = {{flagicon image|Flag of Arabistan.svg}} ]<ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0yYdBQAAQBAJ&q=Liberation+of+Arabistan+iran+iraq+war&pg=PA20|title=The Iran–Iraq War|first=Rob|last=Johnson|date=2010|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|isbn=978-1137267788}}{{Dead link|date=January 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WVBCBAAAQBAJ&q=Liberation+of+Arabistan+iran+iraq+war&pg=PA93|title=The Iran–Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History|first1=Williamson|last1=Murray|first2=Kevin M.|last2=Woods|year=2014|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1107062290}}</ref><br />{{flagicon image|Flag of the People's Mujahedin of Iran.svg}} ]<br />{{flagicon image|NCRI National Council of Resistance of Iran Lion & Sun Flag.jpg}} ]<br/>{{flagicon image|Flag of Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistana Îranê.png}} ]<ref>{{cite book|last=Entessar|first=Nader|title=Kurdish Politics in the Middle East|publisher=]|location=Lanham|page=48|year=2010|isbn=9780739140390|oclc=430736528|quote=Throughout much of the 1980s, the KDPI received aid from the Ba'thi regime of Saddam Hussein, but Ghassemlou broke with Baghdad in 1988 after Iraq used chemical weapons against Kurds in Halabja and then forced Kurdish villagers to...}}</ref><br />]<ref name=":6">{{Cite conference|last=van Bruinessen|first=Martin|author-link=Martin van Bruinessen|date=15 August 1986|title=The Naqshbandi Order as a Vehicle of Political Protest among the Kurds (With Some Comparative Notes on Indonesia)|url=https://www.academia.edu/10965366|conference=New Approaches in Islamic Studies|location=Jakarta|publisher=]|pages=1–3|via=Academia.edu|access-date=19 July 2023|archive-date=16 August 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230816190924/https://www.academia.edu/10965366|url-status=live}}</ref><br />] volunteers{{efn|from:<ref name="auto">{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1982/10/04/world/sudanese-brigades-could-provide-key-aid-for-iraq-military-analysis.html|title=Sudanese Brigades Could Provide Key Aid for Iraq; Military Analysis|newspaper=The New York Times|date=4 October 1982|access-date=8 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191208094106/https://www.nytimes.com/1982/10/04/world/sudanese-brigades-could-provide-key-aid-for-iraq-military-analysis.html|archive-date=8 December 2019|url-status=live|last1=Middleton|first1=Drew}}</ref><ref name="auto1">{{Cite journal|url=https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0205/020559.html|title=Iraq–Iran war becoming Arab-Persian war? (The Christian Science Monitor)|journal=The Christian Science Monitor|date=5 February 1982|access-date=8 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191208094106/https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0205/020559.html|archive-date=8 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>
* {{flag|Egypt|1972}}<ref name="auto"/>
* {{nowrap|{{flag|Jordan}}<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0211/021106.html|title=Jordan's call for volunteers to fight Iran misfires (The Christian Science Monitor)|journal=The Christian Science Monitor|date=11 February 1982|access-date=8 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191208094041/https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0211/021106.html|archive-date=8 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Schenker">{{cite book|url=https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/DancingwithSaddam.pdf.pdf|title=Dancing with Saddam: The Strategic Tango of Jordanian–Iraqi Relations|publisher=] / ]|last=Schenker|first=David Kenneth|year=2003|isbn=0-7391-0649-X|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170123153530/https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/DancingwithSaddam.pdf.pdf|archive-date=23 January 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/01/29/jordanian-unit-going-to-aid-iraq-6-hussein-will-join-volunteer-force-fighting-iranians/a6b7099c-3c36-4152-9411-6b0620038463/|title=Jordanian Unit Going To Aid Iraq 6 Hussein Will Join Volunteer Force Fighting Iranians (The Washington Post)|newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=8 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191208094156/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/01/29/jordanian-unit-going-to-aid-iraq-6-hussein-will-join-volunteer-force-fighting-iranians/a6b7099c-3c36-4152-9411-6b0620038463/|archive-date=8 December 2019|url-status=live}}</ref>}}
* {{flag|Morocco}}<ref name="auto1"/><ref name="auto"/>
* {{flag|North Yemen}}<ref>''Dictionary of modern Arab history'', Kegan Paul International 1998. {{ISBN|978-0710305053}} p.&nbsp;196.</ref>
* {{flag|Sudan}}<ref name="web.archive.org">{{Cite web|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160911220456if_/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran-IraqWar_Part1_0.pdf|title=Iran–Iraq War Timeline. Part 1}}</ref><ref>Berridge, W.J. "Civil Uprisings in Modern Sudan: The 'Khartoum Springs' of 1964 and 1985", p.&nbsp;136. Bloomsbury Academic, 2015 {{ISBN?}}</ref>
* {{flag|Tunisia|1959}}<ref name="auto"/>
}}
}}
{{Saddam Hussein series}}
The '''Iran–Iraq War''', also known as the '''First Gulf War''',{{efn|{{langx|ar|حرب الخليج الأولى|translit=Ḥarb al-Khalīj al-ʾAwlā}}; {{langx|fa|جنگ ایران و عراق|translit=Jang-e Irān va Erāq}}}} was an armed conflict between ] and ] that lasted from September 1980 to August 1988. Active hostilities began with the ] and lasted for nearly eight years, until the acceptance of ] by both sides. Iraq's primary rationale for the attack against Iran cited the need to prevent ]—who had spearheaded the ] in 1979—from ] to Iraq. There were also fears among the Iraqi leadership of ] that Iran, a theocratic state with a population predominantly composed of ], would exploit ] by rallying Iraq's Shia majority against the ], which was officially secular but dominated by ]. Iraq also wished to replace Iran as the power player in the ], which was not seen as an achievable objective prior to the Islamic Revolution because of ]'s economic and military superiority as well as its close relationships with the ] and ].

The Iran–Iraq War followed a long-running history of ], as a result of which Iraq planned to retake the eastern bank of the ] that it had ceded to Iran in the ]. Iraqi support for ] increased following the outbreak of hostilities; Saddam disputedly ] Iran's Arab-majority ].

While the Iraqi leadership had hoped to take advantage of ] and expected a decisive victory in the face of a severely weakened Iran, the Iraqi military only made progress for three months, and by December 1980, the Iraqi invasion had stalled. The Iranian military began to gain momentum against the Iraqis and regained all lost territory by June 1982. After pushing Iraqi forces back to the pre-war border lines, Iran rejected ] and launched an invasion of Iraq. The subsequent Iranian offensive within Iraqi territory lasted for five years, with Iraq taking back the initiative in mid-1988 and subsequently launching a series of major counter-offensives that ultimately led to the conclusion of the war in a stalemate.

The eight years of war-exhaustion, economic devastation, decreased morale, military stalemate, inaction by the international community towards the ], as well as increasing ] all culminated in Iran's acceptance of a ceasefire brokered by the ]. In total, around 500,000 people were killed during the Iran–Iraq War, with Iran bearing the larger share of the casualties, excluding the tens of thousands of civilians killed in the concurrent ] that targeted ]. The end of the conflict resulted in neither reparations nor border changes, and the combined financial losses suffered by both combatants is believed to have exceeded {{Currency|1 trillion|USD|passthrough=yes}}.<ref name="Riedel">{{cite book|last=Riedel|first=Bruce|title=Becoming Enemies: U.S.–Iran Relations and the Iran–Iraq War, 1979–1988|publisher=] Publishers|year=2012|isbn=978-1-4422-0830-8|page=ix|chapter=Foreword|quote=The Iran–Iraq War was devastating—one of the largest and longest conventional interstate wars since the ] ended in 1953. A half million lives were lost, perhaps another million were injured, and the economic cost was over a trillion dollars.&nbsp;... the battle lines at the end of the war were almost exactly where they were at the beginning of hostilities. It was also the only war in modern times in which chemical weapons were used on a massive scale.&nbsp;... The Iranians call the war the 'imposed war' because they believe the United States imposed it on them and orchestrated the global 'tilt' toward Iraq in the war.|author-link=Bruce Riedel}}</ref> There were a number of proxy forces operating for both countries: Iraq and the pro-Iraqi Arab separatist militias in Iran were most notably supported by the ]; whereas Iran re-established an alliance with the ], being primarily supported by the ] and the ]. During the conflict, Iraq received an abundance of financial, political, and logistical aid from the United States, the United Kingdom, the ], ], ], ], and the overwhelming majority of ]. While Iran received a significant amount of aid from ], ], China, ], ], ], and ].


The conflict has been compared to ] in terms of the tactics used by both sides, including large-scale ] with barbed wire stretched across fortified defensive lines, manned machine-gun posts, ]s, Iranian ]s, Iraq's extensive use of ]s, and deliberate attacks on civilian targets. The discourses on martyrdom formulated in the Iranian Shia Islamic context led to the widespread usage of human wave attacks and thus had a lasting impact on the dynamics of the conflict.<ref>Gölz, {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190517122543/https://www.academia.edu/39134486/G%C3%B6lz_Martyrdom_and_Masculinity_in_Warring_Iran_The_Karbala_Paradigm_the_Heroic_and_the_Personal_Dimensions_of_War._Behemoth_12_no._1_2019_35_51 |date=17 May 2019 }}, Behemoth 12, no. 1 (2019): 35–51, 35.</ref>
The war began when Iraq invaded Iran on 22 September 1980 following a long history of ] and fears of ] insurgency among Iraq's long suppressed ] majority influenced by the ] (mostly known as the Islamic Revolution). Although Iraq hoped to take advantage of revolutionary chaos in Iran and attacked without formal warning, they made only limited progress into Iran and within several months were repelled by the Iranians who regained virtually all lost territory by June 1982. For the next six years Iran was on the offensive.<ref name="Molavi2005p152">{{citation
| last = Molavi | first = Afshin
| title = The Soul of Iran
| publisher = Norton
| year = 2005
| page = 152}}</ref> Despite ] by the ], hostilities continued until 20 August 1988. The last ] were exchanged in 2003.<ref name="Molavi2005p152" /><ref></ref>


{{TOC limit|limit=3}}
The war came at a great cost in lives and economic damage - a hundred thousand Iraqis and one million Iranian soldiers died as well as civilians are believed to have died in the war with many more injured and wounded - but brought neither reparations nor change in borders. The conflict is often compared to ],<ref>Abrahamian, Ervand, ''A History of Modern Iran'', Cambridge, 2008, pages 171</ref> in that the tactics used closely mirrored those of the 1914-1918 war, including large scale ], manned machine-gun posts, bayonet charges, use of ] across trenches and on ], ] and Iraq's extensive use of ] (such as ]) against Iranian ] and ] as well as Iraqi ]s. At time the UN Security Council issued statements that "chemical weapons had been used in the war" . However in these UN statements the name Iraq was not mentioned by name, so that the situation is viewed as "the international community remained silent as Iraq used weapons of mass destruction against Iranian as well as Iraqi Kurds" and it is believed that United States had prevented UN from condemning Iraq.<ref name=iranica-IIW/>


==Background== ==Background==
===History of war's name=== ===Iran–Iraq relations===
{{Main|Iran–Iraq relations|Shatt al-Arab dispute}}
The war was commonly referred to as the '''Gulf War''' or '''Persian Gulf War''' until the ] (] Jan-Feb 1991), and for a while thereafter as the '''First Persian Gulf War'''. The Iraq-Kuwait conflict, while originally known as the Second Persian Gulf War, later became known simply as '''"The Gulf War."''' The United States-led ] and the ongoing conflict there has since been called the Second Persian Gulf War.{{Fact|note="The entire paragraph needs citations."}}


], ], and ] (left to right) during the Algiers Agreement in 1975]]
Iraqi president ] initially dubbed the conflict "The Whirlwind War".<ref>''The Great War for Civilisation'' by ], ISBN 1-84115-007-x pages 219</ref>
In April 1969, Iran abrogated the 1937 treaty over the ] and Iranian ships stopped paying tolls to Iraq when they used the Shatt al-Arab.<ref>Karsh, Efraim ''The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988'', London: Osprey, 2002 pp. 7–8</ref> The Shah argued that the 1937 treaty was unfair to Iran because almost all river borders around the world ran along the '']'', and because most of the ships that used the Shatt al-Arab were Iranian.<ref>Bulloch, John and Morris, Harvey ''The Gulf War'', London: Methuen, 1989 p. 37.</ref> Iraq threatened war over the Iranian move, but on 24 April 1969, an Iranian tanker escorted by Iranian warships (]) sailed down the Shatt al-Arab, and Iraq—being the militarily weaker state—did nothing.<ref name="Karsh, Efraim page 8">Karsh, Efraim ''The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988'', London: Osprey, 2002 p. 8</ref> The Iranian abrogation of the 1937 treaty marked the beginning of a period of acute Iraqi–Iranian tension that would see ] and was to last until the ].<ref name="Karsh, Efraim page 8"/>


The relationship between the governments of Iran and Iraq briefly improved in 1978, when Iranian agents in Iraq discovered plans for a pro-Soviet ''coup d'état'' against Iraq's government. When informed of this plot, Saddam ordered the execution of dozens of his army's officers, and in a sign of reconciliation, expelled from Iraq ], an exiled leader of clerical opposition to the Shah.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar>{{cite web|url=http://www.iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war1.php|title=Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988|work=History of Iran|publisher=Iran Chamber Society|access-date=29 June 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011172148/http://www.iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war1.php|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>
===Early history===
Although the Iran–Iraq War from 1980–1988 was a war for dominance of the ] region, the roots of the war go back many centuries. There has been rivalry between kingdoms of ] (the ], modern ]) and the rugged highlands to the East (] or modern ]) since the beginning of recorded history in ].


===After the Iranian Revolution===
Of strategic importance was the question of sovereignty over the resource-rich province of ]. Before the ] 1299–1922, Iraq was part of Persia. The rising power of the Ottomans put an end to this when ] annexed Arabian Iraq. The Turkish ] and general, ] recaptured Baghdad from the ] of Persia in 1638 via the ] (Peace of Qasr-e-Shirin). The border disputes between Persia and the Ottomans never ended. Between 1555 and 1918, Persia and the Ottoman empire signed no fewer than 18 treaties delineating their disputed borders. Today's border comes from the Treaty of Zuhab. Modern Iraq was created from the ], formed after the final collapse of the Ottoman empire following ], thereby inheriting all the disputes with Persia.
{{See also|Iranian Revolution|Consolidation of the Iranian Revolution|Iran hostage crisis|Iranian Embassy siege|Iraqi invasion of Iran}}


Tensions between Iraq and Iran were fuelled by Iran's Islamic revolution and its appearance of being a ] force, in contrast to Iraq's ].<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Asadzade|first1=Peyman|title=War and Religion: The Iran−Iraq War|journal=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics|date=2019|doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.812|isbn=978-0190228637|url=https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-812|access-date=21 April 2020|archive-date=23 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201023123429/https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-812|url-status=live}}</ref> Despite Iraq's goal of regaining the ]{{NoteTag|Called ''Arvand Rood'' ({{lang|fa|اروندرود}}) in Iran and ''Shatt al-Arab'' ({{lang|ar|شط العرب}}) in Iraq|name=waterway}}, the Iraqi government initially seemed to welcome the ], which overthrew Shah ], who was seen as a common enemy.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> There were frequent clashes along the Iran–Iraq border throughout 1980, with Iraq publicly complaining of at least 544 incidents and Iran citing at least 797 violations of its border and airspace.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=58–59 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>
Biographers have described Saddam's ], developed in his formative years living with his virulently anti-Iranian uncle ] as a factor in his later foreign policy, including the Iran–Iraq War.<ref name="DT2003-03-18">{{citation
| url = http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/03/18/wisad18.xml
| title = He dreamed of glory but dealt out only despair
| first = David | last = Blair
| journal = The Daily Telegraph
| date = 18 March 2003
}}</ref><ref name="Coughlin">{{cite book
| first = Con |last=Coughlin
| title = Saddam: His Rise and Fall
| page = 19
| isbn = 9780060505431
| publisher = Harper Perennial
| year = 2005
}}</ref> Talfah was the author of ], a pamphlet Saddam's government was later to republish.<ref name="Kengor">{{citation
| author = Kengor, Paul
| title = The rise and fall of a dictator
| journal =The Washington Times
| date = 7 January 2007
|url = http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5244/is_200701/ai_n20941022}}</ref>


] rose to power after the ].]]
===Post-colonial era===
] Ruhollah Khomeini called on Iraqis to overthrow the Ba'ath government, which was received with considerable anger in Baghdad.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> On 17 July 1979, despite Khomeini's call, Saddam gave a speech praising the Iranian Revolution and called for an Iraqi–Iranian friendship based on non-interference in each other's internal affairs.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> When Khomeini rejected Saddam's overture by calling for Islamic revolution<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> in Iraq, Saddam was alarmed.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Iran's new Islamic administration was regarded in ] as an irrational, existential threat to the Ba'ath government, especially because the Ba'ath party, having a secular nature, discriminated against and posed a threat to the fundamentalist ] movement in Iraq, whose clerics were Iran's allies within Iraq and whom Khomeini saw as oppressed.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
On 18 December 1959, the new leader of Iraq ], declared: "We do not wish to refer to the history of Arab tribes residing in Al-Ahwaz and Mohammareh . The ]s handed over Mohammareh, which was part of Iraqi territory, to Iran." The Iraqi regime's dissatisfaction with Iran's possession of the ]-rich ] province was not limited to rhetorical statements; Iraq began supporting ]ist movements in Khuzestan, and even raised the issue of its territorial claims at the next meeting of the ], without success. Iraq showed reluctance in fulfilling existing agreements with Iran—especially after the death of ]ian President ] and the rise of the ], when Iraq decided to take on the role of "leader of the ]".


On 1 April 1980, the ], an Iraqi Islamist group with supportive ties to Iran, attempted to assassinate ], a high ranking Ba'athist and Iraq's deputy prime minister, in retaliation for a 30 March decree declaring "membership of Dawa a capital offense".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=57–58 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> The attempt failed and instead killed several civilians.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/Iraq/Story/0,2763,943280,00.html|title=Christian outsider in Saddam's inner circle|work=The Guardian|location=London, UK|access-date=24 December 2007|first=Brian|last=Whitaker|date=25 April 2003}}</ref> This failed assassination plot, carried out by an Iran-backed group, formed a part of Iraq's ] for the invasion of Iran.<ref name=gsick03>{{cite journal|last=Sick|first=Gary|title=Iran: Confronting terrorism|journal=The Washington Quarterly|year=2003|volume=26|issue=4|pages=83–98|doi=10.1162/016366003322387127|s2cid=153688389}}</ref> Iraq's immediate response was to order the ] of ], an Iraqi Shi'ite cleric seen as the public face of the Dawa movement, along with al-Sadr's sister.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=57–58, 145–146 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> On 30 April, Iraq organized ].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=58–59 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>
In 1969, the deputy prime minister of Iraq stated: "Iraq's dispute with Iran is in connection with Arabistan (]) which is part of Iraq's soil and was annexed to Iran during foreign rule." Soon Iraqi ]s began exclusively{{Fact|date=May 2009}} broadcasting into "Arabistan", encouraging Arabs living in Iran and even ] to revolt against the ]'s government. ] TV stations even began showing Iran's Khuzestan province as part of Iraq's new province called ], renaming all Iranian cities with ] names.


Saddam's primary interest in war may have also stemmed from his desire to right the supposed "wrong" of the ], in addition to finally achieving his desire of becoming the regional superpower.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=61–62 (e-book, page numbers approximate)|quote=Certainly Saddam believed that the oil-rich areas of Arabistan (Khuzestan) were within his reach, a goal his intelligence services seemed delighted to further.}}</ref> Saddam's goal was to supplant ] as the "leader of the Arab world" and to achieve ] over the Persian Gulf.<ref name="Brittanica Saddam Hussein">{{cite web|title=Britannica Online Encyclopedia: Saddam Hussein|url=https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/277539/Saddam-Hussein/284496/Presidency|access-date=28 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150503191210/https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/277539/Saddam-Hussein/284496/Presidency|archive-date=3 May 2015|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author-link=Kanan Makiya|last=Makiya|first=Kanan|title=Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq|edition=Updated|url=https://archive.org/details/republicoffearpo00maki|url-access=registration|publisher=]|year=1998|isbn=978-0520921245|page=273}}</ref> He saw Iran's increased weakness due to revolution, sanctions, and international isolation.<ref name=AggrPolitics>{{cite book|title=The Iran–Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression|year=1993|publisher=University Press of Florida|location=Gainesville|isbn=978-0-8130-1177-6|editor=Rajaee, Farhang}}</ref> Saddam had invested heavily in Iraq's military since his defeat against Iran in 1975, buying large amounts of weaponry from the Soviet Union and France. Between 1973 and 1980 alone, Iraq purchased an estimated 1,600 tanks and ]s and over 200 Soviet-made aircraft.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=The opponents|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=71–73 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>
In 1971, Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Iran after claiming sovereignty rights over the islands of ], ] in the ], following the withdrawal of the British.<ref name="Fendereski2005">{{citation | title = 2005: Tonb (Greater and Lesser) | first = Guive |last= Fendereski
| page =
| publisher = www.iranica.com Eisenbrauns Inc.
| year =2005
}}</ref> Iraq then expropriated the properties of 70, 000 Iraqis of Iranian origin and expelled them from its territory, after complaining to the Arab League and the UN without success. Many, if not most of those expelled were in fact Iraqi Shia who had little to no family ties with Iran, and the vast majority of whom spoke Arabic, rather than Persian. The expulsions formed part of a longstanding Iraqi Baathist tradition of marginalizing and deligitimizing the Shia majority by alleging subversive ties with Iran. <ref name="BBC">{{citation | title = 2003: BBC (Iraq's rich mosaic of people) | page = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2783989.stm}}</ref>


By 1980, Iraq possessed 242,000 soldiers, second only to ] in the Arab world,<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Kanan Makiya|last=Makiya|first=Kanan|title=Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq|edition=Updated|url=https://archive.org/details/republicoffearpo00maki|url-access=registration|publisher=]|year=1998|isbn=978-0520921245|pages=33–34}}</ref> 2,350 tanks<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=The opponents|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=77–79 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> and 340 combat aircraft.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=The opponents|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=79–80 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> Watching the disintegration of the powerful Iranian army that frustrated him in 1974–1975, he saw an opportunity to attack, using the threat of Islamic Revolution as a pretext.<ref name="Fürtig">{{cite journal|title=Den Spieß umgedreht: iranische Gegenoffensive im Ersten Golfkrieg|trans-title=Turning of the Tables: the Iranian counter-offensive during the first Gulf War|first=Henner|last=Fürtig|language=de|journal=]|issue=5|year=2012|pages=10–13}}</ref><ref name="Murray and Woods pp. 104-106">{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1980: The Iraqi invasion begins|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=104–106 (e-book, page numbers approximate)|quote=While the evidence now available suggests the skirmishes were more a convenient excuse for war, questions still remain.}}</ref> Iraqi ] reported in July 1980 that despite Iran's bellicose rhetoric, "it is clear that, at present, Iran has no power to launch wide offensive operations against Iraq, or to defend on a large scale."<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=59–61, 63 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author-link=Hal Brands|last=Brands|first=Hal|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/14682745.2011.564612|title=Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the invasion of Iran: was there a green light?|journal=]|volume=12|issue=2|year=2012|publisher=]|page=334|doi=10.1080/14682745.2011.564612|s2cid=154354622|access-date=15 February 2022|archive-date=15 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220215093258/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/14682745.2011.564612|url-status=live|issn=1468-2745}}</ref> Days before the Iraqi invasion and in the midst of rapidly escalating cross-border skirmishes, Iraqi military intelligence again reiterated on 14 September that "the enemy deployment organization does not indicate hostile intentions and appears to be taking on a more defensive mode".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1980: The Iraqi invasion begins|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=103–106 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>
One of the factors contributing to hostility between the two powers was a dispute over full control of the ] waterway (known as ''Arvand Rud'' in Iran) at the head of the Persian Gulf, an important channel for the oil exports of both countries.


Some scholars writing prior to the opening of formerly classified Iraqi archives, such as Alistair Finlan, argued that Saddam was drawn into a conflict with Iran due to the border clashes and Iranian meddling in Iraqi domestic affairs. Finlan stated in 2003 that the Iraqi invasion was meant to be a limited operation in order to send a political message to the Iranians to keep out of Iraqi domestic affairs,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Finlan|first1=Alistair|title=Essential Histories – The Gulf War 1991|date=2003|publisher=Routledge|location=New York|isbn=0-203-57971-2|page=1}}</ref> whereas Kevin M. Woods and Williamson Murray stated in 2014 that the balance of evidence suggests Saddam was seeking "a convenient excuse for war" in 1980.<ref name="Murray and Woods pp. 104-106"/>
In addition to Iraq's fomenting of separatism in Iran's ] and ] provinces, both countries encouraged separatist activities by ]ish nationalists in the other country. During the first few years of the 1980–1988 Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi government tried to accommodate the Kurds in order to focus on the war against Iran. In 1984, the ] agreed to cooperate with Baghdad, but the ] remained opposed.<ref></ref>


On 8 March 1980, Iran announced it was withdrawing its ambassador from Iraq, downgraded its diplomatic ties to the ] level, and demanded that Iraq do the same.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The following day, Iraq declared Iran's ambassador ], and demanded his withdrawal from Iraq by 15 March.<ref name=cia80>{{cite report|url=http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001251999/DOC_0001251999.pdf|title=National Intelligence Daily|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency|date=10 March 1980|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101105212626/http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0001251999/DOC_0001251999.pdf|archive-date=5 November 2010}}</ref>
In the 1975 ] Iraq made territorial concessions — including the waterway — in exchange for normalized relations.


===Iranian military preparations===
The relationship between Iranian and Iraqi governments briefly improved in 1978, when Iranian agents in Iraq discovered a pro-Soviet ] against the Iraqi government. When informed of this plot, ], who was Vice President at the time, ordered the execution of dozens of his army officers, and to return the favor, expelled ], an exiled leader of clerical opposition to the Shah, from Iraq.


In Iran, severe officer purges, including numerous executions ordered by ], the new ] judge, and shortages of spare parts for Iran's American and British-made equipment had crippled Iran's once-mighty ]. Between February and September 1979, Iran's government executed 85 senior generals and forced all ] and most ] into early retirement.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
===After the Islamic Revolution===
{{seealso|Islamic Revolution|Iranian Embassy Siege|Modern usage of al-Qādisiyyah}}
]i 25-] note, with the ] depicted in the background]]
The ] and revolutionary Shia ] of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and the Arab nationalism of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime were central to the conflict.


], who was also commander-in-chief, inspecting a Jeep-mounted ]]]
Saddam Hussein was keenly interested in elevating Iraq to a strong regional power. A successful invasion of Iran would enlarge Iraq's oil reserves and make Iraq the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region.


By September 1980, the revolutionary government had purged some 12,000 officers of all levels from the army.<ref name="efraimkarsh" /> These purges resulted in a drastic decline in the Iranian military's operational capacities.<ref name="efraimkarsh" />
On several occasions Saddam ] the ] in propagating his position against Iran. For example, on 2 April 1980, half a year before the outbreak of the war, in a visit by Saddam to al-Mustansiriyyah University in Baghdad, drawing parallels with the 7th century defeat of Persia in the ], he announced:


On the eve of the revolution in 1978, international experts in military science had assessed that Iran's armed forces were the fifth most powerful in the world.<ref name="farmanfarmaian11">{{cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/201121393446561799.html|publisher=Al Jazeera|title=What makes a revolution succeed?|date=14 February 2011|last=Farmanfarmaian|first=Roxane|access-date=1 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121105001633/http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/201121393446561799.html|archive-date=5 November 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> However, by the eve of war with Iraq, the recently formidable Iranian army was in many crucial ways a shell of its former self, having been badly weakened by losses in experienced personnel. The desertion rate had reached 60%, the officer corps was devastated and its most highly skilled soldiers and aviators had been exiled, imprisoned, or executed. When the invasion occurred, many pilots and officers were released from prison, or had their executions commuted to combat the Iraqis. Throughout the war, Iran never managed to fully recover from this ].<ref name="parstimes">{{cite web|url=http://www.parstimes.com/history/national_security.html|title=National Security|work=Pars Times|access-date=8 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130515172515/http://www.parstimes.com/history/national_security.html|archive-date=15 May 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>
<BLOCKQUOTE>In your name, brothers, and on behalf of the Iraqis and Arabs everywhere we tell those ] cowards and dwarfs who try to avenge Al-Qadisiyah that the spirit of Al-Qadisiyah as well as the blood and honor of the people of Al-Qadisiyah who carried the message on their spearheads are greater than their attempts."<ref>Speech made by Saddam Hussein. Baghdad, ''Voice of the Masses'' in Arabic, 1200 GMT 2 April 1980. FBIS-MEA-80-066. 3 April 1980, E2-3. E3</ref></BLOCKQUOTE>


Many junior officers were promoted to generals, resulting in the army being more integrated as a part of the regime by the war's end.<ref name="parstimes" /> Meanwhile, a new ] organisation gained prominence in Iran, the ].<ref name="Ottolenghi 2011">{{cite web|last=Ottolenghi|first=Emanuelle|title=The Pasdaran: Inside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps|url=http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/the-pasdaran-inside-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps/|date=3 September 2011|publisher=Foundation for Defense of Democracies|access-date=13 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120625224142/http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/the-pasdaran-inside-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps|archive-date=25 June 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> Created to protect the new regime and serve as a counterbalance to the army, the ''Revolutionary Guards''{{efn| Also known in Iran as the ''Sepah-e-Pasdaran''}} (IRGC) had been trained to act only as a militia and struggled to adapt as needed following the Iraqi invasion, initially refusing to fight alongside the regular army, resulting in many defeats. It was not until 1982 that the two groups began carrying out combined operations.<ref name="pollack04">{{cite book|last=Pollack|first=Kenneth M.|title=Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991|year=2004|publisher=University of Nebraska Press|location=Lincoln|isbn=978-0-8032-8783-9|chapter=Iraq}}</ref>
In turn the ] ] believed Muslims, particularly the ] in Iraq, ], and ], whom he saw as oppressed, could and should follow the Iranian example, rise up against their governments to join a united Islamic republic.<ref>{{cite book
| title = Islam and Revolution: Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini
| author = Khomeini,Ruhollah and Algar, Hamid (translator)
| publisher = Mizan Press
| year = 1981
| page = 122}}</ref> Khomeini and Iran's Islamic revolutionaries despised Saddam's secularist, Arab nationalist Ba'athist regime in particular as un-Islamic and "a puppet of Satan,"<ref name="Macket1996">{{cite book
| author = Mackey, Sandra
| title = The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation
| publisher = Dutton
| year = 1996
| page = 317}}</ref> and called on Iraqis to overthrow Saddam and his regime. At the same time severe officer purges (including several executions ordered by ], the post-revolution '']'' ruler), and spare parts shortages for Iran's American-made equipment, had crippled Iran's once mighty ]. The bulk of the Iranian military was made up of poorly armed, though committed, ]s. Iran had minimal defenses in the Shatt al-Arab river.


An additional paramilitary militia was founded in response to the invasion, the "Army of 20 Million", commonly known as the ].<ref name="Alfoneh 2010">{{cite web|last=Alfoneh|first=Ali|title=The Basij Resistance Force|url=http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force|work=The Iran Primer|date=6 October 2010|publisher=United States Institute of Peace|access-date=13 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130120132917/http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force|archive-date=20 January 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> The Basij were poorly armed and had members as young as 12 and as old as 70. They often acted in conjunction with the Revolutionary Guard, launching so-called ]s and other campaigns against the Iraqis.<ref name="Alfoneh 2010" /> They were subordinate to the Revolutionary Guards, and they made up most of the manpower that was used in the Revolutionary Guard's attacks.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />
Iraq started the war believing that Sunnis of Iran would join the opposing forces, failing to fully appreciate the power of Iranian nationalism over historically clan-centered differences, and the power of Iranian government control of the press. Few of the ethnic Arabs of ] or Sunnis of Iran collaborated with Iraqis.{{Fact|date=February 2008}}


Stephen Pelletiere wrote in his 1992 book ''The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum'':
Iran's embassy in London was attacked by Iraqi-sponsored terrorist forces a few months prior to the war in 1980, in what came to be known as the ].<ref></ref>


{{blockquote|The human wave has been largely misconstrued both by the popular media in the West and by many scholars. The Iranians did not merely assemble masses of individuals, point them at the enemy, and order a charge. The waves were made up of the 22-man squads mentioned above . Each squad was assigned a specific objective. In battle, they would surge forward to accomplish their missions, and thus gave the impression of a human wave pouring against enemy lines.<ref>''The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum''. Stephen C. Pelletiere{{ISBN missing|date=September 2024}}</ref>{{page needed|date=September 2024}}}}
The ] report dated 9 December 1991 (S/23273){{Clarify me|date=January 2008}} explicitly cites "Iraq's aggression against Iran" in starting the war and breaching International security and peace.<ref>{{citation
| first = R.K. Ramazani
| title = Who started the Iran–Iraq War?
| journal= Virginia Journal of International Law
| volume =33
| date = Fall 1992
| pages = 69–89
| url = http://www.student.virginia.edu/~vjil
}}</ref>


Despite neglect by the new regime, at the outset of the conflict, Iran still had at least 1,000 operational tanks and several hundred functional aircraft and could ] equipment to procure spare parts.{{efn| A resort that became increasingly necessary as the war continued. Though Iran could and did acquire weapons from multiple foreign manufacturers; the pre-revolution arsenal was composed overwhelmingly of US made weaponry, meaning obtaining additional spare parts was not an option.}}<ref name="pollack04" /> Continuous sanctions greatly limited Iran from acquiring many additional heavy weapons, including tanks and aircraft.<ref name="parstimes" />
==War==
===Iraqi precursor for war===
Iraq's pretext was an alleged assassination attempt on ] ] in southern Iraq, which Saddam Hussein blamed on "Iranian agents", in one of his speeches.
] waterway on the Iran–Iraq border]]
"Relations deteriorated rapidly until in March 1980, Iran unilaterally downgraded its diplomatic ties to the ] level, withdrew its ambassador, and demanded that Iraq do the same. The tension increased in April following the attempted assassination of Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister ] and, three days later, the bombing of a funeral procession being held to bury students who had died in an earlier attack. Iraq blamed Iran, and in September, attacked.<ref name="Cruze1988" />
] in September–October 1981]]
On 17 September, in a statement addressed to the Iraqi parliament, Saddam Hussein stated that "The frequent and blatant Iranian violations of Iraqi sovereignty...have rendered the ] null and void... This river...must have its Iraqi-Arab identity restored as it was throughout history in name and in reality with all the disposal rights emanating from full sovereignty over the river.",<ref name="Karsh">{{cite book
| title = The Iran–Iraq War, 1980–1988
| first = Efraim |last=Karsh
| page = 22
| publisher = Osprey Publishing
| year = 2002}}</ref>


===Iraqi military preparations===
The objectives of Iraq's invasion of Iran were:
] in Iran, which Iraq planned to annex]]
#Control over the ] waterway
#Acquisition of the three islands of ] and the ], on behalf of the ].
#Annexation of ] to Iraq
#Overthrow of the revolutionary regime in Tehran{{Fact|date=January 2008}}


In addition, the area around the ] posed no obstacle for the Iraqis, as they possessed river crossing equipment. Iraq correctly deduced that Iran's defences at the crossing points around the ] and ] Rivers were undermanned and that the rivers could be easily crossed. Iraqi intelligence was also informed that the Iranian forces in ], which consisted of two divisions prior to the revolution, now only consisted of several ill-equipped and under-strength ]s. Only a handful of ]-sized tank units remained operational.<ref name="iranchamber-iraniraqwar" />
===U.S. green light for Iraq===
In a secret 1981 memo summing up a trip to the Middle East, then-Secretary of State ] wrote:
"It was also interesting to confirm that ] gave the Iraqis a green light to launch the war against Iran through ]" of Jordan."<ref name="znet2002">{{cite news|url=http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/11715
|accessdate=2008-11-20
|title=Fueling the Iran-Iraq Slaughter
|work=ZNet
|first=Larry
|last=Everest
|date=2002-09-05
}}</ref>
U.S. National Security Adviser ] met with ] in July 1980 in Amman, Jordan, to discuss joint efforts to oppose Iran, ] and former Iranian President ]. According to Saddam Hussein biographer Said Aburish however, at the Amman meeting Saddam Hussein met with three CIA agents, not Brzezinski personally.


The only qualms the Iraqis had were over the ] (formerly the ]). Despite the purge of several key pilots and commanders, as well as the lack of spare parts, the air force showed its power during local uprisings and rebellions. They were also active after the failed U.S. attempt to rescue ], ]. Based on these observations, Iraq's leaders decided to carry out a surprise ] against the Iranian air force's infrastructure prior to the main invasion.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />
In June 1980, students in Iran revealed a 1980 memorandum from Brzezinski to Secretary of State ] recommending the "destabilization" of the Iranian government by using Iran's neighbors. The U.S. has denied that it gave Iraq a "green light" for its ] ] invasion of Iran. Five months before Iraq's invasion, on ] ], Brzezinski signaled the U.S.'s willingness to work with Iraq: "We see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq... we do not feel that American- Iraqi relations need to be frozen in antagonisms."


=== Khuzestan ===
Iran's president ] wrote that Brzezinski met directly with Saddam Hussein in Jordan two months before the Iraqi assault. Bani-Sadr wrote, "Brzezinski had assured Saddam Hussein that the United States would not oppose the separation of Khuzestan from Iran." The '']'' reported that the U.S. passed satellite intelligence to the regime of Saddam Hussein via third countries, leading Iraq to believe Iranian forces would quickly collapse if attacked. Therefore, it has been argued that the U.S. may have encouraged Saddam Hussein to attack Iran, not merely giving him a green light.<ref name="znet2002"/>
It is widely accepted among scholars that Iraq was seeking to annex,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=9781107062290|pages=61–62 (e-book, page numbers approximate)|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|quote=Certainly Saddam believed that the oil-rich areas of Arabistan (Khuzestan) were within his reach, a goal his intelligence services seemed delighted to further.}}</ref> or at least to establish ] over,<ref name="Britannica Iran–Iraq War">{{cite encyclopedia|title=Iran–Iraq War|encyclopedia=]|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War|access-date=2021-09-02|archive-date=30 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210830211148/https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War|url-status=live}}</ref> Iran's ], but Saddam Hussein publicly denied this in November 1980.<ref>Ariane M. Tabatabai, ''No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran's National Security Strategy'', Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 198. {{ISBN?}}</ref>


===Border conflicts leading up to the war===
Former Carter official Gary Sick denies that Washington directly encouraged Iraq's attack, but instead let "Saddam assume there was a U.S. green light because there was no explicit red light."<ref name="pacific2003">{{cite news|url=http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=c33335175cc184e56416dbb1d1ebc595
{{Main|Iraqi invasion of Iran#Border conflicts}}
|accessdate=2008-11-20
|title=Four Questions for Saddam -- and the U.S.
|date=2003-12-17
|work=Pacific News Service
}}</ref>


] on the ]]]
===September 1980: Iraqi invasion===
] launched a full-scale invasion of ] on 22 September 1980.
On 22 September 1980, the Iraqi air force attacked Iran, attacking ten airfields inside Iran, but failed to achieve their objective of destroying the Iranian air force on the ground.<ref name="TKR">{{cite book
| last =
| first =
| authorlink =
| coauthors =
| title = The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988
| publisher =
| date =
| location =
| page = 22
| url =
| doi =
| id =
| isbn =}}</ref> The next day Iraq initiated a ground invasion of Iran along a front measuring 644 kilometres, in three simultaneous thrusts.<ref name="TKR" /> The purpose of the invasion, according to Saddam Hussein, was to blunt the edge of Khomeini's movement and to thwart his attempt to ] to Iraq and the Persian Gulf states."<ref name="Cruze1988">{{citation
| title = Iran and Iraq: Perspectives in Conflict
| volume = research report
| first = Gregory S. | last = Cruze
| publisher = U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College
| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1988/CGS.htm
| date = Spring 1988
}}</ref> Of the six Iraqi divisions that were invading, four were sent against the Iranian province of ], which was located near the southern end of the border, to cut off the ] from the rest of Iran, and to establish a territorial security zone.<ref name="TKR" /> The other two divisions invaded through the northern and central part of the border, to prevent an Iranian counter-attack into Iraq.<ref name="FKR">{{cite book
| last =
| first =
| authorlink =
| coauthors =
| title = The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988
| publisher =
| date =
| location =
| page = 23
| url =
| doi =
| id =
| isbn =}}</ref> Two of the four Iraqi divisions operating near the southern end, one mechanized and one armored, began a siege of the strategically important towns of ] and ].<ref name="TKR" /> The other two, both armoured, secured the territory bounded by the line Khorramshahr-Ahvaz-Susangerd-Musian, due to an enveloping movement.<ref name="TKR" /> On the central front, the Iraqis occupied ], advanced towards the foothills of the ]; and were able to block the traditional Tehran–Baghdad invasion route by securing some territory forward of ].<ref name="FKR" /> On the northern front, the Iraqis attempted to establish a strong defensive position opposite ] to protect the Iraqi Kirkuk oil complex.<ref name="FKR" />


On 10 September 1980, Iraq forcibly reclaimed territories in Zain al-Qaws and Saif Saad that it had been promised under the terms of the ] but that Iran had never handed over, leading to both Iran and Iraq declaring the treaty null and void, on 14 September and 17 September, respectively. As a result, the only outstanding border dispute between Iran and Iraq at the time of the Iraqi invasion of 22 September was the question of whether Iranian ships would fly Iraqi flags and pay Iraq navigation fees for a stretch of the Shatt al-Arab river spanning several miles.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=A context of 'bitterness and anger'|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=62–63 (e-book, page numbers approximate)|quote=On 7 September 1980, Iraq accused Iran of shelling Iraqi villages in the territories of Zain al-Qaws and Saif Saad on 4 September 1980. Iraq demanded that the Iranian forces in those territories evacuate and return the villages to Iraq. Tehran gave no reply. Iraqi forces then moved to 'liberate' the villages, and on 10 September announced that its forces had done so in a short, sharp military engagement.&nbsp;... On 14 September 1980, Iran announced it would no longer abide by the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Given the scene that was set, it was no surprise that on 17 September, five days before the invasion, Iraq declared the accords null and void.&nbsp;... On 22 September, Iraqi units crossed the frontier.}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author-link=Kanan Makiya|last=Makiya|first=Kanan|title=Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq|edition=Updated|url=https://archive.org/details/republicoffearpo00maki|url-access=registration|publisher=]|year=1998|isbn=978-0520921245|page=270|quote=There remains the issue of sovereignty over Shatt al-Arab.&nbsp;... Granted that this might have been a genuine motive for abrogating the 1975 treaty, and reclaiming title to the whole Shatt, what was the point of the invasion on September 22? Iraq had taken back by unilateral action on September 10 the only strips of territory it still claimed under the treaty. There was no longer any 'territory' as such on the other side to conquer. The Ba'th had already followed the Shah's example of 1971 when he unilaterally took over the three islands in the Gulf.}}</ref>
Since the Iranian regular military and the ] conducted their operations separately, the Iraqi invading forces did not face co-ordinated resistance.<ref name="FKR" /> On 24 September, though, the ] attacked ] and, on the way, had destroyed two oil terminals near the Iraqi port of ], which reduced Iraq's ability to export oil.<ref name="NOne">{{cite book
| last =
| first =
| authorlink =
| coauthors =
| title = The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988
| publisher =
| date =
| location =
| page = 29
| url =
| doi =
| id =
| isbn =}}</ref> The Iranian air force also begun air strikes in September against strategically important Iraqi targets, including oil facilities, dams, petrochemical plants, and a nuclear reactor near Baghdad.<ref name="NOne" /> Baghdad was subjected to eight air raids by 1 October.<ref name="NOne" /> In response to these air attacks, Iraq launched a number of aerial strikes against Iranian targets.<ref name="NOne" /> The Pasdaran fought against the Iraqi invasion with "great fervour and tenacity"<ref name="NTwo" />, and bore the brunt of the invasion.<ref name="NThree">{{cite book
| last =
| first =
| authorlink =
| coauthors =
| title = The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988
| publisher =
| date =
| location =
| page = 25
| url =
| doi =
| id =
| isbn =}}</ref> On 24 October, ] was captured<ref name="NTwo">{{cite book
| last =
| first =
| authorlink =
| coauthors =
| title = The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988
| publisher =
| date =
| location =
| page = 27
| url =
| doi =
| id =
| isbn =}}</ref> and by November Saddam ordered his forces to advance towards ] and ],<ref name="NOne" /> but they were not successful in occupying these two settlements.<ref name="NOne" />


==Course of the war==
Iraq had mobilized 21 divisions for the invasion, while Iran countered with only 13 regular army divisions and one brigade. Of these divisions, only seven were deployed to the border.
{{overly detailed|section|date=June 2024}}


===1980: Iraqi invasion===
The ] advanced quickly against the still disorganized ], advancing on a wide front into Iranian territory along the ]–] axis in central Iran and towards ] in the oil-rich southern province of ].
{{Main|Iraqi invasion of Iran}}
{{Further information|22 September 1980 Iraqi airstrike on Iran|Operation Kaman 99|Operation Scorch Sword|Operation Sultan 10}}
] in ] after Iraqi forces attacked Tehran on 22 September 1980]]
]|right]]


Iraq launched a full-scale invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980. The ] launched surprise air strikes on ten Iranian airfields with the objective of destroying the ].<ref name=efraimkarsh>{{cite book|title=The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988|pages=1–8, 12–16, 19–82|author=Karsh, Efraim|publisher=Osprey Publishing|year=2002|isbn=978-1-84176-371-2}}</ref> The attack failed to cripple the Iranian Air Force: while it damaged some of Iran's airbase infrastructure, it did not destroy a significant number of aircraft. The Iraqi Air Force was only able to strike in depth with a few ], ], and ] aircraft,<ref name=cordesman90>{{cite book|isbn=978-0-8133-0955-2|title=The Lessons of Modern War: Volume;– The Iran–Iraq Conflict|first1=Anthony H.|last1=Cordesman|first2=Abraham|last2=Wagner|year=1990|page=444 567 |publisher=Westview Press|url=https://archive.org/details/lessonsofmodernw02cord/page/102}}</ref> and Iran had built ]s where most of its combat aircraft were stored.
===The invasion stalls===
<!-- Image with inadequate rationale removed: ] and the Iran–Iraq War which Saddam referred to as "Saddam's al-Qādisiyyah"]] -->
The Iraqi invasion soon encountered unexpected resistance, however, and around March 1981 it stalled. A preemptive strike executed by the ] on the first day of the war successfully destroyed parts of Iran's airbase infrastructure, but failed to destroy a significant number of aircraft. The ] was only able to strike in depth with a few ], ] and ] aircraft, ineffective in a country as large as Iran. When three MiG-23BN's flew over Tehran, they attacked its airport but damaged only a few aircraft.<ref name="Cordesman1990">{{cite book
| title = The Lessons of Modern War: Volume Two - The Iran-Iraq Conflict
| author =Cordesman, Anthony and Wagner,Abraham R.
| publisher =Westview
| year = 1990
| page = 102}}</ref> Over the next day dozens of Iranian F-4s attacked Iraqi targets, and in a few days the ] gained air superiority over IQAF, allowing them to conduct ground attack missions with fighter-bombers and helicopters.


The next day, Iraq launched a ground invasion, mounting three simultaneous attacks along a {{convert|644|km|mi|abbr=on}} front.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Saddam hoped an attack on Iran would cause such a blow to Iran's prestige that it would lead to the new government's downfall, or at least end Iran's calls for his overthrow.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
Also, rather than turning against the Ayatollah's government as exiles had promised, the people of Iran rallied around their country and mounted a stiff resistance. An estimated 200, 000 additional troops arrived at the front by November, many of them "ideologically committed" volunteers.<ref name="GlobalSecIIWar" /> The Iraqis soon found the Iranian military was not nearly as depleted as they had thought.


Of Iraq's six divisions that invaded by ground, four were sent to ], which was located near the border's southern end, to cut off the Shatt al-Arab{{NoteTag|name=waterway}} from the rest of Iran and to establish a territorial security zone.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|22}} The other two divisions invaded across the northern and central part of the border to prevent an Iranian counter-attack.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Two of the four Iraqi divisions, one ] and one armoured, operated near the southern end and began a siege of the strategically important port cities of ] and ].<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|22}}
For about a year after the Iraqi offensive stalled in March 1981 there was little change in the front, but in mid-March 1982 Iran took the offensive and the Iraqi military was forced to retreat. By June 1982, an Iranian counter-offensive had recovered the areas lost to Iraq earlier in the war. An especially significant battle of this counter-offensive in the Khuzestan province was the ] from the Iraqis on 24 May 1982.


The two armoured divisions secured the territory bounded by the cities of ], ], ], and ].<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|22}} On the central front, the Iraqis occupied ], advanced towards the foothills of the ], and were able to block the traditional Tehran–Baghdad invasion route by securing territory forward of ], Iran.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|23}} On the northern front, the Iraqis attempted to establish a strong defensive position opposite ] to protect the Iraqi ].<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|23}} Iraqi hopes of an uprising by the ethnic ] failed to materialise, as most of the ethnic Arabs remained loyal to Iran.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
===Iraq retreats but the war continues===
{{Article issues|disputed=February 2008|POV=February 2008}}
] at Khorramshahr]]


The Iraqi troops advancing into Iran in 1980 were described by Patrick Brogan as "badly led and lacking in offensive spirit".<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|261|date=November 2012}} The first known ] on Iran probably took place during the fighting around Susangerd.<ref name=iranchamber-chemicalwarfare>{{cite web|url=http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/chemical_warfare_iran_iraq_war.php|title=Chemical Warfare in the Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988|work=History of Iran|first1=Julian Perry|last1=Robinson|last2=Goldbat|first2=Jozef|publisher=Iran Chamber Society|date=May 1984|access-date=1 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101040325/http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/chemical_warfare_iran_iraq_war.php|archive-date=1 January 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> ] served as Iraqi Minister of Defence throughout the Iran–Iraq War, and was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, second only to Saddam Hussein.<ref name="Dictionary p135">{{cite book|last1=Ghareeb|first1=Edmund A.|title=Historical Dictionary of Iraq|last2=Dougherty|first2=Beth|publisher=Scarecrow Press|year=2004|isbn=0-8108-4330-7|location=Lanham, Maryland|page=135}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Georges Malbrunot|date=16 October 2007|title=Majid: 'Saddam is no longer the lion I knew'|newspaper=Le Figaro}}</ref> In this position, he played a crucial role in rebuilding and modernizing the Iraqi military.<ref name="Dictionary p135" />
Saddam decided to withdraw his armed forces completely from Iran, and that they should be deployed along the international border between Iraq and Iran.<ref name="FKR" /> ] states that Saddam made this choice because the Iraqi leader believed that his army was now too demoralised and damaged to hold onto any territory in Iran, and that Iran could be successfully resisted through a line of defence on Iraqi land near the border.<ref name="FKR" /> Using the ] as a pretext for a withdrawal, Saddam suggested to Iran that they should stop fighting, and that they should send their troops to assist the Palestinians fighting in Lebanon, an offer which was refused.<ref name="FKR" /> The withdrawal began on 20 June, and was complete by 30 June.<ref name="FKR">{{cite book
| last =
| first =
| authorlink =
| coauthors =
| title = The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988
| publisher =
| date =
| location =
| page = 36
| url =
| doi =
| id =
| isbn =}}</ref> Karsh describes Saddam's decision to withdraw his forces from Iran as "one of his wisest strategic moves during the war".<ref name="FKR" />


] equipped with ], ] and ] missiles]]
A Saudi Arabia-backed plan to end the war agreed to by Iraq included $70 billion in war reparations to be paid by Arabian states of the Persian Gulf on behalf of Iraq, and complete the Iraqi evacuation from Iranian territory - an offer called by some critics of Iranian government as "extraordinarily favorable to Iran."<ref name="Molavi-270">{{cite book
Though the Iraqi air invasion surprised the Iranians, the Iranian air force retaliated the day after with a large-scale attack against Iraqi air bases and infrastructure in ]. Groups of ] and ] fighter jets attacked targets throughout Iraq, such as oil facilities, dams, ] and oil refineries, and included ], Baghdad, and the ] oil refinery. Iraq was taken by surprise at the strength of the retaliation, which caused the Iraqis heavy losses and economic disruption, but the Iranians took heavy losses as well as losing many aircraft and aircrews to Iraqi air defenses.
| author = Molavi, Afsin
| title =The Soul of Iran
| publisher = Norton
| year = 2005
| page =270
}}</ref>
Iran rejected Iraq's offer, demanding the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime, the repatriation of 100, 000 Shi'ites expelled from Iraq before the war, and $150 billion in war reparations. {{Fact|date=January 2008}}


]'s ] helicopter gunships began attacks on the advancing Iraqi divisions, along with ] armed with ] missiles;<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> they destroyed numerous armoured vehicles and impeded the Iraqi advance, though not completely halting it.<ref name=cooper03_206>{{cite web|url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_206.shtml|last1=Cooper|first1=Thomas|last2=Bishop|first2=Farzad|title=Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980|date=9 September 2003|work=Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf Database|publisher=Air Combat Information Group|access-date=9 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140221222156/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_206.shtml|archive-date=21 February 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref name="Modern Warfare">{{cite video|title=Modern Warfare: Iran–Iraq War|medium=film documentary}}</ref> Meanwhile, Iraqi air attacks on Iran were repelled by Iran's ] interceptor fighter jets, using ] missiles, which downed a dozen of Iraq's Soviet-built fighters in the first two days of battle.<ref name=cooper03_206 />{{Dubious|date=July 2013}}
On 21 June, Khomeini indicated that Iran would invade Iraq shortly, and on 22 June, the Iranian Chief-of-Staff ] declared to "continue the war until Saddam Hussein is overthrown so that we can pray at ] and ]".<ref name="FKR" /> This matched a comment made by Khomeini on the issue of a truce with Iraq: "There are no conditions. The only condition is that the regime in Baghdad must fall and must be replaced by an Islamic Republic."<ref name="Wright1989">{{cite book
| title = In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade
| author = Wright, Robin
| year = 1989
| page = 126
| publisher = Simon and Schuster
}}</ref>


The Iranian regular military, police forces, volunteer Basij, and Revolutionary Guards all conducted their operations separately; thus, the Iraqi invading forces did not face coordinated resistance.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> However, on 24 September, the Iranian Navy attacked ], Iraq, destroying two oil terminals near the Iraqi port of ], which reduced Iraq's ability to export oil.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The Iranian ground forces, primarily consisting of the Revolutionary Guard, retreated to the cities, where they set up defences against the invaders.<ref name="Wilson 2007">{{cite web|last=Wilson|first=Ben|title=The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting during the Iran–Iraq War|url=http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/PF-Iran-Iraq.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029201227/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/PF-Iran-Iraq.pdf|archive-date=29 October 2013}}</ref>
===Iranian offensive, blunders, and hardening of Iraqi resolve===
Under the slogans `War, War until Victory,` and The Road to Jerusalem Goes through Baghdad,` <ref>Abrahamian, ''History of Modern Iran'', (2008) pages 171, 175</ref> Iran advanced. A tactic used in this advance noted throughout the world was the encouragment of heroism among young Iranian ] volunteers who sought martyrdom in human wave attacks on Iraqi positions, wearing a "key to heaven" around their necks. The volunteers were inspired before battle by tales of ], the ], and the supreme glory of ], and sometimes by an actor (usually a more mature soldier), playing the part of ] himself riding a white horse, galloping along the lines, providing the child soldiers a vision of "the hero who would lead them into their fateful battle before they met their God." <ref>Majd, Hooman, ''The Ayatollah Begs to Differ : The Paradox of Modern Iran'', by Hooman Majd, Doubleday, 2008, pages 146</ref>


On 30 September, Iran's air force launched ], striking and badly damaging the nearly-complete ] near Baghdad.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> By 1 October, Baghdad had been subjected to eight air attacks.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|29}} In response, Iraq launched aerial strikes against Iranian targets.<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=cooper03_206 />
On 13 July, the Iranian units crossed the border in force, aiming towards the city of ], the second most important city in Iraq. However the enemy they encountered had entrenched itself in formidable defenses. Unlike the hastily improvised defenses that the Iraqis had manned in Iran during the 1980–1981 occupation of the conquered territories, the border defenses were, by necessity, well developed even before the war; and the Iraqis were able to utilize a highly-developed network of bunkers and artillery fire-bases. Saddam had also more than doubled the size of the Iraqi army from 1981's 500, 000 soldiers (26 divisions and 3 independent brigades) to 1985's 1, 050, 000 (55 divisions and nine brigades).{{Fact|date=January 2008}}


The mountainous border between Iran and Iraq made a deep ground invasion almost impossible,<ref name=eckolm11>{{cite journal|last=Eckholm|first=Leif|title=Invading Iran: Lessons From Iraq|journal=Policy Review|volume=168|date=1 August 2011|url=http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/87231|quote=Invading forces would need to be prepared for a deeply embedded and enduring insurgency, due to extreme challenges presented by terrain, and resolve...|publisher=Stanford University Hoover Institution|access-date=1 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130508163142/http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/87231|archive-date=8 May 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> and air strikes were used instead. The invasion's first waves were a series of air strikes targeted at Iranian airfields. Iraq also attempted to bomb Tehran, Iran's capital and command centre, into submission.<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=cordesman90 />
Saddam's efforts bore fruit. Iran had been using combined-arms operations to great effect when it was attacking the Iraqi troops in its country, and had launched the iconic human-wave attacks with great support from artillery, aircraft, and tanks. However, lack of ammunition meant that the Iranians were now launching human-wave assaults with no support from other branches of the military. The superior defenses of the Iraqis meant that tens of thousands of Iranian soldiers were lost in most operations after 1982, and the Iraqi defenses would continue to hold in most sectors.


====First Battle of Khorramshahr====
In the Basra offensive, or ] five human-wave attacks were met with withering fire from the Iraqis. The boy-soldiers of Iran were particularly hard-hit, especially since they volunteered to run into minefields, in order to clear the way for the Iranian soldiers behind them. The Iranians were also hard-hit by the employment of chemical weapons and mustard gas by the Iraqis.
{{Main|Battle of Khorramshahr (1980)}}
] slowed the Iraqis for a month.]]
On 22 September, a prolonged battle began in the city of Khorramshahr, eventually leaving around 7,000 dead on each side.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Reflecting the bloody nature of the struggle, Iranians came to call Khorramshahr "City of Blood".<ref name=efraimkarsh />


The battle began with Iraqi air raids against key points and mechanised divisions advancing on the city in a crescent-like formation. They were slowed by Iranian air attacks and Revolutionary Guard troops with ]s, ]s, and ]s.<ref name=wilson07 /> The Iranians flooded the marsh areas around the city, forcing the Iraqis to traverse through narrow strips of land.<ref name=wilson07 /> Iraqi tanks launched attacks with no infantry support, and many tanks were lost to Iranian anti-tank teams.<ref name=wilson07 />
===1983–1985: Iraq battered, but not beaten===
]
], with Iranian soldiers on the front-line. Khameini opposed Khomeini's decision to extend the war into Iraq.<ref name="SKR">{{cite book
| last =
| first =
| authorlink =
| coauthors =
| title = The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988
| publisher =
| date =
| location =
| page = 41
| url =
| doi =
| id =
| isbn =}}</ref>]]
After the failure of their 1982 summer offensives, Iran believed that a major effort along the entire breadth of the front would yield the victory that they desired. Iranian numerical superiority might have achieved a break-through if they had attacked across all parts of the front at the same time, but they still lacked the organization for that type of assault. Iran was getting supplies from countries like ], ], China and Israel. One report estimated that Israeli Arms sales to Iran during the Iraq-Iran war was $500 million per year<ref>http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/1186/8611002.html</ref>. The Iraqis had more suppliers like the ] nations, France, Great Britain, ],], Spain, Italy, ], ], and the United States.


By 30 September, the Iraqis had managed to clear the Iranians from the outskirts of the city. The next day, the Iraqis launched infantry and armoured attacks into the city. After heavy ], the Iraqis were repelled. On 14 October, the Iraqis launched a second offensive. The Iranians initiated a controlled withdrawal from the city, street by street.<ref name=wilson07 /> By 24 October, most of the city was captured, and the Iranians evacuated across the Karun River. Some ] remained, and fighting continued until 10 November.
During the course of 1983, the Iranians launched five major assaults along the front. None met with substantial success. Khomeini's position on a truce remained unchanged.


====Iraqi advance stalls====
Saddam had hoped that mounting casualties and the lack of progress would force the Iranians to accept peace, but the ] government again re-iterated their demands for the overthrow of the Ba'ath regime in early 1984.{{Fact|date=January 2008}} Saddam realized that he would need to adopt a more aggressive posture to bring the Iranians to the bargaining table.{{Fact|date=January 2008}} He declared that eleven Iranian cities would come under attack unless Iran halted their acts of aggression by 7 February 1984.
{{Main|Siege of Abadan|Operation Morvarid}}]|left]]


Though Khorramshahr was captured, the battle had delayed the Iraqis enough to allow the large-scale deployment of the Iranian military.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> In November, Saddam ordered his forces to advance towards ] and ], and lay sieges to both cities. However, the Iraqi offensive had been badly damaged by Iranian militias and air power. Iran's air force had destroyed Iraq's army ]s and fuel supplies, and was strangling Iraq through an aerial siege.<ref name="cooper03_206" />
As an answer to this ultimatum, the Iranians launched an attack against Iraqi forces along the northern sector of the front line. Although a minor attack, Saddam stuck to his pledge and ordered aerial and missile attacks against the eleven cities that he had designated. The bombardment ceased on 22 February. Iran soon retaliated against urban centers, and these exchanges become known as the first "war of the cities". There would be five throughout the course of the war.


Iran's supplies had not been exhausted, despite sanctions, and the military often ] spare parts from other equipment and began searching for parts on the ]. On 28 November, Iran launched ] (Pearl), a combined air and sea attack which destroyed 80% of Iraq's navy and all of its ] sites in the southern portion of the country. When Iraq laid ] and dug its troops in around the city, it was unable to blockade the port, which allowed Iran to resupply ] by sea.<ref name=Abdoleinen-Ghazaleh />
The attacks on the Iranian cities did not destroy the Iranian government's resolve to fight. On 15 February, the Iranians launched a major attack against the central section of the front where the Second Iraqi Army Corps was deployed. 250, 000 Iranians faced 250, 000 Iraqis.


Iraq's ]s had been depleted, and by now it lacked the power to go on any major offensives until nearly the end of the war.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> On 7 December, Hussein announced that Iraq was going on the defensive.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> By the end of 1980, Iraq had destroyed about 500 Western-built Iranian tanks and captured 100 others.<ref>Tucker, A.R. (May 1988). "Armored warfare in the Gulf". ''Armed Forces'', p. 226.</ref><ref>"Irano–Irakskii konflikt. Istoricheskii ocherk." Niyazmatov. J.A. – M.: Nauka, 1989.</ref>
From 15 to 22 February, in ], and 22 to 24 February, in ], the Iranians attempted to capture the vital town of Kut al-Amara and to cut the key highway linking Baghdad and Basra. Capture of this road would have made it extremely difficult for the Iraqis to supply and co-ordinate the defenses, but the Iranian forces only came within {{convert|15|mi|km}} of the highway.


===1981: Stalemate===
However, ] met with much greater success. Involving a number of thrusts towards the key Iraqi city of ], the operation started on the 24 February and lasted until 19 March. The Iraqi defenses, under continuous strain since 15 February, seemed close to breaking conclusively. The Iraqis successfully stabilized the front but not before the Iranians captured part of the ]. Despite a heavy Iraqi counterattack coupled with the use of ] and ] ], the Iranians held their gains and would continue to hold them almost until the end of the war.<ref name="GlobalSecIIWar"/>


For the next eight months, both sides were on a defensive footing, with the exception of the ], as the Iranians needed more time to reorganise their forces after the damage inflicted by the purge of 1979–80.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> During this period, fighting consisted mainly of artillery duels and raids.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Iraq had mobilised 21 divisions for the invasion, while Iran countered with only 13 regular army divisions and one ]. Of the regular divisions, only seven were deployed to the border. The war bogged down into World War I-style ] with tanks and modern late-20th century weapons. Due to the power of anti-tank weapons such as the ], armored manoeuvre by the Iraqis was very costly, and they consequently entrenched their tanks into static positions.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=pollack04 />
===January 1985 - February 1986: Abortive offensives by Iran and Iraq===


Iraq also began firing ] missiles into ] and ], and used ] to bring the war to the Iranian civilian population.<ref name=Abdoleinen-Ghazaleh>{{cite journal|url=http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ghazalah%E2%80%99s-phased-analysis-of-combat-operations-part-two-of-three|title=Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran–Iraq War|series=Ghazalah's Phased Analysis of Combat Operations|first1=Youssef|last1=Aboul-Enein|first2=Andrew|last2=Bertrand|first3=Dorothy|last3=Corley|date=12 April 2012|journal=Small Wars Journal|publisher=Small Wars Foundation|access-date=6 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101040325/http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ghazalah%E2%80%99s-phased-analysis-of-combat-operations-part-two-of-three|archive-date=1 January 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Iran launched dozens of "human wave assaults".
With his armed forces now benefiting from financial support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Persian Gulf states, and substantial arms purchases from the ], China and France (among others), ] went on the offensive on 28 January 1985, for the first time since late 1980. This offensive, however, did not produce any significant gains, and the Iranians responded in kind with their own offensive directed against Basra, codenamed ], on 11 March 1985. The Imam Khomeini urged Iranians on saying, `It is our belief that Saddam wishes to return Islam to blasphemy and polytheism. ... if America becomes victorious ... and grants victory to Saddam, Islam will receive such a blow that it will not be able to raise its head for a long time ... The issue is one of Islam versus blasphemy, and not of Iran versus Iraq.` <ref>`Further on Khomenyni April 4 Speech on War,` broadcast 4 April 1985, quoted in ''Reinventing Khomeini : The Struggle for Reform in Iran'' by Daniel Brumberg
University of Chicago Press, 2001, pages 132-34</ref>


====Battle of Dezful====
By this time, the failure of the unsupported human wave attacks during 1984 meant that Iran was trying to develop a better working relationship between the army and the Pasdaran. The Iranian government also worked on molding the Pasdaran units into a much more conventional fighting force. The attack did succeed in capturing a part of the Baghdad-Basra highway that had proven elusive during ] and ]. Saddam responded to this strategic emergency by launching chemical attacks against the Iranian positions along the highway and by initiating the second 'war of the cities' with a massive air and missile campaign against twenty Iranian towns, including ].
{{Main|Battle of Dezful}}


] during a visit to the frontlines]]
===The Tanker War and U.S. support for Iraq===
The Tanker War started when Iraq attacked Iranian tankers and the oil terminal at ] island in 1984. Iran struck back by attacking tankers carrying Iraqi oil from Kuwait and then any tanker of the Persian Gulf states supporting Iraq. The air and small boat attacks did very little damage to Persian Gulf state economies and Iran just moved its shipping port to ] in the ].<ref name="Dugdale2002">{{citation
| first = TDP | last = Dugdale-Pointon
| date = 27 October 2002
| title = Tanker War 1984–1988, | url = http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_tanker.html}}</ref>


On 5 January 1981, Iran had reorganised its forces enough to launch a large-scale offensive, ] (Victory).<ref name=wilson07 /><ref name=dennis09>{{cite book|last=Dennis|first=Simon Dunstan|title=The Six Day War, 1967: Jordan and Syria|year=2009|publisher=Osprey Publishing|location=Oxford|isbn=978-1-84603-364-3|edition=1st|page=22}}</ref><ref name="Jafari 2011">{{cite web|last=Jafari|first=Mojtaba|title=Nasr Offensive Operation|url=http://www.tebyan.net/newindex.aspx?pid=188315|date=26 July 2019|access-date=13 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140715001111/http://www.tebyan.net/newindex.aspx?pid=188315|archive-date=15 July 2014|url-status=live}}</ref> The Iranians launched their major armoured offensive from ] in the direction of ], consisting of tank brigades from the 16th ''Qazvin'', 77th ''Khorasan'', and ]s,<ref name="Jafari 2011" /> and broke through Iraqi lines.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|32}} However, the Iranian tanks had raced through Iraqi lines with their flanks unprotected and with no infantry support;<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> as a result, they were cut off by Iraqi tanks.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
In 1982 with Iranian success on the battlefield, the U.S. made its backing of Iraq more pronounced, supplying it with intelligence, economic aid, normalizing relations with the government (broken during the 1967 ]), and also supplying weapons.<ref name="King2003-03">{{citation

| url=http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/arming_iraq.php
In the ensuing Battle of Dezful, the Iranian armoured divisions were nearly wiped out in one of the biggest tank battles of the war.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> When the Iranian tanks tried to manoeuvre, they became stuck in the mud of the marshes, and many tanks were abandoned.<ref name=wilson07 /> The Iraqis lost 45 ] and ] tanks, while the Iranians lost 100–200 ] and ] tanks. Reporters counted roughly 150 destroyed or deserted Iranian tanks, and also 40 Iraqi tanks.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> 141 Iranians were killed during the battle.<ref name="Jafari 2011" />
| title = Arming Iraq: A Chronology of U.S. Involvement

| first = John | last = King
The battle had been ordered by Iranian president ], who was hoping that a victory might shore up his deteriorating political position; instead, the failure hastened his fall.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|71}} Many of Iran's problems took place because of political infighting between President ], who supported the regular army, and the hardliners who supported the IRGC. Once he was ] and the competition ended, the performance of the Iranian military improved.
| date = March 2003
| publisher = Iran Chamber Society
The Islamic Republic government in Iran was further distracted by internal fighting between the regime and the ] (MEK) on the streets of Iran's major cities in June 1981 and again in September.<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|250–251|date=November 2012}} In 1983, the MEK started an alliance with Iraq following a meeting between MEK leader ] and Iraqi Deputy Prime minister ].<ref>{{cite book|first=Shaul|last=Shay|title=The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror|date=October 1994|publisher=Routledge|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uLo6DwAAQBAJ&q=1983+Tariq+Aziz+massoud+rajavi&pg=PT239|isbn=978-0765802552|quote="The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside."}}</ref>{{sfn|Piazza|1994|p=16|ps=: "At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty."}}<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/10/world/iraqi-visits-iranian-leftist-in-paris.html|title=Iraqi Visits Iranian Leftist in Paris|newspaper=The New York Times|date=10 January 1983|quote=The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mujahedeen, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran–Iraq War"|access-date=30 December 2021|archive-date=16 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816021516/https://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/10/world/iraqi-visits-iranian-leftist-in-paris.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|first=Shaul|last=Shay|title=The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror|date=1994|publisher=Routledge|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uLo6DwAAQBAJ&q=1983+Tariq+Aziz+massoud+rajavi&pg=PT239|isbn=978-0765802552|quote="Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside."}}</ref>
}}</ref> President Ronald Reagan decided that the United States "could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran", and that the United States "would do whatever was necessary to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran."<ref> to the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. </ref> President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD") to this effect in June, 1982.

In 1984 ] left the coalition because of a dispute with ]. In 1986, Rajavi moved from ] to Iraq and set up a base on the Iranian border.{{NoteTag|]}} The Battle of Dezful became a critical battle in Iranian military thinking. Less emphasis was placed on the Army with its conventional tactics, and more emphasis was placed on the Revolutionary Guard with its unconventional tactics.<ref name="wilson07" /><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0120/012038.html/(page)/2|title=Iran–Iraq War bogs down in rain, conflicting claims|newspaper=The Christian Science Monitor|access-date=5 October 2013|date=20 January 1981|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131231002127/http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0120/012038.html/(page)/2|archive-date=31 December 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Attack on H3====

] is considered to be one of the most sophisticated air operations of the war.|right]]

The Iraqi Air Force, badly damaged by the Iranians, was moved to the ] in Western Iraq, near the ]ian border and away from Iran. However, on 3 April 1981, the Iranian air force used eight F-4 Phantom fighter bombers, four F-14 Tomcats, three ] refuelling tankers, and one ] command plane to launch a surprise ], destroying 27–50 Iraqi fighter jets and bombers.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://iiaf.net/stories/warstories/s1.html|title=Assault on Al-Wallid|website=Imperial Iraniasn Air Force|access-date=9 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011172153/http://iiaf.net/stories/warstories/s1.html|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>

Despite the successful ] attack (in addition to other air attacks), the Iranian Air Force was forced to cancel its successful 180-day air offensive. In addition, they abandoned their attempted control of Iranian ]. They had been seriously weakened by sanctions and pre-war purges and further damaged by a fresh purge after the ].<ref name="csis 5">{{cite web|last=Cordesman|first=Anthony|title=Lessons of Modern Warfare: The Iran Iraq War Chapter V|url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap05.pdf|access-date=4 May 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090911152946/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap05.pdf|archive-date=11 September 2009|url-status=live}}</ref> The Iranian Air Force could not survive further attrition, and decided to limit their losses, abandoning efforts to control Iranian ]. The Iranian air force would henceforth fight on the defensive, trying to deter the Iraqis rather than engaging them. While throughout 1981–1982 the Iraqi air force would remain weak, within the next few years they would rearm and expand again, and begin to regain the strategic initiative.<ref name="Cooper Blinders">{{cite web|last=Cooper|first=Tom|title=Bombed by Blinders Part 1|url=http://www.acig.info/CMS/?option=com_content&task=view&id=247&Itemid=47|access-date=20 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170630000305/http://www.acig.info/CMS/?option=com_content&task=view&id=247&Itemid=47|archive-date=30 June 2017|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Introduction of human wave attacks====

The Iranians suffered from a shortage of heavy weapons,<ref name=pollack04 />{{rp|225|date=November 2012}} but had a large number of devoted volunteer troops, so they began using ]s against the Iraqis. Typically, an Iranian assault would commence with poorly trained Basij who would launch the primary human wave assaults to swamp the weakest portions of the Iraqi lines en masse (on some occasions even bodily clearing minefields).<ref name=pollack04 /><ref name=moin> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924090001/https://books.google.com/books?id=b2OL9IEXaAgC&printsec=frontcover&dq=moin+khomeini&hl=en&src=bmrr&ei=xilNTreuMOLj0QHz5ID_Bg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=snippet&q=martyrdom%20iraq&f=false |date=24 September 2015 }} By Baqer Moin</ref> This would be followed up by the more experienced Revolutionary Guard infantry, who would breach the weakened Iraqi lines,<ref name=pollack04 /><ref name="Wilson 2007" /> and followed up by the regular army using mechanized forces, who would maneuver through the breach and attempt to encircle and defeat the enemy.<ref name=pollack04 /><ref name=wilson07 />

]]]

According to ] Stephen C. Pelletiere, the idea of Iranian "human wave attacks" was a misconception.<ref name=Pelletiere /> Instead, the Iranian tactics consisted of using groups of 22-man infantry ], which moved forward to attack specific objectives. As the squads surged forward to execute their missions, that gave the impression of a "human wave attack". Nevertheless, the idea of "human wave attacks" remained virtually ] with any large-scale infantry frontal assault Iran carried out.<ref name=Pelletiere>{{cite book|last=Pelletiere|first=Stephen|title=The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V_-MKu4k6QAC&q=Iran+did+not+use+human+wave+attacks&pg=PA40|isbn=978-0275938437|year=1992|publisher=Abc-Clio}}</ref> Large numbers of troops would be used, aimed at overwhelming the Iraqi lines (usually the weakest portion, typically manned by the ]), regardless of losses.<ref name=pollack04 />

According to the former Iraqi general ], the Iranian human wave charges consisted of armed "civilians" who carried most of their necessary equipment themselves into battle and often lacked ] and ].<ref name="Woods 2010">{{cite web|last=Woods|first=Kevin|title=Saddam's Generals: A Perspective of the Iran–Iraq War|url=http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/saddams-generals.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130403150153/http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/saddams-generals.pdf|archive-date=3 April 2013}}</ref> Operations were often carried out during the night and deception operations, infiltrations, and maneuvers became more common.<ref name=Abdoleinen-Ghazaleh /> The Iranians would also reinforce the infiltrating forces with new units to keep up their momentum. Once a weak point was found, the Iranians would concentrate all of their forces into that area in an attempt to break through with human wave attacks.<ref name="Woods 2010" />

The human wave attacks, while extremely bloody (tens of thousands of troops died in the process),<ref name="moin" /> when used in combination with infiltration and surprise, caused major Iraqi defeats. As the Iraqis would dig in their tanks and infantry into static, entrenched positions, the Iranians would manage to break through the lines and encircle entire divisions.<ref name=pollack04 /> Merely the fact that the Iranian forces used ] by their light infantry against static Iraqi defenses was often the decisive factor in battle.<ref name="Wilson 2007" /> However, lack of coordination between the Iranian Army and IRGC and shortages of heavy weaponry played a detrimental role, often with most of the infantry not being supported by artillery and armor.<ref name=pollack04 /><ref name="Wilson 2007" />

====Operation Eighth-Imam====

After the Iraqi offensive stalled in March 1981, there was little change in the front other than Iran retaking the high ground above ] in May. By late 1981, Iran returned to the offensive and launched ]&nbsp;(The Eighth Imam),<ref name=biontino88>{{cite book|title=Iran Yearbook|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VRoYAQAAMAAJ|page=125|publisher=Moini-Biontino|year=1988|isbn=978-3927073005|lccn=sn89044105}}</ref> ending the Iraqi ] on 27–29 September 1981.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|9}} The Iranians used a combined force of regular army artillery with small groups of armor, supported by Pasdaran (IRGC) and Basij infantry.<ref name="csis 5" /> On 15 October, after breaking the siege, a large Iranian convoy was ambushed by Iraqi tanks, and during the ensuing tank battle Iran lost 20 ] and other armored vehicles and withdrew from the previously gained territory.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241169.pdf|title=Tactical Evolution in the Iraqi Army: The Abadan Island And Fish Lake Campaigns of the Iran-Ipaq War|access-date=2014-08-18|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131203034017/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241169.pdf|archive-date=3 December 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Operation Tariq al-Quds====
On 29 November 1981, Iran began ] with three army brigades and seven Revolutionary Guard brigades. The Iraqis failed to properly patrol their occupied areas, and the Iranians constructed a {{convert|14|km|m mi|abbr=on}} road through the unguarded sand dunes, launching their attack from the Iraqi rear.<ref name=wilson07 /> The town of ] was retaken from Iraqi divisions by 7 December.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|10}} By this time the Iraqi Army was experiencing serious morale problems,<ref name=efraimkarsh /> compounded by the fact that Operation Tariq al-Quds marked the first use of Iranian "human wave" tactics, where the Revolutionary Guard ] repeatedly charged at Iraqi positions, oftentimes without the support of armour or air power.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The fall of Bostan exacerbated the Iraqis' logistical problems, forcing them to use a roundabout route from Ahvaz to the south to resupply their troops.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> 6,000 Iranians and over 2,000 Iraqis were killed in the operation.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

===1982: Iraqi retreat, Iranian offensive===

] aircraft during the war|right]]

The Iraqis, realising that the Iranians were planning to attack, decided to preempt them with Operation al-Fawz al-'Azim (Supreme Success)<ref name=firestone08>{{cite book|last=Firestone|first=Reuven|title=Who are the real chosen people?: The Meaning of Chosenness in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam|year=2008|publisher=SkyLight Paths Publishing|location=Woodstock, VT|isbn=978-1-59473-248-5|page=143|edition=2008 hardcover}}</ref> on 19 March. Using a large number of tanks, helicopters, and fighter jets, they attacked the Iranian buildup around the Roghabiyeh pass. Though Saddam and his generals assumed they had succeeded, in reality the Iranian forces remained fully intact.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> The Iranians had concentrated much of their forces by bringing them directly from the cities and towns throughout Iran via trains, buses, and private cars. The concentration of forces did not resemble a traditional military buildup, and although the Iraqis detected a population buildup near the front, they failed to realize that this was an attacking force.<ref name="Woods 2010" /> As a result, Saddam's army was unprepared for the Iranian offensives to come.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

====Operation Fath ol-Mobin====

Iran's next major offensive, led by then Colonel ], was ]. On 22 March 1982, Iran launched an attack which took the Iraqi forces by surprise: using ]s, they landed behind Iraqi lines, silenced their artillery, and captured an Iraqi headquarters.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

The Revolutionary Guard and regular army followed up by surrounding the Iraqi ] and ] and ] that had camped close to the Iranian town of ]. The Iraqis launched a counter-attack using their 12th Armoured division to break the encirclement and rescue the surrounded divisions. Iraqi tanks came under attack by 95 Iranian F-4 Phantom and F-5 Tiger fighter jets, destroying much of the division.<ref name="Farrokh Wall Street Journal">{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/31/idUS180865+31-May-2011+PRN20110531|agency=Reuters|title=Iran at war|date=31 May 2012|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140808231300/https://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/31/idUS180865%2B31-May-2011%2BPRN20110531|archive-date=8 August 2014}} cited in {{cite web|url=http://www.kavehfarrokh.com/books/iran-at-war-1500-1988/|title=Review: Wall Street Journal and Reuters|first=Kaveh|last=Farrokh|access-date=25 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180816123246/http://kavehfarrokh.com/books/iran-at-war-1500-1988/|archive-date=16 August 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

Operation Fath ol-Mobin was an Iranian victory; Iraqi forces were driven away from Shush, Dezful and Ahvaz. The Iranian armed forces destroyed 320–400 Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles in a costly success. In just the first day of the battle, the Iranians lost 196 tanks.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> By this time, most of the Khuzestan province had been recaptured.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

====Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas====

] tank wreckage in Khuzestan province, Iran]]

In preparation for ], the Iranians had launched numerous air raids against Iraq air bases, destroying 47 jets (including Iraq's brand new ] fighter jets from France); this gave the Iranians air superiority over the battlefield while allowing them to monitor Iraqi troop movements.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

On 29 April, Iran launched the offensive. 70,000 Revolutionary Guard and Basij members struck on several axes—Bostan, Susangerd, the west bank of the Karun River, and Ahvaz. The Basij launched human wave attacks, which were followed up by the regular army and Revolutionary Guard support along with tanks and helicopters.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Under heavy Iranian pressure, the Iraqi forces retreated. By 12 May, Iran had driven out all Iraqi forces from the Susangerd area.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|36}} The Iranians captured several thousand Iraqi troops and a large number of tanks.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

The Iraqis retreated to the Karun River, with only Khorramshahr and a few outlying areas remaining in their possession.<ref name=pollack04 /> Saddam ordered 70,000 troops to be placed around the city of Khorramshahr. The Iraqis created a hastily constructed defence line around the city and outlying areas.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> To discourage airborne commando landings, the Iraqis also placed metal spikes and destroyed cars in areas likely to be used as troop landing zones. Saddam Hussein even visited Khorramshahr in a dramatic gesture, swearing that the city would never be relinquished.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> However, Khorramshahr's only resupply point was across the Shatt al-Arab{{NoteTag|name=waterway}}, and the Iranian air force began bombing the supply bridges to the city, while their artillery zeroed in on the besieged garrison.

=====Second Battle of Khorramshahr=====
{{Main|Battle of Khorramshahr (1982)}}
]]]
In the early morning hours of 23 May 1982, the Iranians began the drive towards Khorramshahr across the ].<ref name=efraimkarsh /> This part of Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas was spearheaded by the 77th Khorasan division with tanks along with the Revolutionary Guard and Basij. The Iranians hit the Iraqis with destructive air strikes and massive artillery barrages, crossed the Karun River, captured ]s, and launched human wave attacks towards the city. Saddam's defensive barricade collapsed;<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> in less than 48 hours of fighting, the city fell and 19,000 Iraqis surrendered to the Iranians. A total of 10,000 Iraqis were killed or wounded in Khorramshahr, while the Iranians suffered 30,000 casualties.<ref>{{cite book|last=Keegan|first=John|title=The Iraq war|year=2004|publisher=Knopf|location=New York|isbn=978-1-4000-4199-2|author-link=John Keegan|url=https://archive.org/details/iraqwar00keeg}}</ref> During the whole of Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas, 33,000 Iraqi soldiers were captured by the Iranians.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

====State of Iraqi armed forces====
{{Multiple image
| align = left
| image1 =
| width1 = 200
| alt1 =
| caption1 = Iraqi ] pilots prior to a mission into Iran.
| image2 =
| width2 = 215
| alt2 =
| caption2 = Iranian pilots and a ] Freedom Fighter before a mission into Iraq.
| footer =
}}

The fighting had battered the Iraqi military: its strength fell from 210,000 to 150,000 troops; over 20,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed and over 30,000 captured; two out of four active armoured divisions and at least three mechanised divisions fell to less than a brigade's strength; and the Iranians had captured over 450 tanks and armoured personnel carriers.<ref name=cooper03_214>{{cite web|url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_214.shtml|author=Thomas Cooper and Farzad Bishop|title=Fire in the Hills: Iranian and Iraqi Battles of Autumn 1982|date=9 September 2003|work=Arabian Peninsula & Persian Gulf Database|publisher=Air Combat Information Group|access-date=17 September 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140822073723/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_214.shtml|archive-date=22 August 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref>

The Iraqi Air Force was also left in poor shape: after losing up to 55 aircraft since early December 1981, they had only 100 intact ]s and ]. A defector who flew his ] to ] in June 1982 revealed that the Iraqi Air Force had only three squadrons of fighter-bombers capable of mounting operations into Iran. The Iraqi Army Air Corps was in slightly better shape, and could still operate more than 70 helicopters.<ref name="cooper03_214" /> Despite this, the Iraqis still held 3,000 tanks, while Iran held 1,000.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

At this point, Saddam believed that his army was too demoralised and damaged to hold onto Khuzestan and major swathes of Iranian territory, and withdrew his remaining forces, redeploying them in defence along the border.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> However, his troops continued to occupy some key Iranian border areas of Iran, including the disputed territories that prompted his invasion, notably the Shatt al-Arab waterway.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=Viewpoints>{{cite web|title=Viewpoints of the Iranian political and military elites|url=http://en.merc.ir/default.aspx?tabid=98&ArticleId=272|access-date=10 June 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303213700/http://en.merc.ir/default.aspx?tabid=98&ArticleId=272|archive-date=3 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> In response to their failures against the Iranians in Khorramshahr, Saddam ordered the executions of Generals ] and Salah al-Qadhi and Colonels Masa and al-Jalil.<ref name="Woods 2010" /> At least a dozen other high-ranking officers were also executed during this time.<ref name="csis 5" /> This became an increasingly common punishment for those who failed him in battle.<ref name="Woods 2010" />

===Early international response===

In April 1982, the rival ] regime in ], one of the few nations that supported Iran, closed the ] that had allowed Iraqi oil to reach tankers on the Mediterranean, reducing the Iraqi budget by $5&nbsp;billion per month.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Journalist Patrick Brogan wrote, "It appeared for a while that Iraq would be strangled economically before it was defeated militarily."<ref name=brogan89>{{cite book|last=Brogan|first=Patrick|title=World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife Since 1945|year=1989|publisher=Bloomsbury|location=London|isbn=0-7475-0260-9}}</ref>{{rp|260|date=November 2012}} Syria's closure of the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline left Iraq with the pipeline to ] as the only means of exporting oil, along with transporting oil by tanker truck to the ] in Jordan.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1983–1984: A war of attrition|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=252–253 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>

The Turkish pipeline had a capacity of only {{convert|500000|oilbbl/d|m3/d}}, which was insufficient to pay for the war.<ref name=bulloch89>{{cite book|last1=Bulloch|first1=John|last2=Morris|first2=Harvey|title=The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences|year=1989|publisher=Methuen|location=London|isbn=978-0-413-61370-7|edition=1st published|url=https://archive.org/details/gulfwaritsorigin00bull}}</ref>{{rp|160|date=November 2012}} Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf states saved Iraq from bankruptcy<ref name=efraimkarsh /> by providing it with $37–60&nbsp;billion in loans.<ref name=brogan89 /><ref name="ISGfunding" /><ref>{{Citation|title=The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)|date=2019|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/threats-and-alliances-in-the-middle-east/iraniraq-war-19801988/1855A877B8E863D2DD733A09F7A9EBA2|work=Threats and Alliances in the Middle East: Saudi and Syrian Policies in a Turbulent Region|pages=54–91|editor-last=Darwich|editor-first=May|access-date=2023-11-14|place=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/9781108656689.004|isbn=978-1-108-49362-8}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=The Gulf War, 1991|url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/gulf-war|access-date=14 November 2023|archive-date=8 November 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161108074144/https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/gulf-war|url-status=live}}</ref>{{rp|263|date=November 2012}}{{clarify|date=October 2012|reason=Each or total?}} Though Iraq had previously been hostile towards other Gulf states, "the threat of Persian fundamentalism was far more feared."<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|162–163|date=November 2012}}<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|263|date=November 2012}} They were especially inclined to fear Iranian victory after Ayatollah Khomeini declared monarchies to be illegitimate and an un-Islamic form of government.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Khomeini's statement was widely received as a call to overthrow the Gulf monarchies.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Journalists John Bulloch and Harvey Morris wrote:

<blockquote>The virulent Iranian campaign, which at its peak seemed to be making the overthrow of the Saudi regime a war aim on a par with the defeat of Iraq, did have an effect on the Kingdom , but not the one the Iranians wanted: instead of becoming more conciliatory, the Saudis became tougher, more self-confident, and less prone to seek compromise.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|163|date=November 2012}}</blockquote>

Saudi Arabia was said to provide Iraq with $1&nbsp;billion per month starting in mid-1982.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|160|date=November 2012}}

Iraq began receiving support from the United States and west European countries as well. Saddam was given diplomatic, monetary, and military support by the United States, including massive loans, political influence, and intelligence on Iranian deployments gathered by American spy satellites.<ref name="iranchamber-armingiraq" /> The Iraqis relied heavily on American satellite footage and radar planes to detect Iranian troop movements, and they enabled Iraq to move troops to the site before the battle.<ref name=williams02>{{cite thesis|url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA405987.pdf|last=Williams|first=Scott|publisher=Naval Postgraduate School|location=Monterey, CA|date=June 2002|title=The Battle of al-Khafji|degree=Master's|access-date=21 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130413142907/http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA405987|archive-date=13 April 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

With Iranian success on the battlefield, the United States increased its support of the Iraqi government, supplying intelligence, economic aid, and ] equipment and vehicles, as well as normalizing its intergovernmental relations (which had been broken during the 1967 ]).<ref name=iranchamber-armingiraq /> In March 1982, president ] signed National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 4-82—seeking "a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East"—and in June Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) co-written by NSC official ], which determined: "The United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran",<ref name="Yaphe">{{cite book|last=Yaphe|first=Judith|title=The Iran–Iraq War: New International Perspectives|chapter=Changing American Perspectives on the Iran–Iraq war|publisher=]|year=2013|isbn=9780415685245}}</ref><ref name="nsarchiv">Battle, Joyce. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120204034420/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/index.htm |date=2012-02-04 }}, ''National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82''. George Washington University National Security Archive, 25 February 2003.</ref> and that the United States "would do whatever was necessary to prevent Iraq from losing".<ref>{{cite journal|title=Declaration of Howard Teicher|journal=Case No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH|publisher=United States District Court: Southern District Florida|date=31 January 1995|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq61.pdf|access-date=4 April 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120526041432/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq61.pdf|archive-date=26 May 2012|url-status=live}} {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130423034232/http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1413.htm |date=23 April 2013 }}</ref>

In 1982, Reagan removed Iraq from the list of countries "supporting terrorism" and sold weapons such as ]s to Iraq via Jordan.<ref name="iranchamber-armingiraq" /> France sold Iraq millions of dollars worth of weapons, including ], Mirage F-1 fighters, and ] missiles. Both the United States and ] sold Iraq dual-use pesticides and poisons that would be used to create ]s.<ref name="iranchamber-armingiraq" />

Iran did not have the money to purchase arms to the same extent as Iraq did. They counted on China, ], ], ], and Japan for supplying anything from weapons and munitions to logistical and engineering equipment.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php|title=Importer/Exporter TIV Tables|website=armstrade.sipri.org|access-date=13 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151125105813/http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php|archive-date=25 November 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref>

====Ceasefire proposal====

On 20 June 1982, Saddam announced that he wanted to ] and proposed an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal from Iranian territory within two weeks.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181116212956/https://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/10/world/iraq-vows-to-quit-iran-fight-israel.html |date=16 November 2018 }} AP 10 June 1982</ref> Khomeini responded by saying the war would not end until a new government was installed in Iraq and reparations paid.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171023202305/http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/22/world/iran-says-iraqis-withdrawal-won-t-end-war.html |date=23 October 2017 }} New York Times 22 June 1982</ref> He proclaimed that Iran would invade Iraq and would not stop until the Ba'ath regime was replaced by an ].<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=Viewpoints /> Iran supported a ] for Iraq, the ], led by exiled Iraqi cleric ], which was dedicated to overthrowing the Ba'ath party. They recruited POWs, dissidents, exiles, and Shias to join the ], the military wing of the organisation.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

The decision to invade Iraq was taken after much debate within the Iranian government.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> One faction, comprising Prime Minister ], Foreign Minister ], President ],<ref name="mearsheimer02">{{cite web|last1=Mearsheimer|first1=John J.|last2=Walt|first2=Stephen M.|date=12 November 2002|title=Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes|url=http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3114/can_saddam_be_contained_history_says_yes.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080118033437/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3114/can_saddam_be_contained_history_says_yes.html|archive-date=18 January 2008|work=International Security|publisher=Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs}}</ref> Army Chief of Staff General Ali Sayad Shirazi as well as Major General Qasem-Ali Zahirnejad, wanted to accept the ceasefire, as most of Iranian soil had been recaptured.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> In particular, General Shirazi and Zahirnejad were both opposed to the invasion of Iraq on logistical grounds, and stated they would consider resigning if "unqualified people continued to meddle with the conduct of the war".<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|38}} Of the opposing view was a hardline faction led by the clerics on the ], whose leader was the politically powerful speaker of the '']'', ].<ref name=efraimkarsh />

Iran also hoped that its attacks would ignite a revolt against Saddam's rule by the Shia and Kurdish population of Iraq, possibly resulting in his downfall. It was successful in doing so with the Kurdish population, but not the Shia.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Iran had captured large quantities of Iraqi equipment, enough to create several tank battalions, Iran once again had 1,000 tanks, and also managed to clandestinely procure spare parts as well, including those pertaining to the F-14 Tomcat.<ref name=pollack04 /><ref>{{Citation|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-07-16-mn-6838-story.html|title=Navy Theft Ring Linked to Iran Undetected for Years|work=Los Angeles Times|date=1985-07-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221223012608/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-07-16-mn-6838-story.html|archive-date=2022-12-23}}</ref>

At a cabinet meeting in Baghdad, ] Riyadh Ibrahim Hussein suggested that Saddam could step down temporarily as a way of easing Iran towards a ceasefire, and then afterwards would come back to power.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|147|date=November 2012}} Saddam, annoyed, asked if anyone else in the Cabinet agreed with the Health Minister's idea. When no one raised their hand in support, he escorted Riyadh Hussein to the next room, closed the door, and shot him with his pistol.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|147|date=November 2012}}

===Iran invades Iraq and Iraqi tactics in response===

] ibn Abi Ṭālib, ] and ] are buried. Iraq has undoubtedly been an honorable country. All refugees are precious. Anyone who wants to live in exile can choose Iraq freely. We, the Sons of Iraq, have been ambushing foreign aggressors. The enemies who plan to assault Iraq will be disfavoured by God in this world and the hereafter. Be careful of attacking Iraq and Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib! If you surrender, you might be in peace."]]

For the most part, Iraq remained on the defensive for the next five years, unable and unwilling to launch any major offensives, while Iran launched more than 70 offensives. Iraq's strategy changed from holding territory in Iran to denying Iran any major gains in Iraq, as well as holding onto disputed territories along the border.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar /> Saddam began a policy of ], gearing most of his country towards defending against Iran. By 1988, Iraq was spending 40–75% of its GDP on military equipment.<ref name=cordesman99-praeger>{{cite book|last=Cordesman|first=Anthony H.|title=Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction|year=1999|publisher=Praeger|location=Westport, Connecticut|isbn=0-275-96528-7|edition=1st published|url=https://archive.org/details/iraqwarofsanctio00cord}}</ref> Saddam had also more than doubled the size of the Iraqi army, from 200,000 soldiers (12 divisions and three independent brigades) to 500,000 (23 divisions and nine brigades).<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Iraq also began launching air raids against Iranian border cities, greatly increasing the practice by 1984.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />{{rp|2|date=November 2012}}

By the end of 1982, Iraq had been resupplied with new Soviet and Chinese ], and the ground war entered a new phase. Iraq used newly acquired T-55, T-62 and T-72 tanks, as well as Chinese copies, ] truck-mounted rocket launchers, and ] helicopter gunships to prepare a Soviet-type three-line defence, replete with obstacles such as barbed wire, minefields, fortified positions and bunkers. The Combat Engineer Corps built bridges across water obstacles, laid minefields, erected earthen revetments, dug trenches, built machine gun nests, and prepared new defence lines and fortifications.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />{{rp|2|date=November 2012}}

Iraq began to focus on using ] to defeat the Iranians.<ref name=pollack04 /> Iraq created multiple static defense lines to bleed the Iranians through sheer size.<ref name=pollack04 /> When faced against large Iranian attack, where human waves would overrun Iraq's forward entrenched infantry defences, the Iraqis would often retreat, but their ] would bleed the Iranians and channel them into certain directions, drawing them into traps or pockets. Iraqi air and artillery attacks would then pin the Iranians down, while tanks and mechanised infantry attacks using mobile warfare would push them back.<ref name=williams02 />

Sometimes, the Iraqis would launch "probing attacks" into the Iranian lines to provoke them into launching their attacks sooner. While Iranian human wave attacks were successful against the dug-in Iraqi forces in Khuzestan, they had trouble breaking through Iraq's defense in depth lines.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Iraq had a logistical advantage in their defence: the front was located near the main Iraqi bases and arms depots, allowing their army to be efficiently supplied.<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|260, 265|date=November 2012}} By contrast, the front in Iran was a considerable distance away from the main Iranian bases and arms depots, and as such, Iranian troops and supplies had to travel through mountain ranges before arriving at the front.<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|260|date=November 2012}}

Iran's military power was weakened once again by large purges in 1982, resulting from another supposedly attempted coup.<ref name="Dunn 1998" />

====Operation Ramadan (First Battle of Basra)====

The Iranian generals wanted to launch an all-out attack on Baghdad and seize it while the Iranian army's supplies allowed for such an offensive. This was rejected as being impracticable<ref name=Viewpoints /> and the decision was made to capture one area of Iraq after the other, with the hope that this would force Iraq to withdraw from disputed border territories and begin negotiations to end the war.<ref name=Viewpoints />

On 13 July 1982, Iran began their attack in southern Iraq, near Basra.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Called ], it involved over 180,000 troops from both sides, and was one of the largest land battles since ].<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />{{rp|3|date=November 2012}} Iranian strategy dictated that they launch their primary attack on the weakest point of the Iraqi lines. However, the Iraqis were informed of Iran's battle plans and moved all of their forces to the area the Iranians planned to attack.<ref name="cooper03_214" /> The Iraqis were equipped with ] to use against the enemy, which was the first major use of chemical warfare during the conflict, throwing an entire attacking division into chaos.<ref name="Dunn 1998" />

]

Over 100,000 Revolutionary Guards and Basij volunteer forces charged towards the Iraqi lines.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The Iraqi troops had entrenched themselves in formidable defenses, and had set up a network of bunkers and artillery positions.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The Basij used human waves, and were even used to bodily clear the Iraqi minefields and allow the Revolutionary Guards to advance.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Combatants came so close to one another that Iranians were able to board Iraqi tanks and throw grenades inside the hulls. By the eighth day, the Iranians had gained {{convert|16|km|mi|abbr=on}} inside Iraq and had taken several causeways. Iran's Revolutionary Guards also used the T-55 tanks they had captured in earlier battles.<ref name=pollack04 />

The attacks came to a halt and the Iranians turned to defensive measures. Seeing this, Iraq used their ] helicopters, along with ]s armed with ], against columns of Iranian mechanised infantry and tanks. These "hunter-killer" teams of helicopters, which had been formed with the help of ] advisors, proved very costly for the Iranians. Aerial dogfights occurred between Iraqi MiGs and Iranian F-4 Phantoms.<ref name="Dunn 1998">{{cite web|last=Dunn|first=Brian|title=The First Gulf War|url=http://thedignifiedrant.blogspot.com/2009/06/first-gulf-war-iran-and-iraq-at-war-in.html|date=3 June 2009|access-date=23 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181116024632/http://thedignifiedrant.blogspot.com/2009/06/first-gulf-war-iran-and-iraq-at-war-in.html|archive-date=16 November 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

On 16 July, Iran tried again further north and managed to push the Iraqis back. Only {{convert|13|km|mi|abbr=on}} from Basra, the poorly equipped Iranian forces were surrounded on three sides by Iraqis with heavy weaponry. Some were captured, while many were killed. Only a last-minute attack by Iranian AH-1 Cobra helicopters stopped the Iraqis from ]ing the Iranians.<ref name="cooper03_214" /> Three more similar attacks occurred around the Khorramshahr-Baghdad road area towards the end of the month, but none were significantly successful.<ref name=pollack04 />

Iraq had concentrated three armoured divisions, the 3rd, 9th, and 10th, as a counter-attack force to attack any penetrations. They were successful in defeating the Iranian breakthroughs, but suffered heavy losses. The 9th Armoured Division in particular had to be disbanded, and was never reformed. The total casualty toll had grown to include 80,000 soldiers and civilians. 400 Iranian tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed or abandoned, while Iraq lost at least 370 tanks.<ref>O'Ballance, E. (1988). ''The Gulf War''. Brassey's. p. 95 {{ISBN?}}</ref><ref>Zabih, S. (1988). ''The Iranian Military in Revolution and War''. New York: Routledge. p. 181 {{ISBN?}}</ref>

====Final operations of 1982====

After Iran's failure in Operation Ramadan, they carried out only a few smaller attacks. Iran launched two limited offensives aimed at reclaiming the Sumar Hills and isolating the Iraqi pocket at ] at the international border, both of which were part of the disputed territories still under Iraqi occupation. They then aimed to capture the Iraqi border town of ].<ref name=cooper03_214 /> They planned to take the Iraqis by surprise using Basij militiamen, army helicopters, and some armoured forces, then stretch their defences and possibly break through them to open a road to Baghdad for future exploitation.<ref name=cooper03_214 />

During ] (1–7 October),{{NoteTag|'']'' referring to the Muslim figure.}} Iran recovered {{convert|150|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of disputed territory straddling the international border and reached the outskirts of Mandali before being stopped by Iraqi helicopter and armoured attacks.<ref name=Abdoleinen-Ghazaleh /><ref name=cooper03_214 /> During ] (1–21 November),{{NoteTag|'']'' referring to the first month of the ], during which the operation took place.<ref name="naficy12">{{cite book|title=A Social History of Iranian Cinema The Globalizing Era, 1984–2010|year=2012|publisher=Duke University Press|isbn=978-0-8223-4878-8|page=11|first=Hamid|last=Naficy}}</ref>}} the Iranians captured part of the ] with the help of their fighter jets and helicopters, destroying 105 Iraqi tanks, 70 ], and 7 planes with few losses. They nearly breached the Iraqi lines but failed to capture Mandali after the Iraqis sent reinforcements, including brand new ] tanks, which possessed armour that could not be pierced from the front by Iranian ]s.<ref name=cooper03_214 /> The Iranian advance was also impeded by heavy rains. 3,500 Iraqis and an unknown number of Iranians died, with only minor gains for Iran.<ref name=cooper03_214 />

===1983–84: Stalemate and war of attrition===

]

After the failure of the 1982 summer offensives, Iran believed that a major effort along the entire breadth of the front would yield victory. In 1983, the Iranians launched five major assaults along the front. None achieved substantial success, as the Iranians staged more massive "human wave" attacks.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> By this time, it was estimated that no more than 70 Iranian fighter aircraft were still operational at any given time. Iran had its own helicopter repair facilities, left over from before the revolution, and often used helicopters for close air support.<ref name=cooper03_214 /><ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

Iranian fighter pilots had superior training compared to their Iraqi counterparts, as most had received training from US officers before the ],<ref>{{cite book|title=The Role of Airpower in the Iran–Iraq War|last=Bergquist|first=Ronald E.|publisher=Air University Press|year=1988|isbn=978-1-234-87718-7|location=Alabama|page=56}}</ref> and continued to dominate in combat.<ref>{{cite book|last=Razoux|first=Pierre|title=The Iran–Iraq War|year=2015|publisher=The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, MA|isbn=978-0-674-08863-4|pages=568–572}}</ref> However, aircraft shortages, the size of defended territory/airspace, and American intelligence supplied to Iraq allowed the Iraqis to exploit gaps in Iranian airspace. Iraqi air campaigns met little opposition, striking over half of Iran, as the Iraqis were able to gain air superiority towards the end of the war.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1988-06-01/iran-iraq-war-military-analysis|title=The Iran–Iraq War: A Military Analysis|journal=Foreign Affairs|date=28 January 2009|access-date=16 March 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181128193219/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1988-06-01/iran-iraq-war-military-analysis|archive-date=28 November 2018|url-status=live|last1=Segal|first1=David|volume=66|issue=Summer 1988}}</ref>

====Operation Before the Dawn====
In ], launched 6 February 1983, the Iranians shifted focus from the southern to the central and northern sectors. Employing 200,000 "last reserve" Revolutionary Guard troops, Iran attacked along a {{convert|40|km|mi|abbr=on}} stretch near ], about {{convert|200|km|mi|abbr=on}} southeast of Baghdad, in an attempt to reach the highways connecting northern and southern Iraq. The attack was stalled by {{convert|60|km|mi|abbr=on}} of hilly escarpments, forests, and river torrents blanketing the way to al-Amarah, but the Iraqis could not force the Iranians back. Iran directed artillery on Basra, Al Amarah, and ].<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

The Iranians suffered a large number of casualties clearing minefields and breaching Iraqi ]s, which Iraqi engineers were unable to replace. After this battle, Iran reduced its use of human wave attacks, though they still remained a key tactic as the war went on.<ref name=aboulenein12_dawn3 />

Further Iranian attacks were mounted in the Mandali–Baghdad north-central sector in April 1983, but were repelled by Iraqi mechanised and infantry divisions. Casualties were high, and by the end of 1983, an estimated 120,000 Iranians and 60,000 Iraqis had been killed. Iran held the advantage in the ]. In 1983, Iran had an estimated population of 43.6 million to Iraq's 14.8 million, and the discrepancy continued to grow throughout the war.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar /><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/iraq-population|title=Iraq Population 2021 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs)|access-date=14 September 2021|archive-date=13 April 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240413191251/https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/iraq-population|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/iran-population|title=Iran Population 2021 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs)|access-date=14 September 2021|archive-date=27 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210927151151/https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/iran-population|url-status=live}}</ref>{{rp|2|date=November 2012}}

====Dawn Operations====
From early 1983–1984, Iran launched a series of four ''Valfajr'' (Dawn) Operations, that eventually numbered to 10. During ], in early February 1983, 50,000 Iranian forces attacked westward from Dezful and were confronted by 55,000 Iraqi forces. The Iranian objective was to cut off the road from Basra to Baghdad in the central sector. The Iraqis carried out 150 air sorties against the Iranians, and even bombed Dezful, Ahvaz, and Khorramshahr in retribution. The Iraqi counterattack was broken up by Iran's 92nd Armoured Division.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

] in 1983 near ], Iraq]]

During ], the Iranians directed insurgency operations by ] in April 1983 by supporting the Kurds in the north. With Kurdish support, the Iranians attacked on 23 July 1983, capturing the Iraqi town of Haj Omran and maintaining it against an Iraqi poison gas counteroffensive.{{citation needed|date=June 2020}} This operation incited Iraq to later conduct indiscriminate chemical attacks against the Kurds.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" /> The Iranians attempted to further exploit activities in the north on 30 July 1983, during ]. Iran saw an opportunity to sweep away Iraqi forces controlling the roads between the Iranian mountain border towns of Mehran, ] and ]. Iraq launched airstrikes, and equipped attack helicopters with chemical ]s. While ineffective, it demonstrated both the Iraqi general staff's and Saddam's increasing interest in using chemical weapons. In the end, 17,000 had been killed on both sides,{{clarify|date=November 2012|reason=Total or on each side?}} with no gain for either country.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

The focus of ] in September 1983 was the northern sector in Iranian Kurdistan. Three Iranian regular divisions, the Revolutionary Guard, and ] (KDP) elements amassed in ] and ] in a move to threaten the major Iraqi city ]. Iran's strategy was to press Kurdish tribes to occupy the Banjuin Valley, which was within {{convert|45|km|mi|abbr=on}} of Suleimaniyah and {{convert|140|km|mi|abbr=on}} from the oilfields of ]. To stem the tide, Iraq deployed ] attack helicopters equipped with chemical weapons and executed 120 sorties against the Iranian force, which stopped them {{convert|15|km|mi|abbr=on}} into Iraqi territory.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

5,000 Iranians and 2,500 Iraqis died.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" /> Iran gained {{convert|110|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of its territory back in the north, gained {{convert|15|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of Iraqi land, and captured 1,800 Iraqi prisoners while Iraq abandoned large quantities of valuable weapons and war ] in the field. Iraq responded to these losses by firing a series of SCUD-B missiles into the cities of Dezful, ], and ]. Iran's use of artillery against Basra while the battles in the north raged created multiple fronts, which effectively confused and wore down Iraq.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

====Iran's change in tactics====
Previously, the Iranians had outnumbered the Iraqis on the battlefield, but Iraq expanded their ], pursuing a policy of total war, and by 1984, the armies were equal in size. By 1986, Iraq had twice as many soldiers as Iran. By 1988, Iraq had 1&nbsp;million soldiers, giving it the fourth largest army in the world. Some of its equipment, such as tanks, outnumbered Iran's by at least five to one. Iranian commanders, however, remained more tactically skilled.<ref name=pollack04 />

After the Dawn Operations, Iran attempted to change tactics. In the face of increasing Iraqi defense in depth, as well as increased ]s and manpower, Iran could no longer rely on simple human wave attacks.<ref name=wilson07>{{cite magazine|url=http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/PF-Iran-Iraq.pdf|title=The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting During the Iran–Iraq War: When Dismounted Light Infantry Made the Difference|last=Wilson|first=Ben|date=July–August 2007|publisher=U.S. Army: Foreign Military Studies Office|magazine=Infantry|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029201227/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/PF-Iran-Iraq.pdf|archive-date=29 October 2013}}</ref> Iranian offensives became more complex and involved extensive maneuver warfare using primarily light infantry. Iran launched frequent, and sometimes smaller offensives to slowly gain ground and deplete the Iraqis through attrition.<ref name="Wilson 2007" /> They wanted to drive Iraq into economic failure by wasting money on weapons and war mobilization, and to deplete their smaller population by bleeding them dry, in addition to creating an anti-government ]. They were successful in Kurdistan, but not southern Iraq.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name="Wilson 2007" /><ref name="Dunn 1998" />

Iran supported their attacks with heavy weaponry when possible and with better planning, although the brunt of the battles still fell to the infantry. The Army and Revolutionary Guards worked together better as their tactics improved.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Human wave attacks became less frequent, although were still used.<ref name="Woods 2010" /> To negate the Iraqi advantage of defense in depth, static positions, and heavy firepower, Iran began to focus on fighting in areas where the Iraqis could not use their heavy weaponry, such as marshes, valleys, and mountains, and frequently using infiltration tactics.<ref name="Woods 2010" />

Iran began training troops in infiltration, patrolling, night-fighting, marsh warfare, and mountain warfare.<ref name=wilson07 /> They began training thousands of Revolutionary Guard ] in ],<ref name=csis8>{{cite book|chapter-url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap08.pdf|publisher=]|title=The Lessons of Modern War&nbsp;– Volume II: Iran–Iraq War|chapter=Phase Five: New Iranian Efforts at "Final Offensives", 1986–1887|access-date=21 September 2012|archive-date=7 June 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130607125439/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap08.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> as southern Iraq is marshy and filled with wetlands. Iran used ] to cross the marshes and rivers in southern Iraq and landed troops on the opposing banks, where they would dig and set up ]s across the rivers and wetlands to allow heavy troops and supplies to cross. Iran also learned to integrate foreign guerrilla units as part of their military operations.<ref name=wilson07 /> On the northern front, Iran began working heavily with the Peshmerga, Kurdish guerrillas.<ref name=wilson07 /> Iranian military advisors organised the Kurds into raiding parties of 12 guerrillas, which would attack Iraqi command posts, troop formations, infrastructure, including roads and supply lines, and government buildings.<ref name=wilson07 /> The oil refineries of Kirkuk became a favourite target, and were often hit by homemade Peshmerga rockets.<ref name=wilson07 />

====Battle of the Marshes====
{{Main|Battle of the Marshes|Operation Dawn 5|Operation Dawn 6|Operation Kheibar}}

]

By 1984, the Iranian ground forces were reorganised well enough for the Revolutionary Guard to start ],<ref name=aboulenein12_dawn3 /><ref name=cooper03_205 /> which lasted from 24 February to 19 March.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|171|date=November 2012}} On 15 February 1984, the Iranians began launching attacks against the central section of the front, where the Second Iraqi Army Corps was deployed: 250,000 Iraqis faced 250,000 Iranians.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The goal of this new major offensive was the capture of Basra-Baghdad Highway, cutting off Basra from Baghdad and setting the stage for an eventual attack upon the city.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> The Iraqi high command had assumed that the ] above Basra were natural barriers to attack, and had not reinforced them. The marshes negated Iraqi advantage in armor, and absorbed artillery rounds and bombs.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Prior to the attack, Iranian ] on helicopters had landed behind Iraqi lines and destroyed Iraqi artillery. Iran launched two preliminary attacks prior to the main offensive, ] and ].<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

] began on 24 February with Iranian infantrymen crossing the ] using motorboats and transport helicopters in an ].<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> The Iranians attacked the vital oil-producing ] by landing troops via helicopters onto the islands and severing the communication lines between Amareh and Basra.<ref name=cooper03_205>{{cite web|url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_205.shtml|author=Thomas Coper and Farzad Bishop|title=Persian Gulf War, 1980–1988: The Mother of All Build-Ups|date=9 September 2003|work=Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf Database|publisher=Air Combat Information Group|access-date=9 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131115022800/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_205.shtml|archive-date=15 November 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> They then continued the attack towards ].<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> By 27 February, they had captured the island, but suffered catastrophic helicopter losses to the ]. On that day, a massive array of Iranian helicopters transporting Pasdaran troops were intercepted by Iraqi combat aircraft (], Mirages and Sukhois). In what was essentially an aerial slaughter, Iraqi jets shot down 49 of the 50 Iranian helicopters.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> At times, fighting took place in waters over {{convert|2|m|ft|abbr=on}} deep. Iraq ran live ] through the water, electrocuting numerous Iranian troops and then displaying their corpses on state television.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

By 29 February, the Iranians had reached the outskirts of Qurna and were closing in on the ].<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> They had broken out of the marshes and returned to open terrain, where they were confronted by Iraqi artillery, tanks, air power, and ]. 1,200 Iranian soldiers were killed in the counter-attack. The Iranians retreated back to the marshes, though they still held onto them along with Majnoon Island.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|44}}

]
The Battle of the Marshes saw an Iraqi defence that had been under continuous strain since 15 February. They were relieved by their use of chemical weapons and ], where they layered defensive lines: even if the Iranians broke through the first line, they were usually unable to break through the second due to exhaustion and heavy losses.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|171|date=November 2012}} They largely relied on ] Hind to "hunt" the Iranian troops in the marshes.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> At least 20,000 Iranians were killed in the marsh battles.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" /> Iran used the marshes as a springboard for future attacks/infiltrations.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

Four years into the war, the human cost to Iran had been 170,000 combat fatalities and 340,000 wounded. Iraqi combat fatalities were estimated at 80,000 with 150,000 wounded.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

{{anchor|1984: 'Tanker War' in Persian Gulf|Persian Gulf tanker war}}

===''Tanker war'' and the ''war of the cities''===

Unable to launch successful ground attacks against Iran, Iraq used their now expanded air force to carry out ] against Iranian shipping, economic targets, and cities in order to damage Iran's economy and morale.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name="Cordesman VII" /> Iraq also wanted to provoke Iran into doing something that would cause the ]s to be directly involved in the conflict on the Iraqi side.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />


====Attacks on shipping==== ====Attacks on shipping====
{{Main|Tanker war}}
], a British ] ], estimated that the Tanker War damaged 546 commercial vessels and killed about 430 civilian mariners. The largest portion of the attacks were directed by Iran against Kuwaiti vessels, and on 1 November 1986, Kuwait formally petitioned foreign powers to protect its shipping. The ] agreed to charter tankers starting in 1987, and the United States offered to provide protection for tankers ] on 7 March 1987 (] and ]).<ref name="Kelley2007" /> Under ], an attack on such ships would be treated as an attack on the United States, allowing the U.S. Navy to retaliate. This support would protect neutral ships headed to Iraqi ports, effectively guaranteeing Iraq's revenue stream for the duration of the war.{{Fact|date=April 2008}}
{{Further|Operation Earnest Will|Operation Prime Chance}}


]: Tanker convoy No. 12 under ] escort (21 October 1987)]]
====Iraqi attack on US warship====
On 17 May 1987, an Iraqi plane attacked the ], a ] ], killing 37 and injuring 21.<ref name="ROE">{{citation
| journal = Military Law Review
| volume = 143
| date = Winter 1994
| title = Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering
| first = Mark S. | last = Martins
| pages = 43–46
| url = http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Military_Law_Review/pdf-files/27687D~1.pdf
|format=PDF}}</ref><ref name="NoHigher61">{{citation
| title = No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf
| pages = 61–63
| first = Bradley | last = Peniston
| publisher = Naval Institute Press
| isbn = 1591146615.
| url = http://www.navybook.com/nohigherhonor/pic-stark.shtml
| unused_data = |Persian Gulf
| year = 2006
| title = No higher honor : saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf}}</ref>


The so-called ''tanker war'' started when Iraq attacked the oil terminal and oil tankers at ] in early 1984.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Iraq's aim in attacking Iranian shipping was to provoke the Iranians to retaliate with extreme measures, such as closing the ] to all maritime traffic, thereby bringing American intervention; the United States had threatened several times to intervene if the Strait of Hormuz were closed.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> As a result, the Iranians limited their retaliatory attacks to Iraqi shipping, leaving the strait open to general passage.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
====US military actions toward Iran====
However, U.S. attention was focused on isolating Iran as well as ], criticizing Iran's mining of international waters, and sponsored ], which passed unanimously on 20 July, under which it skirmished with Iranian forces. During the ] in October 1987, the U.S. attacked Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for an Iranian attack on the U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tanker ].<ref name="Kelley2007">{{citation
| title = Better Lucky than Good: Operation Earnest Will as Gunboat Diplomacy
| first = Stephen Andrew | last = Kelley
| date = June 2007
| volume = Master's Thesis
| publisher = U.S. Naval Postgraduate School
}}</ref>


Iraq declared that all ships going to or from Iranian ports in the northern zone of the Persian Gulf were subject to attack.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> They used F-1 Mirage, Super Etendard, Mig-23, Su-20/22, and Super Frelon helicopters armed with ] anti-ship missiles as well as Soviet-made air-to-surface missiles to enforce their threats. Iraq repeatedly bombed Iran's main oil export facility on Kharg Island, causing increasingly heavy damage. As a first response to these attacks, Iran attacked a Kuwaiti tanker carrying Iraqi oil near ] on 13 May 1984, as well as a Saudi tanker in Saudi waters on 16 May.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
On 14 April 1988, the frigate ] was badly damaged by an Iranian mine, suffering 10 wounded but no dead. U.S. forces responded with ] on 18 April, the ]'s largest engagement of surface warships since ]. Two Iranian oil platforms, two Iranian ships and six Iranian gunboats were destroyed. An American helicopter also crashed.<ref name="Kelley2007" />

Because Iraq had become landlocked during the course of the war, they had to rely on their Arab allies, primarily Kuwait, to transport their oil. Iran attacked tankers carrying Iraqi oil from Kuwait, later attacking tankers from any Persian Gulf state supporting Iraq. Attacks on ships of noncombatant nations in the Persian Gulf sharply increased thereafter, with both nations attacking oil tankers and merchant ships of neutral nations in an effort to deprive their opponent of trade.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The Iranian attacks against Saudi shipping led to Saudi F-15s shooting down a pair of F-4 Phantom II fighters on ].<ref name=efraimkarsh />

The air and small-boat attacks did little damage to Persian Gulf state economies, and Iran moved its shipping port to ] in the Strait of Hormuz.<ref name="Dugdale2002">{{cite web|first=T.D.P.|last=Dugdale-Pointon|date=27 October 2002|title=Tanker War 1984–1988|url=http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_tanker.html|access-date=17 January 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100124124829/http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_tanker.html|archive-date=24 January 2010|url-status=live}}</ref>

The Iranian Navy imposed a naval blockade of Iraq, using its British-built ]s to stop and inspect any ships thought to be trading with Iraq. They operated with virtual impunity, as Iraqi pilots had little training in hitting naval targets. Some Iranian warships attacked tankers with ship-to-ship missiles, while others used their radars to guide land-based ]s to their targets.<ref>{{cite video|title=Wars in Peace: Iran–Iraq War|medium=film documentary|year=1995|series=Wars in Peace|url=https://archive.org/details/warsinpeace-iraniraqwar|access-date=14 November 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160401031702/https://archive.org/details/warsinpeace-iraniraqwar|archive-date=1 April 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Iran began to rely on its new ], which used ] speedboats fitted with rocket launchers and heavy machine guns. These speedboats would launch surprise attacks against tankers and cause substantial damage. Iran also used F-4 Phantom II fighters and helicopters to launch ] and unguided rockets at tankers.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

A ] ship, {{USS|Stark|FFG-31|2}}, was struck on 17 May 1987 by two Exocet anti-ship missiles fired from an Iraqi ] plane.<ref>{{cite report|url=http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20STARK%20BASIC.pdf|date=3 September 1987|title=Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on the USS Stark (FFG 31) on 17 May 1987|publisher=U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps|series=JAG Manual Investigations|access-date=13 July 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110501033851/http://www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20STARK%20BASIC.pdf|archive-date=1 May 2011|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Pokrant|first=Marvin|title=Desert Storm at Sea: What the Navy Really Did|year=1999|publisher=Greenwood Press|location=Westport, CT|isbn=978-0-313-31024-9|page=|url=https://archive.org/details/desertstormatsea00pokr/page/43}}</ref> The missiles had been fired at about the time the plane was given a routine radio warning by ''Stark''.<ref name=kelley07>{{cite thesis|title=Better Lucky Than Good: Operation Earnest Will as Gunboat Diplomacy|last=Kelley|first=Stephen Andrew|date=June 2007|location=Monterrey, CA|publisher=]|url=https://archive.org/details/betterluckythgoo109453463/page/n1|degree=Master's|hdl=10945/3463|hdl-access=free}}</ref> The frigate did not detect the missiles with radar, and warning was given by the lookout only moments before they struck.<ref name="DoD_report">{{cite report|title=Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack of the USS Stark in 1987|url=http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/USS_Liberty_Pueblo_Stark/65rev.pdf|publisher=Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff|series=OSD/JS FOIA Library|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130210220555/http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/USS_Liberty_Pueblo_Stark/65rev.pdf|archive-date=10 February 2013}}</ref> Both missiles hit the ship, and one exploded in crew quarters, killing 37 sailors and wounding 21.<ref name="DoD_report" />

], a British insurance market, estimated that the tanker war damaged 546 commercial vessels and killed about 430 civilian sailors. The largest portion of the attacks was directed by Iraq against vessels in Iranian waters, with the Iraqis launching three times as many attacks as the Iranians.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />{{rp|3|date=November 2012}} But Iranian speedboat attacks on Kuwaiti shipping led Kuwait to formally petition foreign powers on 1 November 1986 to protect its shipping. The Soviet Union agreed to charter tankers starting in 1987, and the United States Navy offered to provide protection for foreign tankers reflagged and ] starting 7 March 1987 in ].<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=kelley07 /> Neutral tankers shipping to Iran were not protected by Earnest Will, resulting in reduced foreign tanker traffic to Iran, since they risked Iraqi air attack. Iran accused the United States of helping Iraq.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=iranchamber-armingiraq /><ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />

During the course of the war, Iran attacked two Soviet merchant ships.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/iran/iran172.html|title=Iran: Gradual Superpower Involvement|publisher=AllRefer|access-date=2 August 2011|work=Country Study & Guide|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110628195103/http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/iran/iran172.html|archive-date=28 June 2011|url-status=dead}}</ref>

'']'', the largest ship ever built, was struck by Iraqi Exocet missiles as it was carrying Iranian crude oil out of the Persian Gulf.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.relevantsearchscotland.co.uk/ships/jahre.html|title=Seawise Giant|last=Ross|first=William|access-date=2 August 2011|work=Relevant Search Scotland|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110809115952/http://www.relevantsearchscotland.co.uk/ships/jahre.html|archive-date=9 August 2011|url-status=dead}}</ref>

====Attacks on cities====
{{Main|War of the cities}}

Meanwhile, Iraq's air force also began carrying out ] raids against Iranian cities. While Iraq had launched numerous attacks with aircraft and ] against border cities from the beginning of the war and sporadic raids on Iran's main cities, this was the first systematic strategic bombing that Iraq carried out during the war. This would become known as the ''war of the cities''. With the help of the USSR and the west, Iraq's air force had been rebuilt and expanded.<ref name="Cooper Blinders" /> Meanwhile, Iran, due to sanctions and lack of spare parts, had heavily curtailed its air force operations. Iraq used ] Blinder and ] Badger ] to carry out long-range high-speed raids on Iranian cities, including Tehran. Fighter-bombers such as the ] and ] Fitter were used against smaller or shorter range targets, as well as ] the strategic bombers.<ref name="Cooper Blinders" /> Civilian and industrial targets were hit by the raids,<ref>{{Cite book|last=Tucker|first=Spencer C.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=U05OvsOPeKMC&q=Most+of+the+Iraqi+air+raids+were+intercepted+by+the+Iranian+fighter+jets+and+air+defense&pg=PA674|title=The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts : The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts|date=2010|publisher=ABC-CLIO|isbn=978-1-85109-948-1}}</ref> and each successful raid inflicted economic damage from regular strategic bombing.<ref name="Cooper Blinders" />

In response, the Iranians deployed their F-4 Phantoms to combat the Iraqis, and eventually they deployed F-14s as well. By 1986, Iran also expanded their ] network heavily to relieve the pressure on the air force. By later in the war, Iraqi air attacks were used only on fewer, more important targets.<ref name="Cooper Blinders 2">{{cite web|last=Cooper|first=Tom|title=Bombed By Blinders Part 2|url=http://www.acig.info/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=249&Itemid=47|access-date=30 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120822013317/http://www.acig.info/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=249&Itemid=47|archive-date=22 August 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> Starting in 1987, Saddam also ordered several chemical attacks on civilian targets in Iran, such as the town of ].<ref name="Daraghai LA Times" />

] that were targeted during the ] ]]

Iran also launched several retaliatory air raids on Iraq, while primarily shelling border cities such as Basra. Iran also bought some ] missiles from ], and launched them against Baghdad. These too inflicted damage upon Iraq.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

On 7 February 1984, during the first war of the cities, Saddam ordered his air force to attack eleven Iranian cities;<ref name=efraimkarsh /> bombardments ceased on 22 February 1984. It was estimated that 1,200 Iranian civilians were killed during the raids in February alone.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

====Strategic situation in 1984====
By 1984, Iran's losses were estimated to be 300,000 soldiers, while Iraq's losses were estimated to be 150,000.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />{{rp|2|date=November 2012}} Foreign analysts agreed that both Iran and Iraq failed to use their modern equipment properly, and both sides failed to carry out modern military assaults that could win the war. Both sides also abandoned equipment in the battlefield because their technicians were unable to carry out repairs. Iran and Iraq showed little internal coordination on the battlefield, and in many cases units were left to fight on their own. As a result, by the end of 1984, the war was a stalemate.<ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />{{rp|2|date=November 2012}}<ref name=Rubin>{{cite book|last=Rubin|first=Barry|title=Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GFdz4AfyH5MC&q=Iran+capture+Mehran+October+1984&pg=PA57|isbn=978-0203881873|year=2009|publisher=Taylor & Francis}}</ref> One limited offensive Iran launched (Dawn 7) took place from 18 to 25 October 1984, when they recaptured the Iranian city of ], which had been occupied by the Iraqis from the beginning of the war.<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name="Dunn 1998" />

===1985–86 Iraqi offensives===
By 1985, Iraqi armed forces were receiving financial support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Persian Gulf states, and were making substantial arms purchases from the Soviet Union, China, and France. For the first time since early 1980, Saddam launched new offensives.

On 6 January 1986, the Iraqis launched an offensive attempting to retake Majnoon Island. They were quickly bogged down into a stalemate against 200,000 Iranian infantrymen, reinforced by amphibious divisions.<ref name=aboulenein12_dawn3>{{cite journal|url=http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-%22dawn-of-victory%22-campaigns-to-the-%22final-push%22-part-three-of-three|title=The 'Dawn of Victory' campaigns to the 'Final Push': Part Three of Three|first1=Youssef|last1=Aboul-Enein|first2=Andrew|last2=Bertrand|first3=Dorothy|last3=Corley|date=23 April 2012|journal=Small Wars Journal|publisher=Small Wars Foundation}}{{Dead link|date=July 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref> However, they managed to gain a foothold in the southern part of the island.<ref name=cordesman90 />

Iraq also carried out another ''war of the cities'' between 12 and 14 March, hitting up to 158 targets in over 30 towns and cities, including Tehran. Iran responded by launching 14 Scud missiles for the first time, purchased from ]. More Iraqi air attacks were carried out in August, resulting in hundreds of additional civilian casualties. Iraqi attacks against both Iranian and neutral oil tankers in Iranian waters continued, with Iraq carrying out 150 airstrikes using French bought ] and Mirage F-1 jets as well as Super Frelon helicopters, armed with ] missiles.<ref name="Cordesman VII">{{cite web|last=Cordesman|first=Anthony|title=The Lessons of Modern War Vol II|date=May 1990|url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/lessons-modern-war-volume-ii-iran-iraq-war-–-chapter-7-phase-four-stalemate-and-war|access-date=10 March 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130705010234/https://csis.org/publication/lessons-modern-war-volume-ii-iran-iraq-war-%E2%80%93-chapter-7-phase-four-stalemate-and-war-attr|archive-date=5 July 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

====Operation Badr====

]

The Iraqis attacked again on 28 January 1985; they were defeated, and the Iranians retaliated on 11 March 1985 with a major offensive directed against the Baghdad-Basra highway (one of the few major offensives conducted in 1985), codenamed ] (after the ], Muhammad's first military victory in Mecca).<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=wright89>{{cite book|last=Wright|first=Robin|title=In the name of God: The Khomeini decade|year=1989|publisher=Simon and Schuster|location=New York|isbn=978-0-671-67235-5|pages=|url=https://archive.org/details/innameofgodkhome00wrig/page/126}}</ref> Ayatollah Khomeini urged Iranians on, declaring:

<blockquote>It is our belief that Saddam wishes to return Islam to blasphemy and polytheism...if America becomes victorious...and grants victory to Saddam, Islam will receive such a blow that it will not be able to raise its head for a long time...The issue is one of Islam versus blasphemy, and not of Iran versus Iraq.<ref>A speech on 4 April 1985 by Ruhollah Khomeini in Persian quoted in {{cite book|last=Brumberg|first=Daniel|title=Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran|year=2001|publisher=University of Chicago Press|location=Chicago|isbn=978-0-226-07758-1|pages=132–134}}</ref></blockquote>

This operation was similar to Operation Kheibar, though it invoked more planning. Iran used 100,000 troops, with 60,000 more in reserve. They assessed the marshy terrain, plotted points where they could land tanks, and constructed pontoon bridges across the marshes. The Basij forces were also equipped with ].<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" />

The ferocity of the Iranian offensive broke through the Iraqi lines. The Revolutionary Guard, with the support of tanks and artillery, broke through north of Qurna on 14 March. That same night 3,000 Iranian troops reached and crossed the ] using pontoon bridges and captured part of the ], which they had failed to achieve in Operations Dawn 5 and 6.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

Saddam responded by launching chemical attacks against the Iranian positions along the highway and by initiating the aforementioned second ''war of the cities'', with an air and missile campaign against twenty to thirty Iranian population centres, including Tehran.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Under ] and ] (both considered to be among Iraq's most skilled commanders), the Iraqis launched air attacks against the Iranian positions and pinned them down. They then launched a pincer attack using mechanized infantry and heavy artillery.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Chemical weapons were used, and the Iraqis also flooded Iranian trenches with specially constructed pipes delivering water from the Tigris River.

The Iranians retreated back to the ] marshes while being attacked by helicopters,<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> and the highway was recaptured by the Iraqis. Operation Badr resulted in 10,000–12,000 Iraqi casualties and 15,000 Iranian ones.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

===Iranian counteroffensives===

] on the battlefront during the war]]

The failure of the human wave attacks in earlier years had prompted Iran to develop a better working relationship between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard<ref name=efraimkarsh /> and to mould the Revolutionary Guard units into a more conventional fighting force. To combat Iraq's use of chemical weapons, Iran began producing an ].<ref name=aboulenein12_dawn3 /> They also created and fielded their own homemade drones, the ]'s, fitted with six RPG-7's to launch attacks. They were primarily used in observation, being used for up to 700 ]s.<ref name=mashregnews>{{cite news|script-title=fa:نگاهی به نقش ناشناخته "تلاش" و "مهاجر" در کربلای 5 و والفجر 8|language=fa|trans-title=Looking at the unrecognised role of (the drones) 'effort' and 'immigrant' in Dawn Operations 5 and 8|url=http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/69193|date=2 October 2011|newspaper=Mashregnews|access-date=9 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151023134107/http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/69193|archive-date=23 October 2015|url-status=live}}</ref>

For the rest of 1986, and until the spring of 1988, the Iranian Air Force's efficiency in ] increased, with weapons being repaired or replaced and new tactical methods being used. For example, the Iranians would loosely integrate their ] and ] to create "killing fields" in which dozens of Iraqi planes were lost, which was reported in the West as the Iranian Air Force using F-14s as "mini-]". The Iraqi Air Force reacted by increasing the sophistication of its equipment, incorporating modern ] pods, decoys such as ] and ], and ]s.<ref name=cooper03_205 />

Due to the heavy losses in the last war of the cities, Iraq reduced their use of aerial attacks on Iranian cities. Instead, they launched Scud missiles, which the Iranians could not stop. Since the range of the Scud missile was too short to reach Tehran, they converted them to ] with the help of East German engineers, cutting up their Scuds into three chunks and attaching them together. Iran responded to these attacks by using their own Scud missiles.<ref name=mashregnews />

Compounding the extensive foreign help to Iraq, Iranian attacks were severely hampered by their shortages of weaponry, particularly heavy weapons as large amounts had been lost during the war. Iran still managed to maintain 1,000 tanks, often by capturing Iraqi ones and additional artillery, but many needed repairs to be operational. By this time Iran managed to procure spare parts from various sources, helping them to restore some weapons. They secretly imported some weapons, such as ] anti-aircraft ].<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> In an exception to the United States' support for Iraq, in exchange for Iran using its influence to help free western hostages in ], the United States secretly sold Iran some limited supplies. In Akbar Rafsanjani's postwar interview, he stated that during the period when Iran was succeeding, for a short time the United States supported Iran, then shortly after began helping Iraq again.<ref name=Viewpoints /> Iran managed to get some advanced weapons, such as anti-tank ]s, which worked better than ]s. Iran later ] and produced those weapons themselves.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name="Cordesman VII" /> All of these almost certainly helped increase the effectiveness of Iran, although it did not reduce the human cost of their attacks.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name="Cordesman VII" />

====First Battle of al-Faw====
{{Main|First Battle of al-Faw|Operation Dawn 8}}

] during which Iran captured the ]]]

On the night of 10–11 February 1986, the Iranians launched Operation Dawn 8,<ref name=Pollack_217>{{cite book|last=Pollack|first=Kenneth M.|title=The Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991|year=2002|publisher=University of Nebraska Press|location=Lincoln|isbn=0-8032-3733-2|page=217}}</ref> in which 30,000 troops in five Army divisions and men from the Revolutionary Guard and Basij advanced in a two-pronged offensive to capture the ] in southern Iraq, the only area touching the ].<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The capture of Al Faw and Umm Qasr was a major goal for Iran.<ref name=Viewpoints /> Iran began with a feint attack against Basra, which was stopped by the Iraqis.<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=csis8 />

Meanwhile, an amphibious strike force landed at the foot of the peninsula. The resistance, consisting of several thousand poorly trained soldiers of the ], fled or were defeated, and the Iranian forces set up pontoon bridges crossing the Shatt al-Arab{{NoteTag|name=waterway}}, allowing 30,000 soldiers to cross in a short period of time.<ref name=csis8 /> They drove north along the peninsula almost unopposed, capturing it after only 24 hours of fighting.<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|240|date=November 2012}}<ref name=pollack04 /> Afterwards they dug in and set up defenses.<ref name=pollack04 />

The sudden capture of al-Faw shocked the Iraqis, since they had thought it impossible for the Iranians to cross the Shatt al-Arab. On 12 February 1986, the Iraqis began a counter-offensive to retake al-Faw, which failed after a week of heavy fighting.<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=pollack04 /> On 24 February 1986, Saddam sent one of his best commanders, General ], and the ] to begin a new offensive to recapture al-Faw.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> A new round of heavy fighting took place. Their attempts again ended in failure, costing them many tanks and aircraft.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Their 15th mechanised division was almost completely wiped out.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> The capture of al-Faw and the failure of the Iraqi counter-offensives were blows to the Ba'ath regime's prestige, and led the Gulf countries to fear that Iran might win the war.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Kuwait in particular felt menaced with Iranian troops only {{convert|16|km|mi|abbr=on}} away, and increased its support of Iraq accordingly.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|241|date=November 2012}}

In March 1986, the Iranians tried to follow up their success by attempting to take ], which would have completely severed Iraq from the Gulf and placed Iranian troops on the border with Kuwait.<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=Viewpoints /> The offensive failed due to Iranian shortages of armor.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> By this time, 17,000 Iraqis and 30,000 Iranians were casualties.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The First Battle of al-Faw ended in March, but heavy combat operations lasted on the peninsula into 1988, with neither side being able to displace the other. The battle bogged down into a World War I-style ] in the marshes of the peninsula.<ref name="Woods 2010" />

====Battle of Mehran====
{{Main|Battle of Mehran (1986)}}
Immediately after the Iranian capture of al-Faw, Saddam declared a new offensive against Iran, designed to drive deep into the state.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} The Iranian border city of ], on the foot of the Zagros Mountains, was selected as the first target. On 15–19 May, Iraqi Army's Second Corps, supported by helicopter gunships, attacked and captured the city. Saddam then offered to exchange Mehran for al-Faw.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} The Iranians rejected the offer. Iraq then continued the attack, attempting to push deeper into Iran. Iraq's attack was quickly warded off by Iranian AH-1 Cobra helicopters with ] missiles, which destroyed numerous Iraqi tanks and vehicles.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />{{page needed|date=September 2020}}

The Iranians built up their forces on the heights surrounding Mehran. On 30 June, using mountain warfare tactics, they launched their attack, recapturing the city by 3 July.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} Saddam ordered the Republican Guard to retake the city on 4 July, but their attack was ineffective. Iraqi losses were heavy enough to allow the Iranians to also capture territory inside Iraq,<ref name="Farrokh 03" />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} and depleted the Iraqi military enough to prevent them from launching a major offensive for the next two years.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} Iraq's defeats at al-Faw and at Mehran were severe blows to the prestige of the Iraqi regime. Western powers, including the US, became more determined to prevent an Iraqi loss.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />{{page needed|date=September 2020}}

====Situation at the end of 1986====

Through the eyes of international observers, Iran was prevailing in the war by the end of 1986.<ref name=csis8 /> In the northern front, the Iranians began launching attacks toward the city of ] with the help of Kurdish fighters, taking the Iraqis by surprise. They came within {{convert|16|km|mi|abbr=on}} of the city before being stopped by chemical and army attacks. Iran's army had also reached the Meimak Hills, only {{convert|113|km|mi|abbr=on}} from Baghdad.<ref name=csis8 /> Iraq managed to contain Iran's offensives in the south, but was under serious pressure, as the Iranians were slowly overwhelming them.

Iraq retaliated by initiating another ''war of the cities''. In one attack, Tehran's main oil refinery was hit, and in another instance, Iraq damaged Iran's Assadabad satellite dish, disrupting Iranian overseas telephone and ] service for almost two weeks.<ref name=csis8 /> Civilian areas were also hit, resulting in many casualties. Iraq continued to attack oil tankers via air.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Iran responded by launching Scud missiles and air attacks at Iraqi targets.

Iraq continued to attack Kharg Island and the oil tankers and facilities as well. Iran created a tanker ] service of 20 tankers to move oil from Kharg to Larak Island, escorted by Iranian fighter jets. Once moved to Larak, the oil would be moved to oceangoing tankers, usually neutral.<ref name="Cordesman IX" /> They also rebuilt the oil terminals damaged by Iraqi air raids and moved shipping to Larak Island, while attacking foreign tankers that carried Iraqi oil, as Iran had blocked Iraq's access to the open sea with the capture of al-Faw. By now, they almost always used the armed speedboats of the ], and attacked many tankers.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

The tanker war escalated drastically, with attacks nearly doubling in 1986, the majority carried out by Iraq. Iraq got permission from the Saudi government to use its airspace to attack Larak Island, although due to the distance attacks were less frequent there. The escalating tanker war in the Gulf became an ever-increasing concern to foreign powers, especially the United States.<ref name="Cordesman IX" />

In April 1986, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a ] declaring that the war must be won by March 1987. The Iranians increased recruitment efforts, obtaining 650,000 volunteers.<ref name=aboulenein12_dawn3 /> The animosity between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard arose again, with the Army wanting to use more refined, limited military attacks, while the Revolutionary Guard wanted to carry out major offensives.<ref name=aboulenein12_dawn3 /> Iran, confident in its successes, began planning their largest offensives of the war, which they called their "final offensives".<ref name=aboulenein12_dawn3 />

====Iraq's dynamic defense strategy====

Faced with their recent defeats in al-Faw and Mehran, Iraq appeared to be losing the war. Iraq's generals, angered by Saddam's interference, threatened a full-scale mutiny against the Ba'ath Party unless they were allowed to conduct operations freely. In one of the few times during his career, Saddam gave in to the demands of his generals.<ref name=pollack04 />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} Up to this point, Iraqi strategy was to ride out Iranian attacks. However, the defeat at al-Faw led Saddam to declare the war to be ''Al-Defa al-Mutaharakha'' (The Dynamic Defense),<ref name="Farrokh 03" />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} and announcing that all civilians had to take part in the war effort.

The government tried to integrate the Shias into the war effort by recruiting many as part of the Ba'ath Party.<ref name=pollack04 />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} In an attempt to counterbalance the religious fervor of the Iranians and gain support from the devout masses, the regime also began to promote religion and, on the surface, ], despite the fact that Iraq was run by a secular regime. Scenes of Saddam praying and making pilgrimages to shrines became common on state-run television. While Iraqi morale had been low throughout the war, the attack on al-Faw raised patriotic fervor, as the Iraqis feared invasion.<ref name=pollack04 />{{page needed|date=September 2020}}

Saddam also recruited volunteers from other Arab countries into the Republican Guard, and received much technical support from foreign nations as well.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} While Iraqi military power had been depleted in recent battles, through heavy foreign purchases and support, they were able to expand their military to much larger proportions by 1988.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />{{page needed|date=September 2020}}

At the same time, Saddam ordered the ] in an attempt to crush the Kurdish resistance, who were now allied with Iran. The result was the deaths of several hundred thousand Iraqi Kurds, and the destruction of villages, towns, and cities.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Rubin, Michael|title=Are Kurds a pariah minority?|journal=Social Research|date=Spring 2003|volume=70|issue=1|pages=295–330|publisher=The New School|series=Pariah Minorities|doi=10.1353/sor.2003.0028|jstor=40971614|s2cid=141846747}}</ref>

Iraq began to try to perfect its maneuver tactics.<ref name=pollack04 />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} The Iraqis began to prioritize the professionalization of their military. Prior to 1986, the ]-based Iraqi regular army and the volunteer-based Iraqi Popular Army conducted the bulk of the operations in the war, to little effect. The Republican Guard, formerly an elite ], was expanded as a volunteer army and filled with Iraq's best generals.<ref name=pollack04 /> Loyalty to the state was no longer a primary requisite for joining. After the war, due to Saddam's paranoia, the former duties of the Republican Guard were transferred to a new unit, the ].<ref name=pollack04 />{{page needed|date=September 2020}} Full-scale war games against hypothetical Iranian positions were carried out in the western Iraqi desert against mock targets. They were repeated over the course of a full year until the forces involved fully memorized their attacks.<ref name=pollack04 /> Iraq built its military massively, eventually possessing the 4th largest in the world, in order to overwhelm the Iranians through sheer size.<ref name=pollack04 />{{page needed|date=September 2020}}

===1987–88: Renewed Iranian Offensives===

]{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}]]

Meanwhile, Iran continued to attack as the Iraqis were planning their strike. In 1987 the Iranians renewed a series of major human wave offensives in both northern and southern Iraq. The Iraqis had elaborately fortified Basra with 5 defensive rings, exploiting natural waterways such as the Shatt-al-Arab and artificial ones, such as ''Fish Lake'' and the Jasim River, along with earth barriers. Fish Lake was a massive lake filled with mines, underwater barbed wire, ]s and sensors. Behind each waterway and defensive line was radar-guided artillery, ] and helicopters, all capable of firing poison gas or conventional munitions.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

The Iranian strategy was to penetrate the Iraqi defences and encircle Basra, cutting off the city as well as the Al-Faw peninsula from the rest of Iraq.<ref name=csis8 /> Iran's plan was for three assaults: a diversionary attack near Basra, the main offensive and another diversionary attack using Iranian tanks in the north to divert Iraqi heavy armor from Basra.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> For these battles, Iran had re-expanded their military by recruiting many new Basij and Pasdaran volunteers.<ref name=csis8 /> Iran brought 150,000–200,000 total troops into the battles.<ref name=pollack04 />

==== Operation Karbala-4 ====
{{Main|Operation Karbala-4}}

On 25 December 1986, Iran launched ] (''Karbala'' referring to ]'s ]).<ref name=silverstein10>{{cite book|isbn=978-0-19-160934-3|title=Islamic History: A Very Short Introduction|last=Silverstein|first=Adam J.|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2012|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OKOAkshBSIQC}}</ref> According to Iraqi General Ra'ad al-Hamdani, this was a diversionary attack.<ref name="Woods 2010" /> The Iranians launched an amphibious assault against the Iraqi island of Umm al-Rassas in the Shatt-Al-Arab river, parallel to Khoramshahr. They then set up a pontoon bridge and continued the attack, eventually capturing the island in a costly success but failing to advance further. The Iranians had 60,000 casualties, while the Iraqis 9,500.<ref name="aboulenein12_dawn3" /> The Iraqi commanders exaggerated Iranian losses to Saddam, and it was assumed that the main Iranian attack on Basra had been fully defeated and that it would take the Iranians six months to recover. When the main Iranian attack, Operation Karbala 5, began, many Iraqi troops were on leave.<ref name="Woods 2010" />

====Karbala-5 (Sixth Battle of Basra)====
{{Main|Siege of Basra}}

The ], code-named Operation Karbala-5 ({{langx|fa|عملیات کربلای ۵}}), was an offensive operation carried out by ] in an effort to capture the ]i port city of ] in early 1987. This battle, known for its extensive casualties and ferocious conditions, was the biggest battle of the war and proved to be the beginning of the end of the Iran–Iraq War.<ref>Pollack, Kenneth M. (2004). "Iraq". Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. {{ISBN|978-0803287839}}.</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.fatehan.ir/page.aspx?pid=224|title=fatehan.ir|access-date=26 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171024223009/http://www.fatehan.ir/page.aspx?pid=224|archive-date=24 October 2017|url-status=dead}}</ref> While Iranian forces crossed the border and captured the eastern section of Basra Governorate, the operation ended in a stalemate.

====Karbala-6====
{{Main|Operation Karbala-6}}

At the same time as Operation Karbala 5, Iran launched ] against the Iraqis in Qasr-e Shirin in central Iran to prevent the Iraqis from rapidly transferring units down to defend against the Karbala-5 attack. The attack was carried out by Basij infantry and the Revolutionary Guard's 31st '']'' and the Army's 77th ''Khorasan'' armored divisions. The Basij attacked the Iraqi lines, forcing the Iraqi infantry to retreat. An Iraqi armored counter-attack surrounded the Basij in a pincer movement. The Iranian tank divisions attacked, breaking the encirclement. The Iranian attack was stopped by mass Iraqi chemical weapons attacks.<ref name=iraniraqwar.com>{{cite web|title=Iran–Iraq war|url=http://iraniraqwar.com/about.html|access-date=13 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120923205409/http://iraniraqwar.com/about.html|archive-date=23 September 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Iranian war-weariness===

Operation Karbala-5 was a severe blow to Iran's military and morale.<ref name="Dunn 1998" /> To foreign observers, it appeared that Iran was continuing to strengthen. By 1988, Iran had become self-sufficient in many areas, such as anti-tank TOW missiles, Scud ballistic missiles (]), ] anti-ship missiles, ] tactical rockets, and producing spare parts for their weaponry. Iran had improved its air defenses with smuggled surface to air missiles.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Iran was even producing UAV's and the ] propeller aircraft for observation.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Iran doubled their stocks of artillery, and was self-sufficient in the manufacture of ammunition and small arms.<ref name=csis10 />

While it was not obvious to foreign observers, the Iranian public had become increasingly war-weary and disillusioned with the fighting, and relatively few volunteers joined the fight in 1987–88. Because the Iranian war effort relied on popular mobilization, their military strength actually declined, and Iran was unable to launch any major offensives after Karbala-5. As a result, for the first time since 1982, the momentum of the fighting shifted towards the regular army. Since the regular army was conscription based, it made the war even less popular. Many Iranians began to try to escape the conflict. As early as May 1985, ]s took place in 74 cities throughout Iran, which were crushed by the regime, resulting in some protesters being shot and killed.<ref name=spokane85>{{cite news|url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1345&dat=19850510&id=FloaAAAAIBAJ&pg=7018,2528377|title=Anti-war protests reported in Iran|newspaper=Spokane Chronicle|agency=Associated Press|date=10 May 1985|access-date=20 June 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150903232542/https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1345&dat=19850510&id=FloaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=XScEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7018,2528377|archive-date=3 September 2015|url-status=live}}</ref>

The leadership acknowledged that the war was a stalemate, and began to plan accordingly.<ref name=pollack04 /> No more "final offensives" were planned.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> The head of the Supreme Defense Council Akbar Rafsanjani announced during a news conference the end of human wave attacks.<ref name="Sciolino New York Times">{{cite news|author-link=Elaine Sciolino|last=Sciolino|first=Elaine|title=Human Wave raid loses Iran's favor|newspaper=The New York Times|date=5 July 1987|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/05/world/human-wave-raid-losses-iran-s-favor.html|access-date=9 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171106110937/http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/05/world/human-wave-raid-losses-iran-s-favor.html|archive-date=6 November 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> ], head of the IRGC, announced that Iran would focus exclusively on limited attacks and infiltrations, while arming and supporting opposition groups inside of Iraq.<ref name=csis8 />

On the Iranian home front, sanctions, declining oil prices, and Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil facilities and shipping took a heavy toll on the economy. While the attacks themselves were not as destructive as some analysts believed, the U.S.-led ], which protected Iraqi and allied oil tankers, but not Iranian ones, led many neutral countries to stop trading with Iran because of rising ] and fear of air attack.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=iranchamber-armingiraq /><ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar /> Iranian oil and non-oil exports fell by 55%, inflation reached 50% by 1987, and ] skyrocketed.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> At the same time, Iraq was experiencing crushing debt and shortages of workers, encouraging its leadership to try to end the war quickly.<ref name="Dunn 1998" />

====Strategic situation in late 1987====
{{Main|Operation Nimble Archer}}

], Iraqi Defense Minister, meeting with Iraqi soldiers during the war]]

By the end of 1987, Iraq possessed 5,550 tanks, outnumbering the Iranians six to one, and 900 fighter aircraft, outnumbering the Iranians ten to one.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> After Operation Karbala-5, Iraq only had 100 qualified fighter pilots remaining. Therefore, Iraq began to invest in recruiting foreign pilots from countries such as ], ], ], ] and the ].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://kavehfarrokh.com/military-history-1900-present/western-pakistani-and-egyptian-pilots-flying-iraqi-combat-aircraft-during-iran-iraq-war/|title=Kaveh Farrokh {{pipe}} Western, Pakistani and Egyptian pilots flying Iraqi Combat Aircraft during the Iran–Iraq War|access-date=29 September 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181116001004/https://kavehfarrokh.com/military-history-1900-present/western-pakistani-and-egyptian-pilots-flying-iraqi-combat-aircraft-during-iran-iraq-war/|archive-date=16 November 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> They replenished their manpower by integrating volunteers from other Arab countries into their army. Iraq also became self-sufficient in chemical weapons and some conventional ones and received much equipment from abroad.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Foreign support helped Iraq bypass its economic troubles and massive debt to continue the war and increase the size of its military.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

While the southern and central fronts were at a stalemate, Iran began to focus on carrying out offensives in northern Iraq with the help of the Peshmerga (Kurdish ]s). The Iranians used a combination of semi-guerrilla and infiltration tactics in the Kurdish mountains with the Peshmerga. During ] in early April, Iran captured territory near Suleimaniya, provoking a severe poison gas counter-attack. During ], Iran attacked near the same area, capturing more territory. During Operation Nasr-4, the Iranians surrounded the city of Suleimaniya and, with the help of the Peshmerga, infiltrated over 140&nbsp;km into Iraq and raided and threatened to capture the oil-rich city of ] and other northern oilfields.<ref name="Dunn 1998" />

=== Air and tanker war ===

With the stalemate on land, the air/tanker war began to play an increasingly major role in the conflict.<ref name="Cordesman IX">{{cite web|last=Cordesman|first=Anthony|title=Lessons of Modern War: The Iran–Iraq War|url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap09.pdf|access-date=28 May 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140104083713/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap09.pdf|archive-date=4 January 2014|url-status=live}}</ref> The Iranian air force had become very small, with only 20 F-4 Phantoms, 20 F-5 Tigers, and 15 F-14 Tomcats in operation, although Iran managed to restore some damaged planes to service. The Iranian Air Force, despite its once sophisticated equipment, lacked enough equipment and personnel to sustain the war of attrition that had developed, and was unable to lead an outright onslaught against Iraq.<ref name=cooper03_205 />

The Iraqi Air Force, had originally lacked modern equipment and experienced pilots, but after pleas from Iraqi military leaders, Saddam decreased political influence on everyday operations and left the fighting to his combatants. The Soviets began delivering more advanced aircraft and weapons to Iraq, while the French improved training for flight crews and technical personnel and continually introduced new methods for countering Iranian weapons and tactics.<ref name=cooper03_205 /> Iranian ground air defense still shot down many Iraqi aircraft.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=cooper03_205 />

The main Iraqi air effort had shifted to the destruction of Iranian war-fighting capability, primarily Persian Gulf oil fields, tankers, and Kharg Island, and starting in late 1986, the Iraqi Air Force began a comprehensive campaign against Iranian economic infrastructure.<ref name=cooper03_205 /> By late 1987, the Iraqi Air Force could count on direct American support for conducting long-range operations against Iranian infrastructural targets and oil installations deep in the Persian Gulf. U.S. Navy ships tracked and reported movements of Iranian shipping and defences. In the massive Iraqi air strike against Kharg Island, flown on 18 March 1988, the Iraqis destroyed two ] but lost five aircraft to Iranian F-14 Tomcats, including two ]Bs and one ]RB.<ref name=cooper03_205 />

] speedboats using ]]]

The attacks on oil tankers continued. Both Iran and Iraq carried out frequent attacks during the first four months of the year. Iran was effectively waging a naval guerilla war with its IRGC navy speedboats, while Iraq attacked with its aircraft. In 1987, Kuwait asked to reflag its tankers to the U.S. flag. They did so in March, and the U.S. Navy began ] to escort the tankers.<ref name="Cordesman IX" /> The result of Earnest Will would be that, while oil tankers shipping Iraqi/Kuwaiti oil were protected, Iranian tankers and neutral tankers shipping to Iran would be unprotected, resulting in both losses for Iran and the undermining of its trade with foreign countries, damaging Iran's economy further.<ref name="Cordesman IX" />

Iran deployed Silkworm missiles to attack ships, but only a few were actually fired. Both the United States and Iran jockeyed for influence in the Gulf. To discourage the United States from escorting tankers, Iran secretly ] some areas. The United States began to escort the reflagged tankers, but one was damaged by a mine while under escort. While being a public-relations victory for Iran, the United States increased its reflagging efforts. While Iran mined the Persian Gulf, their speedboat attacks were reduced, primarily attacking unflagged tankers shipping in the area.<ref name="Cordesman IX" />

On 24 September, ] captured the Iranian mine-laying ship '']'', a diplomatic disaster for the already isolated Iranians. Iran had previously sought to maintain at least a pretense of ] regarding its use of mines, but the Navy SEALS captured and photographed extensive evidence of ''Iran Ajr''{{'}}s mine-laying activities.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1987–1988: An end in sight?|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=318–320 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> On 8 October, the U.S. Navy destroyed four Iranian speedboats, and in response to Iranian Silkworm missile attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers, launched ], destroying two Iranian oil rigs in the Persian Gulf.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> During November and December, the Iraqi air force launched a bid to destroy all Iranian airbases in Khuzestan and the remaining Iranian air force. Iran managed to shoot down 30 Iraqi fighters with fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns, and missiles, allowing the Iranian air force to survive to the end of the war.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

On 28 June, Iraqi ] attacked the Iranian town of ] near the border, using chemical ] bombs. While many towns and cities had been bombed before, and troops attacked with gas, this was the first time that the Iraqis had attacked a civilian area with poison gas.<ref name="Mohammadi 2006">{{cite web|last=Mohammadi|first=Karim|title=The Forgotten Victims of the Iran–Iraq War|url=http://www.payvand.com/news/06/nov/1322.html|access-date=16 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011172047/http://www.payvand.com/news/06/nov/1322.html|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> One quarter of the town's then population of 20,000 was burned and stricken, and 113 were killed immediately, with many more dying and suffering health effects over following decades.<ref name="Daraghai LA Times">{{cite web|last=Daraghai|first=Borzou|title=1987 Chemical Strike Still Haunts Iran|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-mar-19-fg-sardasht19-story.html|work=Los Angeles Times|date=19 March 2007|access-date=16 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151015235323/http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/19/world/fg-sardasht19|archive-date=15 October 2015|url-status=live}}</ref>

===1988: Final Iraqi offensives===
{{Main|Operation Praying Mantis|Iran Air Flight 655}}
By 1988, with massive equipment imports and reduced Iranian volunteers, Iraq was ready to launch major offensives against Iran.<ref name=pollack04 /> In February 1988, Saddam began the fifth and most deadly ''war of the cities''.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Over the next two months, Iraq launched over 200 al-Husayn missiles at 37 Iranian cities.<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name="csis10" /> Saddam also threatened to use chemical weapons in his missiles, which caused 30% of Tehran's population to leave the city.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Iran retaliated, launching at least 104 missiles against Iraq in 1988 and shelling Basra.<ref name=aboulenein12_dawn3 /><ref name=csis10>{{cite book|chapter-url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap10.pdf|publisher=Center for Strategic and International Studies|title=The Lessons of Modern War – Volume II: Iran–Iraq War|chapter=The Combination of Iraqi offensives and Western intervention force Iran to accept a cease-fire: September 1987 to March 1989|access-date=6 October 2012|archive-date=7 June 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130607155707/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap10.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref> This event was nicknamed the "Scud Duel" in the foreign media.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> In all, Iraq launched 520 Scuds and al-Husseins against Iran and Iran fired 177 in return.<ref name="AggrPolitics" /> The Iranian attacks were too few in number to deter Iraq from launching their attacks.<ref name=csis10 /> Iraq also increased their airstrikes against Kharg Island and Iranian oil tankers. With their tankers protected by U.S. warships, they could operate with virtual impunity.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name="Cordesman IX" /> In addition, the West supplied Iraq's air force with ] ], allowing them to attack economic targets while evading anti-aircraft defenses. These attacks began to have a major toll on the Iranian economy and morale and caused many casualties.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=Viewpoints /><ref name="Cordesman IX" />

====Iran's Kurdistan Operations====

]

In March 1988, the Iranians carried out ], ], and ] in ] with the aim of capturing the ] and the power plant at ], which supplied Iraq with much of its electricity and water, as well as the city of ].<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|264|date=November 2012}} Iran hoped that the capture of these areas would bring more favourable terms to the ceasefire agreement.<ref name=Viewpoints /> This infiltration offensive was carried out in conjunction with the ]. Iranian airborne commandos landed behind the Iraqi lines and Iranian helicopters hit Iraqi tanks with TOW missiles. The Iraqis were taken by surprise, and Iranian F-5E Tiger fighter jets even damaged the Kirkuk oil refinery.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Iraq carried out executions of multiple officers for these failures in March–April 1988, including Colonel Jafar Sadeq.<ref name="Woods 2010" /> The Iranians used infiltration tactics in the Kurdish mountains, captured the town of Halabja and began to fan out across the province.<ref name="Woods 2010" />

Though the Iranians advanced to within sight of Dukan and captured around {{convert|1040|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} and 4,000 Iraqi troops, the offensive failed due to the Iraqi use of chemical warfare.<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|264|date=November 2012}} The Iraqis launched the deadliest chemical weapons attacks of the war. The Republican Guard launched 700 chemical shells, while the other artillery divisions launched 200–300 chemical shells each, unleashing a chemical cloud over the Iranians, killing or wounding 60% of them, the blow was felt particularly by the Iranian 84th infantry division and 55th paratrooper division.<ref name="Woods 2010" /> The Iraqi special forces then stopped the remains of the Iranian force.<ref name="Woods 2010" /> In retaliation for Kurdish collaboration with the Iranians, Iraq launched a ] against Kurdish civilians in ], recently taken by the Iranians, killing thousands of civilians.<ref name="bbc_onthisday">{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm|title=1988: Thousands die in Halabja gas attack|work=On This Day|publisher=BBC|access-date=9 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180210230111/http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm|archive-date=10 February 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> Iran airlifted foreign journalists to the ruined city, and the images of the dead were shown throughout the world, but Western mistrust of Iran and collaboration with Iraq led them to also blame Iran for the attack.<ref name="bbc_onthisday" />

====Second Battle of al-Faw====

On 17 April 1988, Iraq launched ] (Blessed ]), a surprise attack against the 15,000 Basij troops on the al-Faw peninsula.<ref name=pollack04 /> The attack was preceded by Iraqi diversionary attacks in northern Iraq, with a massive artillery and air barrage of Iranian front lines. Key areas, such as supply lines, command posts, and ammunition depots, were hit by a storm of ] and ], as well as by conventional explosives. Helicopters landed Iraqi commandos behind Iranian lines on al-Faw while the main Iraqi force made a frontal assault. Within 48 hours, all of the Iranian forces had been killed or cleared from the al-Faw Peninsula.<ref name=pollack04 /> The day was celebrated in Iraq as Faw Liberation Day throughout Saddam's rule. The Iraqis had planned the offensive well. Prior to the attack, the Iraqi soldiers gave themselves poison gas antidotes to shield themselves from the effect of the saturation of gas. The heavy and well executed use of chemical weapons was the decisive factor in the victory.<ref name="Tyler New York Times">{{cite news|last=Tyler|first=Patrick|title=Officers Say US Aided Iraq in war despite use of gas|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/18/world/officers-say-us-aided-iraq-in-war-despite-use-of-gas.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm|newspaper=The News York Times|date=18 August 2002|access-date=9 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180120190328/http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/18/world/officers-say-us-aided-iraq-in-war-despite-use-of-gas.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm|archive-date=20 January 2018|url-status=live}}</ref> Iraqi losses were relatively light, especially compared to Iran's casualties.<ref name="Woods 2010" /> ] later recounted that the recapture of al-Faw marked "the highest point of experience and expertise that the Iraqi Army reached."<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1987–1988: An end in sight?|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=334–335 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> The Iranians eventually managed to halt the Iraqi drive as they pushed towards Khuzestan.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

To the shock of the Iranians, rather than breaking off the offensive, the Iraqis kept up their drive, and a new force attacked the Iranian positions around Basra.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Following this, the Iraqis launched a sustained drive to clear the Iranians out of all of southern Iraq.<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|264|date=November 2012}} One of the most successful Iraqi tactics was the "one-two punch" attack using chemical weapons. Using artillery, they would saturate the Iranian front line with rapidly dispersing ] and nerve gas, while longer-lasting mustard gas was launched via fighter-bombers and rockets against the Iranian rear, creating a "chemical wall" that blocked reinforcement.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

====Operation Praying Mantis====

] burns after being hit by 20 U.S. air launched missiles and bombs, killing a third of the crew, April 1988<ref name=Crist>{{cite book|last=Crist|first=David|title=The Twilight War: The secret history of America's thirty-year conflict with Iran|year=2012|publisher=Penguin Press|location=New York|isbn=978-1-59420-341-1|page=434 (Photo plates)}}</ref>]]

The same day as Iraq's attack on al-Faw peninsula, the United States Navy launched ] in retaliation against Iran for damaging a warship with a mine. Iran lost ]s, ]s, and frigates in this battle, which ended only when President Reagan decided that the Iranian navy had been damaged enough. In spite of this, the ] continued their speedboat attacks against oil tankers.<ref name=pollack04 /> The defeats at al-Faw and in the Persian Gulf nudged Iranian leadership towards quitting the war, especially when facing the prospect of fighting the Americans.<ref name=pollack04 />

====Iranian counteroffensive====
Faced with such losses, Khomeini appointed Rafsanjani as the ], though he had in actuality occupied that position for months.<ref name="csis10" /> Rafsanjani ordered a last desperate counter-attack into Iraq, which was launched 13 June 1988. The Iranians infiltrated through the Iraqi trenches and moved {{convert|10|km|mi|abbr=on}} into Iraq and managed to strike Saddam's ] in Baghdad using fighter aircraft.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> After three days of fighting, the decimated Iranians were driven back to their original positions again as the Iraqis launched 650 helicopter and 300 aircraft sorties.<ref name="csis10" />

====Operation Forty Stars====

On 18 June 1988, the ] (MEK) conducted a military operation known as ] ({{Langx|fa|عملیات چلچراغ}}).<ref name="Piazza">{{harvnb|Piazza|1994}}: "On June 19, 1988, the NLA launched its offensive entitled Chetel Setareh or "40 Stars" in which twenty-two organized brigades of Mojahedin recaptured the city of Mehran, which the regime had wrested from Iraqi control after the Mojahedin had set up its "provisional government" there. The Mojahedin claimed that absolutely no Iraqi soldiers participated in this operation, and Iraqi Culture and Information Minister, Latif Nusayyif Jasim, later denied that Iraq had deployed air units to help the NLA or had used chemical weapons to drive the Islamic Republic's troops from Mehran."</ref> In four days, the People's Mujahedin of Iran wiped out a ] division, seizing ] and building a bridgehead twelve miles into Iran.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Razoux|first1=Pierre|title=The Iran–Iraq War|date=2015|publisher=Harvard University Press|isbn=9780674915718|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FGsuCwAAQBAJ&q=nlai+iran+iraq&pg=PT464|access-date=5 January 2024|archive-date=25 November 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231125174652/https://books.google.com/books?id=FGsuCwAAQBAJ&q=nlai%20iran%20iraq&pg=PT464|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="csis10" /> According to the MEK, Iraqi soldiers did not participate in the operation. Baghdad also said it was not involved in the battle.<ref name="Piazza" />

====Tawakalna ala Allah operations====
On 25 May 1988, Iraq launched the first of five ],<ref name="Woods 2010" /> consisting of one of the largest artillery barrages in history, coupled with chemical weapons. The marshes had been dried by drought, allowing the Iraqis to use tanks to bypass Iranian field fortifications, expelling the Iranians from the border town of ] after less than 10 hours of combat.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|11}}<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|265|date=November 2012}}<ref name="csis10" />

]

On 25 June, Iraq launched the second Tawakal ala Allah operation against the Iranians on Majnoon Island. Iraqi commandos used ] to block the Iranian rear,<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> then used hundreds of tanks with massed conventional and chemical artillery barrages to recapture the island after 8 hours of combat.<ref name="Woods 2010" /><ref name="csis10" /> Saddam appeared live on Iraqi television to "lead" the charge against the Iranians.<ref name="csis10" /> The majority of the Iranian defenders were killed during the quick assault.<ref name="Woods 2010" /> The final two Tawakal ala Allah operations took place near al-Amarah and Khaneqan.<ref name="Woods 2010" /> By 12 July, the Iraqis had captured the city of ], {{convert|30|km|mi|abbr=on}} inside Iran, along with 2,500 troops and much armour and material, which took four days to transport to Iraq. These losses included more than 570 of the 1,000 remaining Iranian tanks, over 430 armored vehicles, 45 self-propelled artillery, 300 towed artillery pieces, and 320 antiaircraft guns. These figures only included what Iraq could actually put to use; total amount of captured materiel was higher. Since March, the Iraqis claimed to have captured 1,298 tanks, 155 infantry fighting vehicles, 512 heavy artillery pieces, 6,196 mortars, 5,550 recoilless rifles and light guns, 8,050-man-portable rocket launchers, 60,694 rifles, 322 pistols, 454 trucks, and 1,600 light vehicles.<ref name="csis10" /> The Iraqis withdrew from Dehloran soon after, claiming that they had "no desire to conquer Iranian territory".<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> History professor ] considered this to be Iran's greatest military disaster during the war. Stephen Pelletier, a Journalist, Middle East expert, and author, noted that "Tawakal ala Allah ... resulted in the absolute destruction of Iran's military machine."<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

During the 1988 battles, the Iranians put up little resistance, having been worn out by nearly eight years of war.<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|253|date=November 2012}} They lost large amounts of equipment.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> On 2 July, Iran belatedly set up a joint central command which unified the Revolutionary Guard, Army, and Kurdish rebels, and dispelled the rivalry between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard. However, this came too late and, following the capture of 570 of their operable tanks and the destruction of hundreds more, Iran was believed to have fewer than 200 remaining operable tanks on the southern front, against thousands of Iraqi ones.<ref name="csis10" /> The only area where the Iranians were not suffering major defeats was in Kurdistan.<ref name="Dunn 1998" />

===Iran accepts the ceasefire===
{{main|Peace efforts during the Iran–Iraq War}}
Saddam sent a warning to Khomeini in mid-1988, threatening to launch a new and powerful full-scale invasion and attack Iranian cities with ]. Shortly afterwards, Iraqi aircraft bombed the Iranian town of ] with poison gas, immediately killing and wounding over 2,000 civilians. The fear of an all out chemical attack against Iran's largely unprotected civilian population weighed heavily on the Iranian leadership, and they realized that the ] had no intention of restraining Iraq.<ref name="books.google.com">{{cite book|title=Iran's strategic intentions and capabilities|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dsxlDvyDjNAC&pg=PA211|publisher=Diane Publishing|isbn=978-1-4289-9255-9|page=211}}</ref> The lives of the civilian population of Iran were becoming very disrupted, with a third of the urban population evacuating major cities in fear of the seemingly imminent chemical war. Meanwhile, Iraqi conventional bombs and missiles continuously hit towns and cities, destroying vital civilian and military infrastructure, and increasing the death toll. Iran replied with missile and air attacks, but not sufficiently to deter the Iraqis.<ref name=csis10 />

]'' in 1987 a year before it shot down ]]]

With the threat of a new and even more powerful invasion, Commander-in-Chief ] ordered the Iranians to retreat from Haj Omran, Kurdistan on 14 July.<ref name="csis10" /><ref name="dodds09">{{cite journal|title=The Iran–Iraq War: Unattainable Objectives|last1=Dodds|first1=Joanna|last2=Wilson|first2=Ben|date=6 June 2009|journal=Middle East Review of International Affairs|volume=13|url=http://www.gloria-center.org/2009/06/dodds-wilson-2009-06-06/|issue=2|access-date=17 January 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141006121230/http://www.gloria-center.org/2009/06/dodds-wilson-2009-06-06/|archive-date=6 October 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref> The Iranians did not publicly describe this as a retreat, instead calling it a "temporary withdrawal".<ref name=dodds09 /> By July, Iran's army inside Iraq had largely disintegrated.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Iraq put up a massive display of captured Iranian weapons in Baghdad, claiming they captured 1,298 tanks, 5,550 recoilless rifles, and thousands of other weapons.<ref name="csis10" /> However, Iraq had taken heavy losses as well, and the battles were very costly.<ref name="Woods 2010" />

In July 1988, Iraqi aircraft dropped bombs on the Iranian Kurdish village of Zardan. Dozens of villages, such as ],<!--Chemical bombing of Sardasht was June 1987.--> and some larger towns, such as ], ] and ],<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.cbw-events.org.uk/EXIQ84Q1.PDF|title=Archived copy|access-date=28 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160810111132/http://cbw-events.org.uk/EXIQ84Q1.PDF|archive-date=10 August 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> were once again attacked with poison gas, resulting in even heavier civilian casualties.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/02/world/iran-reports-new-iraqi-gas-raids-and-says-cities-may-be-hit-next.html|title=Iran Reports New Iraqi Gas Raids; And Says Cities May be Hit Next|website=The New York Times|date=2 April 1988|access-date=5 October 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131007060612/http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/02/world/iran-reports-new-iraqi-gas-raids-and-says-cities-may-be-hit-next.html|archive-date=7 October 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> On 3 July 1988, the USS ''Vincennes'' shot down ], killing 290 passengers and crew. The lack of international sympathy disturbed the Iranian leadership, and they came to the conclusion that the United States was on the verge of waging a full-scale war against them, and that Iraq was on the verge of unleashing its entire chemical arsenal upon their cities.<ref name="books.google.com" />

At this point, elements of the Iranian leadership, led by Rafsanjani (who had initially pushed for the extension of the war), persuaded Khomeini to accept a ceasefire.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> They stated that in order to win the war, Iran's military budget would have to be increased eightfold and the war would last until 1993.<ref name="csis10" /> On 20 July 1988, Iran accepted Resolution 598, showing its willingness to accept a ceasefire.<ref name=efraimkarsh />{{rp|11}} A statement from Khomeini was read out in a radio address, and he expressed deep displeasure and reluctance about accepting the ceasefire,

<blockquote>Happy are those who have departed through martyrdom. Happy are those who have lost their lives in this convoy of light. Unhappy am I that I still survive and have drunk the poisoned chalice...<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|1|date=November 2012}}</blockquote>

The news of the end of the war was greeted with celebration in Baghdad, with people dancing in the streets; in Tehran, however, the end of the war was greeted with a somber mood.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|1|date=November 2012}}

====Operation Mersad and end of the war====
] ({{lang|fa|مرصاد}} "ambush") was the last big military operation of the war. Both Iran and Iraq had accepted Resolution 598, but despite the ceasefire, after seeing Iraqi victories in the previous months, ] (MEK) decided to launch an attack of its own and wished to advance all the way to Tehran. Saddam and the Iraqi high command decided on a two-pronged offensive across the border into central Iran and Iranian Kurdistan.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Shortly after Iran accepted the ceasefire, the MEK army began its offensive, attacking into Ilam province under cover of Iraqi air power. In the north, Iraq also launched an attack into Iraqi Kurdistan, which was blunted by the Iranians.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

On 26 July 1988, the MEK started their campaign in central Iran, Operation Forough Javidan (Eternal Light), with the support of the Iraqi army. The Iranians had withdrawn their remaining soldiers to Khuzestan in fear of a new Iraqi invasion attempt, allowing the Mujahedeen to advance rapidly towards ], seizing ], ], ], and ]. The MEK expected the Iranian population to rise up and support their advance; the uprising never materialised but they reached {{convert|145|km|mi|abbr=on}} deep into Iran. In response, the Iranian military launched its counter-attack, ], under Lieutenant General ]. Iranian ] landed behind the MEK lines while the Iranian Air Force and helicopters launched an air attack, destroying much of the enemy columns.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> The Iranians defeated the MEK in the city of ] on 29 July 1988.<ref name="csis10" /> On 31 July, Iran drove the MEK out of Qasr-e-Shirin and Sarpol Zahab, though MEK claimed to have "voluntarily withdrawn" from the towns.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name="csis10" /> Iran estimated that 4,500 MEK were killed, while 400 Iranian soldiers died.<ref name="tebyan05">{{cite web|url=http://www.tebyan.net/newindex.aspx?pid=27220|title=Mersad operation|date=27 July 2005|publisher=Tebyan|work=Special Edition}}</ref>

] soldiers killed in Operation Mersad, 1988]]

The last notable combat actions of the war took place on 3 August 1988, in the Persian Gulf when the Iranian navy fired on a ] and Iraq launched chemical attacks on Iranian civilians, killing an unknown number of them and wounding 2,300.<ref name="csis10" /> Iraq came under international pressure to curtail further offensives. Resolution 598 became effective on 8 August 1988, ending all combat operations between the two countries.<ref name="dodds09" /> By 20 August 1988, peace with Iran was restored.<ref name="dodds09" /> ] belonging to the ] mission took the field, remaining on the Iran–Iraq border until 1991. The majority of Western analysts believe that the war had no winners while some believed that Iraq emerged as the victor of the war, based on Iraq's overwhelming successes between April and July 1988.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> While the war was now over, Iraq spent the rest of August and early September clearing the Kurdish resistance. Using 60,000 troops along with helicopter gunships, chemical weapons (poison gas), and mass executions, Iraq hit 15 villages, killing rebels and civilians, and forced tens of thousands of Kurds to relocate to ].<ref name="csis10" /> Many Kurdish civilians fled to Iran. By 3 September 1988, the anti-Kurd campaign ended, and all resistance had been crushed.<ref name="csis10" /> 400 Iraqi soldiers and 50,000–100,000 Kurdish civilians and soldiers had been killed.<ref name="csis10" /><ref name="wong06">{{cite news|last=Wong|first=Edward|title=Hussein charged with genocide in 50,000 deaths|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/05/world/middleeast/05iraq.html|newspaper=The New York Times|date=5 April 2006|access-date=9 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180624093312/https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/05/world/middleeast/05iraq.html|archive-date=24 June 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

At the war's conclusion, it took several weeks for the ] to evacuate Iraqi territory to honor pre-war international borders set by the ].<ref name="Farrokh 03">{{cite book|last=Farrokh|first=Kaveh|title=Iran at War: 1500–1988|publisher=Osprey Publishing|location=Oxford|isbn=978-1-78096-221-4|date=2011}}</ref> The last ] were exchanged in 2003.<ref name="molavi05">{{cite book|last=Molavi|first=Afshin|title=The Soul of Iran: A Nation's Journey to Freedom|publisher=W.W. Norton & Company|year=2005|isbn=978-0-393-32597-3|edition=Revised|location=England|page=152}}</ref><ref name=nazila03>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/14/world/threats-and-responses-briefly-noted-iran-iraq-prisoner-deal.html|work=The New York Times|first=Nazila|last=Fathi|title=Threats And Responses: Briefly Noted; Iran–Iraq Prisoner Deal|date=14 March 2003|access-date=9 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180813175245/https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/14/world/threats-and-responses-briefly-noted-iran-iraq-prisoner-deal.html|archive-date=13 August 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>

The Security Council did not identify Iraq as the ] of the war until 11 December 1991, some 11 years after Iraq invaded Iran and 16 months following Iraq's ].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Tarock|first1=Adam|title=The superpowers' involvement in the Iran–Iraq War|date=1998|publisher=Nova Science Publishers|location=Commack, NY|isbn=978-1-56072-593-0|page=208}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran_Iraq_War_Legal_and_International_Dimensions.htm|title=Iran–Iraq War: Legal and International Dimensions|work=iranreview.org|access-date=31 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180420110303/http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran_Iraq_War_Legal_and_International_Dimensions.htm|archive-date=20 April 2018|url-status=dead}}</ref>

==Aftermath==
===Casualties===
] in ] was erected to commemorate the fallen Iraqi soldiers during the war.]]
The Iran–Iraq War was the deadliest conventional war ever fought between regular armies of developing countries.<ref name="Fürtig" /> ] states: "Estimates of total casualties range from 1,000,000 to twice that number. The number killed on both sides was perhaps 500,000, with Iran suffering the greatest losses."<ref name="Britannica Iran–Iraq War"/> Iraqi casualties are estimated at 105,000–200,000 killed,<ref name="hiro205" /><ref name="PotterSick2006" /><ref name="Karsh2002" /><ref name="KochLong1997" /> while about 400,000 had been wounded and some 70,000 taken prisoner.<ref name="Mikaberidze2011" /><ref name="Karsh2002" /> Thousands of civilians on both sides died in air raids and ballistic missile attacks.<ref name="AggrPolitics" /> Prisoners taken by both countries began to be released on 17 August 1990, though some were not released until more than 10 years after the end of the conflict.<ref name="molavi05" /> Cities on both sides had also been considerably damaged. While revolutionary Iran had been bloodied, Iraq was left with a large military and was a ], albeit with severe debt, financial problems, and labour shortages.<ref name="Dunn 1998" />

According to Iranian government sources, the war cost Iran an estimated 200,000–220,000 killed,<ref name="hiro205" /><ref name="Abrahamian2008" /><ref name="Mikaberidze2011" /><ref name="PotterSick2006" /> or up to 262,000 according to the conservative Western estimates.<ref name="hiro205" /><ref name="Rajaee1997" /> This includes 123,220 combatants,<ref name="hiro205" /><ref name="Abrahamian2008" /> 60,711 ]<ref name="hiro205" /> and 11,000–16,000 ].<ref name="hiro205" /><ref name="Abrahamian2008" /> Combatants include 79,664 members of the ] and additional 35,170 soldiers from ].<ref name="Abrahamian2008" /> In addition, ] accounted for 42,875 Iranian casualties, captured and kept in Iraqi detention centres from 2.5 to more than 15 years after the war was over.<ref name="Zargar2012" />

According to the Janbazan Affairs Organization, 398,587 Iranians sustained injuries that required prolonged medical and health care following primary treatment, including 52,195 (13%) injured due to the exposure to ] agents.<ref name="Zargar2012" /> From 1980 to 2012, 218,867 Iranians died due to war injuries and the mean age of combatants was 23 years old.<ref name="Zargar2012" /> This includes 33,430 civilians, mostly women and children.<ref name="Zargar2012" /> More than 144,000 Iranian children were orphaned as a consequence of these deaths.<ref name="Zargar2012" /> Other estimates put Iranian casualties up to 600,000.<ref name="Dunnigan 1991" /><ref name="Twentieth Century World History 1997" /><ref name="ReferenceA" /><ref name="Chirot, Daniel 1994" /><ref>Hammond Atlas of the 20th Century (1996), pp. 134–135</ref><ref>War Annual: The World in Conflict War Annual .</ref><ref>"B&J": Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, ''International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management 1945–1995'' (1997), p. 195</ref>

Both Iraq and Iran manipulated loss figures to suit their purposes. At the same time, Western analysts accepted improbable estimates.<ref name="PelletiereJohnson1990">{{cite book|last1=Pelletiere|first1=Stephen C.|last2=Johnson|first2=Douglas V.|title=Lessons Learned: Iran–Iraq War|series=Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication|issue=3–203|publisher=]|location=Washington, D.C.|date=10 December 1990|pages=117–119|url=https://fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/docs/3203/appf.pdf|oclc=37998429|access-date=2 November 2013|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131103065353/http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/docs/3203/appf.pdf|archive-date=3 November 2013}}</ref> By April 1988, such casualties were estimated at between 150,000 and 340,000 Iraqis dead, and 450,000 to 730,000 Iranians.<ref name="PelletiereJohnson1990" /> Shortly after the end of the war, it was thought that Iran suffered even more than a million dead.<ref name="Abrahamian2008" /> Considering the style of fighting on the ground and the fact that neither side penetrated deeply into the other's territory, ] analysts believe events do not substantiate the high casualties claimed.<ref name="PelletiereJohnson1990" /> The ] has claimed 800,000 Iranians were killed in action, four times more than Iranian official figures,<ref name="hiro205" /> whereas Iraqi intelligence privately put the number at 228,000–258,000 as of August 1986.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1987–1988: An end in sight?|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=300–301 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> Iraqi losses were also revised downwards over time.<ref name="KochLong1997" />

===Peace talks and postwar situation===

]]]

With the ] in place, and UN peacekeepers monitoring the border, Iran and Iraq sent their representatives to ], ], to negotiate a peace agreement on the terms of the ceasefire. However, peace talks stalled. Iraq, in violation of the UN ceasefire, refused to withdraw its troops from {{convert|3000|sqmi|km2|order=flip}} of disputed territory at the border area unless the Iranians accepted Iraq's full sovereignty over the ] waterway. Foreign powers continued to support Iraq, which wanted to gain at the negotiating table what they failed to achieve on the battlefield, and Iran was portrayed as the one not wanting peace.<ref name=Tarock />

In response, Iran refused to release 70,000 Iraqi prisoners of war, compared to 40,000 Iranian prisoners of war held by Iraq. They continued to carry out a naval blockade of Iraq, although its effects were mitigated by Iraqi use of ports in friendly neighbouring Arab countries. Iran began to improve relations with many of the states that opposed it during the war. Because of Iranian actions, by 1990, Saddam had become more conciliatory, and in a letter to the future fourth President of Iran Rafsanjani, he became more open to the idea of a peace agreement, although he still insisted on full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab.<ref name=Tarock>{{cite book|last=Tarock|first=Adam|title=The Superpower's Involvement in the Iran Iraq War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tJVggCw553QC&q=Iran+Iraq+peace+agreement&pg=PA192|isbn=978-1560725930|year=1998|publisher=Nova Publishers|access-date=12 November 2020|archive-date=18 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230118165557/https://books.google.com/books?id=tJVggCw553QC&q=Iran+Iraq+peace+agreement&pg=PA192|url-status=live}}</ref>

By 1990, Iran was undergoing military rearmament and reorganization, and purchased $10&nbsp;billion worth of heavy weaponry from the USSR and China, including aircraft, tanks, and missiles. Rafsanjani reversed Iran's self-imposed ban on chemical weapons, and ordered the manufacture and stockpile of them (Iran destroyed them in 1993 after ratifying the ]).{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} As ] loomed, Iraq became concerned about the possibility of Iran mending its relations with the west in order to attack Iraq. Iraq had lost its support from the West, and its position in Iran was increasingly untenable.<ref name=Tarock /> Saddam realized that if Iran attempted to expel the Iraqis from the disputed territories in the border area, it was likely they would succeed.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

Shortly after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam wrote a letter to Rafsanjani stating that Iraq recognised Iranian rights over the eastern half of the Shatt al-Arab, a reversion to ''status quo ante bellum'' that he had repudiated a decade earlier,<ref name="Onwar 2000">{{cite web|title=Iran–Iraq war 1980–1990|url=http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr80/firaniraq1980.htm|access-date=10 March 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190410195834/https://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr80/firaniraq1980.htm|archive-date=10 April 2019|url-status=dead}}</ref> and that he would accept Iran's demands and withdraw Iraq's military from the disputed territories. A peace agreement was signed finalizing the terms of the UN resolution, ] were restored, and by late 1990-early 1991, the Iraqi military withdrew. The UN peacekeepers withdrew from the border shortly afterward. Most of the prisoners of war were released in 1990, although some remained as late as 2003.<ref name=Tarock /> Iranian politicians declared it to be the "greatest victory in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran".<ref name=Tarock />

Most historians and analysts consider the war to be a stalemate.<ref name="Karsh2002" /><ref>{{Cite magazine|last=Segal|first=David|date=28 January 2009|title=The Iran–Iraq War: A Military Analysis|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1988-06-01/iran-iraq-war-military-analysis|volume=66|issue=Summer 1988|work=Foreign Affairs|access-date=16 March 2019|archive-date=28 November 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181128193219/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1988-06-01/iran-iraq-war-military-analysis|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="molavi05" /> Certain analysts believe that Iraq won, on the basis of the successes of their 1988 offensives which thwarted Iran's major territorial ambitions in Iraq and persuaded Iran to accept the ceasefire.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /> Iranian analysts believe that they won the war because although they did not succeed in overthrowing the Iraqi government, they thwarted Iraq's major territorial ambitions in Iran, and that, two years after the war had ended, Iraq permanently gave up its claim of ownership over the entire Shatt al-Arab as well.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

On 9 December 1991, ], ] at the time, reported that Iraq's initiation of the war was unjustified, as was its occupation of Iranian territory and use of chemical weapons against civilians:

<blockquote>That explanations do not appear sufficient or acceptable to the international community is a fact... cannot be justified under the charter of the United Nations, any recognized rules and principles of international law, or any principles of international morality, and entails the responsibility for conflict. Even if before the outbreak of the conflict there had been some encroachment by Iran on Iraqi territory, such encroachment did not justify Iraq's aggression against Iran—which was followed by Iraq's continuous occupation of Iranian territory during the conflict—in violation of the prohibition of the use of force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus cogens...On one occasion I had to note with deep regret the experts' conclusion that "chemical weapons ha been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban center lacking any protection against that kind of attack."<ref>{{cite report|publisher=U.N. Secretary General's|date=9 December 1991|url=http://www.iranian.com/Kasraie/2005/April/Ahwaz/Images/page2.pdf|title=Further Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 598|quote=That explanations do not appear sufficient or acceptable to the international community is a fact. Accordingly, the outstanding event under the violations referred to is the attack of 22 September 1980, against Iran, which cannot be justified under the charter of the United Nations, any recognized rules and principles of international law or any principles of international morality and entails the responsibility for conflict.<br />Even if before the outbreak of the conflict there had been some encroachment by Iran on Iraqi territory, such encroachment did not justify Iraq's aggression against Iran—which was followed by Iraq's continuous occupation of Iranian territory during the conflict—in violation of the prohibition of the use of force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus cogens.<br />...On one occasion I had to note with deep regret the experts' conclusion that "chemical weapons ha been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban center lacking any protection against that kind of attack" (s/20134, annex). The Council expressed its dismay on the matter and its condemnation in ] (1988), adopted on 26 August 1988.|access-date=23 May 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120130153306/http://www.iranian.com/Kasraie/2005/April/Ahwaz/Images/page2.pdf|archive-date=30 January 2012|url-status=live}} S/23273, items 6, 7, and 8</ref></blockquote>

He also stated that had the UN accepted this fact earlier, the war would have almost certainly not lasted as long as it did. Iran, encouraged by the announcement, sought reparations from Iraq, but never received any.<ref name=Tarock />

]

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Iran and Iraq relations remained balanced between a ] and a ]. Despite renewed and somewhat thawed relations, both sides continued to have low level conflicts. Iraq continued to host and support the ], which carried out multiple attacks throughout Iran up until the ], including the ] of Iranian general ] in 1999, cross border raids, and mortar attacks. Iran carried out several ]s and missile attacks against Mujahedeen targets inside of Iraq, the largest taking place in 2001, when Iran fired 56 Scud missiles at Mujahedeen targets.<ref name="New York Times Scuds 2001">{{cite web|title=Iraq accuses Iran of Scud missile attack|website=Los Angeles Times|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-apr-19-mn-52980-story.html|date=19 April 2001|access-date=21 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120111161808/http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/19/news/mn-52980|archive-date=11 January 2012|url-status=live}}</ref>

According to General Hamdani, Iran continued to carry out low-level infiltrations of Iraqi territory, using Iraqi dissidents and anti-government activists rather than Iranian troops, in order to incite revolts. After the fall of Saddam in 2003, Hamdani claimed that Iranian agents infiltrated and created numerous militias in Iraq and built an intelligence system operating within the country.<ref name="Woods 2010" />

In 2005, the new government of Iraq apologised to Iran for starting the war.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary|location=London|work=The Guardian|first=Ian|last=Black|title=Iran and Iraq remember war that cost more than a million lives|date=23 September 2010|access-date=14 December 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170102173349/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary|archive-date=2 January 2017|url-status=live}}</ref> The Iraqi government also commemorated the war with various monuments, including the ] and the ], both in Baghdad. The war also helped to create a forerunner for the ], when the ] states banded together early in the war to form the ] to help Iraq fight Iran.<ref name="Dunn 1998" />

===Economic situation===
The economic loss at the time was believed to exceed $500&nbsp;billion for each country ($1.2&nbsp;trillion total).<ref name="Riedel"/><ref name="encarta88">{{cite encyclopedia|url=http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761580640_2/Iran-Iraq_War.html|title=Iran–Iraq War|encyclopedia=Encarta|publisher=MSN|date=20 August 1988|access-date=1 March 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090406234844/http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761580640_2/Iran-Iraq_War.html|archive-date=6 April 2009}}</ref> In addition, economic development stalled and oil exports were disrupted. Iraq had accrued more than $130&nbsp;billion of international debt, excluding interest, and was also weighed down by a slowed ]. Iraq's debt to the ] amounted to $21&nbsp;billion, 85% of which had originated from the combined inputs of Japan, the USSR, France, Germany, the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom. The largest portion of Iraq's debt, amounting to $130&nbsp;billion, was to its former Arab backers, with $67&nbsp;billion loaned by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, ], and Jordan.{{citation needed|date=February 2023}}

After the war, Iraq accused Kuwait of ] and stealing oil, inciting its ], which in turn worsened Iraq's financial situation: the ] mandated Iraq to pay reparations of more than $200&nbsp;billion to victims of the invasion, including Kuwait and the United States. To enforce payment, Iraq was put under a ], which further strained the Iraqi economy and pushed its ] to private and public sectors to more than $500&nbsp;billion by the end of Saddam's rule. Combined with Iraq's negative economic growth after prolonged international sanctions, this produced a ] of more than 1,000%, making Iraq the most indebted developing country in the world. The unsustainable economic situation compelled the new Iraqi government to request that a considerable portion of debt incurred during the Iran–Iraq war be written off.<ref name="weiss11">{{cite report|last=Weiss|first=Martin A.|publisher=Congressional Research Service|title=Iraq's Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential Implications for International Debt Relief|date=29 March 2011|url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33376.pdf|via=Federation of American Scientists|access-date=20 June 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924132518/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33376.pdf|archive-date=24 September 2015|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="truman03">{{cite news|author=Truman, Edwin M.|url=http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=249|title=Op-ed: The Right Way to Ease Iraq's Debt Burden|newspaper=Financial Times|location=London|date=28 April 2003|access-date=2 August 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110713005331/http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=249|archive-date=13 July 2011|url-status=dead}} Re-published by Peterson Institute for International Economics</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7492115.stm|publisher=BBC News|title=UAE waives billions of Iraqi debt|date=6 July 2008|access-date=12 August 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080722083028/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7492115.stm|archive-date=22 July 2008|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5736M320090804|agency=Reuters|title=Iraq war reparations to Kuwait could be reduced: UK|date=4 August 2009|access-date=1 July 2017|archive-date=26 January 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126200140/https://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5736M320090804|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Science and technology===

The war had its impact on medical science: a surgical intervention for comatose patients with penetrating ] was ] treating wounded soldiers, later establishing ] guidelines to treat civilians who had suffered blunt or penetrating skull injuries.<ref name=":2">{{Cite news|url=https://www.latimes.com/health/la-xpm-2011-jan-24-la-he-medical-advances-20110124-story.html|title=Advances in treatment help more people survive severe injuries to the brain|last=Healy|first=Melissa|date=2011-01-24|newspaper=Los Angeles Times|issn=0458-3035|access-date=2016-10-12|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161013082653/http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/24/health/la-he-medical-advances-20110124|archive-date=13 October 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> Iranian physicians' experience in the war informed the medical care of U.S. congresswoman ] after the ].<ref name=":2" /><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Amirjamshidi|first1=Abbass|title=Minimal debridement or simple wound closure as the only surgical treatment in war victims with low-velocity penetrating head injuries: indications and management protocol based upon more than 8 years follow-up of 99 cases from Iran–Iraq conflict|journal=Surgical Neurology|date=2003|volume=60|issue=2|pages=105–110; discussion 110–111|doi=10.1016/S0090-3019(03)00358-6|pmid=12900110}}</ref>

In addition to helping trigger the Persian Gulf War, the Iran–Iraq War also contributed to Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War. Iraq's military was accustomed to fighting the slow moving Iranian infantry formations with artillery and static defenses, while using mostly unsophisticated tanks to gun down and shell the infantry and overwhelm the smaller Iranian tank force; in addition to being dependent on ] to help secure victories. Therefore, they were rapidly overwhelmed by the high-tech, quick-maneuvering ] using modern doctrines such as ].<ref name="Dunn 1998" />

==Domestic situation==
===Iraq===

At first, Saddam attempted to ensure that the Iraqi population suffered from the war as little as possible. There was rationing, but civilian projects begun before the war continued.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> At the same time, the already extensive ] around Saddam reached new heights while the regime tightened its control over the military.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

After the Iranian victories of the spring of 1982 and the Syrian closure of Iraq's main pipeline, Saddam did a ] on his policy towards the home front: a policy of austerity and total war was introduced, with the entire population being mobilised for the war effort.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> All Iraqis were ordered to donate blood and around 100,000 Iraqi civilians were ordered to clear the reeds in the southern marshes. Mass demonstrations of loyalty towards Saddam became more common.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Saddam also began implementing a policy of discrimination against Iraqis of Iranian origin.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

In the summer of 1982, Saddam began a ]. More than 300 Iraqi Army officers were executed for their failures on the battlefield.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> In 1983, a major crackdown was launched on the leadership of the Shia community. Ninety members of the al-Hakim family, an influential family of Shia clerics whose leading members were the émigrés ] and ], were arrested, and six were hanged.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

The crackdown on Kurds saw 8,000 members of the ], whose leader (]) also led the Kurdistan Democratic Party, similarly executed.<ref name="efraimkarsh" /> From 1983 onwards, a campaign of increasingly brutal repression was started against the Iraqi Kurds, characterised by Israeli historian ] as having "assumed genocidal proportions" by 1988.<ref name="efraimkarsh" /> The ] was intended to "pacify" Iraqi Kurdistan permanently.<ref name="efraimkarsh" /> By 1983, the Barzanis entered an alliance with Iran in defense against Saddam Hussein.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Entessar|first=Nader|title=Kurdish Ethnonationalism|date=1992|publisher=Lynn Rienner Publishers|isbn=978-1-55587-250-2|page=131}}</ref>

====Gaining civilian support====
To secure the loyalty of the Shia population, Saddam allowed more Shias into the Ba'ath Party and the government, and improved Shia living standards, which had been lower than those of the Iraqi Sunnis.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Saddam had the state pay for restoring ]'s tomb with white marble imported from Italy.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The Baathists also increased their policies of repression against the Shia. The most infamous event was the ] of the Shia town of ].<ref name="Dujail-Indian Express">{{cite news|title=The Dujail Massacre|url=http://www.indianexpress.com/news/the-dujail-massacre-/19772|date=31 December 2006|newspaper=The Indian Express}}</ref>

Despite the costs of the war, the Iraqi regime made generous contributions to Shia '']'' (religious endowments) as part of the price of buying Iraqi Shia support.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|75–76|date=November 2012}} The importance of winning Shia support was such that welfare services in Shia areas were expanded during a time in which the Iraqi regime was pursuing austerity in all other non-military fields.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|76|date=November 2012}} During the first years of the war in the early 1980s, the Iraqi government tried to accommodate the Kurds in order to focus on the war against Iran. In 1983, the ] agreed to cooperate with Baghdad, but the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) remained opposed.<ref name=katzman>{{cite report|url=https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22079.pdf|title=The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq|page=2|date=1 October 2010|access-date=2 August 2011|publisher=Congressional Research Service|author=Katzman, Kenneth|via=Federation of American Scientists|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110815173718/http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22079.pdf|archive-date=15 August 2011|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1983, Saddam signed an autonomy agreement with ] of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), though Saddam later reneged on the agreement.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> By 1985, the PUK and KDP had joined forces, and Iraqi Kurdistan saw widespread guerrilla warfare up to the end of the war.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

===Iran===


], 2013]]
====US shoots down civilian airliner====
In the course of these escorts by the U.S. Navy, the cruiser ] shot down ] with the loss of all 290 passengers and crew on 3 July 1988. The ] claimed that the airliner had been mistaken for an Iranian ], and that the Vincennes was operating in international waters at the time and feared that it was under attack, which later appeared to be untrue.<ref name="ROE" /><ref name="Fisk">{{cite book
| first = Robert |last=Fisk
| title = The Great War for Civilization - The Conquest of the Middle East
| year = 2007
| publisher = Vintage
| isbn-10 = 1400075173}}</ref> The Iranians, however, maintain that the Vincennes was in fact in Iranian territorial waters, and that the Iranian passenger jet was turning away and increasing altitude after take-off. U.S. Admiral ] also admitted on ] that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles. At the time, the captain of the Vincennes claimed that the Iranian plane did not identify itself and sent no respond to warning signals from the Vincennes. Apart from Iran, other independent sources, for example the airport of Dubai, have confirmed that the plane did indeed identify itself to the American naval ship and also confirmed that "the civilian aircraft was ascending and therefore could not have posed a threat," agreeing with Iranian officials.<ref name=iranica-IIW>S. M. Gieling, , in ''Encyclopaedia Iranica'', 2006.</ref>


Israeli-British historian ] argued that the Iranian government saw the outbreak of war as chance to strengthen its position and consolidate the Islamic revolution, noting that government propaganda presented it domestically as a glorious '']'' and a test of Iranian national character.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> The Iranian regime followed a policy of total war from the beginning, and attempted to mobilise the nation as a whole.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> They established a group known as the ], whose members were exempted from conscription and were instead sent into the countryside to work on farms to replace the men serving at the front.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
According to an investigation conducted by ABC News' ''Nightline'', decoys were set during the war by the US Navy inside the ] to lure out the Iranian gunboats and destroy them, and at the time USS ''Vincennes'' shot down the Iranian airliner, it was performing such an operation.


Iranian workers had a day's pay deducted from their pay cheques every month to help finance the war, and mass campaigns were launched to encourage the public to donate food, money, and blood.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> To further help finance the war, the Iranian government banned the import of all non-essential items, and launched a major effort to rebuild the damaged oil plants.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
In 1996 the U.S. agreed to pay $131, 800, 000 in compensation for the incident, but expressed regret only for the loss of innocent life, and did not make a specific apology to the Iranian government.<ref name="ROE" /><ref name="AggrPolitics">{{cite book
| title = The Iran–Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression
| first = Farhang |last=Rajaee
| publisher = University Press of Florida}}</ref>


According to former Iraqi general ], the Iraqis believed that in addition to the Arab revolts, the Revolutionary Guards would be drawn out of Tehran, leading to a ] in Iran that would cause Khomeini's government to collapse and thus ensure Iraqi victory.<ref name="Woods 2010" /><ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1980: The Iraqi invasion begins|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=107–109 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref> However, rather than turning against the revolutionary government as experts had predicted, Iran's people (including Iranian Arabs) rallied in support of the country and put up a stiff resistance.<ref name="Farrokh 03" /><ref name=iranchamber-iraniraqwar />
The shooting down of a civilian Iranian passenger plane ''Iran Air Flight 655'' by the American cruiser ''USS Vincennes'', was cited by an Iranian scholar {{Who|date=April 2008}} as apparently giving ] reason to withdraw from the conflict:<ref>], 11 August 2004]</ref>
{{quote|An Iranian scholar present at the conference said a turning point in Iran's thinking came with the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane in July 1988 by the American cruiser USS Vincennes. That incident apparently led Ayatollah Khomeini to conclude that Iran could not risk the possibility of U.S. open combat operations against Iran and he decided it was time to end the conflict.}}


The ] grew as an organization to encompass not just military concerns but also matters of economic, religious, and educational importance.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book|last=Tracy Samuel|first=Annie|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/unfinished-history-of-the-iraniraq-war/C83D5341A9DC845B9B458F8C3143BC56|title=The Unfinished History of the Iran–Iraq War: Faith, Firepower, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards|date=2021|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-47842-7|location=Cambridge|access-date=26 April 2024|archive-date=26 April 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240426224945/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/unfinished-history-of-the-iraniraq-war/C83D5341A9DC845B9B458F8C3143BC56|url-status=live}}</ref> The organization's growth during the war is vital to understanding the organization's role in Iranian society and how it has evolved since its initial formation in 1979. Domestically, the IRGC dealt with suppressing uprisings by Kurds, Baluchs, Turkmen, and the ] (MEK) which broke with Khomeini in June 1981. While initially dealing with internal threats to the revolution in its first few years, the IRGC focused its attention on external threats at the outbreak of the war in 1980. In January 1981, the IRGC would take control of the ] to aid in the fight against Iraqi forces.<ref name=":3" /> The Basij helped bolster the prominence and legitimacy of the IRGC during the war as a vehicle for indoctrination and through its contributions to the defense of Iran. The transformation of the IRGC organized its command structure which allowed for the organization to match the force of Iran's regular military and its first abroad deployment during the war began the sponsoring of other armed groups in the region through its command of the ].<ref>{{Cite web|title=Iran's Revolutionary Guards|url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards|access-date=2024-04-26|website=Council on Foreign Relations|language=en|archive-date=20 October 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211020120758/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/irans-revolutionary-guards|url-status=live}}</ref>
==="War of the Cities"===
<!-- This section is linked from ] -->
Toward the end of the war, the land conflict regressed into ] largely because neither side had enough self-propelled artillery or air power to support ground advances.


====Civil unrest====
The relatively professional Iraqi armed forces could not make headway against the far more numerous Iranian ]. The Iranians were outmatched in towed and self-propelled ], which left their tanks and troops vulnerable. What followed was the Iranians substituting infantry for artillery.
In June 1981, street battles broke out between the Revolutionary Guard and the left-wing Mujaheddin e-Khalq (MEK), continuing for several days and killing hundreds on both sides.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|250|date=November 2012}} In September, more unrest broke out on the streets of Iran as the MEK attempted to seize power.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Thousands of left-wing Iranians (many of whom were not associated with the MEK) were shot and hanged by the government.<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|251|date=November 2012}} The MEK began an assassination campaign that killed hundreds of regime officials by the fall of 1981.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|251|date=November 2012}} On 28 June 1981, they assassinated the secretary-general of the Islamic Republican Party, ] and on 30 August, killed Iran's president, ].<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|251|date=November 2012}} The government responded with mass executions of suspected MEK members, a practice that lasted until 1985.<ref name=efraimkarsh />


In addition to the open civil conflict with the MEK, the Iranian government was faced with Iraqi-supported rebellions in Iranian Kurdistan, which were gradually put down through a campaign of systematic repression.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> 1985 also saw student anti-war demonstrations, which were crushed by government forces.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
Iraq's air force soon began ] against Iranian cities, chiefly ], in 1985. To minimize losses from the superior Iranian Air Force, Iraq rapidly switched to ] and ] improved Scud launches. In retaliation, Iran fired ] missiles acquired from Libya and Syria against ]. In all, Iraq launched 520 Scuds and Al-Husseins against Iran and received only 177 in exchange. In October 1986, Iraqi aircraft attacked civilian passenger trains and aircraft, including an ] Boeing 737 unloading passengers at ].


====Economy====
In retaliation for the Iranian ], an early 1987 attempt to capture Basra, Iraq attacked 65 cities in 226 sorties over 42 days, bombing civilian neighborhoods. Eight Iranian cities came under attack from Iraqi missiles. The bombings killed 65 children in an elementary school in ] alone. The Iranians also responded with Scud missile attacks on Baghdad and struck a primary school there. These events became known as "the war of the cities".<ref name="AggrPolitics" />
In September 2020, ] announced that Iran spent $19.6 billion in the war.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1436923/%D8%A8%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B2%DB%8C%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85|title=ببینید {{pipe}} اعلام رسمی هزینه‌های جنگ تحمیلی توسط عالی‌ترین مقام نظامی کشور برای اولین بار|date=27 September 2020|website=خبرآنلاین|access-date=30 January 2021|archive-date=28 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201028232315/https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/1436923/%D8%A8%D8%A8%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%B2%DB%8C%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%B7-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85|url-status=live}}</ref> The war furthered the decline of the Iranian economy that had begun with the revolution in 1978–79.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Between 1979 and 1981, foreign exchange reserves fell from $14.6&nbsp;billion to $1&nbsp;billion.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> As a result of the war, living standards dropped dramatically,<ref name=efraimkarsh /><ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|252|date=November 2012}} and Iran was described by British journalists John Bulloch and Harvey Morris as "a dour and joyless place" ruled by a harsh regime that "seemed to have nothing to offer but endless war".<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|239|date=November 2012}}


Though Iran was becoming bankrupt, Khomeini interpreted Islam's prohibition of usury to mean they could not borrow against future oil revenues to meet war expenses. As a result, Iran funded the war by the income from oil exports after cash had run out. The revenue from oil dropped from $20&nbsp;billion in 1982 to $5&nbsp;billion in 1988.<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|252|date=November 2012}} French historian Pierre Razoux argued that this sudden drop in economic industrial potential, in conjunction with the increasing aggression of Iraq, placed Iran in a challenging position that had little leeway other than accepting Iraq's conditions of peace.
===Towards a ceasefire===
] supported by Saddam started their ten day operation after the Iranian government accepted UN Resolution 598. Casualties ranged from 2, 000 to 10, 000.]]
1987 saw a renewed wave of Iranian offensives against targets in both the north and south of Iraq. Iranian troops were stopped by Iraqi prepared defenses in the south in a month-and-a-half long battle for Basra (]), but met with more success later in the year in the north as Operations ] and ] threatened to capture the oil-rich Iraqi city of ] and other northern oilfields. However, the Iranian forces were unable to consolidate their gains and continue their advance, and so 1987 saw little land change hands. On 20 July, the Security Council of the United Nations passed the US-sponsored Resolution 598, which called for an end to fighting and a return to pre-war boundaries. Iraq, which had lost important pieces of land over the course of the war, accepted the resolution. Iran, however, was loathe to surrender its gains when total victory seemed close at hand, and so the fighting continued.<ref>{{citation
| title = Iran–Iraq War: Diplomacy and International Involvement
| url = http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761580640_2/Iran-Iraq_War.html
| author = MSN Encarta Encyclopedia
}}</ref>


In January 1985, former prime minister and anti-war Islamic Liberation Movement co-founder ] criticised the war in a telegram to the United Nations, calling it un-Islamic and illegitimate and arguing that Khomeini should have accepted Saddam's truce offer in 1982 instead of attempting to overthrow the Ba'ath.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> In a public letter to Khomeini sent in May 1988, he added "Since 1986, you have not stopped proclaiming victory, and now you are calling upon population to resist until victory. Is that not an admission of failure on your part?"<ref name=brogan89 />{{rp|252|date=November 2012}} Khomeini was annoyed by Bazargan's telegram, and issued a lengthy public rebuttal in which he defended the war as both Islamic and just.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
By April 1988, however, the Iraqi forces had regrouped sufficiently to begin a new series of devastating attacks on the Iranians, and in quick succession recaptured the strategic al-Faw peninsula (lost in 1986 in ]) and territory around Basra and also struck deep into the Iranian north, capturing much matériel.<ref name="GlobalSecIIWar" /> In July 1988 Iraqi airplanes dropped chemical cyanide bombs on the Iranian Kurdish village of Zardan (as they had done four months earlier at their own Kurdish village of Halabja). Hundreds were killed at once, and the survivors are still suffering from a variety of physical and mental disorders. The enraged Iranians considered a huge rearming and nuclear weapons, but decided that this was beyond their means. Following these major setbacks, Iran accepted the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 598. However Iraq, which had seen major victories in the end of the war, thought at first it could invade Iran once more; in the end, Iraqi forces managed to make small gains in Khuzestan but were halted by the Iranians and so Iraq also accepted the terms and on 20 August 1988 peace was restored.


By 1987, Iranian morale had begun to crumble, reflected in the failure of government campaigns to recruit "martyrs" for the front.<ref name=efraimkarsh /> Israeli historian Efraim Karsh points to the decline in morale in 1987–88 as being a major factor in Iran's decision to accept the ceasefire of 1988.<ref name=efraimkarsh />
The ] started their ten day operation after the Iranian government accepted UN Resolution 598. While Iraqi forces attacked ], the Mujahedin attacked western Iran and battled the Pasdaran for Kermanshah. Close air support from the Iraqis contributed to whatever gains the Mojahedin made. However, under heavy international pressure for ending the war, Saddam Hussein withdrew his fighter aircraft and the sky opened for the Iranian airborne forces to be deployed behind Mojahedin lines. The operation ended in a defeat for the Mojahedin. Casualty figures range from 2, 000 to as high as 10, 000.


Not all saw the war in negative terms. The Islamic Revolution of Iran was strengthened and radicalised.<ref>{{cite book|last=Nasr|first=Vali Nasr|title=The Shia revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future|year=2007|publisher=W.W. Norton|location=New York|isbn=978-0-393-32968-1|edition=New|page=140}}</ref> The Iranian government-owned ''Etelaat'' newspaper wrote, "There is not a single school or town that is excluded from the happiness of 'holy defence' of the nation, from drinking the exquisite elixir of martyrdom, or from the sweet death of the martyr, who dies in order to live forever in paradise."<ref>Column in ''Etelaat'', 4 April 1983, quoted in {{cite book|last=Molavi|first=Afshin|title=The soul of Iran a nation's journey to freedom|year=2005|publisher=W.W. Norton & Co|location=England|isbn=978-0-393-32597-3|edition=Revised}}</ref>
{{seealso|Operation Mersad}}


==Comparison of Iraqi and Iranian military strength== ==Comparison of Iraqi and Iranian military strength==
{{main|Order of battle during the Iran–Iraq War}} {{See also|Order of battle during the Iran–Iraq War}}


Iran's ] had been purged after the ], with most high-ranking officers either having fled the country or been executed.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dolatebahar.com/view/205831/%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%88-%DA%AF%D9%88-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%B5%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AA%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D8%B4%D8%AF-%DA%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DA%A9%DB%8C%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7-|title=در گفت و گو با هوشنگ صمدی، فرمانده تکاوران نیروی دریایی مستقر در خرمشهر مطرح شد/ گلایه های ناخدای خونین شهر از کیمیا – دولت بهار|access-date=27 May 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160603170024/http://www.dolatebahar.com/view/205831/%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D9%81%D8%AA-%D9%88-%DA%AF%D9%88-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%86%DA%AF-%D8%B5%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%8C-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AA%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%B1%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%B1%D8%AD-%D8%B4%D8%AF-%DA%AF%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%DA%A9%DB%8C%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7-|archive-date=3 June 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref>
At the commencement of hostilities, Iraq held a clear advantage in armour, while both nations were roughly at parity with artillery. The gap only widened as the war went on. Iran started with a stronger air force, but over time, the balance of power flipped towards favoring Iraq. By the end of the war, Iraq enjoyed an immense numerical superiority over Iran's forces in every category. '']'' estimates for 1980 and 1987 were:<ref>"The Arming, and Disarming, of Iran's Revolution," '']'', International Edition, September 19, 1987, 56-57.</ref>

<center>
At the beginning of the war, Iraq held a clear advantage in armour, while both nations were roughly equal in terms of artillery. The gap only widened as the war went on. Iran started with a stronger air force, but over time, the balance of power reversed in Iraq's favour (as Iraq was constantly expanding its military, while Iran was under arms sanctions). Estimates for 1980 and 1987 were:<ref>{{cite news|title=The Arming, and Disarming, of Iran's Revolution|newspaper=]|edition=International|date=19 September 1987|pages=56–57}}</ref>
{| border="1" class="wikitable" monkey peaches :)

{| class="wikitable" style="margin: 1em auto; text-align:center; "
|- |-
! Imbalance of Power (1980–1987) !! Iraq !! Iran ! Imbalance of Power (1980–1987) !! Iraq !! Iran
|- |-
|align="center" |] in 1980 | Tanks in 1980
| 2,700
|align="center" |2700
| 1,740 (~500 operable)
|align="center" |1740
|- |-
|align="center" |] in 1987 | style="border-bottom:2px solid black;"|Tanks in 1987
| style="border-bottom:2px solid black;"|4,500+
|align="center" |4500
| style="border-bottom:2px solid black;"|1,000
|align="center" |1000
|- |-
|align="center" |] in 1980 | Fighter aircraft in 1980
|align="center" |332 | 332
| 445 (205 operable)
|align="center" |445
|- |-
|align="center" |] in 1987 | style="border-bottom:2px solid black;"|Fighter aircraft in 1987
| style="border-bottom:2px solid black;"|500+
|align="center" |500+
| style="border-bottom:2px solid black;"|65 (serviceable)
|align="center" |65*
|- |-
|align="center" |] in 1980 | Helicopters in 1980
|align="center" |40 | 40
|align="center" |500 | 500
|- |-
|align="center" |] in 1987 | style="border-bottom:2px solid black;"|Helicopters in 1987
| style="border-bottom:2px solid black;"|150
|align="center" |150
| style="border-bottom:2px solid black;"|60
|align="center" |60
|- |-
|align="center" |] in 1980 | Artillery in 1980
| 1,000
|align="center" |1000
| 1,000+ (~300 operable)
|align="center" |1000+
|- |-
|align="center" |] in 1987 | Artillery in 1987
| 4,000+
|align="center" |4000+
| 1,000+
|align="center" |1000+
|}
|}</center>

The conflict has been compared to ]<ref name=abrahamian08>{{cite book|last=Abrahamian|first=Ervand|title=A History of Modern Iran|year=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge, UK|isbn=978-0-521-52891-7|edition=3rd print}}</ref>{{rp|171|date=November 2012}} in terms of the tactics used, including large-scale ] with ] stretched across trenches, manned ] posts, bayonet charges, ]s across a ], and extensive use of ]s such as ] by the Iraqi government against Iranian troops, civilians, and ]. The world powers United States and the ], together with many Western and Arab countries, provided military, intelligence, economic, and political support for Iraq. On average, Iraq imported about $7 billion in weapons during every year of the war, accounting for fully 12% of global arms sales in the period.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1981–1982: Stalemate|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=171–173 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>

The value of Iraqi arms imports increased to between $12 billion and $14 billion during 1984–1987, whereas the value of Iranian arms imports fell from $14 billion in 1985 to $5.89 billion in 1986 and an estimated $6 billion to $8 billion in 1987. Iran was constrained by the price of oil during the ] as foreign countries were largely unwilling to extend credit to Iran, but Iraq financed its continued massive military expansion by taking on vast quantities of debt that allowed it to win a number of victories against Iran near the end of the war but that left the country bankrupt.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=Conclusion|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=350–354 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>

Despite its larger population, by 1988 Iran's ground forces numbered only 600,000 whereas the Iraqi army had grown to include 1 million soldiers.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1987–1988: An end in sight?|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=328–330 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>

==Foreign support to Iraq and Iran==
{{Main|International aid to combatants in the Iran–Iraq War}}

] as the American special envoy to the Middle East meets Saddam Hussein in December 1983. Rumsfeld was later ] during the 2003 ], which saw Saddam ousted from power and ultimately ].]]

During the war, Iraq was regarded by the West and the Soviet Union as a counterbalance to ] Iran.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|119|date=November 2012}} The Soviet Union, Iraq's main arms supplier during the war, did not wish for the end of its alliance with Iraq, and was alarmed by Saddam's threats to find new arms suppliers in the West and China if the ] did not provide him with the weapons he wanted.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|119, 198–199|date=November 2012}} The Soviet Union hoped to use the threat of reducing arms supplies to Iraq as leverage for forming a Soviet–Iranian alliance.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|197|date=November 2012}}

During the early years of the war, the United States lacked meaningful relations with either Iran or Iraq, the former due to the ] and the ] and the latter because of Iraq's alliance with the Soviet Union and hostility towards ]. Following Iran's success in repelling the Iraqi invasion and ] refusal to end the war in 1982, the United States made an outreach to Iraq, beginning with the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1984. The United States wished to both keep Iran away from Soviet influence and protect other Gulf states from any threat of Iranian expansion. As a result, the U.S. began to provide limited support to Iraq.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|142–143|date=November 2012}} In 1982, ], former ], outlined U.S. policy towards Iran:

<blockquote>The focus of Iranian pressure at this moment is Iraq. There are few governments in the world less deserving of our support and less capable of using it. Had Iraq won the war, the fear in the Gulf and the threat to our interest would be scarcely less than it is today. Still, given the importance of the balance of power in the area, it is in our interests to promote a ceasefire in that conflict; though not a cost that will preclude an eventual rapprochement with Iran either if a more moderate regime replaces Khomeini's or if the present rulers wake up to geopolitical reality that the historic threat to Iran's independence has always come from the country with which it shares a border of {{convert|1500|mi|km|disp=x| }}: the Soviet Union. A rapprochement with Iran, of course, must await at a minimum Iran's abandonment of hegemonic aspirations in the Gulf.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|142–143|date=November 2012}}</blockquote>

], Assistant Secretary of State during the war, testified to Congress in 1984 that the Reagan administration believed a victory for either Iran or Iraq was "neither militarily feasible nor strategically desirable".<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|178|date=November 2012}}

Support to Iraq was given via technological aid, intelligence, the sale of ] ] and military equipment, and satellite intelligence. While there was direct combat between Iran and the United States, it is not universally agreed that the fighting between the United States and Iran was specifically to benefit Iraq, or for separate issues between the U.S. and Iran. American official ambiguity towards which side to support was summed up by Henry Kissinger when he remarked, "It's a pity they can't both lose."<ref name="McCarthy">{{cite news|url=http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/292496/it-s-pity-somebody-has-win-andrew-c-mccarthy|title=It's a Pity Somebody Has to Win|last=McCarthy|first=Andrew C.|newspaper=National Review Online|date=3 March 2012|access-date=7 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130330234452/http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/292496/it-s-pity-somebody-has-win-andrew-c-mccarthy|archive-date=30 March 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

More than 30 countries provided support to Iraq, Iran, or both; most of the aid went to Iraq. Iran had a complex clandestine procurement network to obtain munitions and critical materials. Iraq had an even larger clandestine purchasing network, involving 10–12 allied countries, to maintain ambiguity over their arms purchases and to circumvent "official restrictions". Arab mercenaries and volunteers from Egypt<ref name=rajaee97>{{cite book|editor1-last=Rajaee|editor1-first=Farhang|title=Iranian perspectives on the Iran–Iraq War|year=1997|publisher=University Press of Florida|location=Gainesville|isbn=978-0-8130-1476-0}}</ref> and Jordan formed the ]<ref>{{cite book|title=An encyclopedic dictionary of conflict and conflict resolution, 1945–1996|first=John E.|last=Jessup|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|year=1998|isbn=978-0-313-28112-9}}</ref> and participated in the war alongside Iraqis.

===Iraq===
{{See also|French support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War|Italian support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war|British support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War}}

] in Iran]]

According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, the ], France, and China together accounted for over 90% of the value of Iraq's arms imports between 1980 and 1988.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110728025517/http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php |date=28 July 2011 }} Indicates that of $29,079&nbsp;million of arms exported to Iraq from 1980 to 1988 the Soviet Union accounted for $16,808&nbsp;million, France $4,591&nbsp;million, and China $5,004&nbsp;million (Info must be entered)</ref>

The United States pursued policies in favour of Iraq by reopening diplomatic channels, lifting restrictions on the export of ], overseeing the transfer of third-party military hardware, and providing operational intelligence on the battlefield{{Citation needed|date=December 2023|reason=}}. France, which from the 1970s had been one of Iraq's closest allies, was a major supplier of military hardware.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|184–185|date=November 2012}} The French sold weapons equal to $5&nbsp;billion, which made up well over a quarter of Iraq's total arms stockpile.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|184–185|date=November 2012}} Citing French magazine ''Le Nouvel Observateur'' as the primary source, but also quoting French officials, ''The New York Times'' reported ] had been sending chemical precursors of ] to Iraq, since 1986.<ref name=NYT>{{cite web|url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE3DA153EF932A1575AC0A966958260|title=Confrontation in the Gulf; French Reportedly Sent Iraq Chemical War Tools|date=21 September 1990|first=Youssef M.|last=Ibrahim|website=The New York Times|access-date=1 January 2019|archive-date=13 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200613032632/https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE3DA153EF932A1575AC0A966958260|url-status=live}}</ref> China, which had no direct stake in the victory of either side and whose interests in the war were entirely commercial, freely sold arms to both sides.<ref name=bulloch89 />{{rp|185, 187–188, 192–193|date=November 2012}}

Iraq also made extensive use of ], middlemen, secret ownership of all or part of companies all over the world, forged ]s, and other methods to hide what it was acquiring. Some transactions may have involved people, shipping, and manufacturing in as many as 10 countries.<ref name="UNSCOM-D">{{citation|title=UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review|author=United Nations Special Commission|section=Annex D: Actions by Iraq to Obstruct Disarmament|publisher=James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies|url=http://cns.miis.edu/iraq/ucreport/dis_acti.htm|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130103191459/http://cns.miis.edu/iraq/ucreport/dis_acti.htm|archive-date=3 January 2013}}</ref> ] exemplified the methods by which Iraq would circumvent export controls. Iraq bought at least one British company with operations in the United Kingdom and the United States, and had a complex relationship with France and the Soviet Union, its major suppliers of actual weapons.

Turkey took action against the Kurds in 1986, alleging they were attacking the ] (PKK), which prompted a harsh diplomatic intervention by Iran, which planned a new offensive against Iraq at the time and were counting on the support of Kurdish factions.<ref>Entessar, Nader (1992), p. 134</ref>

Sudan supported Iraq directly during the war, sending a contingent to fight at the frontlines. The Sudanese unit consisted to a large degree of Ugandan refugees from the ], recruited by ].{{sfn|Leopold|2005|p=44}}

The ] initially called for a cease-fire after a week of fighting while Iraq was occupying Iranian territory, and renewed the call on later occasions. However, the UN did not come to Iran's aid to repel the Iraqi invasion, and the Iranians thus interpreted the UN as subtly biased in favour of Iraq.<ref name="encarta88" />

====Financial support====
Iraq's main financial backers were the oil-rich Persian Gulf states, most notably ] ($30.9&nbsp;billion), ] ($8.2&nbsp;billion), and the ] ($8&nbsp;billion).{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} In all, Iraq received $35&nbsp;billion in loans from the West and between $30 and $40&nbsp;billion from the Persian Gulf states during the 1980s.<ref name="ISGfunding">{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2_annxD.html#use-of-illicit-smuggling|title=Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD|date=27 April 2007|volume=1 of 3|chapter=Annex D: Iraq Economic Data (1989–2003)|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency|access-date=3 November 2012|archive-date=1 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121101151425/https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2_annxD.html#use-of-illicit-smuggling|url-status=dead}}</ref>

The ] scandal revealed that a branch of Italy's largest bank, ] (BNL), in ], Georgia, relied partially on U.S. taxpayer-guaranteed loans to funnel $5&nbsp;billion to Iraq from 1985 to 1989. In August 1989, when ] agents raided the Atlanta branch of BNL, branch manager Christopher Drogoul was charged with making unauthorised, clandestine, and illegal loans to Iraq—some of which, according to his indictment, were used to purchase arms and weapons technology.<ref name="FAS">{{cite report|title=The Administration's Iraq Gate Scandal|first=William|last=Safire|date=19 May 1992|publisher=Congressional Record|url=https://fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1992/h920519l.htm|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150620160547/https://fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1992/h920519l.htm|archive-date=20 June 2015|via=Federation of American Scientists}}</ref> According to the '']'', ], ], and ]'s branch in ] were among the companies shipping militarily useful technology to Iraq under the eye of the U.S. government.

===Iran===
{{See also|Israel's role in the Iran–Iraq war|North Korean support for Iran during the Iran–Iraq War}}
While the United States directly fought Iran, citing ] as a major '']'', it also indirectly supplied some weapons to Iran as part of a complex and illegal programme that became known as the ]. These secret sales were partly to help secure the release of hostages held in ], and partly to make money to help the ] rebel group in ]. This arms-for-hostages agreement turned into a major scandal.

] supported Iran in its war against Iraq through the supply of military equipment including spare parts for fighter jets, missile systems, ammunition and tank engines.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Seale|first=Patrick|date=2 November 1980|title=Israel sends spares for US arms to Iran|page=9|work=The Observer|location=London}}</ref> Israel's motivations for supporting Iran stemmed from a fear of what would have become if Iraq came out victorious and as an opportunity to create business for the Israeli arms industry.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Marshall|first1=Jonathan|url=https://archive.org/details/irancontraconnec00mars|title=The Iran–Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era|last2=Scott|first2=Peter Dale|last3=Hunter|first3=Jane|date=1987|publisher=Black Rose Books Ltd.|isbn=978-0-921689-15-7}}</ref>

North Korea was a ], often acting as a third party in arms deals between Iran and the Communist bloc. Support included domestically manufactured arms and Eastern-Bloc weapons, for which the major powers wanted ]. ] of Iran's Islamic Revolution, the major ones were Libya, Syria, and China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, China was the largest foreign arms supplier to Iran between 1980 and 1988.<ref> {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110728025517/http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php |date=28 July 2011 }} Indicates that of $5,044&nbsp;million of arms exported to Iran from 1980 to 1988 China count for $1,958&nbsp;million (Info must be entered)</ref>

Syria and Libya, breaking Arab solidarity, supported Iran with arms, rhetoric and diplomacy.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Terrill|first=W. Andrew|title=Iran's Strategy for Saving Asad|date=Spring 2015|journal=]|publisher=]|volume=69|issue=2|pages=222–236|doi=10.3751/69.2.13|s2cid=142964464|url-access=}}</ref> However, Libya then distanced itself from Iran from 1987, criticizing Tehran's attitude and restoring diplomatic relations with Iraq.<ref name="LeMonde1">{{cite web|url=https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1987/09/12/la-libye-reequilibre-sa-position-au-profit-de-l-irak_4051052_1819218.html|title=La Libye 'rééquilibre' sa position au profit de l'Irak|website=]|date=12 September 1987|access-date=11 March 2023|language=French|archive-date=11 March 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311223734/https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1987/09/12/la-libye-reequilibre-sa-position-au-profit-de-l-irak_4051052_1819218.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="LeMonde2">{{cite web|url=https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1987/04/25/la-guerre-du-golfe-le-colonel-kadhafi-critique-la-france-et-l-iran_4054912_1819218.html|title=La guerre du Golfe Le colonel Kadhafi critique la France et l'Iran|website=]|date=25 April 1987|access-date=11 March 2023|language=French|archive-date=11 March 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311223734/https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1987/04/25/la-guerre-du-golfe-le-colonel-kadhafi-critique-la-france-et-l-iran_4054912_1819218.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Aid to both countries===
{{See also|Soviet Union during the Iran-Iraq War|Portugal and the Iran–Iraq War}}
Besides the United States and the Soviet Union, ] also sold weapons to both countries for the entire duration of the conflict. Likewise, ];<ref name=csis10 />{{rp|8|date=November 2012}} it was not unusual to see Iranian and Iraqi flagged ships anchored at ], waiting their turn to dock.

From 1980 to 1987, Spain sold €458&nbsp;million in weapons to Iran and €172&nbsp;million{{clarify|date=November 2012|reason=The euro wasn't introduced until 1999. What year was this conversion done?}} to Iraq. Weapons sold to Iraq included 4x4 vehicles, ] helicopters, explosives, and ammunition. A research party later discovered that an unexploded chemical Iraqi warhead in Iran was manufactured in Spain.<ref name=csis10 />{{rp|8|date=November 2012}}<ref name=elmundo>{{cite book|title=El camino de la libertad: la democracia año a año (1986)|trans-title=The Path of Liberty: Democracy Year to Year|pages=27–32|language=es|publisher=El Mundo}}</ref>

Although neither side acquired any weapons from Turkey, both sides enjoyed Turkish civilian trade during the conflict, although the Turkish government remained neutral and refused to support the U.S.-imposed trade embargo on Iran. Turkey's export market jumped from $220&nbsp;million in 1981 to $2&nbsp;billion in 1985, making up 25% of Turkey's overall exports. Turkish construction projects in Iraq totaled $2.5&nbsp;billion between 1974 and 1990. Trading with both countries helped Turkey to offset its ongoing economic crisis, though the benefits decreased as the war neared its end and accordingly disappeared entirely with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the resulting Iraq sanctions Turkey imposed in response.<ref>{{cite book|last=Fuller|first=Graham E.|title=The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World|year=2008|publisher=United States Institute of Peace Press|location=Washington, D.C.|isbn=978-1-60127-019-1|author-link=Graham Fuller|pages=40, 49}}</ref>

==U.S. involvement==
{{Main|United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War}}
{{See also|Iraq–United States relations|Iran–United States relations}}

American support for ] during the Iran–Iraq War, in which it fought against ] ], included several billion dollars' worth of economic aid, the sale of ], non-U.S. origin weaponry, military intelligence, and special operations training.<ref name=spidersweb>Friedman, Alan. ''Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq'', Bantam Books, 1993. {{ISBN?}}</ref><ref name="deathlobby">Timmerman, Kenneth R. ''The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq''. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991. {{ISBN?}}</ref> The U.S. refused to sell arms to Iraq directly due to Iraq's ties to ], but several sales of "dual-use" technology have been documented; notably, Iraq purchased 45 ] for $200 million in 1985. Total sales of U.S. dual-use technology to Iraq are estimated at $500 million.<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Elaine Sciolino|last=Sciolino|first=Elaine|title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis|publisher=]|year=1991|isbn=9780471542995|page=|quote=Under pressure from the Reagan administration, the <nowiki>]<nowiki>]</nowiki> began extending short-term loans to cash-starved Iraq for American-made spare parts and consumer goods. Iraq was also keenly interested in more than credits and rice, but the Reagan administration repeatedly told Iraq not even to ask for weapons. Iraq had more than enough arms from Moscow, Paris, and other capitals to fight Iran, and weapons sales to a country with a history of terrorism and antagonism to Israel would never receive congressional approval.&nbsp;... In some instances, items that could be used for military purposes did go through. In 1985, for example, the United States approved a $200 million sale of 45 Bell helicopters to Iraq, on condition they would be used only for civilian purposes. But administration officials learned later that the Iraqi Army took possession of at least some of the helicopters, painted them in military colors, and used them to ferry VIP delegations and journalists to the war front.}}</ref><ref name="Byrne">{{cite book|last=Byrne|first=Malcolm|title=The Iran–Iraq War: New International Perspectives|chapter=Critical Oral History: A new approach to examining the United States' role in the war|publisher=]|year=2013|isbn=9780415685245}}</ref>

U.S. government support for Iraq was not a secret and was frequently discussed in open sessions of the ] and ].<ref name="abc2">Koppel, Ted. , ABC ''Nightline''. 1 July 1992.</ref> American views toward Iraq were not enthusiastically supportive in its conflict with Iran, and activity in assistance was largely to prevent an Iranian victory. This was encapsulated by ] when he remarked, "It's a pity they both can't lose."<ref name="McCarthy"/>

===U.S. embargo===

] and Vice President ] in the Oval Office of the White House, 20 July 1984]]

A key element of U.S. political–military and energy–economic planning occurred in early 1983. The Iran–Iraq war had been going on for three years and there were significant casualties on both sides, reaching hundreds of thousands. Within the Reagan ] concern was growing that the war could spread beyond the boundaries of the two belligerents. A National Security Planning Group meeting was called chaired by Vice President ] to review U.S. options. It was determined that there was a high likelihood that the conflict would spread into Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, but that the United States had little capability to defend the region.<ref name="wpain1"/>

It was determined that a prolonged war in the region would induce much higher oil prices and threaten the fragile world recovery which was just beginning to gain momentum. On 22 May 1984, President Reagan was briefed on the project conclusions in the Oval Office by ] who had served as the head of the NSC staff that organized the study. The full declassified presentation can be seen here.<ref name="wpain1">{{cite web|url=http://www.wpainc.com/Archive/Reagan%20Administration/WFM%20Papers%20from%20Reagan%20Archives/Iran-Iraq/Presentation%20on%20Gulf%20Oil%20Disruption%205-22-84.pdf|title=Presentation on Gulf Oil Disruption 5–22–84|access-date=21 August 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304041513/http://www.wpainc.com/Archive/Reagan%20Administration/WFM%20Papers%20from%20Reagan%20Archives/Iran-Iraq/Presentation%20on%20Gulf%20Oil%20Disruption%205-22-84.pdf|archive-date=4 March 2016|url-status=dead}}</ref>

The conclusions were threefold: firstly, oil stocks needed to be increased among members of the ] and, if necessary, released early in the event of oil market disruption; second, the United States needed to reinforce the security of friendly Arab states in the region; and thirdly, an embargo should be placed on sales of military equipment to Iran and Iraq. The plan was approved by the President and later affirmed by the G-7 leaders headed by ] in the ].

===U.S. knowledge of Iraqi chemical weapons use===

According to ''Foreign Policy'', the "Iraqis used mustard gas and ] prior to four major offensives in early 1988 that relied on U.S. satellite imagery, maps, and other intelligence. ... According to recently declassified CIA documents and interviews with former intelligence officials like Francona, the U.S. had firm evidence of Iraqi chemical attacks beginning in 1983."<ref>{{cite news|title=Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/26/exclusive-cia-files-prove-america-helped-saddam-as-he-gassed-iran/|work=]|date=26 August 2013|access-date=1 January 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140915042349/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/25/secret_cia_files_prove_america_helped_saddam_as_he_gassed_iran?page=0%2C2|archive-date=15 September 2014|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Iraqi attack on U.S. warship===
{{Main|USS Stark incident}}

] listing following two hits by ] missiles|right]]

On 17 May 1987, an Iraqi ] fighter jet launched two ] at {{USS|Stark|FFG-31|6}}, a ] frigate.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://warisboring.com/in-1987-a-secret-iraqi-warplane-struck-an-american-frigate-and-killed-37-sailors-b341a948fa21#.av4l0q41w|archive-date=17 August 2016|archive-url=http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20160817044851/https://warisboring.com/in%2D1987%2Da%2Dsecret%2Diraqi%2Dwarplane%2Dstruck%2Dan%2Damerican%2Dfrigate%2Dand%2Dkilled%2D37%2Dsailors%2Db341a948fa21#.av4l0q41w|url-status=dead|title=In 1987, a Secret Iraqi Warplane Struck an American Frigate and Killed 37 Sailors|first=War Is|last=Boring|date=27 July 2016}}</ref> The first struck the port side of the ship and failed to explode, though it left burning propellant in its wake; the second struck moments later in approximately the same place and penetrated through to crew quarters, where it exploded, killing 37 crew members and leaving 21 injured. Whether or not Iraqi leadership authorised the attack is still unknown. Initial claims by the Iraqi government that ''Stark'' was inside the Iran–Iraq War zone were shown to be false, and the motives and orders of the pilot remain unanswered.<ref name=fisk05/>

Though American officials claimed that the pilot who attacked ''Stark'' had been executed, an ex-Iraqi Air Force commander since stated he had not been punished, and was still alive at the time.<ref name=fisk05>{{cite book|last=Fisk|first=Robert|title=The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East|url=https://archive.org/details/greatwarforcivil00fisk_0|url-access=registration|year=2005|publisher=Alfred A. Knopf|isbn=1-84115-007-X|location=New York|author-link=Robert Fisk}}</ref> The attack remains the only successful anti-ship missile strike on an American warship.<ref name="ROE">{{Cite journal|journal=Military Law Review|volume=143|date=Winter 1994|title=Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering|first=Mark S.|last=Martins|pages=43–46|url=https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Military_Law_Review/pdf-files/27687D~1.pdf|access-date=29 December 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011172209/http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Military_Law_Review/pdf-files/27687D~1.pdf|archive-date=11 October 2017|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="NoHigher61">{{Cite book|title=No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf|pages=61–63|first=Bradley|last=Peniston|publisher=Naval Institute Press|isbn=1-59114-661-5|url=http://www.navybook.com/nohigherhonor/pic-stark.shtml|location=Persian Gulf|year=2006|access-date=4 June 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120622121924/http://www.navybook.com/nohigherhonor/pic-stark.shtml|archive-date=22 June 2012|url-status=dead}}</ref> Due to the extensive political and military cooperation between the Iraqis and Americans by 1987, the attack had little effect on relations between the two countries.

===U.S. military actions toward Iran===


U.S. attention was focused on isolating Iran as well as maintaining ]. It criticised Iran's mining of international waters, and sponsored ], which passed unanimously on 20 July, under which the U.S. and Iranian forces skirmished during ]. During ] in October 1987, the United States attacked Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for an Iranian attack on the U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tanker '']''.<ref name=kelley07 />
== Foreign support to Iraq and Iran ==
{{main|International aid to combatants in the Iran–Iraq War}}


On 14 April 1988, the frigate {{USS|Samuel B. Roberts|FFG-58|6}} was badly damaged by an Iranian mine, and 10 sailors were wounded. U.S. forces responded with ] on 18 April, the U.S. Navy's largest engagement of surface warships since World War II. Two Iranian oil platforms were destroyed, and five Iranian warships and gunboats were sunk. An American helicopter also crashed.<ref name=kelley07 />
] as US special envoy to the Middle East, meets Saddām in December 1983. Ironically, Rumsfeld would later become ] during the ] which saw Saddam ousted from power, and ultimately ]. ]]
During the war, Iraq was regarded by the ] (and specifically the United States) as a counterbalance to ] ]. The support of Iraq took the form of technological aid, ], the sale of dual-use and military equipment and satellite intelligence to Iraq. While there was direct combat between Iran and the United States, it is not universally agreed that the fighting between the U.S. and Iran was specifically to benefit Iraq, or for separate, although occurring at the same time, issues between the U.S. and Iran. American ambiguity towards which side to support was summed up by ] when the American statesman remarked that "it's a pity they both can't lose."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-6662950/Like-the-Iran-Iraq-war.html |title=Like the Iran-Iraq war. &#124; Goliath Business News |publisher=Goliath.ecnext.com |date=2007-04-30 |accessdate=2009-03-01}}</ref>
More than 30 countries provided support to Iraq, Iran, or both. Iraq, in particular, had a complex clandestine procurement network to obtain munitions and critical materials, which, in some transactions, involved 6-10 countries. The most practical way to describe such complex procurement is to put the history in the article for the country in which the sale began.


====Iran Air Flight 655====
When a country, at the same or different times, supported both Iran and Iraq, the "export control" section of both articles is apt to be identical, assuming it describes a national policy, or, in some cases, the lack of one. When a country made an exception, that will be noted. Articles in the following table detail of support of other nations to either Iran or Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War:
In the course of escorts by the U.S. Navy, the cruiser {{USS|Vincennes|CG-49|6}} shot down ] on 3 July 1988, killing all 290 passengers and crew on board. The American government claimed that ''Vincennes'' was in international waters at the time (which was later proven to be untrue), that the ] had been mistaken for an Iranian ], and that ''Vincennes'' feared that she was under attack.<ref name=fisk05 />{{rp|260–273|date=November 2012}}<ref name="ROE" /> The Iranians maintain that ''Vincennes'' was in their own waters, and that the passenger jet was turning away and increasing altitude after take-off. U.S. Admiral ] later admitted on '']'' that ''Vincennes'' was in Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles. At the time of the attack, Admiral Crowe claimed that the Iranian plane did not identify itself and sent no response to warning signals he had sent. In 1996, the United States expressed their regret for the event and the civilian deaths it caused.<ref name="AggrPolitics" /><ref name="ROE" />


==Iraq's use of chemical weapons==
{| class="wikitable" border="1"
{{Main|Iraqi chemical attacks against Iran}}
{{See also|Halabja chemical attack|Iraqi chemical weapons programme|Second Battle of al-Faw}}
{| style="text-align:center; float:right; font-size:85%; margin-left:2em;" class="wikitable"
|- |-
|+ Usage of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran<ref>{{Citation|first1=Hamid Reza|last1=Qasemi|title=Eradicating Terrorism from the Middle East|series=Policy and Administrative Approaches|chapter=Chapter 12: Iran and Its Policy Against Terrorism|volume=17|editor=Alexander R. Dawoody|isbn=978-3-319-31018-3|doi=10.1007/978-3-319-31018-3|year=2016|publisher=Springer International Publishing Switzerland|page=210}}</ref>
! Country
! rowspan=2|Year
! Foreign policy
! rowspan=2|Number of usage
! Support to Iraq
! colspan=4|Chemical agent used
! Support to Iran
! colspan=2|Casualties*
|- |-
! {{small|]}}
| All countries
! {{small|]}}
| ]
! {{small|]}}
|
! {{small|]}}
|
! Killed
! Injured
|- |-
|1980||4||rowspan=9|Yes||rowspan=4 colspan=3 {{n/a}}||20||1
| {{flagicon|Soviet Union}} ]
| ]
| ]
| ]
|- |-
|1981||6||101||{{unknown}}
| {{flagicon|Saudi Arabia}} ]
|
| ]
|
|- |-
|1982||12||rowspan=2 colspan=2 {{unknown}}
| {{flagicon|United States}} ]
|
| ]
| ]
|- |-
|1983||64
| {{flagicon|Israel}} ]
|
|
| ]
|- |-
|1984||{{unknown}}||rowspan=5|Yes||rowspan=5|Yes||rowspan=5|Yes||40||2,225
| {{flagicon|Singapore}} ]
|
| ]
|
|- |-
|1985||76||77||11,644
| {{flagicon|Italy}} ]
|
| ]
|
|- |-
|1986||102||102||4,720
| {{flagicon|United Kingdom}} United Kingdom
|
| ]
|
|- |-
|1987||43||442||9,440
| {{flagicon|France}} ]
|
| ]
|
|- |-
|1988||34||colspan=2 {{unknown}}
| {{flagicon|North Korea}} ]
| |-
| colspan=8 | <small>* The actual casualties may be much higher, as the ] is as long as 40 years.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://world.time.com/2014/01/20/iran-still-haunted-and-influenced-by-chemical-weapons-attacks/|title=Iran Still Haunted and Influenced By Chemical Weapons Attacks|last=Wright|first=Robin|date=20 January 2014|magazine=Time|access-date=2017-09-30|issn=0040-781X|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180613203450/http://world.time.com/2014/01/20/iran-still-haunted-and-influenced-by-chemical-weapons-attacks/|archive-date=13 June 2018|url-status=live}}</ref></small>
|
| ]
|} |}
In a declassified 1991 report, the CIA estimated that Iran had suffered more than 50,000 casualties from Iraq's use of several chemical weapons,<ref name=wright08>{{cite book|last=Wright|first=Robin|title=Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East|url=https://archive.org/details/dreamsshadowsfut00wrig|url-access=registration|year=2008|publisher=Penguin Press|location=New York|isbn=978-1-59420-111-0|page=}}</ref> though current estimates are more than 100,000 as the long-term effects continue to cause casualties.<ref name=AggrPolitics /><ref name=bryant07>{{cite book|last=Bryant|first=Terry|title=History's Greatest War|year=2007|publisher=Global Media|location=Chandni Chowk, Delhi|isbn=978-8189940638|edition=1st}}</ref> The official CIA estimate did not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for ]. According to a 2002 article in the '']'', 20,000 Iranian soldiers were killed on the spot by nerve gas. As of 2002, 5,000 of the 80,000 survivors continue to seek regular medical treatment, while 1,000 are hospital inpatients.<ref>{{cite journal|url=http://www.nj.com/specialprojects/index.ssf?/specialprojects/mideaststories/me1209.html|journal=New Jersey Star-Ledger|title=In Iran, grim reminders of Saddam's arsenal|date=27 October 2002|last=Fassihi|first=Farnaz|access-date=10 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071213061050/http://www.nj.com/specialprojects/index.ssf?%2Fspecialprojects%2Fmideaststories%2Fme1209.html|archive-date=13 December 2007|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="r1">Center for Documents of The Imposed War, Tehran. (مرکز مطالعات و تحقیقات جنگ){{full citation needed|date=November 2012}}</ref>


According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, the ], the United Kingdom, and France. A report stated that Dutch, Australian, Italian, French and both West and East German companies were involved in the export of raw materials to Iraqi chemical weapons factories.<ref>{{cite web|title=Iraqi Scientist Reports on German, Other Help for Iraq Chemical Weapons Program|url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/cw/az120103.html|publisher=]|access-date=10 May 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190513085855/https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/cw/az120103.html|archive-date=13 May 2019|url-status=live}}</ref> Declassified CIA documents show that the United States was providing reconnaissance intelligence to Iraq around 1987–88 which was then used to launch chemical weapon attacks on Iranian troops and that the CIA fully knew that chemical weapons would be deployed and ] and ] attacks followed.<ref name=foreignpolicy.com_2013aug26>{{cite web|first1=Shane|last1=Harris|first2=Matthew M.|last2=Aid|title=Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran|date=26 August 2013|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/25/secret_cia_files_prove_america_helped_saddam_as_he_gassed_iran|publisher=]|access-date=27 August 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130826210438/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/25/secret_cia_files_prove_america_helped_saddam_as_he_gassed_iran|archive-date=26 August 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>
===Iraq===


On 21 March 1986, the United Nations Security Council made a declaration stating that "members are profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian troops, and the members of the Council strongly condemn this continued use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons." The United States was the only member who voted against the issuance of this statement.<ref>{{cite report |url = http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/{65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9}/Disarm%20S17911.pdf |author=United Nations Security Council |publisher=Security Council Report |date=12 March 1986|title=Report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq S/17911}} S/17911 and Add. 1. Cited in {{cite web|url=http://www.casi.org.uk/info/usdocs/usiraq80s90s.html#fiftyone|title=U.S. Diplomatic and Commercial Relationships with Iraq, 1980 – 2 August 1990|last=Hurd|first=Nathaniel}}</ref>{{NoteTag|This was a "decision" rather than a resolution.}} A mission to the region in 1988 found evidence of the use of chemical weapons, and was condemned in ].
Among major powers, the United States' policy was to "tilt" toward Iraq by reopening diplomatic channels, lifting restrictions on the export of dual-use technology, overseeing the transfer of third party military hardware, and providing operational intelligence on the battlefield.


], Iran]]
As will be seen in some of the country-specific sub-articles of this page, Iraq made extensive use of front companies, middlemen, secret ownership of all or part of companies all over the world, forged ]s and other methods to hide what it was acquiring. At this time, the country-level sub-articles emphasize the country in which the procurement started, but also illustrate how procurement infrastructure was established in different countries. Some transactions may have involved people, shipping, and manufacturing in as many as 10 countries.<ref name="UNSCOM-D">{{citation
| title = UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review
| author = United Nations Special Commission
| contribution = Annex D: Actions by Iraq to Obstruct Disarmament
| publisher = James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
| url = http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/dis_acti.htm
}}</ref>


According to ], senior defense intelligence officer at the U.S. ], "the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern" to Reagan and his aides, because they "were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose". He claimed that the Defense Intelligence Agency "would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival".<ref name="Tyler New York Times" /> The Reagan administration did not stop aiding Iraq after receiving reports of the use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians.<ref name="Galbraith">{{cite report|first1=Peter W.|last1=Galbraith|first2=Christopher Jr.|last2=Van Hollen|title=Chemical Weapons Use in Kurdistan: Iraq's Final Offensive|series=Report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations|date=21 September 1988|page=30|url=http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb1b0.html|publisher=United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees|access-date=3 November 2012|archive-date=18 December 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191218033316/http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdfb1b0.html|url-status=live}}{{clarify|reason=url points someplace other than to the Galbraith / Van Holland report|date=January 2020}}</ref><ref name="NYT1988-09-15">{{cite news|first=Robert|last=Pear|title=U.S. Says It Monitored Iraqi Messages on Gas|newspaper=The New York Times|date=15 September 1988|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/15/world/us-says-it-monitored-iraqi-messages-on-gas.html|access-date=9 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180130025429/http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/15/world/us-says-it-monitored-iraqi-messages-on-gas.html|archive-date=30 January 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>
] especially illustrated the ways by which Iraq would circumvent export controls. Iraq bought at least one British company with operations in the U.K. and the U.S.


The United States accused Iran of using chemical weapons as well,<ref name=fisk05 />{{rp|214|date=November 2012}} though the allegations have been disputed. ], the principal researcher for ] between 1992 and 1994, conducted a two-year study that included a field investigation in Iraq, and obtained Iraqi government documents in the process. According to Hiltermann, the literature on the Iran–Iraq War reflects allegations of chemical weapons used by Iran, but they are "marred by a lack of specificity as to time and place, and the failure to provide any sort of evidence".<ref name="potter04">{{cite book|last1=Potter|first1=Lawrence|last2=Sick|first2=Gary|title=Iran, Iraq, and the legacies of war|year=2004|publisher=MacMillan|isbn=1-4039-6450-5}}</ref>{{rp|153|date=November 2012}}
Iraq had a complex relationship with France and the ], its major suppliers of actual weapons, to some extent having the two nations compete for its business.


Analysts ] and Lawrence Potter have called the allegations against Iran "mere assertions" and stated, "No persuasive evidence of the claim that Iran was the primary culprit was ever presented."<ref name="potter04" />{{rp|156|date=November 2012}} Policy consultant and author Joseph Tragert stated, "Iran did not retaliate with chemical weapons, probably because it did not possess any at the time".<ref name="Tragert">{{cite book|last=Tragert|first=Joseph|title=Understanding Iran|year=2003|isbn=1-59257-141-7|page=190|publisher=Alphan|location=Indianapolis, Indiana}}</ref> Documents uncovered after the ] show that Iraqi military intelligence was not aware of any large-scale chemical attacks by Iranian forces, although a March 1987 document describes five small-scale chemical attacks perpetrated by the Iranians (four involving mustard gas and one involving ], with the likely source being captured Iraqi munitions), and there are also reports of Iranian use of tear gas and ].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=Introduction|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=9781107062290|page=2}}</ref>
] discusses land mines assembled there, as well as chemical warfare precursors shipped from Singapore, possibly by an Iraqi front company.


At his trial in December 2006, Saddam said he would take responsibility "with honour" for any attacks on Iran using conventional or chemical weapons during the war, but that he took issue with the charges that he ordered attacks on Iraqis.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20950607-1702,00.html|title=Saddam admits Iran gas attacks|newspaper=The Australian|first=Ahmed|last=Rasheed|date=19 December 2006|access-date=18 December 2006|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070527021050/http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20950607-1702,00.html|archive-date=27 May 2007|url-status=dead}}</ref> A medical analysis of the effects of Iraqi mustard gas is described in a U.S. military textbook and contrasted effects of World War I gas.<ref name="MMCC07">{{cite book|title=Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare|publisher=Office of The Surgeon General, Department of the Army, United States of America|chapter-url=http://www.sc-ems.com/ems/NuclearBiologicalChemical/MedicalAspectsofNBC/chapters/chapter_7.htm|chapter=Chapter 7: Vesicants|first1=Frederick R.|last1=Sidell|first2=John S.|last2=Urbanetti|first3=William J.|last3=Smith|first4=Charles G.|last4=Hurst|access-date=17 January 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060112201608/http://sc-ems.com/ems/NuclearBiologicalChemical/MedicalAspectsofNBC/chapters/chapter_7.htm|archive-date=12 January 2006|url-status=dead}}</ref>
Another country that had an important role in arming Iraq was Italy, whose greatest impact was financial, through the U.S. branch of the state-owned largest bank in Italy. The Italian article is one example of how Iraq circumvented a national embargo, by, as one example, moving land and sea mine production to Singapore.


At the time of the conflict, the ] issued statements that "chemical weapons had been used in the war". UN statements never clarified that only Iraq was using chemical weapons, and according to retrospective authors "the international community remained silent as Iraq used weapons of mass destruction against Iranian as well as Iraqi Kurds."<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|url=http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iraq-vii-iran-iraq-war|title=Iraq vii. Iran–Iraq War|encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Iranica|date=15 December 2006|access-date=8 February 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170913183529/http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iraq-vii-iran-iraq-war|archive-date=13 September 2017|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/169/36403.html|title=America Didn't Seem to Mind Poison Gas|first=Joost|last=Hiltermann|work=Global Policy Forum|date=17 January 2003|access-date=18 January 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160310223249/https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/169/36403.html|archive-date=10 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=iranchamber-armingiraq>{{cite web|url=http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/arming_iraq.php|title=Arming Iraq and the Path to War|first=John|last=King|publisher=U.N. Observer & International Report|date=31 March 2003|access-date=6 January 2005|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170918203103/http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/arming_iraq.php|archive-date=18 September 2017|url-status=dead}}</ref> A 1987 UN report conducted at the behest of both belligerents discovered weapon fragments that established Iraqi responsibility for chemical attacks on Iranian soldiers and civilians, but could not substantiate Iraq's allegations of Iranian chemical weapons use: "Iraqi forces have been affected by mustard gas and a pulmonary element, possibly phosgene. In the absence of conclusive evidence of the weapons used, it could not be determined how the injuries were caused."<ref name="Hiltermann 2007 165–166, 170–172">{{cite book|author-link=Joost Hiltermann|last=Hiltermann|first=Joost R.|title=A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja|publisher=]|year=2007|isbn=9780521876865|pages=165–166, 170–172}}</ref>
Additional country details will be added as the articles become available, in some cases in stub format for individual yet significant support, such as providing the largest amount of precursor chemicals from which chemical weapons were produced.


Evidence suggests that these Iraqi chemical casualties were likely the result of "blowback", whereas the evidence that Iraq submitted to the UN—such as two Iranian 130&nbsp;mm shells that UN specialists found had "no internal chemical-resistant coating" and were "normally used for filling with high explosives"—did not withstand scrutiny; UN official ] later acknowledged that Iraq's evidence was "clearly fabricated". However, the report's phrasing—"chemical weapons were again used against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces&nbsp;... now also Iraqi forces have sustained injuries from chemical warfare"—contributed to an erroneous perception that Iran and Iraq were equally at fault.<ref name="Hiltermann 2007 165–166, 170–172"/>
Although the ] called for a cease-fire after a week of fighting and renewed the call on later occasions, the initial call was made while Iraq occupied Iranian territory. Moreover, the UN refused to come to Iran's aid to repel the Iraqi invasion. The Iranians thus interpreted the UN as subtly biased in favor of Iraq.<ref> © 1997–2008 Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved</ref>


In response to further Iraqi chemical attacks on Kurdish civilians after the August 1988 ceasefire with Iran, United States senators ] and ] called for comprehensive ] ] against Iraq, including an oil embargo and severe limitations on the export of dual-use technology. Although the ensuing legislation passed in the U.S. Senate, it faced strong opposition within the House of Representatives and did not become law. In a rare rebuke, Secretary of State ] condemned Iraq's "unjustified and abhorrent" chemical attacks, which Shultz's assistant ] characterized as "unacceptable to the civilized world". Even after these pronouncements, however, the State Department advised against sanctions.<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Elaine Sciolino|last=Sciolino|first=Elaine|title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis|publisher=]|year=1991|isbn=9780471542995|page=}}</ref>
===Iran===
While the United States directly fought Iran, citing ] as a major '']'', as part of a complex and partially illegal program (see ]), it also indirectly supplied weapons to Iran.


=={{anchor|Distinctions and peculiarity}} Comparison to other conflicts==
] was a ]{{Fact|date=January 2009}}. DPRK support included domestically manufactured arms and Eastern-bloc weapons for which the major powers wanted ]{{Fact|date=January 2009}}.
<!--Anchor is to protect links to old section name-->


{{Events leading to the Iraq War}}
===Both countries===
] describes the Iran–Iraq War as "one of the largest and longest conventional interstate wars" of the twentieth century and "the only war in modern times in which chemical weapons were used on a massive scale".<ref name="Riedel"/> ] writes that "there has not been anything like it in the long history of Iraqi–Iranian relations, just like there had been nothing like World War I in the history of Europe."<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Kanan Makiya|last=Makiya|first=Kanan|title=Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq|edition=Updated|url=https://archive.org/details/republicoffearpo00maki|url-access=registration|publisher=]|year=1998|isbn=9780520921245|page=}}</ref>
Besides the US and the Soviet Union, ] also sold weapons to both countries for the entire duration of the conflict.Likewise, ] helped both countries: it was not unusual seeing Iranian and Iraqi flagged ] moored side-by-side at the port town of ]. {{Fact|date=March 2009}}


] on the '']'' nuclear reactor in September 1980 was the first attack on a ] and one of only a small handful of ] in history. It was also the first instance of a ] attack on a nuclear reactor to forestall the development of a ], though it did not achieve its objective, as France repaired the reactor after the attack.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52412|title=Iran: Eyes on the Skies Over Bushehr Nuclear Reactor|last=Cohen|first=Marsha|newspaper=Inter Press Service News Agency|date=6 August 2010|access-date=2 August 2011|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110807121348/http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52412|archive-date=7 August 2011}}</ref> (It took ] by the ] in June 1981 to disable the reactor, killing a French engineer in the process and causing France to pull out of ''Osirak''. The decommissioning of ''Osirak'' has been cited as causing a substantial delay to Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons.<ref name="schneider_mcnair41">{{cite book|chapter-url=https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/u?/ndupress,6475|archive-url=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20171011172257/https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ndupress/id/6475|url-status=dead|archive-date=11 October 2017|title=Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation|series=McNair Paper|date=1980|publisher=National Defense University Library|access-date=2 August 2011|chapter=Iran Attacks an Iraqi Nuclear Reactor|last=Schneider|first=Barry|issue=41}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq.htm|title=Osiraq: Iraq Special Weapons Facilities|publisher=Federation of American Scientists|access-date=2 August 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090901175613/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/facility/osiraq.htm|archive-date=1 September 2009|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="reiter05">{{cite journal|url=http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Osirak.pdf|title=Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the "Success" at Osiraq"|doi=10.1080/10736700500379008|series=Viewpoint|last=Reiter|first=Dan|issn=1746-1766|date=July 2005|publisher=The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies|journal=Nonproliferation Review|volume=12|issue=2|pages=355–371|s2cid=144450978|access-date=3 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121002083323/http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/Osirak.pdf|archive-date=2 October 2012|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=rass07>{{cite journal|url=http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3104_pp007-033_raas_long.pdf|title=Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities|last1=Raas|first1=Whitney|last2=Long|first2=Austin|publisher=Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs|journal=International Security|volume=31|date=Spring 2007|pages=7–33|issue=4|doi=10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.7|s2cid=57560777|access-date=6 November 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120706112857/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3104_pp007-033_raas_long.pdf|archive-date=6 July 2012|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://airtoair.blogfa.com/post-18.aspx|script-title=fa:پايگاه هشتم شكاري|publisher=Airtoair|access-date=2 August 2011|language=fa|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110708020616/http://airtoair.blogfa.com/post-18.aspx|archive-date=8 July 2011|url-status=dead}}</ref>)
From 1980 to 1987 ] sold €458 million in weapons to Iran and €172 million in weapons to Iraq. Spain sold to Iraq 4x4 vehicles, ] Helicopters, explosives and ammunition. A research party discovered that an unexploded chemical Iraqui warhead in Iran was manufactured in Spain.<ref>] book. ''El Camino de la Libertad. La democracia año a año. 1986'' ISBN 9788492540099. Page 27-32.</ref>


The Iran–Iraq War was the first conflict in the history of warfare in which both forces used ]s against each other.<ref name="schneider_mcnair41" /> This war also saw the only confirmed air-to-air helicopter battles in history with the Iraqi Mi-25s flying against Iranian ] (supplied by the United States before the ]) on several separate occasions. In November 1980, not long after Iraq's initial invasion of Iran, two Iranian SeaCobras engaged two Mi-25s with ] wire-guided antitank missiles. One Mi-25 went down immediately, the other was badly damaged and crashed before reaching base.<ref name=vert /><ref name="greg" />
==Financial support==
Iraq's main financial backers were the oil-rich ] states, most notably ] ($30.9 billion), ] ($8.2 billion) and the ] ($8 billion).<ref></ref>


The Iranians repeated this accomplishment on 24 April 1981, destroying two Mi-25s without incurring losses to themselves.<ref name=vert /> One Mi-25 was also downed by an Iranian ].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.acig.info/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=63&Itemid=62|title=I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980|access-date=10 April 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160808125733/http://www.acig.info/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=63&Itemid=62|archive-date=8 August 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> The Iraqis hit back, claiming the destruction of a SeaCobra on 14 September 1983 (with YaKB machine gun), then three SeaCobras on 5 February 1984<ref name="greg">{{cite web|url=http://www.airvectors.net/avhind_2.html|title=Hind in Foreign Service / Hind Upgrades / Mi-28 Havoc|date=16 September 2012|work=The Mil Mi-24 Hind & Mi-28 Havoc|first=Greg|last=Goebel|access-date=16 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131113105640/http://www.airvectors.net/avhind_2.html|archive-date=13 November 2013|url-status=live}}</ref> and three more on 25 February 1984 (two with Falanga missiles, one with S-5 rockets).<ref name=vert /> After a lull in helicopter losses, each side lost a gunship on 13 February 1986.<ref name=vert>Yakubovich, Nikolay. ''Boevye vertolety Rossii. Ot "Omegi" do "Alligatora"'' (Russia's combat helicopters. From Omega to Alligator). Moscow, Yuza & Eksmo, 2010, {{ISBN|978-5-699-41797-1}}, pp. 164–173.</ref> Later, a Mi-25 claimed a SeaCobra shot down with YaKB gun on 16 February, and a SeaCobra claimed a Mi-25 shot down with rockets on 18 February.<ref name=vert />
The ] scandal revealed that an ] branch of Italy's largest bank, ], relying partially on U.S. taxpayer-guaranteed loans, funneled $5 billion to Iraq from 1985 to 1989. In August 1989, when ] agents finally raided the Atlanta branch of BNL, the branch manager, Christopher Drogoul, was charged with making unauthorized, clandestine, and illegal loans to Iraq — some of which, according to his indictment, were used to purchase arms and weapons technology.


The last engagement between the two types was on 22 May 1986, when Mi-25s shot down a SeaCobra. The final claim tally was 10 SeaCobras and 6 Mi-25s destroyed. The relatively small numbers and the inevitable disputes over actual kill numbers makes it unclear if one gunship had a real technical superiority over the other. Iraqi Mi-25s also claimed 43 kills against other Iranian helicopters, such as ].<ref name="greg" /> Both sides, especially Iraq, also carried out air and missile attacks against population centres.
The '']'', the '']'', and ]'s ], covered the Iraq-gate story, and the investigation by the U.S. Congress.<ref name="FAS">{{citation
| title = The Administration's Iraq Gate Scandal, by William Safire
| author = Lantos, Tom
| date = 19 May 1992
| publisher = Congressional Record
| url = http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1992/h920519l.htm}}</ref> This scandal is covered in Alan Friedman's book ''The Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq.''{{Clarify me|date=January 2008}}


In October 1986, Iraqi aircraft began to attack civilian passenger trains and aircraft on Iranian soil, including an ] Boeing 737 unloading passengers at ].<ref name="r1" /> In retaliation for the Iranian Operation Karbala 5, Iraq attacked 65 cities in 226 sorties over 42 days, bombing civilian neighbourhoods. Eight Iranian cities came under attack from Iraqi missiles. The bombings killed 65 children in an elementary school in ]. The Iranians responded with Scud missile attacks on Baghdad and struck a primary school there. These events became known as the ''war of the cities''.<ref name="AggrPolitics" />
Beginning in September 1989, the '']'' laid out the first charges that BNL, relying heavily on U.S. government-guaranteed loans, was funding Iraqi chemical and nuclear weapons work. For the next two and a half years, the ''Financial Times'' provided the only continuous newspaper reportage (over 300 articles) on the subject. Among the companies shipping militarily useful technology to Iraq under the eye of the U.S. government, according to the ''Financial Times'', were ], ], and ], through its ] branch.<!--dead link<ref>Report by ]: http://www.cjr.org/archives.asp?url=/93/2/iraqgate.asp</ref>--> {{Clarify me|date=January 2008}}


The war of the cities resumed and peaked in 1988, when Iraq dropped 40 tons of high explosives on Tehran using modified Scud missiles (dubbed "al-Husayn" missiles) over seven weeks, causing panic among civilians and prompting almost 1 million residents of Tehran to temporarily flee their homes. Nevertheless, scholars have noted that this still "ranks as one of the smallest strategic bombing campaigns in history", paling in comparison to ], which saw 1.2 million tons of bombs dropped on German cities in 1944 alone, or more recent events such as the ] of ], which saw 20,000 tons of bombs dropped on ] and ] in a mere eleven days. In total, 10,000–11,000 civilians died as a result of the aerial bombardment of Iranian cities with the majority of those deaths occurring in the final year of the war.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin M.|title=The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History|chapter=1987–1988: An end in sight?|publisher=]|year=2014|isbn=978-1107062290|pages=330–331 (e-book, page numbers approximate)}}</ref>
In all, Iraq received $35 billion in loans from the West and between $30 and $40 billion from the Persian Gulf states during the 1980s.<ref name="ISGfunding">{{citation
| url = http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/isg-final-report_vol1_rfp-anx-d.htm
| title = Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD
| date = 30 September 2004
| volume = 1 of 3
| chapter = Annex D, Iraq Economic Data (1989–2003)
}}</ref>


Despite the war, Iran and Iraq maintained diplomatic relations and embassies in each other's countries until mid-1987.<ref name="Cooper Blinders" />
==Use of chemical weapons==
{{seealso|Halabja poison gas attack}}
], used by ], killed and injured numerous Iranians and Kurds]]
With more than 100, 000 Iranian victims of Iraq's chemical weapons during the eight-year war, ] is one of the countries most severely afflicted by "]".<ref name="r1">Center for Documents of The Imposed War, Tehran. (مرکز مطالعات و تحقیقات جنگ)</ref>


Iran's government used human waves to attack enemy troops and even in some cases to clear minefields. Children volunteered as well. Some reports mistakenly have the Basijis marching into battle while marking their expected entry to heaven by wearing "]" around their necks, although other analysts regard this story as a hoax involving a misinterpretation of the carrying of a prayer book called "The Keys to Paradise"(]) by Sheikh Abbas Qumi given to all volunteers.<ref name="moin" />
The official estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans of Iran. According to a 2002 article in the '']'':


According to journalist Robin Wright:
:"Nerve gas killed about 20, 000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to official reports. Of the 90, 000 survivors, some 5, 000 seek medical treatment regularly and about 1, 000 are still hospitalized with severe, chronic conditions."<ref>{{citation
| url = http://www.nj.com/specialprojects/index.ssf?/specialprojects/mideaststories/me1209.html
| journal = New Jersey Star-Ledger
| title = In Iran, grim reminders of Saddam's arsenal
| date = 27 October 2002
| author = Fassihi, Farnaz
}}</ref>


<blockquote>During the Fateh offensive in February 1987, I toured the southwest front on the Iranian side and saw scores of boys, aged anywhere from nine to sixteen, who said with staggering and seemingly genuine enthusiasm that they had volunteered to become martyrs. Regular army troops, the paramilitary Revolutionary Guards and ]s all lauded these youths, known as baseeji , for having played the most dangerous role in breaking through Iraqi lines. They had led the way, running over fields of mines to clear the ground for the Iranian ground assault. Wearing white headbands to signify the embracing of death, and shouting "], shaheed" (Martyr, martyr) they literally blew their way into heaven. Their numbers were never disclosed. But a walk through the residential suburbs of Iranian cities provided a clue. Window after window, block after block, displayed black-bordered photographs of teenage or preteen youths.<ref>{{cite book|last=Wright|first=Robin|title=Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam|year=2001|publisher=Simon & Schuster|location=New York|isbn=978-0-7432-3342-2|edition=Updated|page=|url=https://archive.org/details/sacredragewratho00wrig_0/page/37}}</ref></blockquote>
Iraq also used chemical weapons on Iranian civilians, killing many in villages and hospitals. Many civilians suffered severe burns and health problems, and still suffer from them. Furthermore, 308 Iraqi missiles were launched at population centers inside Iranian cities between 1980 and 1988 resulting in 12, 931 casualties.<ref name="r1" />


== Iran and Iraq's modern relationship ==
On 21 March 1986, the United Nations Security Council made a declaration stating that "members are profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian troops and the members of the Council strongly condemn this continued use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons." The United States was the only member who voted against the issuance of this statement.<ref> S/17911 and Add. 1, 21 March 1986. Note that this is a "decision" and not a resolution.</ref>


The relationship between Iraq and Iran has warmed immensely since the downfall of Saddam Hussein, out of mostly pragmatic interests, as they share a common enemy in the Islamic State. Significant military assistance has been provided by Iran to Iraq, resulting in Iran holding a large amount of political influence in Iraq's newly elected Shia government. Iraq is also heavily dependent on the relatively more stable and developed Iran for its energy needs, so a stable Iraq is an interest for Iran, foreign policy wise.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.newsweek.com/iran-iraq-war-allies-us-between-1077536|title=Iran–Iraq War, 30 Years Later: From Foes to Allies with U.S. In Between|website=]|date=20 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181031091207/https://www.newsweek.com/iran-iraq-war-allies-us-between-1077536|archive-date=31 October 2018|url-status=live}}</ref>
According to retired Colonel Walter Lang, senior defense intelligence officer for the United States ] at the time, "the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern" to Reagan and his aides, because they "were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose." He claimed that the Defense Intelligence Agency "would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival",<ref>, ], 18 August 2002.</ref> The Reagan administration did not stop aiding Iraq after receiving reports of the use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians.<ref name="Galbraith">{{citation
| first1 = Peter W. | last1 =Galbraith | first2 = Christopher Jr. | last2 = Van Hollen
| title = Chemical Weapons Use in Kurdistan: Iraq's Final Offensive
| volume = staff report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
| date = 21 September 1988
| page = 30}}</ref><ref name="NYT1988-09-15">{{citation
| first = Robert | last = Pear
| title = U.S. Says It Monitored Iraqi Messages on Gas
| journal = New York Times
| date = 15 September 1988
| url = http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE6DC1E3BF936A2575AC0A96E948260}}</ref> There is great resentment in Iran {{Fact|date=January 2008}} that the international community helped Iraq develop its chemical weapons arsenal and armed forces, and also that the world did nothing to punish Saddam's Ba'athist regime for its use of chemical weapons against Iran throughout the war — particularly since the US and other western powers soon felt obliged to oppose the Iraqi invasion of ] and eventually invade Iraq itself to remove Saddam Hussein.


]
]]]
The U.S. ] also accused Iran of using chemical weapons.{{Fact|date=April 2007}} These allegations however, have been disputed. ], who was the principal researcher for ] between 1992–1994, conducted a two year study, including a field investigation in Iraq, capturing Iraqi government documents in the process. According to Hiltermann, the literature on the Iran–Iraq War reflects a number of allegations of chemical weapons use by Iran, but these are "marred by a lack of specificity as to time and place, and the failure to provide any sort of evidence".<ref name="Potter153">{{citation
| last1= Potter | first1= Lawrence |last2= Sick | first = Gary
| title = Iran, Iraq, and the legacies of war
| year = 2004
| publisher = MacMillan
| isbn = 1-4039-6450-5
| page = 153
}}</ref>


The Iran–Iraq War is regarded as being a major trigger for rising sectarianism in the region, as it was viewed by many as a clash between Sunni Muslims<ref>{{Cite web|last=Review|first=Catholic|date=2012-01-19|title=Iraqi Christians were safer under Saddam|url=https://www.archbalt.org/iraqi-christians-were-safer-under-saddam/|access-date=2022-08-15|website=Archdiocese of Baltimore|language=en-US|archive-date=5 July 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220705053332/https://www.archbalt.org/iraqi-christians-were-safer-under-saddam/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Iraqi Christians want a stronger state and weaker militias – opinion|url=https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-704986|access-date=2022-08-15|website=The Jerusalem Post |date=24 April 2022|language=en-US|archive-date=15 August 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220815045824/https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-704986|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|date=2010-11-01|title=Iraqi Christians' long history|language=en-GB|publisher=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11669994|access-date=2022-08-15|archive-date=2 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210602094242/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11669994|url-status=live}}</ref> (Ba'athist Iraq and other Arab States) and the Shia revolutionaries that had recently taken power in Iran.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/reflecting-on-the-iran-iraq-war-thirty-years-later|title=Reflecting on the Iran–Iraq War, Thirty Years Later|last=Faily|first=Lukman|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181031134536/http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/reflecting-on-the-iran-iraq-war-thirty-years-later|archive-date=2018-10-31|url-status=dead}}</ref> There remains lingering animosity however despite the pragmatic alliance that has been formed as multiple government declarations from Iran have stated that the war will "affect every issue of internal and foreign policy" for decades to come.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Tabatabai|first=Arianne|s2cid=57559579|date=Summer 2017|title=What the Iran–Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal|journal=International Security|volume=42|pages=152–185|doi=10.1162/ISEC_a_00286|via=EBSCO host}}</ref>
] and ] call the allegations against Iran "mere assertions" and state: "no persuasive evidence of the claim that Iran was the primary culprit was ever presented".<ref name="Potter156">{{citation
| last1= Potter | first1= Lawrence |last2= Sick | first = Gary
| title = Iran, Iraq, and the legacies of war
| year = 2004
| publisher = MacMillan
| isbn = 1-4039-6450-5
| page = 156
}}</ref> Policy consultant and author ] also states: "Iran did not retaliate with chemical weapons, probably because it did not possess any at the time".<ref name="Tragert">{{cite book
| author = Tragert, Joseph
| title = Understanding Iran
| year = 2003
| isbn= 1-59257-141-7
| page = 190
| publisher = Alpha
| location = Indianapolis., Indiana
}}</ref>


The sustained importance of this conflict is attributed mostly to the massive human and economic cost resulting from it, along with its ties to the Iranian Revolution.<ref name=":0" /> Another significant effect that the war has on Iran's policy is the issue of remaining war reparations. The UN estimates that Iraq owes about $149&nbsp;billion, while Iran contends that, with both the direct and indirect effects taken into account, the cost of the war reaches a trillion.<ref name=":1">{{cite journal|last=Barzegar|first=Kayhan|year=2004|title=The New Iraqi Challenge to Iran|journal=The Iranian Hub}}</ref>
At his trial in December 2006, Saddam Hussein said he would take responsibility "with honour" for any attacks on Iran using conventional or chemical weapons during the 1980–1988 war but he took issue with charges he ordered attacks on Iraqis.<ref>{{citation
| url = http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20950607-1702,00.html
| title = Saddam admits Iran gas attacks]
| journal = The Australian
| first = Ahmed | last = Rasheed
| date = 19 December 2006
}}</ref> A medical analysis of the effects of Iraqi ] is described a U.S. military textbook, and contrasted with slightly different effects in the First World War.<ref name="MMCC07">{{citation
| title = Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare
| publisher = Office of The Surgeon General, Department of the Army, United States of America
|url =http://www.sc-ems.com/ems/NuclearBiologicalChemical/MedicalAspectsofNBC/chapters/chapter_7.htm
| contribution = Chapter 7: Vesicants
| first1 = Frederick R. | last1 = Sidell
| first2 = John S. | last2 = Urbanetti
| first3 = William J. | last3=Smith
| first4 = Charles G. | last4 = Hurst
}}</ref>


Iran has not vocalized the desire for these reparations in recent years, and has even suggested forms of financial aid.<ref name=":1" /> This is due most likely to Iran's interest in keeping Iraq politically stable, and imposing these reparation costs would further burden the already impoverished nation. The most important factor that governs Iraq's current foreign policy is the national government's consistent fragility following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Iraq's need for any and all allies that can help bring stability and bring development has allowed Iran to exert significant influence over the new Iraqi state despite lingering memories of the war.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Takeyh|first=Ray|s2cid=144891295|date=Summer 2010|title=The Iran–Iraq War: A Reassessment|journal=The Middle East Journal|volume=64|issue=3|pages=365–383|doi=10.3751/64.3.12}}</ref>
==Aftermath==
]]]
<!-- Deleted image removed: ] -->
<!-- Deleted image removed: ] -->
The Iran–Iraq War was extremely costly in lives and material, one of the deadliest wars since ] (see ]). Both countries were devastated by the war's effect. It cost Iran an estimated 1 million casualties, killed or wounded, and Iranians continue to suffer and die as a consequence of Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Iraqi casualties are estimated at 250,000-500,000 killed or wounded. Thousands of civilians died on both sides from air raids and missiles.<ref name="AggrPolitics"/>


Currently, Iraq is between two opposing interests, one with Iran, who can provide a reliable source of power as well as military support to the influential Shia militias and political factions, and the other with the United States, who can offer Iraq significant economic aid packages, along with military support in the form of air and artillery strikes. If Iraq is seen to be pulled too far into one side's orbit, then the benefits offered to them by the other side will likely be gradually reduced or cut off completely. Another significant factor influencing relations is the shared cultural interests of Iraq and Iran's citizens to freely visit the multitude of holy sites located in each country.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Barzegar|first=Kayhan|title=Iran's Foreign Policy in Post-Invasion Iraq|date=Winter 2008|journal=Middle East Policy|volume=15|issue=4|pages=47–58|doi=10.1111/j.1475-4967.2008.00368.x}}</ref>
The financial loss was also heavy, at that time exceeding US$500 billion for each (US$1.2 trillion in total), but shortly after it turned out that the economic cost of war is more profound and long-lasting than estimated right after war.<ref name="encyclopedia1"/> Economic development was stalled and oil exports disrupted. Iraq was left with serious debts to its former Arab backers, including US$14 billion loaned by Kuwait, a debt which contributed to Saddam's 1990 decision to ].


==Legacy and memory==
Much of the oil industry in both countries was damaged in ]. Iran's production capacity has yet to fully recover from the damages of the war. 10 million shells had landed in Iraq's oil fields at Basra, seriously damaging Iraq's oil production. Prisoners taken by both sides were not released until more than 10 years after the end of the conflict. Cities on both sides had also taken considerable damage.
{{Main|Legacy and memory of the Iran–Iraq War}}
], 2011.]]
The war is known in Iran as the {{Transliteration|fa|Defā-e Moqaddas}} ("Sacred Defence") and the ''{{transliteration|fa|Jang-e Tahmili}}'' ("the Imposed War").{{Sfn|Khosronejad|2013|p=3}}<ref name="Riedel" /> The war is known in the Arab world and a few other regions as the ''First Gulf War'' ({{langx|ar|حرب الخليج الأولى}}). That name, or simply the 'Gulf War', was used by ] also, until it was used to refer to the conflict between the ]. The Iran–Iraq War was rarely referred to as the ''Persian Gulf War'' until the ], after which the previous war was dubbed the ''First Persian Gulf War''.<ref name="britannica.com">{{Cite web|title=Iraq War {{!}} Summary, Causes, Combatants, & Facts|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190121065735/https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War|archive-date=21 January 2019|access-date=2019-01-20|website=Encyclopædia Britannica}}</ref>


Besides the Iran–Iraq war, the 1990 Iraq–Kuwait conflict, as well as The ] from 2003 to 2011 have all been called the ''Second Persian Gulf War''.<ref name="britannica.com"/> State media in Iraq ] ({{lang|ar|قادسية صدام}}, ''{{transliteration|ar|Qādisiyyat Ṣaddām}}''), in reference to the seventh-century ], in which ] warriors overcame the ] during the ].<ref name="lewental01">{{cite journal|last=Lewental|first=D. Gershon|date=November 2014|title='Saddam's Qadisiyyah': Religion and history in the service of state ideology in Baʿthi Iraq|journal=Middle Eastern Studies|publisher=Taylor & Francis|volume=50|issue=6|pages=891–910|doi=10.1080/00263206.2013.870899|s2cid=143904965}}</ref>
Not all saw the war in negative terms. The Islamic Revolution of Iran was strengthened and radicalized.<ref>Nasr, Vali, ''The Shia Revival'', Norton, (2006), pages 140</ref> The Iranian government-owned ''Etelaat'' newspaper wrote:
<blockquote>"There is not a single school or town that is excluded from the happiness of waging war, from drinking the exquisite elixir of death or from the sweet death of the martyr, who dies in order to live forever in paradise."<ref>Column in ''Etelaat'', 4 April 1983, quoted in Molavi, Afshin, ''The Soul of Iran'' (Norton), (2006)</ref> </blockquote>


"]", the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolutionary military march song performed by IRGC troops in front of Ayatollah Khomeini in ] Husinie, made a cultural impact during the war.<ref>{{Cite news|date=2021-03-05|title=سرودی حماسی که به تیتراژ "خبر" تبدیل شد/ ما مسلح به "الله اکبر"یم – خبرگزاری مهر {{!}} اخبار ایران و جهان {{!}} Mehr News Agency|newspaper=خبرگزاری مهر {{pipe}} اخبار ایران و جهان {{pipe}} Mehr News Agency|url=https://www.mehrnews.com/news/4885258/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%DA%98-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%A8%D8%B1-%DB%8C%D9%85|access-date=2022-01-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210305070357/https://www.mehrnews.com/news/4885258/%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%DA%98-%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%DA%A9%D8%A8%D8%B1-%DB%8C%D9%85|archive-date=2021-03-05|language=fa}}</ref>
The Iraqi government commemorated the war with various monuments, including the ] and the ], both in Baghdad.


== See also ==
The war left the ]s unchanged. Two years later, as war with the western powers loomed, Saddam recognized Iranian rights over the eastern half of the Shatt al-Arab, a reversion to the ''status quo ante bellum'' that he had repudiated a decade earlier.
{{Portal|Iran|Iraq|Middle East}}
{{columns-list|colwidth=25em|
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
* ]
}}


===Notable Iranian veterans===
Declassified US intelligence available has explored both the domestic and foreign implications of Iran's apparent (in 1982) victory over Iraq in their then two-year old war.<ref>SNIE 34/36.2-82 link: </ref>


{{columns-list|colwidth=25em|
On 9 December 1991, the UN Secretary-General reported the following to the UN Security Council:
*]
*]
*]
*{{ill|Abu al-Fazl Hassan Baygi|fa|ابوالفضل حسن‌بیگی}}
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*{{ill|Ali Mohammad Bozorgvari|fa|سید علی‌محمد بزرگواری}}
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*{{ill|Kazim Mousavi|fa|سید کاظم موسوی}}
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*{{ill|Mohammad Hussayn Ahmadi Shahroudi|fa|محمدحسین احمدی شاهرودی}}
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*{{ill|Qodratollah Mansouri|fa|قدرت‌الله منصوری}}
*{{ill|Sabir Jabbari|fa|سید صابر جباری}}
*]
*]
*]
}}


===Notable Iranian casualties===
<blockquote>


{{columns-list|colwidth=25em|
"That Iraq's explanations do not appear sufficient or acceptable to the international community is a fact. Accordingly, the outstanding event under the violations referred to is the attack of 22 September 1980, against Iran, which cannot be justified under the charter of the United Nations, any recognized rules and principles of international law or any principles of international morality and entails the responsibility for conflict."
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]


===Notable Iraqi veterans===
"Even if before the outbreak of the conflict there had been some encroachment by Iran on Iraqi territory, such encroachment did not justify Iraq's aggression against Iran—which was followed by Iraq's continuous occupation of Iranian territory during the conflict—in violation of the prohibition of the use of force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus cogens."


*]
"On one occasion I had to note with deep regret the experts' conclusion that "chemical weapons had been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban center lacking any protection against that kind of attack" (s/20134, annex). The Council expressed its dismay on the matter and its condemnation in resolution 620 (1988), adopted on 26 August 1988."<ref>See items 6, 7, and 8 of the UN Secretary General's report to the ] on 9 December 1991:</ref>
*]
</blockquote>
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
*]
}}


===Notable Iraqi casualties===
==References==
{{Reflist|2}}


*]
==See also==
*] *]

*]
===Persons===
*]

*]
{{columns-list|colwidth=25em|
*]
*] * ]
* ], prominent photographer of the Iran–Iraq War, creator of '']''
*]
* ]
*]
* ], Iranian filmmaker
*]
* ]
*]
* ], French-Iranian author
*]
}}
*]

*], the minelaying ship captured by the U.S.
===Memoirs===
*], prominent photographer of the Iran–Iraq War
* '']''
*]
* '']''
*]
*] * '']''

===Stories===
* '']''
* '']''

===Relevant conflicts===
* ] dispute
* ]
* ]

== Notes ==
{{NoteFoot}}
{{Notelist|refs=

<!--(this citation is not used in content and was thus giving a cite error)
{{efn|name=Note 1|Iraq claims that the war began on 4 September 1980, when Iran shelled Iraqi towns.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War|title=Iran–Iraq War {{pipe}} Causes, Summary, Casualties, & Facts {{pipe}} Britannica|date=6 July 2023|website=britannica.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/25/world/chronology-of-the-war-between-iran-and-iraq.html|title=Chronology of the War Between Iran and Iraq|date=25 May 1982}}</ref>}}
-->

}}

== References ==
{{page numbers improve|date=September 2020}}

=== Citations ===
{{Reflist}}

=== Sources ===
<!-- Genreal references consulted but not in reflist + Most cited references -->
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book|last=Brogan|first=Patric k|title=World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife Since 1945|year=1989|publisher=Bloomsbury|location=London|isbn=0-7475-0260-9}}
* {{cite book|last1=Bulloch|first1=John|author1-link=John Bulloch (journalist)|last2=Morris|first2=Harvey|title=The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences|url=https://archive.org/details/gulfwaritsorigin00bull|url-access=registration|year=1989|publisher=Methuen|location=London|isbn=978-0-413-61370-7|edition=1st}}
* {{cite journal|last=Lewental|first=D. Gershon|title="Saddam's Qadisiyyah": Religion and history in the service of state ideology in Baʿthi Iraq|date=November 2014|volume=50|issue=6|pages=891–910|journal=]|publisher=Taylor & Francis|doi=10.1080/00263206.2013.870899|s2cid=143904965}}
* {{cite book|last=Farrokh|first=Kaveh|author-link=Kaveh Farrokh|title=Iran at War: 1500–1988|publisher=Osprey Publishing|location=Oxford|isbn=978-1-78096-221-4|year=2011}}
* {{cite book|chapter-url=http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap08.pdf|publisher=]|title=The Lessons of Modern War – Volume II: Iran–Iraq War|chapter=Phase Five: New Iranian Efforts at "Final Offensives", 1986–1887|access-date=21 September 2012|archive-date=7 June 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130607125439/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/9005lessonsiraniraqii-chap08.pdf|url-status=dead}}
* {{cite web|url=http://www.iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war1.php|title=Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988|work=History of Iran|publisher=Iran Chamber Society|access-date=29 June 2012|archive-date=15 January 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100115210436/http://iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war1.php|url-status=live}}
* {{cite book|title=The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988|pages=1–8, 12–16, 19–82|last=Karsh|first=Efraim|author-link=Efraim Karsh|publisher=]|year=2002|isbn=978-1-84176-371-2}}
* {{cite journal|first=James A.|last=Piazza|title=The Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran in Exile|date=October 1994|journal=Digest of Middle East Studies|volume=3|issue=4|pages=9–43|doi=10.1111/j.1949-3606.1994.tb00535.x}}
* {{cite book|last=Pollack|first=Kenneth M.|author-link=Kenneth M. Pollack|title=Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991|year=2004|publisher=University of Nebraska Press|location=Lincoln|isbn=978-0-8032-8783-9|chapter=Iraq}}
* {{cite journal|last=Wright|first=Edwin M.|author-link=Edwin M. Wright|title=Iran as a Gateway to Russia|date=January 1942|pages=367–372|url=http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/70155/edwin-m-wright/iran-as-a-gateway-to-russia|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130606092743/http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/70155/edwin-m-wright/iran-as-a-gateway-to-russia|url-status=dead|archive-date=2013-06-06|journal=Foreign Affairs|volume=20|issue=2|publisher=]|doi=10.2307/20029156|jstor=20029156}}
* {{cite book|last=Pelletiere|first=Stephan C.|title=The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum|url=https://archive.org/details/iraniraqwarchaos00pell_0|url-access=registration|year=1992|publisher=Praeger Publishers|isbn=978-0-275-93843-7}}
* {{cite book|last1=Pfetsch|first1=Frank R.|authorlink1=Frank R. Pfetsch|last2=Rohloff|first2=Christoph|title=National and International Conflicts, 1945–1995: New Empirical and Theoretical Approaches|publisher=Routledge|year=2013|isbn=9781136357817|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dRhUAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA154}}
* {{cite book|title=Fanning the Flames: Guns, Greed & Geopolitics in the Gulf War|last=Timmerman|first=Kenneth R.|author-link=Kenneth R. Timmerman|chapter=Chapter 7: Operation Staunch|url=http://www.iran.org/tib/krt/fanning_ch7.htm|via=Iran Brief|access-date=17 September 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130313220502/http://www.iran.org/tib/krt/fanning_ch7.htm|archive-date=13 March 2013|url-status=dead}} (syndicated by New York Times Syndication Sales, 1987, published in book form as "Öl ins Feuer Internationale Waffengeschäfte im Golfkrieg" Orell Füssli Verlag Zürich and Wiesbaden 1988 {{ISBN|3-280-01840-4}}
* {{cite book|last=Leopold|first=Mark|title=Inside West Nile. Violence, History & Representation on an African Frontier|date=2005|publisher=James Currey|location=Oxford|isbn=978-0-85255-941-3}}
{{refend}}

== Further reading ==
* {{Cite book|last=Khosronejad|first=Pedram|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MYDbAAAAQBAJ|title=Unburied Memories: The Politics of Bodies of Sacred Defense Martyrs in Iran|publisher=Taylor & Francis|year=2013|isbn=9781135711603}}
* Chubin, Shahram, and Charles Tripp. ''Iran and Iraq at War'' (Routledge, 2020) {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221213174729/https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=57578 |date=13 December 2022 }}
* {{cite book|last1=Murray|first1=Williamson|last2=Woods|first2=Kevin|title=The Iran–Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History|location=New York|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2014|isbn=978-1-107-06229-0|oclc=877852628}}
* {{cite book|last1=Razoux|first1=Pierre|last2=Elliott|first2=Nicholas|title=The Iran–Iraq War|location=Cambridge, MA|publisher=The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press|year=2015|isbn=978-0-674-08863-4|oclc=907204345}}
* {{cite journal|last1=Nelson|first1=Chad E.|year=2018|title=Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran|journal=Middle East Journal|volume=72|issue=2|pages=246–266|doi=10.3751/72.2.14|s2cid=149704506|issn=1940-3461}}
* {{cite magazine|last=Cooper|first=Tom|title='Floggers" in Action: Early MiG-23s in Operational Service|magazine=]|date=July–August 2002|issue=100|pages=56–67|issn=0143-5450}}


==External links== ==External links==
{{sister project links|c=Category:Iran-Iraq War|d=yes|q=yes|n=no|b=no|v=no|voy=no|m=no|mw=no|wikt=no|s=no|species=no}}
*
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201020073413/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xbm0g-HvBfk&gl=US&hl=en |date=20 October 2020 }} (Video on ]: ])
{{commonscat|Iran-Iraq War}}
* {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210126191132/http://www.warphotoltd.com/exhibitions/iran-iraq-war49 |date=26 January 2021 }} by Alfred Yaghobzadeh
{{wikisourcecat|Iran–Iraq War}}
*
* {{dmoz|Society/History/By_Time_Period/Twentieth_Century/Wars_and_Conflicts/Iran-Iraq_War|Iran–Iraq War}}
* .
*, ], 18 March 2005.
* Sasan Fayazmanesh, ''Historical Amnesia: The Shoot Down of Iran Air Flight 655'', Counterpunch, 11 July 2008, .
* .


{{Iran–Iraq War}}
]
{{Iran topics}}
]
{{Iraq topics}}
{{Saddam Hussein}}
{{Ruhollah Khomeini}}
{{Iran–United States relations}}
{{Iraq–United States relations}}
{{North Korea–United States relations}}
{{Syria–United States relations}}
{{Iran–Saudi Arabia relations}}
{{Iran–United Kingdom relations}}
{{Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict}}
{{Middle East conflicts}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Iran-Iraq War}}
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
] ]
] ]
] ]
] ]
]

]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]
]

Latest revision as of 19:42, 10 January 2025

1980–1988 war in West Asia

This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably. When this tag was added, its readable prose size was 26,000 words. Consider splitting content into sub-articles, condensing it, or adding subheadings. Please discuss this issue on the article's talk page. (April 2024)
Iran–Iraq War
Part of the Cold War, aftermath of the Iranian revolution, Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, and Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict

Top-left to bottom-right:
Date22 September 1980 – 20 August 1988
(7 years, 10 months, 4 weeks and 1 day)
Location
Result Inconclusive
Territorial
changes		 Status quo ante bellum
Belligerents
 Iran  Iraq
KDP
PUK
ISCI
Islamic Dawa Party
 Hezbollah
Shia volunteers		 DRFLA
MEK
NCRI
PKDI
Salvation Force
Arab volunteers
Commanders and leaders
Main Iranian leaders: Main Iraqi leaders:
Units involved
See order of battle See order of battle
Strength

Start of war:
110,000–215,000 soldiers

More:
  • 1,700–2,100 tanks,
    (500–1,150 operable)
    1,000–1,900 armoured vehicles,
    (1,300 operable)
    300–1,100 artillery pieces,
    421–485 fighter-bombers,
    (200–205 fully operational)
    750–835 helicopters
    (240 fully operational)

    In 1982:
    350,000 soldiers,
    700 tanks,
    2,700 armoured vehicles,
    400 artillery pieces,
    350 aircraft,
    700 helicopters

    In 1988:
    600,000–850,000 soldiers,
    1,500+ tanks,
    800–1,400 armoured vehicles,
    600–900 heavy artillery pieces,
    60–80 fighter-bombers,
    70–90 helicopters

    KDP: 45,000 Peshmerga (1986–88)
    PUK: 12,000 Peshmerga (1986–88)

Start of war:
200,000–210,000 soldiers

More:
  • 1,750–2,800 tanks,
    2,350–4,000 APCs,
    1,350–1,400 artillery pieces,
    295–380 fighter-bombers,
    300–350 helicopters

    In 1982:
    175,000 soldiers,
    1,200 tanks,
    2,300 armoured vehicles,
    400 artillery pieces,
    450 aircraft,
    180 helicopters

    In 1988:
    800,000–1,500,000 soldiers,
    3,400–5,000 tanks,
    4,500–10,000 APCs,
    2,300–12,000 artillery pieces,
    360–900 fighter-bombers,
    140–1,000 helicopters

    KDPI: 30,000 Peshmerga (1980–83)
    MEK: 15,000 fighters (1981–83, 87–88)

Casualties and losses

Military dead:
200,000–600,000

More:
  • 123,220–160,000 KIA,
    60,711 MIA
    (Iranian claim)
    800,000 killed
    (Iraqi claim)

    320,000–500,000 WIA
    40,000–42,875 POW
    11,000–16,000 civilian dead

    Economic loss:
    $627 billion

Military dead:
105,000–500,000

More:
  • 400,000 WIA
    70,000 POW

    Economic loss:
    $561 billion
Civilian dead: 100,000+
Total dead:
450,000–500,000
Iran–Iraq War
Pre-war incidents

Iraqi invasion of Iran (1980)

Stalemate (1981)

Iranian offensives to free Iranian territory (1981–82)

Iranian offensives in Iraq (1982–84)

Iranian offensives in Iraq (1985–87)

Final stages (1988)

Tanker War

International incidents

Persian Gulf Wars
  • Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)
  • Gulf War (1990–1991)
  • Iraq no-fly zones conflict (1991–2003)
  • Iraqi conflict (2003–present)
    • Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
    This article is part of
    a series aboutSaddam Hussein
    Personal
    Affiliations
    Political offices
    Rise to power
    Presidency
    Desposition
    Elections and referendums
    Novels
    Saddam Hussein's signature

    The Iran–Iraq War, also known as the First Gulf War, was an armed conflict between Iran and Iraq that lasted from September 1980 to August 1988. Active hostilities began with the Iraqi invasion of Iran and lasted for nearly eight years, until the acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 by both sides. Iraq's primary rationale for the attack against Iran cited the need to prevent Ruhollah Khomeini—who had spearheaded the Iranian revolution in 1979—from exporting the new Iranian ideology to Iraq. There were also fears among the Iraqi leadership of Saddam Hussein that Iran, a theocratic state with a population predominantly composed of Shia Muslims, would exploit sectarian tensions in Iraq by rallying Iraq's Shia majority against the Baʽathist government, which was officially secular but dominated by Sunni Muslims. Iraq also wished to replace Iran as the power player in the Persian Gulf, which was not seen as an achievable objective prior to the Islamic Revolution because of Pahlavi Iran's economic and military superiority as well as its close relationships with the United States and Israel.

    The Iran–Iraq War followed a long-running history of territorial border disputes between the two states, as a result of which Iraq planned to retake the eastern bank of the Shatt al-Arab that it had ceded to Iran in the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Iraqi support for Arab separatists in Iran increased following the outbreak of hostilities; Saddam disputedly may have wished to annex Iran's Arab-majority Khuzestan province.

    While the Iraqi leadership had hoped to take advantage of Iran's post-revolutionary chaos and expected a decisive victory in the face of a severely weakened Iran, the Iraqi military only made progress for three months, and by December 1980, the Iraqi invasion had stalled. The Iranian military began to gain momentum against the Iraqis and regained all lost territory by June 1982. After pushing Iraqi forces back to the pre-war border lines, Iran rejected United Nations Security Council Resolution 514 and launched an invasion of Iraq. The subsequent Iranian offensive within Iraqi territory lasted for five years, with Iraq taking back the initiative in mid-1988 and subsequently launching a series of major counter-offensives that ultimately led to the conclusion of the war in a stalemate.

    The eight years of war-exhaustion, economic devastation, decreased morale, military stalemate, inaction by the international community towards the use of weapons of mass destruction by Iraqi forces on Iranian soldiers and civilians, as well as increasing Iran–United States military tensions all culminated in Iran's acceptance of a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations Security Council. In total, around 500,000 people were killed during the Iran–Iraq War, with Iran bearing the larger share of the casualties, excluding the tens of thousands of civilians killed in the concurrent Anfal campaign that targeted Iraqi Kurdistan. The end of the conflict resulted in neither reparations nor border changes, and the combined financial losses suffered by both combatants is believed to have exceeded US$1 trillion. There were a number of proxy forces operating for both countries: Iraq and the pro-Iraqi Arab separatist militias in Iran were most notably supported by the National Council of Resistance of Iran; whereas Iran re-established an alliance with the Iraqi Kurds, being primarily supported by the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. During the conflict, Iraq received an abundance of financial, political, and logistical aid from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and the overwhelming majority of Arab countries. While Iran received a significant amount of aid from Syria, Libya, China, North Korea, Israel, Pakistan, and South Yemen.

    The conflict has been compared to World War I in terms of the tactics used by both sides, including large-scale trench warfare with barbed wire stretched across fortified defensive lines, manned machine-gun posts, bayonet charges, Iranian human wave attacks, Iraq's extensive use of chemical weapons, and deliberate attacks on civilian targets. The discourses on martyrdom formulated in the Iranian Shia Islamic context led to the widespread usage of human wave attacks and thus had a lasting impact on the dynamics of the conflict.

    Background

    Iran–Iraq relations

    Main articles: Iran–Iraq relations and Shatt al-Arab dispute
    A meeting of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Houari Boumédiène, and Saddam Hussein (left to right) during the Algiers Agreement in 1975

    In April 1969, Iran abrogated the 1937 treaty over the Shatt al-Arab and Iranian ships stopped paying tolls to Iraq when they used the Shatt al-Arab. The Shah argued that the 1937 treaty was unfair to Iran because almost all river borders around the world ran along the thalweg, and because most of the ships that used the Shatt al-Arab were Iranian. Iraq threatened war over the Iranian move, but on 24 April 1969, an Iranian tanker escorted by Iranian warships (Joint Operation Arvand) sailed down the Shatt al-Arab, and Iraq—being the militarily weaker state—did nothing. The Iranian abrogation of the 1937 treaty marked the beginning of a period of acute Iraqi–Iranian tension that would see significant bloodshed and was to last until the Algiers Agreement of 1975.

    The relationship between the governments of Iran and Iraq briefly improved in 1978, when Iranian agents in Iraq discovered plans for a pro-Soviet coup d'état against Iraq's government. When informed of this plot, Saddam ordered the execution of dozens of his army's officers, and in a sign of reconciliation, expelled from Iraq Ruhollah Khomeini, an exiled leader of clerical opposition to the Shah.

    After the Iranian Revolution

    See also: Iranian Revolution, Consolidation of the Iranian Revolution, Iran hostage crisis, Iranian Embassy siege, and Iraqi invasion of Iran

    Tensions between Iraq and Iran were fuelled by Iran's Islamic revolution and its appearance of being a Pan-Islamic force, in contrast to Iraq's Arab nationalism. Despite Iraq's goal of regaining the Shatt al-Arab, the Iraqi government initially seemed to welcome the Iranian revolution, which overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was seen as a common enemy. There were frequent clashes along the Iran–Iraq border throughout 1980, with Iraq publicly complaining of at least 544 incidents and Iran citing at least 797 violations of its border and airspace.

    Ruhollah Khomeini rose to power after the Iranian revolution.

    Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called on Iraqis to overthrow the Ba'ath government, which was received with considerable anger in Baghdad. On 17 July 1979, despite Khomeini's call, Saddam gave a speech praising the Iranian Revolution and called for an Iraqi–Iranian friendship based on non-interference in each other's internal affairs. When Khomeini rejected Saddam's overture by calling for Islamic revolution in Iraq, Saddam was alarmed. Iran's new Islamic administration was regarded in Baghdad as an irrational, existential threat to the Ba'ath government, especially because the Ba'ath party, having a secular nature, discriminated against and posed a threat to the fundamentalist Shia movement in Iraq, whose clerics were Iran's allies within Iraq and whom Khomeini saw as oppressed.

    On 1 April 1980, the Islamic Dawa Party, an Iraqi Islamist group with supportive ties to Iran, attempted to assassinate Tariq Aziz, a high ranking Ba'athist and Iraq's deputy prime minister, in retaliation for a 30 March decree declaring "membership of Dawa a capital offense". The attempt failed and instead killed several civilians. This failed assassination plot, carried out by an Iran-backed group, formed a part of Iraq's casus belli for the invasion of Iran. Iraq's immediate response was to order the execution of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, an Iraqi Shi'ite cleric seen as the public face of the Dawa movement, along with al-Sadr's sister. On 30 April, Iraq organized an attack on the Iranian embassy in London.

    Saddam's primary interest in war may have also stemmed from his desire to right the supposed "wrong" of the Algiers Agreement, in addition to finally achieving his desire of becoming the regional superpower. Saddam's goal was to supplant Egypt as the "leader of the Arab world" and to achieve hegemony over the Persian Gulf. He saw Iran's increased weakness due to revolution, sanctions, and international isolation. Saddam had invested heavily in Iraq's military since his defeat against Iran in 1975, buying large amounts of weaponry from the Soviet Union and France. Between 1973 and 1980 alone, Iraq purchased an estimated 1,600 tanks and APCs and over 200 Soviet-made aircraft.

    By 1980, Iraq possessed 242,000 soldiers, second only to Egypt in the Arab world, 2,350 tanks and 340 combat aircraft. Watching the disintegration of the powerful Iranian army that frustrated him in 1974–1975, he saw an opportunity to attack, using the threat of Islamic Revolution as a pretext. Iraqi military intelligence reported in July 1980 that despite Iran's bellicose rhetoric, "it is clear that, at present, Iran has no power to launch wide offensive operations against Iraq, or to defend on a large scale." Days before the Iraqi invasion and in the midst of rapidly escalating cross-border skirmishes, Iraqi military intelligence again reiterated on 14 September that "the enemy deployment organization does not indicate hostile intentions and appears to be taking on a more defensive mode".

    Some scholars writing prior to the opening of formerly classified Iraqi archives, such as Alistair Finlan, argued that Saddam was drawn into a conflict with Iran due to the border clashes and Iranian meddling in Iraqi domestic affairs. Finlan stated in 2003 that the Iraqi invasion was meant to be a limited operation in order to send a political message to the Iranians to keep out of Iraqi domestic affairs, whereas Kevin M. Woods and Williamson Murray stated in 2014 that the balance of evidence suggests Saddam was seeking "a convenient excuse for war" in 1980.

    On 8 March 1980, Iran announced it was withdrawing its ambassador from Iraq, downgraded its diplomatic ties to the charge d'affaires level, and demanded that Iraq do the same. The following day, Iraq declared Iran's ambassador persona non grata, and demanded his withdrawal from Iraq by 15 March.

    Iranian military preparations

    In Iran, severe officer purges, including numerous executions ordered by Sadegh Khalkhali, the new Revolutionary Court judge, and shortages of spare parts for Iran's American and British-made equipment had crippled Iran's once-mighty military. Between February and September 1979, Iran's government executed 85 senior generals and forced all major-generals and most brigadier-generals into early retirement.

    Iranian President Abolhassan Banisadr, who was also commander-in-chief, inspecting a Jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless anti-tank gun

    By September 1980, the revolutionary government had purged some 12,000 officers of all levels from the army. These purges resulted in a drastic decline in the Iranian military's operational capacities.

    On the eve of the revolution in 1978, international experts in military science had assessed that Iran's armed forces were the fifth most powerful in the world. However, by the eve of war with Iraq, the recently formidable Iranian army was in many crucial ways a shell of its former self, having been badly weakened by losses in experienced personnel. The desertion rate had reached 60%, the officer corps was devastated and its most highly skilled soldiers and aviators had been exiled, imprisoned, or executed. When the invasion occurred, many pilots and officers were released from prison, or had their executions commuted to combat the Iraqis. Throughout the war, Iran never managed to fully recover from this flight of human capital.

    Many junior officers were promoted to generals, resulting in the army being more integrated as a part of the regime by the war's end. Meanwhile, a new paramilitary organisation gained prominence in Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Created to protect the new regime and serve as a counterbalance to the army, the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) had been trained to act only as a militia and struggled to adapt as needed following the Iraqi invasion, initially refusing to fight alongside the regular army, resulting in many defeats. It was not until 1982 that the two groups began carrying out combined operations.

    An additional paramilitary militia was founded in response to the invasion, the "Army of 20 Million", commonly known as the Basij. The Basij were poorly armed and had members as young as 12 and as old as 70. They often acted in conjunction with the Revolutionary Guard, launching so-called human wave attacks and other campaigns against the Iraqis. They were subordinate to the Revolutionary Guards, and they made up most of the manpower that was used in the Revolutionary Guard's attacks.

    Stephen Pelletiere wrote in his 1992 book The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum:

    The human wave has been largely misconstrued both by the popular media in the West and by many scholars. The Iranians did not merely assemble masses of individuals, point them at the enemy, and order a charge. The waves were made up of the 22-man squads mentioned above . Each squad was assigned a specific objective. In battle, they would surge forward to accomplish their missions, and thus gave the impression of a human wave pouring against enemy lines.

    Despite neglect by the new regime, at the outset of the conflict, Iran still had at least 1,000 operational tanks and several hundred functional aircraft and could cannibalize equipment to procure spare parts. Continuous sanctions greatly limited Iran from acquiring many additional heavy weapons, including tanks and aircraft.

    Iraqi military preparations

    The location of Khuzestan province in Iran, which Iraq planned to annex

    In addition, the area around the Shatt al-Arab posed no obstacle for the Iraqis, as they possessed river crossing equipment. Iraq correctly deduced that Iran's defences at the crossing points around the Karkheh and Karoun Rivers were undermanned and that the rivers could be easily crossed. Iraqi intelligence was also informed that the Iranian forces in Khuzestan province, which consisted of two divisions prior to the revolution, now only consisted of several ill-equipped and under-strength battalions. Only a handful of company-sized tank units remained operational.

    The only qualms the Iraqis had were over the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (formerly the Imperial Iranian Air Force). Despite the purge of several key pilots and commanders, as well as the lack of spare parts, the air force showed its power during local uprisings and rebellions. They were also active after the failed U.S. attempt to rescue its hostages, Operation Eagle Claw. Based on these observations, Iraq's leaders decided to carry out a surprise airstrike against the Iranian air force's infrastructure prior to the main invasion.

    Khuzestan

    It is widely accepted among scholars that Iraq was seeking to annex, or at least to establish suzerainty over, Iran's Khuzestan province, but Saddam Hussein publicly denied this in November 1980.

    Border conflicts leading up to the war

    Main article: Iraqi invasion of Iran § Border conflicts
    The Shatt al-Arab on the Iran–Iraq border

    On 10 September 1980, Iraq forcibly reclaimed territories in Zain al-Qaws and Saif Saad that it had been promised under the terms of the 1975 Algiers Agreement but that Iran had never handed over, leading to both Iran and Iraq declaring the treaty null and void, on 14 September and 17 September, respectively. As a result, the only outstanding border dispute between Iran and Iraq at the time of the Iraqi invasion of 22 September was the question of whether Iranian ships would fly Iraqi flags and pay Iraq navigation fees for a stretch of the Shatt al-Arab river spanning several miles.

    Course of the war

    This section may contain an excessive amount of intricate detail that may interest only a particular audience. Please help by spinning off or relocating any relevant information, and removing excessive detail that may be against Misplaced Pages's inclusion policy. (June 2024) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

    1980: Iraqi invasion

    Main article: Iraqi invasion of Iran Further information: 22 September 1980 Iraqi airstrike on Iran, Operation Kaman 99, Operation Scorch Sword, and Operation Sultan 10
    Explosion in Mehrabad Air Base in Tehran after Iraqi forces attacked Tehran on 22 September 1980
    Destroyed Iranian C-47 Skytrain

    Iraq launched a full-scale invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980. The Iraqi Air Force launched surprise air strikes on ten Iranian airfields with the objective of destroying the Iranian Air Force. The attack failed to cripple the Iranian Air Force: while it damaged some of Iran's airbase infrastructure, it did not destroy a significant number of aircraft. The Iraqi Air Force was only able to strike in depth with a few MiG-23BN, Tu-22, and Su-20 aircraft, and Iran had built hardened aircraft shelters where most of its combat aircraft were stored.

    The next day, Iraq launched a ground invasion, mounting three simultaneous attacks along a 644 km (400 mi) front. Saddam hoped an attack on Iran would cause such a blow to Iran's prestige that it would lead to the new government's downfall, or at least end Iran's calls for his overthrow.

    Of Iraq's six divisions that invaded by ground, four were sent to Khuzestan, which was located near the border's southern end, to cut off the Shatt al-Arab from the rest of Iran and to establish a territorial security zone. The other two divisions invaded across the northern and central part of the border to prevent an Iranian counter-attack. Two of the four Iraqi divisions, one mechanised and one armoured, operated near the southern end and began a siege of the strategically important port cities of Abadan and Khorramshahr.

    The two armoured divisions secured the territory bounded by the cities of Khorramshahr, Ahvaz, Susangerd, and Musian. On the central front, the Iraqis occupied Mehran, advanced towards the foothills of the Zagros Mountains, and were able to block the traditional Tehran–Baghdad invasion route by securing territory forward of Qasr-e Shirin, Iran. On the northern front, the Iraqis attempted to establish a strong defensive position opposite Suleimaniya to protect the Iraqi Kirkuk oil complex. Iraqi hopes of an uprising by the ethnic Arabs of Khuzestan failed to materialise, as most of the ethnic Arabs remained loyal to Iran.

    The Iraqi troops advancing into Iran in 1980 were described by Patrick Brogan as "badly led and lacking in offensive spirit". The first known chemical weapons attack by Iraq on Iran probably took place during the fighting around Susangerd. Adnan Khayr Allah served as Iraqi Minister of Defence throughout the Iran–Iraq War, and was appointed Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, second only to Saddam Hussein. In this position, he played a crucial role in rebuilding and modernizing the Iraqi military.

    Iranian F-14A Tomcats equipped with AIM-54A, AIM-7 and AIM-9 missiles

    Though the Iraqi air invasion surprised the Iranians, the Iranian air force retaliated the day after with a large-scale attack against Iraqi air bases and infrastructure in Operation Kaman 99. Groups of F-4 Phantom and F-5 Tiger fighter jets attacked targets throughout Iraq, such as oil facilities, dams, petrochemical plants, and oil refineries, and included Mosul Airbase, Baghdad, and the Kirkuk oil refinery. Iraq was taken by surprise at the strength of the retaliation, which caused the Iraqis heavy losses and economic disruption, but the Iranians took heavy losses as well as losing many aircraft and aircrews to Iraqi air defenses.

    Iranian Army Aviation's AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships began attacks on the advancing Iraqi divisions, along with F-4 Phantoms armed with AGM-65 Maverick missiles; they destroyed numerous armoured vehicles and impeded the Iraqi advance, though not completely halting it. Meanwhile, Iraqi air attacks on Iran were repelled by Iran's F-14A Tomcat interceptor fighter jets, using AIM-54A Phoenix missiles, which downed a dozen of Iraq's Soviet-built fighters in the first two days of battle.

    The Iranian regular military, police forces, volunteer Basij, and Revolutionary Guards all conducted their operations separately; thus, the Iraqi invading forces did not face coordinated resistance. However, on 24 September, the Iranian Navy attacked Basra, Iraq, destroying two oil terminals near the Iraqi port of Al-Faw, which reduced Iraq's ability to export oil. The Iranian ground forces, primarily consisting of the Revolutionary Guard, retreated to the cities, where they set up defences against the invaders.

    On 30 September, Iran's air force launched Operation Scorch Sword, striking and badly damaging the nearly-complete Osirak Nuclear Reactor near Baghdad. By 1 October, Baghdad had been subjected to eight air attacks. In response, Iraq launched aerial strikes against Iranian targets.

    The mountainous border between Iran and Iraq made a deep ground invasion almost impossible, and air strikes were used instead. The invasion's first waves were a series of air strikes targeted at Iranian airfields. Iraq also attempted to bomb Tehran, Iran's capital and command centre, into submission.

    First Battle of Khorramshahr

    Main article: Battle of Khorramshahr (1980)
    Resistance of the outnumbered and outgunned Iranians in Khorramshahr slowed the Iraqis for a month.

    On 22 September, a prolonged battle began in the city of Khorramshahr, eventually leaving around 7,000 dead on each side. Reflecting the bloody nature of the struggle, Iranians came to call Khorramshahr "City of Blood".

    The battle began with Iraqi air raids against key points and mechanised divisions advancing on the city in a crescent-like formation. They were slowed by Iranian air attacks and Revolutionary Guard troops with recoilless rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and Molotov cocktails. The Iranians flooded the marsh areas around the city, forcing the Iraqis to traverse through narrow strips of land. Iraqi tanks launched attacks with no infantry support, and many tanks were lost to Iranian anti-tank teams.

    By 30 September, the Iraqis had managed to clear the Iranians from the outskirts of the city. The next day, the Iraqis launched infantry and armoured attacks into the city. After heavy house-to-house fighting, the Iraqis were repelled. On 14 October, the Iraqis launched a second offensive. The Iranians initiated a controlled withdrawal from the city, street by street. By 24 October, most of the city was captured, and the Iranians evacuated across the Karun River. Some partisans remained, and fighting continued until 10 November.

    Iraqi advance stalls

    Main articles: Siege of Abadan and Operation Morvarid
    Fighting during the Siege of Abadan

    Though Khorramshahr was captured, the battle had delayed the Iraqis enough to allow the large-scale deployment of the Iranian military. In November, Saddam ordered his forces to advance towards Dezful and Ahvaz, and lay sieges to both cities. However, the Iraqi offensive had been badly damaged by Iranian militias and air power. Iran's air force had destroyed Iraq's army supply depots and fuel supplies, and was strangling Iraq through an aerial siege.

    Iran's supplies had not been exhausted, despite sanctions, and the military often cannibalised spare parts from other equipment and began searching for parts on the black market. On 28 November, Iran launched Operation Morvarid (Pearl), a combined air and sea attack which destroyed 80% of Iraq's navy and all of its radar sites in the southern portion of the country. When Iraq laid siege to Abadan and dug its troops in around the city, it was unable to blockade the port, which allowed Iran to resupply Abadan by sea.

    Iraq's strategic reserves had been depleted, and by now it lacked the power to go on any major offensives until nearly the end of the war. On 7 December, Hussein announced that Iraq was going on the defensive. By the end of 1980, Iraq had destroyed about 500 Western-built Iranian tanks and captured 100 others.

    1981: Stalemate

    For the next eight months, both sides were on a defensive footing, with the exception of the Battle of Dezful, as the Iranians needed more time to reorganise their forces after the damage inflicted by the purge of 1979–80. During this period, fighting consisted mainly of artillery duels and raids. Iraq had mobilised 21 divisions for the invasion, while Iran countered with only 13 regular army divisions and one brigade. Of the regular divisions, only seven were deployed to the border. The war bogged down into World War I-style trench warfare with tanks and modern late-20th century weapons. Due to the power of anti-tank weapons such as the RPG-7, armored manoeuvre by the Iraqis was very costly, and they consequently entrenched their tanks into static positions.

    Iraq also began firing Scud missiles into Dezful and Ahvaz, and used terror bombing to bring the war to the Iranian civilian population. Iran launched dozens of "human wave assaults".

    Battle of Dezful

    Main article: Battle of Dezful
    Iranian president Abulhassan Banisadr during a visit to the frontlines

    On 5 January 1981, Iran had reorganised its forces enough to launch a large-scale offensive, Operation Nasr (Victory). The Iranians launched their major armoured offensive from Dezful in the direction of Susangerd, consisting of tank brigades from the 16th Qazvin, 77th Khorasan, and 92nd Khuzestan Armoured Divisions, and broke through Iraqi lines. However, the Iranian tanks had raced through Iraqi lines with their flanks unprotected and with no infantry support; as a result, they were cut off by Iraqi tanks.

    In the ensuing Battle of Dezful, the Iranian armoured divisions were nearly wiped out in one of the biggest tank battles of the war. When the Iranian tanks tried to manoeuvre, they became stuck in the mud of the marshes, and many tanks were abandoned. The Iraqis lost 45 T-55 and T-62 tanks, while the Iranians lost 100–200 Chieftain and M-60 tanks. Reporters counted roughly 150 destroyed or deserted Iranian tanks, and also 40 Iraqi tanks. 141 Iranians were killed during the battle.

    The battle had been ordered by Iranian president Abulhassan Banisadr, who was hoping that a victory might shore up his deteriorating political position; instead, the failure hastened his fall. Many of Iran's problems took place because of political infighting between President Banisadr, who supported the regular army, and the hardliners who supported the IRGC. Once he was impeached and the competition ended, the performance of the Iranian military improved.

    The Islamic Republic government in Iran was further distracted by internal fighting between the regime and the Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) on the streets of Iran's major cities in June 1981 and again in September. In 1983, the MEK started an alliance with Iraq following a meeting between MEK leader Massoud Rajavi and Iraqi Deputy Prime minister Tariq Aziz.

    In 1984 Banisadr left the coalition because of a dispute with Rajavi. In 1986, Rajavi moved from Paris to Iraq and set up a base on the Iranian border. The Battle of Dezful became a critical battle in Iranian military thinking. Less emphasis was placed on the Army with its conventional tactics, and more emphasis was placed on the Revolutionary Guard with its unconventional tactics.

    Attack on H3

    The surprise attack on H-3 airbase is considered to be one of the most sophisticated air operations of the war.

    The Iraqi Air Force, badly damaged by the Iranians, was moved to the H-3 Airbase in Western Iraq, near the Jordanian border and away from Iran. However, on 3 April 1981, the Iranian air force used eight F-4 Phantom fighter bombers, four F-14 Tomcats, three Boeing 707 refuelling tankers, and one Boeing 747 command plane to launch a surprise attack on H3, destroying 27–50 Iraqi fighter jets and bombers.

    Despite the successful H-3 airbase attack (in addition to other air attacks), the Iranian Air Force was forced to cancel its successful 180-day air offensive. In addition, they abandoned their attempted control of Iranian airspace. They had been seriously weakened by sanctions and pre-war purges and further damaged by a fresh purge after the impeachment crisis of President Banisadr. The Iranian Air Force could not survive further attrition, and decided to limit their losses, abandoning efforts to control Iranian airspace. The Iranian air force would henceforth fight on the defensive, trying to deter the Iraqis rather than engaging them. While throughout 1981–1982 the Iraqi air force would remain weak, within the next few years they would rearm and expand again, and begin to regain the strategic initiative.

    Introduction of human wave attacks

    The Iranians suffered from a shortage of heavy weapons, but had a large number of devoted volunteer troops, so they began using human wave attacks against the Iraqis. Typically, an Iranian assault would commence with poorly trained Basij who would launch the primary human wave assaults to swamp the weakest portions of the Iraqi lines en masse (on some occasions even bodily clearing minefields). This would be followed up by the more experienced Revolutionary Guard infantry, who would breach the weakened Iraqi lines, and followed up by the regular army using mechanized forces, who would maneuver through the breach and attempt to encircle and defeat the enemy.

    A wounded Iranian soldier holding an IV bag

    According to historian Stephen C. Pelletiere, the idea of Iranian "human wave attacks" was a misconception. Instead, the Iranian tactics consisted of using groups of 22-man infantry squads, which moved forward to attack specific objectives. As the squads surged forward to execute their missions, that gave the impression of a "human wave attack". Nevertheless, the idea of "human wave attacks" remained virtually synonymous with any large-scale infantry frontal assault Iran carried out. Large numbers of troops would be used, aimed at overwhelming the Iraqi lines (usually the weakest portion, typically manned by the Iraqi Popular Army), regardless of losses.

    According to the former Iraqi general Ra'ad al-Hamdani, the Iranian human wave charges consisted of armed "civilians" who carried most of their necessary equipment themselves into battle and often lacked command and control and logistics. Operations were often carried out during the night and deception operations, infiltrations, and maneuvers became more common. The Iranians would also reinforce the infiltrating forces with new units to keep up their momentum. Once a weak point was found, the Iranians would concentrate all of their forces into that area in an attempt to break through with human wave attacks.

    The human wave attacks, while extremely bloody (tens of thousands of troops died in the process), when used in combination with infiltration and surprise, caused major Iraqi defeats. As the Iraqis would dig in their tanks and infantry into static, entrenched positions, the Iranians would manage to break through the lines and encircle entire divisions. Merely the fact that the Iranian forces used maneuver warfare by their light infantry against static Iraqi defenses was often the decisive factor in battle. However, lack of coordination between the Iranian Army and IRGC and shortages of heavy weaponry played a detrimental role, often with most of the infantry not being supported by artillery and armor.

    Operation Eighth-Imam

    After the Iraqi offensive stalled in March 1981, there was little change in the front other than Iran retaking the high ground above Susangerd in May. By late 1981, Iran returned to the offensive and launched Operation Samen-ol-A'emeh (The Eighth Imam), ending the Iraqi Siege of Abadan on 27–29 September 1981. The Iranians used a combined force of regular army artillery with small groups of armor, supported by Pasdaran (IRGC) and Basij infantry. On 15 October, after breaking the siege, a large Iranian convoy was ambushed by Iraqi tanks, and during the ensuing tank battle Iran lost 20 Chieftains and other armored vehicles and withdrew from the previously gained territory.

    Operation Tariq al-Quds

    On 29 November 1981, Iran began Operation Tariq al-Quds with three army brigades and seven Revolutionary Guard brigades. The Iraqis failed to properly patrol their occupied areas, and the Iranians constructed a 14 km (14,000 m; 8.7 mi) road through the unguarded sand dunes, launching their attack from the Iraqi rear. The town of Bostan was retaken from Iraqi divisions by 7 December. By this time the Iraqi Army was experiencing serious morale problems, compounded by the fact that Operation Tariq al-Quds marked the first use of Iranian "human wave" tactics, where the Revolutionary Guard light infantry repeatedly charged at Iraqi positions, oftentimes without the support of armour or air power. The fall of Bostan exacerbated the Iraqis' logistical problems, forcing them to use a roundabout route from Ahvaz to the south to resupply their troops. 6,000 Iranians and over 2,000 Iraqis were killed in the operation.

    1982: Iraqi retreat, Iranian offensive

    Iranian Northrop F-5 aircraft during the war

    The Iraqis, realising that the Iranians were planning to attack, decided to preempt them with Operation al-Fawz al-'Azim (Supreme Success) on 19 March. Using a large number of tanks, helicopters, and fighter jets, they attacked the Iranian buildup around the Roghabiyeh pass. Though Saddam and his generals assumed they had succeeded, in reality the Iranian forces remained fully intact. The Iranians had concentrated much of their forces by bringing them directly from the cities and towns throughout Iran via trains, buses, and private cars. The concentration of forces did not resemble a traditional military buildup, and although the Iraqis detected a population buildup near the front, they failed to realize that this was an attacking force. As a result, Saddam's army was unprepared for the Iranian offensives to come.

    Operation Fath ol-Mobin

    Iran's next major offensive, led by then Colonel Ali Sayad Shirazi, was Operation Fath ol-Mobin. On 22 March 1982, Iran launched an attack which took the Iraqi forces by surprise: using Chinook helicopters, they landed behind Iraqi lines, silenced their artillery, and captured an Iraqi headquarters.

    The Revolutionary Guard and regular army followed up by surrounding the Iraqi 9th and 10th Armoured and 1st Mechanised Divisions that had camped close to the Iranian town of Shush. The Iraqis launched a counter-attack using their 12th Armoured division to break the encirclement and rescue the surrounded divisions. Iraqi tanks came under attack by 95 Iranian F-4 Phantom and F-5 Tiger fighter jets, destroying much of the division.

    Operation Fath ol-Mobin was an Iranian victory; Iraqi forces were driven away from Shush, Dezful and Ahvaz. The Iranian armed forces destroyed 320–400 Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles in a costly success. In just the first day of the battle, the Iranians lost 196 tanks. By this time, most of the Khuzestan province had been recaptured.

    Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas

    Iraqi T-62 tank wreckage in Khuzestan province, Iran

    In preparation for Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas, the Iranians had launched numerous air raids against Iraq air bases, destroying 47 jets (including Iraq's brand new Mirage F-1 fighter jets from France); this gave the Iranians air superiority over the battlefield while allowing them to monitor Iraqi troop movements.

    On 29 April, Iran launched the offensive. 70,000 Revolutionary Guard and Basij members struck on several axes—Bostan, Susangerd, the west bank of the Karun River, and Ahvaz. The Basij launched human wave attacks, which were followed up by the regular army and Revolutionary Guard support along with tanks and helicopters. Under heavy Iranian pressure, the Iraqi forces retreated. By 12 May, Iran had driven out all Iraqi forces from the Susangerd area. The Iranians captured several thousand Iraqi troops and a large number of tanks.

    The Iraqis retreated to the Karun River, with only Khorramshahr and a few outlying areas remaining in their possession. Saddam ordered 70,000 troops to be placed around the city of Khorramshahr. The Iraqis created a hastily constructed defence line around the city and outlying areas. To discourage airborne commando landings, the Iraqis also placed metal spikes and destroyed cars in areas likely to be used as troop landing zones. Saddam Hussein even visited Khorramshahr in a dramatic gesture, swearing that the city would never be relinquished. However, Khorramshahr's only resupply point was across the Shatt al-Arab, and the Iranian air force began bombing the supply bridges to the city, while their artillery zeroed in on the besieged garrison.

    Second Battle of Khorramshahr
    Main article: Battle of Khorramshahr (1982)
    Iraqi soldiers surrendering after the Liberation of Khorramshahr

    In the early morning hours of 23 May 1982, the Iranians began the drive towards Khorramshahr across the Karun River. This part of Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas was spearheaded by the 77th Khorasan division with tanks along with the Revolutionary Guard and Basij. The Iranians hit the Iraqis with destructive air strikes and massive artillery barrages, crossed the Karun River, captured bridgeheads, and launched human wave attacks towards the city. Saddam's defensive barricade collapsed; in less than 48 hours of fighting, the city fell and 19,000 Iraqis surrendered to the Iranians. A total of 10,000 Iraqis were killed or wounded in Khorramshahr, while the Iranians suffered 30,000 casualties. During the whole of Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas, 33,000 Iraqi soldiers were captured by the Iranians.

    State of Iraqi armed forces

    The fighting had battered the Iraqi military: its strength fell from 210,000 to 150,000 troops; over 20,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed and over 30,000 captured; two out of four active armoured divisions and at least three mechanised divisions fell to less than a brigade's strength; and the Iranians had captured over 450 tanks and armoured personnel carriers.

    The Iraqi Air Force was also left in poor shape: after losing up to 55 aircraft since early December 1981, they had only 100 intact fighter-bombers and interceptors. A defector who flew his MiG-21 to Syria in June 1982 revealed that the Iraqi Air Force had only three squadrons of fighter-bombers capable of mounting operations into Iran. The Iraqi Army Air Corps was in slightly better shape, and could still operate more than 70 helicopters. Despite this, the Iraqis still held 3,000 tanks, while Iran held 1,000.

    At this point, Saddam believed that his army was too demoralised and damaged to hold onto Khuzestan and major swathes of Iranian territory, and withdrew his remaining forces, redeploying them in defence along the border. However, his troops continued to occupy some key Iranian border areas of Iran, including the disputed territories that prompted his invasion, notably the Shatt al-Arab waterway. In response to their failures against the Iranians in Khorramshahr, Saddam ordered the executions of Generals Juwad Shitnah and Salah al-Qadhi and Colonels Masa and al-Jalil. At least a dozen other high-ranking officers were also executed during this time. This became an increasingly common punishment for those who failed him in battle.

    Early international response

    In April 1982, the rival Ba'athist regime in Syria, one of the few nations that supported Iran, closed the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline that had allowed Iraqi oil to reach tankers on the Mediterranean, reducing the Iraqi budget by $5 billion per month. Journalist Patrick Brogan wrote, "It appeared for a while that Iraq would be strangled economically before it was defeated militarily." Syria's closure of the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline left Iraq with the pipeline to Turkey as the only means of exporting oil, along with transporting oil by tanker truck to the port of Aqaba in Jordan.

    The Turkish pipeline had a capacity of only 500,000 barrels per day (79,000 m/d), which was insufficient to pay for the war. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf states saved Iraq from bankruptcy by providing it with $37–60 billion in loans. Though Iraq had previously been hostile towards other Gulf states, "the threat of Persian fundamentalism was far more feared." They were especially inclined to fear Iranian victory after Ayatollah Khomeini declared monarchies to be illegitimate and an un-Islamic form of government. Khomeini's statement was widely received as a call to overthrow the Gulf monarchies. Journalists John Bulloch and Harvey Morris wrote:

    The virulent Iranian campaign, which at its peak seemed to be making the overthrow of the Saudi regime a war aim on a par with the defeat of Iraq, did have an effect on the Kingdom , but not the one the Iranians wanted: instead of becoming more conciliatory, the Saudis became tougher, more self-confident, and less prone to seek compromise.

    Saudi Arabia was said to provide Iraq with $1 billion per month starting in mid-1982.

    Iraq began receiving support from the United States and west European countries as well. Saddam was given diplomatic, monetary, and military support by the United States, including massive loans, political influence, and intelligence on Iranian deployments gathered by American spy satellites. The Iraqis relied heavily on American satellite footage and radar planes to detect Iranian troop movements, and they enabled Iraq to move troops to the site before the battle.

    With Iranian success on the battlefield, the United States increased its support of the Iraqi government, supplying intelligence, economic aid, and dual-use equipment and vehicles, as well as normalizing its intergovernmental relations (which had been broken during the 1967 Six-Day War). In March 1982, president Ronald Reagan signed National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 4-82—seeking "a review of U.S. policy toward the Middle East"—and in June Reagan signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) co-written by NSC official Howard Teicher, which determined: "The United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran", and that the United States "would do whatever was necessary to prevent Iraq from losing".

    In 1982, Reagan removed Iraq from the list of countries "supporting terrorism" and sold weapons such as howitzers to Iraq via Jordan. France sold Iraq millions of dollars worth of weapons, including Gazelle helicopters, Mirage F-1 fighters, and Exocet missiles. Both the United States and West Germany sold Iraq dual-use pesticides and poisons that would be used to create chemical weapons.

    Iran did not have the money to purchase arms to the same extent as Iraq did. They counted on China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and Japan for supplying anything from weapons and munitions to logistical and engineering equipment.

    Ceasefire proposal

    On 20 June 1982, Saddam announced that he wanted to sue for peace and proposed an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal from Iranian territory within two weeks. Khomeini responded by saying the war would not end until a new government was installed in Iraq and reparations paid. He proclaimed that Iran would invade Iraq and would not stop until the Ba'ath regime was replaced by an Islamic republic. Iran supported a government in exile for Iraq, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, led by exiled Iraqi cleric Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim, which was dedicated to overthrowing the Ba'ath party. They recruited POWs, dissidents, exiles, and Shias to join the Badr Brigade, the military wing of the organisation.

    The decision to invade Iraq was taken after much debate within the Iranian government. One faction, comprising Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, President Ali Khamenei, Army Chief of Staff General Ali Sayad Shirazi as well as Major General Qasem-Ali Zahirnejad, wanted to accept the ceasefire, as most of Iranian soil had been recaptured. In particular, General Shirazi and Zahirnejad were both opposed to the invasion of Iraq on logistical grounds, and stated they would consider resigning if "unqualified people continued to meddle with the conduct of the war". Of the opposing view was a hardline faction led by the clerics on the Supreme Defence Council, whose leader was the politically powerful speaker of the Majlis, Akbar Rafsanjani.

    Iran also hoped that its attacks would ignite a revolt against Saddam's rule by the Shia and Kurdish population of Iraq, possibly resulting in his downfall. It was successful in doing so with the Kurdish population, but not the Shia. Iran had captured large quantities of Iraqi equipment, enough to create several tank battalions, Iran once again had 1,000 tanks, and also managed to clandestinely procure spare parts as well, including those pertaining to the F-14 Tomcat.

    At a cabinet meeting in Baghdad, Minister of Health Riyadh Ibrahim Hussein suggested that Saddam could step down temporarily as a way of easing Iran towards a ceasefire, and then afterwards would come back to power. Saddam, annoyed, asked if anyone else in the Cabinet agreed with the Health Minister's idea. When no one raised their hand in support, he escorted Riyadh Hussein to the next room, closed the door, and shot him with his pistol.

    Iran invades Iraq and Iraqi tactics in response

    An admonitory declaration issued from the Iraqi government in order to warn Iranian troops in the Iran–Iraq War. The statement says: "Hey Iranians! No one has been downtrodden in the country where Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib, Husayn ibn Ali and Abbas ibn Ali are buried. Iraq has undoubtedly been an honorable country. All refugees are precious. Anyone who wants to live in exile can choose Iraq freely. We, the Sons of Iraq, have been ambushing foreign aggressors. The enemies who plan to assault Iraq will be disfavoured by God in this world and the hereafter. Be careful of attacking Iraq and Ali ibn Abi Ṭālib! If you surrender, you might be in peace."

    For the most part, Iraq remained on the defensive for the next five years, unable and unwilling to launch any major offensives, while Iran launched more than 70 offensives. Iraq's strategy changed from holding territory in Iran to denying Iran any major gains in Iraq, as well as holding onto disputed territories along the border. Saddam began a policy of total war, gearing most of his country towards defending against Iran. By 1988, Iraq was spending 40–75% of its GDP on military equipment. Saddam had also more than doubled the size of the Iraqi army, from 200,000 soldiers (12 divisions and three independent brigades) to 500,000 (23 divisions and nine brigades). Iraq also began launching air raids against Iranian border cities, greatly increasing the practice by 1984.

    By the end of 1982, Iraq had been resupplied with new Soviet and Chinese materiel, and the ground war entered a new phase. Iraq used newly acquired T-55, T-62 and T-72 tanks, as well as Chinese copies, BM-21 truck-mounted rocket launchers, and Mi-24 helicopter gunships to prepare a Soviet-type three-line defence, replete with obstacles such as barbed wire, minefields, fortified positions and bunkers. The Combat Engineer Corps built bridges across water obstacles, laid minefields, erected earthen revetments, dug trenches, built machine gun nests, and prepared new defence lines and fortifications.

    Iraq began to focus on using defense in depth to defeat the Iranians. Iraq created multiple static defense lines to bleed the Iranians through sheer size. When faced against large Iranian attack, where human waves would overrun Iraq's forward entrenched infantry defences, the Iraqis would often retreat, but their static defences would bleed the Iranians and channel them into certain directions, drawing them into traps or pockets. Iraqi air and artillery attacks would then pin the Iranians down, while tanks and mechanised infantry attacks using mobile warfare would push them back.

    Sometimes, the Iraqis would launch "probing attacks" into the Iranian lines to provoke them into launching their attacks sooner. While Iranian human wave attacks were successful against the dug-in Iraqi forces in Khuzestan, they had trouble breaking through Iraq's defense in depth lines. Iraq had a logistical advantage in their defence: the front was located near the main Iraqi bases and arms depots, allowing their army to be efficiently supplied. By contrast, the front in Iran was a considerable distance away from the main Iranian bases and arms depots, and as such, Iranian troops and supplies had to travel through mountain ranges before arriving at the front.

    Iran's military power was weakened once again by large purges in 1982, resulting from another supposedly attempted coup.

    Operation Ramadan (First Battle of Basra)

    The Iranian generals wanted to launch an all-out attack on Baghdad and seize it while the Iranian army's supplies allowed for such an offensive. This was rejected as being impracticable and the decision was made to capture one area of Iraq after the other, with the hope that this would force Iraq to withdraw from disputed border territories and begin negotiations to end the war.

    On 13 July 1982, Iran began their attack in southern Iraq, near Basra. Called Operation Ramadan, it involved over 180,000 troops from both sides, and was one of the largest land battles since World War II. Iranian strategy dictated that they launch their primary attack on the weakest point of the Iraqi lines. However, the Iraqis were informed of Iran's battle plans and moved all of their forces to the area the Iranians planned to attack. The Iraqis were equipped with tear gas to use against the enemy, which was the first major use of chemical warfare during the conflict, throwing an entire attacking division into chaos.

    95,000 Iranian child soldiers were casualties during the Iran–Iraq War, mostly between the ages of 16 and 17, with a few younger.

    Over 100,000 Revolutionary Guards and Basij volunteer forces charged towards the Iraqi lines. The Iraqi troops had entrenched themselves in formidable defenses, and had set up a network of bunkers and artillery positions. The Basij used human waves, and were even used to bodily clear the Iraqi minefields and allow the Revolutionary Guards to advance. Combatants came so close to one another that Iranians were able to board Iraqi tanks and throw grenades inside the hulls. By the eighth day, the Iranians had gained 16 km (9.9 mi) inside Iraq and had taken several causeways. Iran's Revolutionary Guards also used the T-55 tanks they had captured in earlier battles.

    The attacks came to a halt and the Iranians turned to defensive measures. Seeing this, Iraq used their Mi-25 helicopters, along with Gazelle helicopters armed with Euromissile HOT, against columns of Iranian mechanised infantry and tanks. These "hunter-killer" teams of helicopters, which had been formed with the help of East German advisors, proved very costly for the Iranians. Aerial dogfights occurred between Iraqi MiGs and Iranian F-4 Phantoms.

    On 16 July, Iran tried again further north and managed to push the Iraqis back. Only 13 km (8.1 mi) from Basra, the poorly equipped Iranian forces were surrounded on three sides by Iraqis with heavy weaponry. Some were captured, while many were killed. Only a last-minute attack by Iranian AH-1 Cobra helicopters stopped the Iraqis from routing the Iranians. Three more similar attacks occurred around the Khorramshahr-Baghdad road area towards the end of the month, but none were significantly successful.

    Iraq had concentrated three armoured divisions, the 3rd, 9th, and 10th, as a counter-attack force to attack any penetrations. They were successful in defeating the Iranian breakthroughs, but suffered heavy losses. The 9th Armoured Division in particular had to be disbanded, and was never reformed. The total casualty toll had grown to include 80,000 soldiers and civilians. 400 Iranian tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed or abandoned, while Iraq lost at least 370 tanks.

    Final operations of 1982

    After Iran's failure in Operation Ramadan, they carried out only a few smaller attacks. Iran launched two limited offensives aimed at reclaiming the Sumar Hills and isolating the Iraqi pocket at Naft shahr at the international border, both of which were part of the disputed territories still under Iraqi occupation. They then aimed to capture the Iraqi border town of Mandali. They planned to take the Iraqis by surprise using Basij militiamen, army helicopters, and some armoured forces, then stretch their defences and possibly break through them to open a road to Baghdad for future exploitation.

    During Operation Muslim ibn Aqil (1–7 October), Iran recovered 150 km (58 sq mi) of disputed territory straddling the international border and reached the outskirts of Mandali before being stopped by Iraqi helicopter and armoured attacks. During Operation Muharram (1–21 November), the Iranians captured part of the Bayat oilfield with the help of their fighter jets and helicopters, destroying 105 Iraqi tanks, 70 APCs, and 7 planes with few losses. They nearly breached the Iraqi lines but failed to capture Mandali after the Iraqis sent reinforcements, including brand new T-72 tanks, which possessed armour that could not be pierced from the front by Iranian TOW missiles. The Iranian advance was also impeded by heavy rains. 3,500 Iraqis and an unknown number of Iranians died, with only minor gains for Iran.

    1983–84: Stalemate and war of attrition

    The furthest ground gains made by both sides during the war

    After the failure of the 1982 summer offensives, Iran believed that a major effort along the entire breadth of the front would yield victory. In 1983, the Iranians launched five major assaults along the front. None achieved substantial success, as the Iranians staged more massive "human wave" attacks. By this time, it was estimated that no more than 70 Iranian fighter aircraft were still operational at any given time. Iran had its own helicopter repair facilities, left over from before the revolution, and often used helicopters for close air support.

    Iranian fighter pilots had superior training compared to their Iraqi counterparts, as most had received training from US officers before the 1979 revolution, and continued to dominate in combat. However, aircraft shortages, the size of defended territory/airspace, and American intelligence supplied to Iraq allowed the Iraqis to exploit gaps in Iranian airspace. Iraqi air campaigns met little opposition, striking over half of Iran, as the Iraqis were able to gain air superiority towards the end of the war.

    Operation Before the Dawn

    In Operation Before the Dawn, launched 6 February 1983, the Iranians shifted focus from the southern to the central and northern sectors. Employing 200,000 "last reserve" Revolutionary Guard troops, Iran attacked along a 40 km (25 mi) stretch near al-Amarah, Iraq, about 200 km (120 mi) southeast of Baghdad, in an attempt to reach the highways connecting northern and southern Iraq. The attack was stalled by 60 km (37 mi) of hilly escarpments, forests, and river torrents blanketing the way to al-Amarah, but the Iraqis could not force the Iranians back. Iran directed artillery on Basra, Al Amarah, and Mandali.

    The Iranians suffered a large number of casualties clearing minefields and breaching Iraqi anti-tank mines, which Iraqi engineers were unable to replace. After this battle, Iran reduced its use of human wave attacks, though they still remained a key tactic as the war went on.

    Further Iranian attacks were mounted in the Mandali–Baghdad north-central sector in April 1983, but were repelled by Iraqi mechanised and infantry divisions. Casualties were high, and by the end of 1983, an estimated 120,000 Iranians and 60,000 Iraqis had been killed. Iran held the advantage in the war of attrition. In 1983, Iran had an estimated population of 43.6 million to Iraq's 14.8 million, and the discrepancy continued to grow throughout the war.

    Dawn Operations

    From early 1983–1984, Iran launched a series of four Valfajr (Dawn) Operations, that eventually numbered to 10. During Operation Dawn-1, in early February 1983, 50,000 Iranian forces attacked westward from Dezful and were confronted by 55,000 Iraqi forces. The Iranian objective was to cut off the road from Basra to Baghdad in the central sector. The Iraqis carried out 150 air sorties against the Iranians, and even bombed Dezful, Ahvaz, and Khorramshahr in retribution. The Iraqi counterattack was broken up by Iran's 92nd Armoured Division.

    Iranian POWs in 1983 near Tikrit, Iraq

    During Operation Dawn-2, the Iranians directed insurgency operations by proxy in April 1983 by supporting the Kurds in the north. With Kurdish support, the Iranians attacked on 23 July 1983, capturing the Iraqi town of Haj Omran and maintaining it against an Iraqi poison gas counteroffensive. This operation incited Iraq to later conduct indiscriminate chemical attacks against the Kurds. The Iranians attempted to further exploit activities in the north on 30 July 1983, during Operation Dawn-3. Iran saw an opportunity to sweep away Iraqi forces controlling the roads between the Iranian mountain border towns of Mehran, Dehloran and Elam. Iraq launched airstrikes, and equipped attack helicopters with chemical warheads. While ineffective, it demonstrated both the Iraqi general staff's and Saddam's increasing interest in using chemical weapons. In the end, 17,000 had been killed on both sides, with no gain for either country.

    The focus of Operation Dawn-4 in September 1983 was the northern sector in Iranian Kurdistan. Three Iranian regular divisions, the Revolutionary Guard, and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) elements amassed in Marivan and Sardasht in a move to threaten the major Iraqi city Suleimaniyah. Iran's strategy was to press Kurdish tribes to occupy the Banjuin Valley, which was within 45 km (28 mi) of Suleimaniyah and 140 km (87 mi) from the oilfields of Kirkuk. To stem the tide, Iraq deployed Mi-8 attack helicopters equipped with chemical weapons and executed 120 sorties against the Iranian force, which stopped them 15 km (9.3 mi) into Iraqi territory.

    5,000 Iranians and 2,500 Iraqis died. Iran gained 110 km (42 sq mi) of its territory back in the north, gained 15 km (5.8 sq mi) of Iraqi land, and captured 1,800 Iraqi prisoners while Iraq abandoned large quantities of valuable weapons and war materiel in the field. Iraq responded to these losses by firing a series of SCUD-B missiles into the cities of Dezful, Masjid Soleiman, and Behbehan. Iran's use of artillery against Basra while the battles in the north raged created multiple fronts, which effectively confused and wore down Iraq.

    Iran's change in tactics

    Previously, the Iranians had outnumbered the Iraqis on the battlefield, but Iraq expanded their military draft, pursuing a policy of total war, and by 1984, the armies were equal in size. By 1986, Iraq had twice as many soldiers as Iran. By 1988, Iraq had 1 million soldiers, giving it the fourth largest army in the world. Some of its equipment, such as tanks, outnumbered Iran's by at least five to one. Iranian commanders, however, remained more tactically skilled.

    After the Dawn Operations, Iran attempted to change tactics. In the face of increasing Iraqi defense in depth, as well as increased armaments and manpower, Iran could no longer rely on simple human wave attacks. Iranian offensives became more complex and involved extensive maneuver warfare using primarily light infantry. Iran launched frequent, and sometimes smaller offensives to slowly gain ground and deplete the Iraqis through attrition. They wanted to drive Iraq into economic failure by wasting money on weapons and war mobilization, and to deplete their smaller population by bleeding them dry, in addition to creating an anti-government insurgency. They were successful in Kurdistan, but not southern Iraq.

    Iran supported their attacks with heavy weaponry when possible and with better planning, although the brunt of the battles still fell to the infantry. The Army and Revolutionary Guards worked together better as their tactics improved. Human wave attacks became less frequent, although were still used. To negate the Iraqi advantage of defense in depth, static positions, and heavy firepower, Iran began to focus on fighting in areas where the Iraqis could not use their heavy weaponry, such as marshes, valleys, and mountains, and frequently using infiltration tactics.

    Iran began training troops in infiltration, patrolling, night-fighting, marsh warfare, and mountain warfare. They began training thousands of Revolutionary Guard commandos in amphibious warfare, as southern Iraq is marshy and filled with wetlands. Iran used speedboats to cross the marshes and rivers in southern Iraq and landed troops on the opposing banks, where they would dig and set up pontoon bridges across the rivers and wetlands to allow heavy troops and supplies to cross. Iran also learned to integrate foreign guerrilla units as part of their military operations. On the northern front, Iran began working heavily with the Peshmerga, Kurdish guerrillas. Iranian military advisors organised the Kurds into raiding parties of 12 guerrillas, which would attack Iraqi command posts, troop formations, infrastructure, including roads and supply lines, and government buildings. The oil refineries of Kirkuk became a favourite target, and were often hit by homemade Peshmerga rockets.

    Battle of the Marshes

    Main articles: Battle of the Marshes, Operation Dawn 5, Operation Dawn 6, and Operation Kheibar
    An Iraqi POW who was shot by Iranian troops after they conquered the Iraqi Majnoon oil field in October 1984

    By 1984, the Iranian ground forces were reorganised well enough for the Revolutionary Guard to start Operation Kheibar, which lasted from 24 February to 19 March. On 15 February 1984, the Iranians began launching attacks against the central section of the front, where the Second Iraqi Army Corps was deployed: 250,000 Iraqis faced 250,000 Iranians. The goal of this new major offensive was the capture of Basra-Baghdad Highway, cutting off Basra from Baghdad and setting the stage for an eventual attack upon the city. The Iraqi high command had assumed that the marshlands above Basra were natural barriers to attack, and had not reinforced them. The marshes negated Iraqi advantage in armor, and absorbed artillery rounds and bombs. Prior to the attack, Iranian commandos on helicopters had landed behind Iraqi lines and destroyed Iraqi artillery. Iran launched two preliminary attacks prior to the main offensive, Operation Dawn 5 and Dawn 6.

    Operation Kheibar began on 24 February with Iranian infantrymen crossing the Hawizeh Marshes using motorboats and transport helicopters in an amphibious assault. The Iranians attacked the vital oil-producing Majnoon Island by landing troops via helicopters onto the islands and severing the communication lines between Amareh and Basra. They then continued the attack towards Qurna. By 27 February, they had captured the island, but suffered catastrophic helicopter losses to the IrAF. On that day, a massive array of Iranian helicopters transporting Pasdaran troops were intercepted by Iraqi combat aircraft (MiGs, Mirages and Sukhois). In what was essentially an aerial slaughter, Iraqi jets shot down 49 of the 50 Iranian helicopters. At times, fighting took place in waters over 2 m (6.6 ft) deep. Iraq ran live electrical cables through the water, electrocuting numerous Iranian troops and then displaying their corpses on state television.

    By 29 February, the Iranians had reached the outskirts of Qurna and were closing in on the Baghdad–Basra highway. They had broken out of the marshes and returned to open terrain, where they were confronted by Iraqi artillery, tanks, air power, and mustard gas. 1,200 Iranian soldiers were killed in the counter-attack. The Iranians retreated back to the marshes, though they still held onto them along with Majnoon Island.

    Iranian troops firing a 152mm D-20 howitzer

    The Battle of the Marshes saw an Iraqi defence that had been under continuous strain since 15 February. They were relieved by their use of chemical weapons and defence-in-depth, where they layered defensive lines: even if the Iranians broke through the first line, they were usually unable to break through the second due to exhaustion and heavy losses. They largely relied on Mi-24 Hind to "hunt" the Iranian troops in the marshes. At least 20,000 Iranians were killed in the marsh battles. Iran used the marshes as a springboard for future attacks/infiltrations.

    Four years into the war, the human cost to Iran had been 170,000 combat fatalities and 340,000 wounded. Iraqi combat fatalities were estimated at 80,000 with 150,000 wounded.

    Tanker war and the war of the cities

    Unable to launch successful ground attacks against Iran, Iraq used their now expanded air force to carry out strategic bombing against Iranian shipping, economic targets, and cities in order to damage Iran's economy and morale. Iraq also wanted to provoke Iran into doing something that would cause the superpowers to be directly involved in the conflict on the Iraqi side.

    Attacks on shipping

    Main article: Tanker war Further information: Operation Earnest Will and Operation Prime Chance
    Operation Earnest Will: Tanker convoy No. 12 under US Navy escort (21 October 1987)

    The so-called tanker war started when Iraq attacked the oil terminal and oil tankers at Kharg Island in early 1984. Iraq's aim in attacking Iranian shipping was to provoke the Iranians to retaliate with extreme measures, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz to all maritime traffic, thereby bringing American intervention; the United States had threatened several times to intervene if the Strait of Hormuz were closed. As a result, the Iranians limited their retaliatory attacks to Iraqi shipping, leaving the strait open to general passage.

    Iraq declared that all ships going to or from Iranian ports in the northern zone of the Persian Gulf were subject to attack. They used F-1 Mirage, Super Etendard, Mig-23, Su-20/22, and Super Frelon helicopters armed with Exocet anti-ship missiles as well as Soviet-made air-to-surface missiles to enforce their threats. Iraq repeatedly bombed Iran's main oil export facility on Kharg Island, causing increasingly heavy damage. As a first response to these attacks, Iran attacked a Kuwaiti tanker carrying Iraqi oil near Bahrain on 13 May 1984, as well as a Saudi tanker in Saudi waters on 16 May.

    Because Iraq had become landlocked during the course of the war, they had to rely on their Arab allies, primarily Kuwait, to transport their oil. Iran attacked tankers carrying Iraqi oil from Kuwait, later attacking tankers from any Persian Gulf state supporting Iraq. Attacks on ships of noncombatant nations in the Persian Gulf sharply increased thereafter, with both nations attacking oil tankers and merchant ships of neutral nations in an effort to deprive their opponent of trade. The Iranian attacks against Saudi shipping led to Saudi F-15s shooting down a pair of F-4 Phantom II fighters on 5 June 1984.

    The air and small-boat attacks did little damage to Persian Gulf state economies, and Iran moved its shipping port to Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz.

    The Iranian Navy imposed a naval blockade of Iraq, using its British-built frigates to stop and inspect any ships thought to be trading with Iraq. They operated with virtual impunity, as Iraqi pilots had little training in hitting naval targets. Some Iranian warships attacked tankers with ship-to-ship missiles, while others used their radars to guide land-based anti-ship missiles to their targets. Iran began to rely on its new Revolutionary Guard's navy, which used Boghammar speedboats fitted with rocket launchers and heavy machine guns. These speedboats would launch surprise attacks against tankers and cause substantial damage. Iran also used F-4 Phantom II fighters and helicopters to launch Maverick missiles and unguided rockets at tankers.

    A U.S. Navy ship, Stark, was struck on 17 May 1987 by two Exocet anti-ship missiles fired from an Iraqi F-1 Mirage plane. The missiles had been fired at about the time the plane was given a routine radio warning by Stark. The frigate did not detect the missiles with radar, and warning was given by the lookout only moments before they struck. Both missiles hit the ship, and one exploded in crew quarters, killing 37 sailors and wounding 21.

    Lloyd's of London, a British insurance market, estimated that the tanker war damaged 546 commercial vessels and killed about 430 civilian sailors. The largest portion of the attacks was directed by Iraq against vessels in Iranian waters, with the Iraqis launching three times as many attacks as the Iranians. But Iranian speedboat attacks on Kuwaiti shipping led Kuwait to formally petition foreign powers on 1 November 1986 to protect its shipping. The Soviet Union agreed to charter tankers starting in 1987, and the United States Navy offered to provide protection for foreign tankers reflagged and flying the U.S. flag starting 7 March 1987 in Operation Earnest Will. Neutral tankers shipping to Iran were not protected by Earnest Will, resulting in reduced foreign tanker traffic to Iran, since they risked Iraqi air attack. Iran accused the United States of helping Iraq.

    During the course of the war, Iran attacked two Soviet merchant ships.

    Seawise Giant, the largest ship ever built, was struck by Iraqi Exocet missiles as it was carrying Iranian crude oil out of the Persian Gulf.

    Attacks on cities

    Main article: War of the cities

    Meanwhile, Iraq's air force also began carrying out strategic bombing raids against Iranian cities. While Iraq had launched numerous attacks with aircraft and missiles against border cities from the beginning of the war and sporadic raids on Iran's main cities, this was the first systematic strategic bombing that Iraq carried out during the war. This would become known as the war of the cities. With the help of the USSR and the west, Iraq's air force had been rebuilt and expanded. Meanwhile, Iran, due to sanctions and lack of spare parts, had heavily curtailed its air force operations. Iraq used Tu-22 Blinder and Tu-16 Badger strategic bombers to carry out long-range high-speed raids on Iranian cities, including Tehran. Fighter-bombers such as the MiG-25 Foxbat and Su-22 Fitter were used against smaller or shorter range targets, as well as escorting the strategic bombers. Civilian and industrial targets were hit by the raids, and each successful raid inflicted economic damage from regular strategic bombing.

    In response, the Iranians deployed their F-4 Phantoms to combat the Iraqis, and eventually they deployed F-14s as well. By 1986, Iran also expanded their air defense network heavily to relieve the pressure on the air force. By later in the war, Iraqi air attacks were used only on fewer, more important targets. Starting in 1987, Saddam also ordered several chemical attacks on civilian targets in Iran, such as the town of Sardasht.

    A map indicating the attacks on civilian areas of Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait that were targeted during the war of the cities

    Iran also launched several retaliatory air raids on Iraq, while primarily shelling border cities such as Basra. Iran also bought some Scud missiles from Libya, and launched them against Baghdad. These too inflicted damage upon Iraq.

    On 7 February 1984, during the first war of the cities, Saddam ordered his air force to attack eleven Iranian cities; bombardments ceased on 22 February 1984. It was estimated that 1,200 Iranian civilians were killed during the raids in February alone.

    Strategic situation in 1984

    By 1984, Iran's losses were estimated to be 300,000 soldiers, while Iraq's losses were estimated to be 150,000. Foreign analysts agreed that both Iran and Iraq failed to use their modern equipment properly, and both sides failed to carry out modern military assaults that could win the war. Both sides also abandoned equipment in the battlefield because their technicians were unable to carry out repairs. Iran and Iraq showed little internal coordination on the battlefield, and in many cases units were left to fight on their own. As a result, by the end of 1984, the war was a stalemate. One limited offensive Iran launched (Dawn 7) took place from 18 to 25 October 1984, when they recaptured the Iranian city of Mehran, which had been occupied by the Iraqis from the beginning of the war.

    1985–86 Iraqi offensives

    By 1985, Iraqi armed forces were receiving financial support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Persian Gulf states, and were making substantial arms purchases from the Soviet Union, China, and France. For the first time since early 1980, Saddam launched new offensives.

    On 6 January 1986, the Iraqis launched an offensive attempting to retake Majnoon Island. They were quickly bogged down into a stalemate against 200,000 Iranian infantrymen, reinforced by amphibious divisions. However, they managed to gain a foothold in the southern part of the island.

    Iraq also carried out another war of the cities between 12 and 14 March, hitting up to 158 targets in over 30 towns and cities, including Tehran. Iran responded by launching 14 Scud missiles for the first time, purchased from Libya. More Iraqi air attacks were carried out in August, resulting in hundreds of additional civilian casualties. Iraqi attacks against both Iranian and neutral oil tankers in Iranian waters continued, with Iraq carrying out 150 airstrikes using French bought Super Etendard and Mirage F-1 jets as well as Super Frelon helicopters, armed with Exocet missiles.

    Operation Badr

    Iraqi commanders discussing strategies on the battlefront, 1986

    The Iraqis attacked again on 28 January 1985; they were defeated, and the Iranians retaliated on 11 March 1985 with a major offensive directed against the Baghdad-Basra highway (one of the few major offensives conducted in 1985), codenamed Operation Badr (after the Battle of Badr, Muhammad's first military victory in Mecca). Ayatollah Khomeini urged Iranians on, declaring:

    It is our belief that Saddam wishes to return Islam to blasphemy and polytheism...if America becomes victorious...and grants victory to Saddam, Islam will receive such a blow that it will not be able to raise its head for a long time...The issue is one of Islam versus blasphemy, and not of Iran versus Iraq.

    This operation was similar to Operation Kheibar, though it invoked more planning. Iran used 100,000 troops, with 60,000 more in reserve. They assessed the marshy terrain, plotted points where they could land tanks, and constructed pontoon bridges across the marshes. The Basij forces were also equipped with anti-tank weapons.

    The ferocity of the Iranian offensive broke through the Iraqi lines. The Revolutionary Guard, with the support of tanks and artillery, broke through north of Qurna on 14 March. That same night 3,000 Iranian troops reached and crossed the Tigris River using pontoon bridges and captured part of the Baghdad–Basra Highway 6, which they had failed to achieve in Operations Dawn 5 and 6.

    Saddam responded by launching chemical attacks against the Iranian positions along the highway and by initiating the aforementioned second war of the cities, with an air and missile campaign against twenty to thirty Iranian population centres, including Tehran. Under General Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Tai and General Jamal Zanoun (both considered to be among Iraq's most skilled commanders), the Iraqis launched air attacks against the Iranian positions and pinned them down. They then launched a pincer attack using mechanized infantry and heavy artillery. Chemical weapons were used, and the Iraqis also flooded Iranian trenches with specially constructed pipes delivering water from the Tigris River.

    The Iranians retreated back to the Hoveyzeh marshes while being attacked by helicopters, and the highway was recaptured by the Iraqis. Operation Badr resulted in 10,000–12,000 Iraqi casualties and 15,000 Iranian ones.

    Iranian counteroffensives

    Iranian President Ali Khamenei on the battlefront during the war

    The failure of the human wave attacks in earlier years had prompted Iran to develop a better working relationship between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard and to mould the Revolutionary Guard units into a more conventional fighting force. To combat Iraq's use of chemical weapons, Iran began producing an antidote. They also created and fielded their own homemade drones, the Mohajer 1's, fitted with six RPG-7's to launch attacks. They were primarily used in observation, being used for up to 700 sorties.

    For the rest of 1986, and until the spring of 1988, the Iranian Air Force's efficiency in air defence increased, with weapons being repaired or replaced and new tactical methods being used. For example, the Iranians would loosely integrate their SAM Sites and interceptors to create "killing fields" in which dozens of Iraqi planes were lost, which was reported in the West as the Iranian Air Force using F-14s as "mini-AWACs". The Iraqi Air Force reacted by increasing the sophistication of its equipment, incorporating modern electronic countermeasure pods, decoys such as chaff and flare, and anti-radiation missiles.

    Due to the heavy losses in the last war of the cities, Iraq reduced their use of aerial attacks on Iranian cities. Instead, they launched Scud missiles, which the Iranians could not stop. Since the range of the Scud missile was too short to reach Tehran, they converted them to al-Husayn missiles with the help of East German engineers, cutting up their Scuds into three chunks and attaching them together. Iran responded to these attacks by using their own Scud missiles.

    Compounding the extensive foreign help to Iraq, Iranian attacks were severely hampered by their shortages of weaponry, particularly heavy weapons as large amounts had been lost during the war. Iran still managed to maintain 1,000 tanks, often by capturing Iraqi ones and additional artillery, but many needed repairs to be operational. By this time Iran managed to procure spare parts from various sources, helping them to restore some weapons. They secretly imported some weapons, such as RBS-70 anti-aircraft MANPADS. In an exception to the United States' support for Iraq, in exchange for Iran using its influence to help free western hostages in Lebanon, the United States secretly sold Iran some limited supplies. In Akbar Rafsanjani's postwar interview, he stated that during the period when Iran was succeeding, for a short time the United States supported Iran, then shortly after began helping Iraq again. Iran managed to get some advanced weapons, such as anti-tank TOW missiles, which worked better than rocket-propelled grenades. Iran later reverse-engineered and produced those weapons themselves. All of these almost certainly helped increase the effectiveness of Iran, although it did not reduce the human cost of their attacks.

    First Battle of al-Faw

    Main articles: First Battle of al-Faw and Operation Dawn 8
    Operation Dawn 8 during which Iran captured the Faw Peninsula

    On the night of 10–11 February 1986, the Iranians launched Operation Dawn 8, in which 30,000 troops in five Army divisions and men from the Revolutionary Guard and Basij advanced in a two-pronged offensive to capture the al-Faw peninsula in southern Iraq, the only area touching the Persian Gulf. The capture of Al Faw and Umm Qasr was a major goal for Iran. Iran began with a feint attack against Basra, which was stopped by the Iraqis.

    Meanwhile, an amphibious strike force landed at the foot of the peninsula. The resistance, consisting of several thousand poorly trained soldiers of the Iraqi Popular Army, fled or were defeated, and the Iranian forces set up pontoon bridges crossing the Shatt al-Arab, allowing 30,000 soldiers to cross in a short period of time. They drove north along the peninsula almost unopposed, capturing it after only 24 hours of fighting. Afterwards they dug in and set up defenses.

    The sudden capture of al-Faw shocked the Iraqis, since they had thought it impossible for the Iranians to cross the Shatt al-Arab. On 12 February 1986, the Iraqis began a counter-offensive to retake al-Faw, which failed after a week of heavy fighting. On 24 February 1986, Saddam sent one of his best commanders, General Maher Abd al-Rashid, and the Republican Guard to begin a new offensive to recapture al-Faw. A new round of heavy fighting took place. Their attempts again ended in failure, costing them many tanks and aircraft. Their 15th mechanised division was almost completely wiped out. The capture of al-Faw and the failure of the Iraqi counter-offensives were blows to the Ba'ath regime's prestige, and led the Gulf countries to fear that Iran might win the war. Kuwait in particular felt menaced with Iranian troops only 16 km (9.9 mi) away, and increased its support of Iraq accordingly.

    In March 1986, the Iranians tried to follow up their success by attempting to take Umm Qasr, which would have completely severed Iraq from the Gulf and placed Iranian troops on the border with Kuwait. The offensive failed due to Iranian shortages of armor. By this time, 17,000 Iraqis and 30,000 Iranians were casualties. The First Battle of al-Faw ended in March, but heavy combat operations lasted on the peninsula into 1988, with neither side being able to displace the other. The battle bogged down into a World War I-style stalemate in the marshes of the peninsula.

    Battle of Mehran

    Main article: Battle of Mehran (1986)

    Immediately after the Iranian capture of al-Faw, Saddam declared a new offensive against Iran, designed to drive deep into the state. The Iranian border city of Mehran, on the foot of the Zagros Mountains, was selected as the first target. On 15–19 May, Iraqi Army's Second Corps, supported by helicopter gunships, attacked and captured the city. Saddam then offered to exchange Mehran for al-Faw. The Iranians rejected the offer. Iraq then continued the attack, attempting to push deeper into Iran. Iraq's attack was quickly warded off by Iranian AH-1 Cobra helicopters with TOW missiles, which destroyed numerous Iraqi tanks and vehicles.

    The Iranians built up their forces on the heights surrounding Mehran. On 30 June, using mountain warfare tactics, they launched their attack, recapturing the city by 3 July. Saddam ordered the Republican Guard to retake the city on 4 July, but their attack was ineffective. Iraqi losses were heavy enough to allow the Iranians to also capture territory inside Iraq, and depleted the Iraqi military enough to prevent them from launching a major offensive for the next two years. Iraq's defeats at al-Faw and at Mehran were severe blows to the prestige of the Iraqi regime. Western powers, including the US, became more determined to prevent an Iraqi loss.

    Situation at the end of 1986

    Through the eyes of international observers, Iran was prevailing in the war by the end of 1986. In the northern front, the Iranians began launching attacks toward the city of Suleimaniya with the help of Kurdish fighters, taking the Iraqis by surprise. They came within 16 km (9.9 mi) of the city before being stopped by chemical and army attacks. Iran's army had also reached the Meimak Hills, only 113 km (70 mi) from Baghdad. Iraq managed to contain Iran's offensives in the south, but was under serious pressure, as the Iranians were slowly overwhelming them.

    Iraq retaliated by initiating another war of the cities. In one attack, Tehran's main oil refinery was hit, and in another instance, Iraq damaged Iran's Assadabad satellite dish, disrupting Iranian overseas telephone and telex service for almost two weeks. Civilian areas were also hit, resulting in many casualties. Iraq continued to attack oil tankers via air. Iran responded by launching Scud missiles and air attacks at Iraqi targets.

    Iraq continued to attack Kharg Island and the oil tankers and facilities as well. Iran created a tanker shuttle service of 20 tankers to move oil from Kharg to Larak Island, escorted by Iranian fighter jets. Once moved to Larak, the oil would be moved to oceangoing tankers, usually neutral. They also rebuilt the oil terminals damaged by Iraqi air raids and moved shipping to Larak Island, while attacking foreign tankers that carried Iraqi oil, as Iran had blocked Iraq's access to the open sea with the capture of al-Faw. By now, they almost always used the armed speedboats of the IRGC navy, and attacked many tankers.

    The tanker war escalated drastically, with attacks nearly doubling in 1986, the majority carried out by Iraq. Iraq got permission from the Saudi government to use its airspace to attack Larak Island, although due to the distance attacks were less frequent there. The escalating tanker war in the Gulf became an ever-increasing concern to foreign powers, especially the United States.

    In April 1986, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa declaring that the war must be won by March 1987. The Iranians increased recruitment efforts, obtaining 650,000 volunteers. The animosity between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard arose again, with the Army wanting to use more refined, limited military attacks, while the Revolutionary Guard wanted to carry out major offensives. Iran, confident in its successes, began planning their largest offensives of the war, which they called their "final offensives".

    Iraq's dynamic defense strategy

    Faced with their recent defeats in al-Faw and Mehran, Iraq appeared to be losing the war. Iraq's generals, angered by Saddam's interference, threatened a full-scale mutiny against the Ba'ath Party unless they were allowed to conduct operations freely. In one of the few times during his career, Saddam gave in to the demands of his generals. Up to this point, Iraqi strategy was to ride out Iranian attacks. However, the defeat at al-Faw led Saddam to declare the war to be Al-Defa al-Mutaharakha (The Dynamic Defense), and announcing that all civilians had to take part in the war effort.

    The government tried to integrate the Shias into the war effort by recruiting many as part of the Ba'ath Party. In an attempt to counterbalance the religious fervor of the Iranians and gain support from the devout masses, the regime also began to promote religion and, on the surface, Islamization, despite the fact that Iraq was run by a secular regime. Scenes of Saddam praying and making pilgrimages to shrines became common on state-run television. While Iraqi morale had been low throughout the war, the attack on al-Faw raised patriotic fervor, as the Iraqis feared invasion.

    Saddam also recruited volunteers from other Arab countries into the Republican Guard, and received much technical support from foreign nations as well. While Iraqi military power had been depleted in recent battles, through heavy foreign purchases and support, they were able to expand their military to much larger proportions by 1988.

    At the same time, Saddam ordered the al-Anfal campaign in an attempt to crush the Kurdish resistance, who were now allied with Iran. The result was the deaths of several hundred thousand Iraqi Kurds, and the destruction of villages, towns, and cities.

    Iraq began to try to perfect its maneuver tactics. The Iraqis began to prioritize the professionalization of their military. Prior to 1986, the conscription-based Iraqi regular army and the volunteer-based Iraqi Popular Army conducted the bulk of the operations in the war, to little effect. The Republican Guard, formerly an elite praetorian guard, was expanded as a volunteer army and filled with Iraq's best generals. Loyalty to the state was no longer a primary requisite for joining. After the war, due to Saddam's paranoia, the former duties of the Republican Guard were transferred to a new unit, the Special Republican Guard. Full-scale war games against hypothetical Iranian positions were carried out in the western Iraqi desert against mock targets. They were repeated over the course of a full year until the forces involved fully memorized their attacks. Iraq built its military massively, eventually possessing the 4th largest in the world, in order to overwhelm the Iranians through sheer size.

    1987–88: Renewed Iranian Offensives

    Burned-out vehicles shown in the aftermath of Operation Mersad

    Meanwhile, Iran continued to attack as the Iraqis were planning their strike. In 1987 the Iranians renewed a series of major human wave offensives in both northern and southern Iraq. The Iraqis had elaborately fortified Basra with 5 defensive rings, exploiting natural waterways such as the Shatt-al-Arab and artificial ones, such as Fish Lake and the Jasim River, along with earth barriers. Fish Lake was a massive lake filled with mines, underwater barbed wire, electrodes and sensors. Behind each waterway and defensive line was radar-guided artillery, ground attack aircraft and helicopters, all capable of firing poison gas or conventional munitions.

    The Iranian strategy was to penetrate the Iraqi defences and encircle Basra, cutting off the city as well as the Al-Faw peninsula from the rest of Iraq. Iran's plan was for three assaults: a diversionary attack near Basra, the main offensive and another diversionary attack using Iranian tanks in the north to divert Iraqi heavy armor from Basra. For these battles, Iran had re-expanded their military by recruiting many new Basij and Pasdaran volunteers. Iran brought 150,000–200,000 total troops into the battles.

    Operation Karbala-4

    Main article: Operation Karbala-4

    On 25 December 1986, Iran launched Operation Karbala-4 (Karbala referring to Husayn ibn Ali's Battle of Karbala). According to Iraqi General Ra'ad al-Hamdani, this was a diversionary attack. The Iranians launched an amphibious assault against the Iraqi island of Umm al-Rassas in the Shatt-Al-Arab river, parallel to Khoramshahr. They then set up a pontoon bridge and continued the attack, eventually capturing the island in a costly success but failing to advance further. The Iranians had 60,000 casualties, while the Iraqis 9,500. The Iraqi commanders exaggerated Iranian losses to Saddam, and it was assumed that the main Iranian attack on Basra had been fully defeated and that it would take the Iranians six months to recover. When the main Iranian attack, Operation Karbala 5, began, many Iraqi troops were on leave.

    Karbala-5 (Sixth Battle of Basra)

    Main article: Siege of Basra

    The Siege of Basra, code-named Operation Karbala-5 (Persian: عملیات کربلای ۵), was an offensive operation carried out by Iran in an effort to capture the Iraqi port city of Basra in early 1987. This battle, known for its extensive casualties and ferocious conditions, was the biggest battle of the war and proved to be the beginning of the end of the Iran–Iraq War. While Iranian forces crossed the border and captured the eastern section of Basra Governorate, the operation ended in a stalemate.

    Karbala-6

    Main article: Operation Karbala-6

    At the same time as Operation Karbala 5, Iran launched Operation Karbala-6 against the Iraqis in Qasr-e Shirin in central Iran to prevent the Iraqis from rapidly transferring units down to defend against the Karbala-5 attack. The attack was carried out by Basij infantry and the Revolutionary Guard's 31st Ashura and the Army's 77th Khorasan armored divisions. The Basij attacked the Iraqi lines, forcing the Iraqi infantry to retreat. An Iraqi armored counter-attack surrounded the Basij in a pincer movement. The Iranian tank divisions attacked, breaking the encirclement. The Iranian attack was stopped by mass Iraqi chemical weapons attacks.

    Iranian war-weariness

    Operation Karbala-5 was a severe blow to Iran's military and morale. To foreign observers, it appeared that Iran was continuing to strengthen. By 1988, Iran had become self-sufficient in many areas, such as anti-tank TOW missiles, Scud ballistic missiles (Shahab-1), Silkworm anti-ship missiles, Oghab tactical rockets, and producing spare parts for their weaponry. Iran had improved its air defenses with smuggled surface to air missiles. Iran was even producing UAV's and the Pilatus PC-7 propeller aircraft for observation. Iran doubled their stocks of artillery, and was self-sufficient in the manufacture of ammunition and small arms.

    While it was not obvious to foreign observers, the Iranian public had become increasingly war-weary and disillusioned with the fighting, and relatively few volunteers joined the fight in 1987–88. Because the Iranian war effort relied on popular mobilization, their military strength actually declined, and Iran was unable to launch any major offensives after Karbala-5. As a result, for the first time since 1982, the momentum of the fighting shifted towards the regular army. Since the regular army was conscription based, it made the war even less popular. Many Iranians began to try to escape the conflict. As early as May 1985, anti-war demonstrations took place in 74 cities throughout Iran, which were crushed by the regime, resulting in some protesters being shot and killed.

    The leadership acknowledged that the war was a stalemate, and began to plan accordingly. No more "final offensives" were planned. The head of the Supreme Defense Council Akbar Rafsanjani announced during a news conference the end of human wave attacks. Mohsen Rezaee, head of the IRGC, announced that Iran would focus exclusively on limited attacks and infiltrations, while arming and supporting opposition groups inside of Iraq.

    On the Iranian home front, sanctions, declining oil prices, and Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil facilities and shipping took a heavy toll on the economy. While the attacks themselves were not as destructive as some analysts believed, the U.S.-led Operation Earnest Will, which protected Iraqi and allied oil tankers, but not Iranian ones, led many neutral countries to stop trading with Iran because of rising insurance and fear of air attack. Iranian oil and non-oil exports fell by 55%, inflation reached 50% by 1987, and unemployment skyrocketed. At the same time, Iraq was experiencing crushing debt and shortages of workers, encouraging its leadership to try to end the war quickly.

    Strategic situation in late 1987

    Main article: Operation Nimble Archer
    Adnan Khairallah, Iraqi Defense Minister, meeting with Iraqi soldiers during the war

    By the end of 1987, Iraq possessed 5,550 tanks, outnumbering the Iranians six to one, and 900 fighter aircraft, outnumbering the Iranians ten to one. After Operation Karbala-5, Iraq only had 100 qualified fighter pilots remaining. Therefore, Iraq began to invest in recruiting foreign pilots from countries such as Belgium, South Africa, Pakistan, East Germany and the Soviet Union. They replenished their manpower by integrating volunteers from other Arab countries into their army. Iraq also became self-sufficient in chemical weapons and some conventional ones and received much equipment from abroad. Foreign support helped Iraq bypass its economic troubles and massive debt to continue the war and increase the size of its military.

    While the southern and central fronts were at a stalemate, Iran began to focus on carrying out offensives in northern Iraq with the help of the Peshmerga (Kurdish insurgents). The Iranians used a combination of semi-guerrilla and infiltration tactics in the Kurdish mountains with the Peshmerga. During Operation Karbala-9 in early April, Iran captured territory near Suleimaniya, provoking a severe poison gas counter-attack. During Operation Karbala-10, Iran attacked near the same area, capturing more territory. During Operation Nasr-4, the Iranians surrounded the city of Suleimaniya and, with the help of the Peshmerga, infiltrated over 140 km into Iraq and raided and threatened to capture the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and other northern oilfields.

    Air and tanker war

    With the stalemate on land, the air/tanker war began to play an increasingly major role in the conflict. The Iranian air force had become very small, with only 20 F-4 Phantoms, 20 F-5 Tigers, and 15 F-14 Tomcats in operation, although Iran managed to restore some damaged planes to service. The Iranian Air Force, despite its once sophisticated equipment, lacked enough equipment and personnel to sustain the war of attrition that had developed, and was unable to lead an outright onslaught against Iraq.

    The Iraqi Air Force, had originally lacked modern equipment and experienced pilots, but after pleas from Iraqi military leaders, Saddam decreased political influence on everyday operations and left the fighting to his combatants. The Soviets began delivering more advanced aircraft and weapons to Iraq, while the French improved training for flight crews and technical personnel and continually introduced new methods for countering Iranian weapons and tactics. Iranian ground air defense still shot down many Iraqi aircraft.

    The main Iraqi air effort had shifted to the destruction of Iranian war-fighting capability, primarily Persian Gulf oil fields, tankers, and Kharg Island, and starting in late 1986, the Iraqi Air Force began a comprehensive campaign against Iranian economic infrastructure. By late 1987, the Iraqi Air Force could count on direct American support for conducting long-range operations against Iranian infrastructural targets and oil installations deep in the Persian Gulf. U.S. Navy ships tracked and reported movements of Iranian shipping and defences. In the massive Iraqi air strike against Kharg Island, flown on 18 March 1988, the Iraqis destroyed two supertankers but lost five aircraft to Iranian F-14 Tomcats, including two Tupolev Tu-22Bs and one Mikoyan MiG-25RB.

    IRGC navy speedboats using swarm tactics

    The attacks on oil tankers continued. Both Iran and Iraq carried out frequent attacks during the first four months of the year. Iran was effectively waging a naval guerilla war with its IRGC navy speedboats, while Iraq attacked with its aircraft. In 1987, Kuwait asked to reflag its tankers to the U.S. flag. They did so in March, and the U.S. Navy began Operation Earnest Will to escort the tankers. The result of Earnest Will would be that, while oil tankers shipping Iraqi/Kuwaiti oil were protected, Iranian tankers and neutral tankers shipping to Iran would be unprotected, resulting in both losses for Iran and the undermining of its trade with foreign countries, damaging Iran's economy further.

    Iran deployed Silkworm missiles to attack ships, but only a few were actually fired. Both the United States and Iran jockeyed for influence in the Gulf. To discourage the United States from escorting tankers, Iran secretly mined some areas. The United States began to escort the reflagged tankers, but one was damaged by a mine while under escort. While being a public-relations victory for Iran, the United States increased its reflagging efforts. While Iran mined the Persian Gulf, their speedboat attacks were reduced, primarily attacking unflagged tankers shipping in the area.

    On 24 September, US Navy SEALS captured the Iranian mine-laying ship Iran Ajr, a diplomatic disaster for the already isolated Iranians. Iran had previously sought to maintain at least a pretense of plausible deniability regarding its use of mines, but the Navy SEALS captured and photographed extensive evidence of Iran Ajr's mine-laying activities. On 8 October, the U.S. Navy destroyed four Iranian speedboats, and in response to Iranian Silkworm missile attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers, launched Operation Nimble Archer, destroying two Iranian oil rigs in the Persian Gulf. During November and December, the Iraqi air force launched a bid to destroy all Iranian airbases in Khuzestan and the remaining Iranian air force. Iran managed to shoot down 30 Iraqi fighters with fighter jets, anti-aircraft guns, and missiles, allowing the Iranian air force to survive to the end of the war.

    On 28 June, Iraqi fighter bombers attacked the Iranian town of Sardasht near the border, using chemical mustard gas bombs. While many towns and cities had been bombed before, and troops attacked with gas, this was the first time that the Iraqis had attacked a civilian area with poison gas. One quarter of the town's then population of 20,000 was burned and stricken, and 113 were killed immediately, with many more dying and suffering health effects over following decades.

    1988: Final Iraqi offensives

    Main articles: Operation Praying Mantis and Iran Air Flight 655

    By 1988, with massive equipment imports and reduced Iranian volunteers, Iraq was ready to launch major offensives against Iran. In February 1988, Saddam began the fifth and most deadly war of the cities. Over the next two months, Iraq launched over 200 al-Husayn missiles at 37 Iranian cities. Saddam also threatened to use chemical weapons in his missiles, which caused 30% of Tehran's population to leave the city. Iran retaliated, launching at least 104 missiles against Iraq in 1988 and shelling Basra. This event was nicknamed the "Scud Duel" in the foreign media. In all, Iraq launched 520 Scuds and al-Husseins against Iran and Iran fired 177 in return. The Iranian attacks were too few in number to deter Iraq from launching their attacks. Iraq also increased their airstrikes against Kharg Island and Iranian oil tankers. With their tankers protected by U.S. warships, they could operate with virtual impunity. In addition, the West supplied Iraq's air force with laser-guided smart bombs, allowing them to attack economic targets while evading anti-aircraft defenses. These attacks began to have a major toll on the Iranian economy and morale and caused many casualties.

    Iran's Kurdistan Operations

    An Iranian soldier wearing a gas mask during the war

    In March 1988, the Iranians carried out Operation Dawn 10, Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas 2, and Operation Zafar 7 in Iraqi Kurdistan with the aim of capturing the Darbandikhan Dam and the power plant at Lake Dukan, which supplied Iraq with much of its electricity and water, as well as the city of Suleimaniya. Iran hoped that the capture of these areas would bring more favourable terms to the ceasefire agreement. This infiltration offensive was carried out in conjunction with the Peshmerga. Iranian airborne commandos landed behind the Iraqi lines and Iranian helicopters hit Iraqi tanks with TOW missiles. The Iraqis were taken by surprise, and Iranian F-5E Tiger fighter jets even damaged the Kirkuk oil refinery. Iraq carried out executions of multiple officers for these failures in March–April 1988, including Colonel Jafar Sadeq. The Iranians used infiltration tactics in the Kurdish mountains, captured the town of Halabja and began to fan out across the province.

    Though the Iranians advanced to within sight of Dukan and captured around 1,040 km (400 sq mi) and 4,000 Iraqi troops, the offensive failed due to the Iraqi use of chemical warfare. The Iraqis launched the deadliest chemical weapons attacks of the war. The Republican Guard launched 700 chemical shells, while the other artillery divisions launched 200–300 chemical shells each, unleashing a chemical cloud over the Iranians, killing or wounding 60% of them, the blow was felt particularly by the Iranian 84th infantry division and 55th paratrooper division. The Iraqi special forces then stopped the remains of the Iranian force. In retaliation for Kurdish collaboration with the Iranians, Iraq launched a massive poison gas attack against Kurdish civilians in Halabja, recently taken by the Iranians, killing thousands of civilians. Iran airlifted foreign journalists to the ruined city, and the images of the dead were shown throughout the world, but Western mistrust of Iran and collaboration with Iraq led them to also blame Iran for the attack.

    Second Battle of al-Faw

    On 17 April 1988, Iraq launched Operation Ramadan Mubarak (Blessed Ramadan), a surprise attack against the 15,000 Basij troops on the al-Faw peninsula. The attack was preceded by Iraqi diversionary attacks in northern Iraq, with a massive artillery and air barrage of Iranian front lines. Key areas, such as supply lines, command posts, and ammunition depots, were hit by a storm of mustard gas and nerve gas, as well as by conventional explosives. Helicopters landed Iraqi commandos behind Iranian lines on al-Faw while the main Iraqi force made a frontal assault. Within 48 hours, all of the Iranian forces had been killed or cleared from the al-Faw Peninsula. The day was celebrated in Iraq as Faw Liberation Day throughout Saddam's rule. The Iraqis had planned the offensive well. Prior to the attack, the Iraqi soldiers gave themselves poison gas antidotes to shield themselves from the effect of the saturation of gas. The heavy and well executed use of chemical weapons was the decisive factor in the victory. Iraqi losses were relatively light, especially compared to Iran's casualties. Ra'ad al-Hamdani later recounted that the recapture of al-Faw marked "the highest point of experience and expertise that the Iraqi Army reached." The Iranians eventually managed to halt the Iraqi drive as they pushed towards Khuzestan.

    To the shock of the Iranians, rather than breaking off the offensive, the Iraqis kept up their drive, and a new force attacked the Iranian positions around Basra. Following this, the Iraqis launched a sustained drive to clear the Iranians out of all of southern Iraq. One of the most successful Iraqi tactics was the "one-two punch" attack using chemical weapons. Using artillery, they would saturate the Iranian front line with rapidly dispersing cyanide and nerve gas, while longer-lasting mustard gas was launched via fighter-bombers and rockets against the Iranian rear, creating a "chemical wall" that blocked reinforcement.

    Operation Praying Mantis

    The Iranian frigate IS Sahand burns after being hit by 20 U.S. air launched missiles and bombs, killing a third of the crew, April 1988

    The same day as Iraq's attack on al-Faw peninsula, the United States Navy launched Operation Praying Mantis in retaliation against Iran for damaging a warship with a mine. Iran lost oil platforms, destroyers, and frigates in this battle, which ended only when President Reagan decided that the Iranian navy had been damaged enough. In spite of this, the Revolutionary Guard Navy continued their speedboat attacks against oil tankers. The defeats at al-Faw and in the Persian Gulf nudged Iranian leadership towards quitting the war, especially when facing the prospect of fighting the Americans.

    Iranian counteroffensive

    Faced with such losses, Khomeini appointed Rafsanjani as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, though he had in actuality occupied that position for months. Rafsanjani ordered a last desperate counter-attack into Iraq, which was launched 13 June 1988. The Iranians infiltrated through the Iraqi trenches and moved 10 km (6.2 mi) into Iraq and managed to strike Saddam's presidential palace in Baghdad using fighter aircraft. After three days of fighting, the decimated Iranians were driven back to their original positions again as the Iraqis launched 650 helicopter and 300 aircraft sorties.

    Operation Forty Stars

    On 18 June 1988, the People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK) conducted a military operation known as Operation Forty Stars (Persian: عملیات چلچراغ). In four days, the People's Mujahedin of Iran wiped out a Pasdaran division, seizing Mehran and building a bridgehead twelve miles into Iran. According to the MEK, Iraqi soldiers did not participate in the operation. Baghdad also said it was not involved in the battle.

    Tawakalna ala Allah operations

    On 25 May 1988, Iraq launched the first of five Tawakalna ala Allah Operations, consisting of one of the largest artillery barrages in history, coupled with chemical weapons. The marshes had been dried by drought, allowing the Iraqis to use tanks to bypass Iranian field fortifications, expelling the Iranians from the border town of Shalamcheh after less than 10 hours of combat.

    Iranian soldiers captured during Iraq's 1988 offensives

    On 25 June, Iraq launched the second Tawakal ala Allah operation against the Iranians on Majnoon Island. Iraqi commandos used amphibious craft to block the Iranian rear, then used hundreds of tanks with massed conventional and chemical artillery barrages to recapture the island after 8 hours of combat. Saddam appeared live on Iraqi television to "lead" the charge against the Iranians. The majority of the Iranian defenders were killed during the quick assault. The final two Tawakal ala Allah operations took place near al-Amarah and Khaneqan. By 12 July, the Iraqis had captured the city of Dehloran, 30 km (19 mi) inside Iran, along with 2,500 troops and much armour and material, which took four days to transport to Iraq. These losses included more than 570 of the 1,000 remaining Iranian tanks, over 430 armored vehicles, 45 self-propelled artillery, 300 towed artillery pieces, and 320 antiaircraft guns. These figures only included what Iraq could actually put to use; total amount of captured materiel was higher. Since March, the Iraqis claimed to have captured 1,298 tanks, 155 infantry fighting vehicles, 512 heavy artillery pieces, 6,196 mortars, 5,550 recoilless rifles and light guns, 8,050-man-portable rocket launchers, 60,694 rifles, 322 pistols, 454 trucks, and 1,600 light vehicles. The Iraqis withdrew from Dehloran soon after, claiming that they had "no desire to conquer Iranian territory". History professor Kaveh Farrokh considered this to be Iran's greatest military disaster during the war. Stephen Pelletier, a Journalist, Middle East expert, and author, noted that "Tawakal ala Allah ... resulted in the absolute destruction of Iran's military machine."

    During the 1988 battles, the Iranians put up little resistance, having been worn out by nearly eight years of war. They lost large amounts of equipment. On 2 July, Iran belatedly set up a joint central command which unified the Revolutionary Guard, Army, and Kurdish rebels, and dispelled the rivalry between the Army and the Revolutionary Guard. However, this came too late and, following the capture of 570 of their operable tanks and the destruction of hundreds more, Iran was believed to have fewer than 200 remaining operable tanks on the southern front, against thousands of Iraqi ones. The only area where the Iranians were not suffering major defeats was in Kurdistan.

    Iran accepts the ceasefire

    Main article: Peace efforts during the Iran–Iraq War

    Saddam sent a warning to Khomeini in mid-1988, threatening to launch a new and powerful full-scale invasion and attack Iranian cities with weapons of mass destruction. Shortly afterwards, Iraqi aircraft bombed the Iranian town of Oshnavieh with poison gas, immediately killing and wounding over 2,000 civilians. The fear of an all out chemical attack against Iran's largely unprotected civilian population weighed heavily on the Iranian leadership, and they realized that the international community had no intention of restraining Iraq. The lives of the civilian population of Iran were becoming very disrupted, with a third of the urban population evacuating major cities in fear of the seemingly imminent chemical war. Meanwhile, Iraqi conventional bombs and missiles continuously hit towns and cities, destroying vital civilian and military infrastructure, and increasing the death toll. Iran replied with missile and air attacks, but not sufficiently to deter the Iraqis.

    USS Vincennes in 1987 a year before it shot down Iran Air Flight 655

    With the threat of a new and even more powerful invasion, Commander-in-Chief Rafsanjani ordered the Iranians to retreat from Haj Omran, Kurdistan on 14 July. The Iranians did not publicly describe this as a retreat, instead calling it a "temporary withdrawal". By July, Iran's army inside Iraq had largely disintegrated. Iraq put up a massive display of captured Iranian weapons in Baghdad, claiming they captured 1,298 tanks, 5,550 recoilless rifles, and thousands of other weapons. However, Iraq had taken heavy losses as well, and the battles were very costly.

    In July 1988, Iraqi aircraft dropped bombs on the Iranian Kurdish village of Zardan. Dozens of villages, such as Sardasht, and some larger towns, such as Marivan, Baneh and Saqqez, were once again attacked with poison gas, resulting in even heavier civilian casualties. On 3 July 1988, the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing 290 passengers and crew. The lack of international sympathy disturbed the Iranian leadership, and they came to the conclusion that the United States was on the verge of waging a full-scale war against them, and that Iraq was on the verge of unleashing its entire chemical arsenal upon their cities.

    At this point, elements of the Iranian leadership, led by Rafsanjani (who had initially pushed for the extension of the war), persuaded Khomeini to accept a ceasefire. They stated that in order to win the war, Iran's military budget would have to be increased eightfold and the war would last until 1993. On 20 July 1988, Iran accepted Resolution 598, showing its willingness to accept a ceasefire. A statement from Khomeini was read out in a radio address, and he expressed deep displeasure and reluctance about accepting the ceasefire,

    Happy are those who have departed through martyrdom. Happy are those who have lost their lives in this convoy of light. Unhappy am I that I still survive and have drunk the poisoned chalice...

    The news of the end of the war was greeted with celebration in Baghdad, with people dancing in the streets; in Tehran, however, the end of the war was greeted with a somber mood.

    Operation Mersad and end of the war

    Operation Mersad (مرصاد "ambush") was the last big military operation of the war. Both Iran and Iraq had accepted Resolution 598, but despite the ceasefire, after seeing Iraqi victories in the previous months, Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK) decided to launch an attack of its own and wished to advance all the way to Tehran. Saddam and the Iraqi high command decided on a two-pronged offensive across the border into central Iran and Iranian Kurdistan. Shortly after Iran accepted the ceasefire, the MEK army began its offensive, attacking into Ilam province under cover of Iraqi air power. In the north, Iraq also launched an attack into Iraqi Kurdistan, which was blunted by the Iranians.

    On 26 July 1988, the MEK started their campaign in central Iran, Operation Forough Javidan (Eternal Light), with the support of the Iraqi army. The Iranians had withdrawn their remaining soldiers to Khuzestan in fear of a new Iraqi invasion attempt, allowing the Mujahedeen to advance rapidly towards Kermanshah, seizing Qasr-e Shirin, Sarpol-e Zahab, Kerend-e Gharb, and Islamabad-e-Gharb. The MEK expected the Iranian population to rise up and support their advance; the uprising never materialised but they reached 145 km (90 mi) deep into Iran. In response, the Iranian military launched its counter-attack, Operation Mersad, under Lieutenant General Ali Sayyad Shirazi. Iranian paratroopers landed behind the MEK lines while the Iranian Air Force and helicopters launched an air attack, destroying much of the enemy columns. The Iranians defeated the MEK in the city of Kerend-e Gharb on 29 July 1988. On 31 July, Iran drove the MEK out of Qasr-e-Shirin and Sarpol Zahab, though MEK claimed to have "voluntarily withdrawn" from the towns. Iran estimated that 4,500 MEK were killed, while 400 Iranian soldiers died.

    MEK soldiers killed in Operation Mersad, 1988

    The last notable combat actions of the war took place on 3 August 1988, in the Persian Gulf when the Iranian navy fired on a freighter and Iraq launched chemical attacks on Iranian civilians, killing an unknown number of them and wounding 2,300. Iraq came under international pressure to curtail further offensives. Resolution 598 became effective on 8 August 1988, ending all combat operations between the two countries. By 20 August 1988, peace with Iran was restored. UN peacekeepers belonging to the UNIIMOG mission took the field, remaining on the Iran–Iraq border until 1991. The majority of Western analysts believe that the war had no winners while some believed that Iraq emerged as the victor of the war, based on Iraq's overwhelming successes between April and July 1988. While the war was now over, Iraq spent the rest of August and early September clearing the Kurdish resistance. Using 60,000 troops along with helicopter gunships, chemical weapons (poison gas), and mass executions, Iraq hit 15 villages, killing rebels and civilians, and forced tens of thousands of Kurds to relocate to settlements. Many Kurdish civilians fled to Iran. By 3 September 1988, the anti-Kurd campaign ended, and all resistance had been crushed. 400 Iraqi soldiers and 50,000–100,000 Kurdish civilians and soldiers had been killed.

    At the war's conclusion, it took several weeks for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran to evacuate Iraqi territory to honor pre-war international borders set by the 1975 Algiers Agreement. The last prisoners of war were exchanged in 2003.

    The Security Council did not identify Iraq as the aggressor of the war until 11 December 1991, some 11 years after Iraq invaded Iran and 16 months following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

    Aftermath

    Casualties

    The Al-Shaheed Monument in Baghdad was erected to commemorate the fallen Iraqi soldiers during the war.

    The Iran–Iraq War was the deadliest conventional war ever fought between regular armies of developing countries. Encyclopædia Britannica states: "Estimates of total casualties range from 1,000,000 to twice that number. The number killed on both sides was perhaps 500,000, with Iran suffering the greatest losses." Iraqi casualties are estimated at 105,000–200,000 killed, while about 400,000 had been wounded and some 70,000 taken prisoner. Thousands of civilians on both sides died in air raids and ballistic missile attacks. Prisoners taken by both countries began to be released on 17 August 1990, though some were not released until more than 10 years after the end of the conflict. Cities on both sides had also been considerably damaged. While revolutionary Iran had been bloodied, Iraq was left with a large military and was a regional power, albeit with severe debt, financial problems, and labour shortages.

    According to Iranian government sources, the war cost Iran an estimated 200,000–220,000 killed, or up to 262,000 according to the conservative Western estimates. This includes 123,220 combatants, 60,711 MIA and 11,000–16,000 civilians. Combatants include 79,664 members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and additional 35,170 soldiers from regular military. In addition, prisoners of war accounted for 42,875 Iranian casualties, captured and kept in Iraqi detention centres from 2.5 to more than 15 years after the war was over.

    According to the Janbazan Affairs Organization, 398,587 Iranians sustained injuries that required prolonged medical and health care following primary treatment, including 52,195 (13%) injured due to the exposure to chemical warfare agents. From 1980 to 2012, 218,867 Iranians died due to war injuries and the mean age of combatants was 23 years old. This includes 33,430 civilians, mostly women and children. More than 144,000 Iranian children were orphaned as a consequence of these deaths. Other estimates put Iranian casualties up to 600,000.

    Both Iraq and Iran manipulated loss figures to suit their purposes. At the same time, Western analysts accepted improbable estimates. By April 1988, such casualties were estimated at between 150,000 and 340,000 Iraqis dead, and 450,000 to 730,000 Iranians. Shortly after the end of the war, it was thought that Iran suffered even more than a million dead. Considering the style of fighting on the ground and the fact that neither side penetrated deeply into the other's territory, USMC analysts believe events do not substantiate the high casualties claimed. The Iraqi government has claimed 800,000 Iranians were killed in action, four times more than Iranian official figures, whereas Iraqi intelligence privately put the number at 228,000–258,000 as of August 1986. Iraqi losses were also revised downwards over time.

    Peace talks and postwar situation

    Iranian Martyr Cemetery in Isfahan

    With the ceasefire in place, and UN peacekeepers monitoring the border, Iran and Iraq sent their representatives to Geneva, Switzerland, to negotiate a peace agreement on the terms of the ceasefire. However, peace talks stalled. Iraq, in violation of the UN ceasefire, refused to withdraw its troops from 7,800 square kilometres (3,000 sq mi) of disputed territory at the border area unless the Iranians accepted Iraq's full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Foreign powers continued to support Iraq, which wanted to gain at the negotiating table what they failed to achieve on the battlefield, and Iran was portrayed as the one not wanting peace.

    In response, Iran refused to release 70,000 Iraqi prisoners of war, compared to 40,000 Iranian prisoners of war held by Iraq. They continued to carry out a naval blockade of Iraq, although its effects were mitigated by Iraqi use of ports in friendly neighbouring Arab countries. Iran began to improve relations with many of the states that opposed it during the war. Because of Iranian actions, by 1990, Saddam had become more conciliatory, and in a letter to the future fourth President of Iran Rafsanjani, he became more open to the idea of a peace agreement, although he still insisted on full sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab.

    By 1990, Iran was undergoing military rearmament and reorganization, and purchased $10 billion worth of heavy weaponry from the USSR and China, including aircraft, tanks, and missiles. Rafsanjani reversed Iran's self-imposed ban on chemical weapons, and ordered the manufacture and stockpile of them (Iran destroyed them in 1993 after ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention). As war with the western powers loomed, Iraq became concerned about the possibility of Iran mending its relations with the west in order to attack Iraq. Iraq had lost its support from the West, and its position in Iran was increasingly untenable. Saddam realized that if Iran attempted to expel the Iraqis from the disputed territories in the border area, it was likely they would succeed.

    Shortly after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam wrote a letter to Rafsanjani stating that Iraq recognised Iranian rights over the eastern half of the Shatt al-Arab, a reversion to status quo ante bellum that he had repudiated a decade earlier, and that he would accept Iran's demands and withdraw Iraq's military from the disputed territories. A peace agreement was signed finalizing the terms of the UN resolution, diplomatic relations were restored, and by late 1990-early 1991, the Iraqi military withdrew. The UN peacekeepers withdrew from the border shortly afterward. Most of the prisoners of war were released in 1990, although some remained as late as 2003. Iranian politicians declared it to be the "greatest victory in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran".

    Most historians and analysts consider the war to be a stalemate. Certain analysts believe that Iraq won, on the basis of the successes of their 1988 offensives which thwarted Iran's major territorial ambitions in Iraq and persuaded Iran to accept the ceasefire. Iranian analysts believe that they won the war because although they did not succeed in overthrowing the Iraqi government, they thwarted Iraq's major territorial ambitions in Iran, and that, two years after the war had ended, Iraq permanently gave up its claim of ownership over the entire Shatt al-Arab as well.

    On 9 December 1991, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, UN Secretary General at the time, reported that Iraq's initiation of the war was unjustified, as was its occupation of Iranian territory and use of chemical weapons against civilians:

    That explanations do not appear sufficient or acceptable to the international community is a fact... cannot be justified under the charter of the United Nations, any recognized rules and principles of international law, or any principles of international morality, and entails the responsibility for conflict. Even if before the outbreak of the conflict there had been some encroachment by Iran on Iraqi territory, such encroachment did not justify Iraq's aggression against Iran—which was followed by Iraq's continuous occupation of Iranian territory during the conflict—in violation of the prohibition of the use of force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus cogens...On one occasion I had to note with deep regret the experts' conclusion that "chemical weapons ha been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban center lacking any protection against that kind of attack."

    He also stated that had the UN accepted this fact earlier, the war would have almost certainly not lasted as long as it did. Iran, encouraged by the announcement, sought reparations from Iraq, but never received any.

    The Iranian Martyrs Museum in Tehran

    Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Iran and Iraq relations remained balanced between a cold war and a cold peace. Despite renewed and somewhat thawed relations, both sides continued to have low level conflicts. Iraq continued to host and support the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, which carried out multiple attacks throughout Iran up until the 2003 invasion of Iraq, including the assassination of Iranian general Ali Sayyad Shirazi in 1999, cross border raids, and mortar attacks. Iran carried out several airstrikes and missile attacks against Mujahedeen targets inside of Iraq, the largest taking place in 2001, when Iran fired 56 Scud missiles at Mujahedeen targets.

    According to General Hamdani, Iran continued to carry out low-level infiltrations of Iraqi territory, using Iraqi dissidents and anti-government activists rather than Iranian troops, in order to incite revolts. After the fall of Saddam in 2003, Hamdani claimed that Iranian agents infiltrated and created numerous militias in Iraq and built an intelligence system operating within the country.

    In 2005, the new government of Iraq apologised to Iran for starting the war. The Iraqi government also commemorated the war with various monuments, including the Hands of Victory and the al-Shaheed Monument, both in Baghdad. The war also helped to create a forerunner for the Coalition of the Gulf War, when the Gulf Arab states banded together early in the war to form the Gulf Cooperation Council to help Iraq fight Iran.

    Economic situation

    The economic loss at the time was believed to exceed $500 billion for each country ($1.2 trillion total). In addition, economic development stalled and oil exports were disrupted. Iraq had accrued more than $130 billion of international debt, excluding interest, and was also weighed down by a slowed GDP growth. Iraq's debt to the Paris Club amounted to $21 billion, 85% of which had originated from the combined inputs of Japan, the USSR, France, Germany, the United States, Italy and the United Kingdom. The largest portion of Iraq's debt, amounting to $130 billion, was to its former Arab backers, with $67 billion loaned by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and Jordan.

    After the war, Iraq accused Kuwait of slant drilling and stealing oil, inciting its invasion of Kuwait, which in turn worsened Iraq's financial situation: the United Nations Compensation Commission mandated Iraq to pay reparations of more than $200 billion to victims of the invasion, including Kuwait and the United States. To enforce payment, Iraq was put under a comprehensive international embargo, which further strained the Iraqi economy and pushed its external debt to private and public sectors to more than $500 billion by the end of Saddam's rule. Combined with Iraq's negative economic growth after prolonged international sanctions, this produced a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 1,000%, making Iraq the most indebted developing country in the world. The unsustainable economic situation compelled the new Iraqi government to request that a considerable portion of debt incurred during the Iran–Iraq war be written off.

    Science and technology

    The war had its impact on medical science: a surgical intervention for comatose patients with penetrating brain injuries was created by Iranian physicians treating wounded soldiers, later establishing neurosurgery guidelines to treat civilians who had suffered blunt or penetrating skull injuries. Iranian physicians' experience in the war informed the medical care of U.S. congresswoman Gabby Giffords after the 2011 Tucson shooting.

    In addition to helping trigger the Persian Gulf War, the Iran–Iraq War also contributed to Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War. Iraq's military was accustomed to fighting the slow moving Iranian infantry formations with artillery and static defenses, while using mostly unsophisticated tanks to gun down and shell the infantry and overwhelm the smaller Iranian tank force; in addition to being dependent on weapons of mass destruction to help secure victories. Therefore, they were rapidly overwhelmed by the high-tech, quick-maneuvering Coalition forces using modern doctrines such as AirLand Battle.

    Domestic situation

    Iraq

    At first, Saddam attempted to ensure that the Iraqi population suffered from the war as little as possible. There was rationing, but civilian projects begun before the war continued. At the same time, the already extensive personality cult around Saddam reached new heights while the regime tightened its control over the military.

    After the Iranian victories of the spring of 1982 and the Syrian closure of Iraq's main pipeline, Saddam did a volte-face on his policy towards the home front: a policy of austerity and total war was introduced, with the entire population being mobilised for the war effort. All Iraqis were ordered to donate blood and around 100,000 Iraqi civilians were ordered to clear the reeds in the southern marshes. Mass demonstrations of loyalty towards Saddam became more common. Saddam also began implementing a policy of discrimination against Iraqis of Iranian origin.

    In the summer of 1982, Saddam began a campaign of terror. More than 300 Iraqi Army officers were executed for their failures on the battlefield. In 1983, a major crackdown was launched on the leadership of the Shia community. Ninety members of the al-Hakim family, an influential family of Shia clerics whose leading members were the émigrés Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, were arrested, and six were hanged.

    The crackdown on Kurds saw 8,000 members of the Barzani clan, whose leader (Massoud Barzani) also led the Kurdistan Democratic Party, similarly executed. From 1983 onwards, a campaign of increasingly brutal repression was started against the Iraqi Kurds, characterised by Israeli historian Efraim Karsh as having "assumed genocidal proportions" by 1988. The Anfal campaign was intended to "pacify" Iraqi Kurdistan permanently. By 1983, the Barzanis entered an alliance with Iran in defense against Saddam Hussein.

    Gaining civilian support

    To secure the loyalty of the Shia population, Saddam allowed more Shias into the Ba'ath Party and the government, and improved Shia living standards, which had been lower than those of the Iraqi Sunnis. Saddam had the state pay for restoring Imam Ali's tomb with white marble imported from Italy. The Baathists also increased their policies of repression against the Shia. The most infamous event was the massacre of 148 civilians of the Shia town of Dujail.

    Despite the costs of the war, the Iraqi regime made generous contributions to Shia waqf (religious endowments) as part of the price of buying Iraqi Shia support. The importance of winning Shia support was such that welfare services in Shia areas were expanded during a time in which the Iraqi regime was pursuing austerity in all other non-military fields. During the first years of the war in the early 1980s, the Iraqi government tried to accommodate the Kurds in order to focus on the war against Iran. In 1983, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan agreed to cooperate with Baghdad, but the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) remained opposed. In 1983, Saddam signed an autonomy agreement with Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), though Saddam later reneged on the agreement. By 1985, the PUK and KDP had joined forces, and Iraqi Kurdistan saw widespread guerrilla warfare up to the end of the war.

    Iran

    An Iranian soldier's funeral in Mashhad, 2013

    Israeli-British historian Ephraim Karsh argued that the Iranian government saw the outbreak of war as chance to strengthen its position and consolidate the Islamic revolution, noting that government propaganda presented it domestically as a glorious jihad and a test of Iranian national character. The Iranian regime followed a policy of total war from the beginning, and attempted to mobilise the nation as a whole. They established a group known as the Reconstruction Campaign, whose members were exempted from conscription and were instead sent into the countryside to work on farms to replace the men serving at the front.

    Iranian workers had a day's pay deducted from their pay cheques every month to help finance the war, and mass campaigns were launched to encourage the public to donate food, money, and blood. To further help finance the war, the Iranian government banned the import of all non-essential items, and launched a major effort to rebuild the damaged oil plants.

    According to former Iraqi general Ra'ad al-Hamdani, the Iraqis believed that in addition to the Arab revolts, the Revolutionary Guards would be drawn out of Tehran, leading to a counter-revolution in Iran that would cause Khomeini's government to collapse and thus ensure Iraqi victory. However, rather than turning against the revolutionary government as experts had predicted, Iran's people (including Iranian Arabs) rallied in support of the country and put up a stiff resistance.

    The IRGC grew as an organization to encompass not just military concerns but also matters of economic, religious, and educational importance. The organization's growth during the war is vital to understanding the organization's role in Iranian society and how it has evolved since its initial formation in 1979. Domestically, the IRGC dealt with suppressing uprisings by Kurds, Baluchs, Turkmen, and the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) which broke with Khomeini in June 1981. While initially dealing with internal threats to the revolution in its first few years, the IRGC focused its attention on external threats at the outbreak of the war in 1980. In January 1981, the IRGC would take control of the Basij to aid in the fight against Iraqi forces. The Basij helped bolster the prominence and legitimacy of the IRGC during the war as a vehicle for indoctrination and through its contributions to the defense of Iran. The transformation of the IRGC organized its command structure which allowed for the organization to match the force of Iran's regular military and its first abroad deployment during the war began the sponsoring of other armed groups in the region through its command of the Quds force.

    Civil unrest

    In June 1981, street battles broke out between the Revolutionary Guard and the left-wing Mujaheddin e-Khalq (MEK), continuing for several days and killing hundreds on both sides. In September, more unrest broke out on the streets of Iran as the MEK attempted to seize power. Thousands of left-wing Iranians (many of whom were not associated with the MEK) were shot and hanged by the government. The MEK began an assassination campaign that killed hundreds of regime officials by the fall of 1981. On 28 June 1981, they assassinated the secretary-general of the Islamic Republican Party, Mohammad Beheshti and on 30 August, killed Iran's president, Mohammad-Ali Rajai. The government responded with mass executions of suspected MEK members, a practice that lasted until 1985.

    In addition to the open civil conflict with the MEK, the Iranian government was faced with Iraqi-supported rebellions in Iranian Kurdistan, which were gradually put down through a campaign of systematic repression. 1985 also saw student anti-war demonstrations, which were crushed by government forces.

    Economy

    In September 2020, Ali Fadavi announced that Iran spent $19.6 billion in the war. The war furthered the decline of the Iranian economy that had begun with the revolution in 1978–79. Between 1979 and 1981, foreign exchange reserves fell from $14.6 billion to $1 billion. As a result of the war, living standards dropped dramatically, and Iran was described by British journalists John Bulloch and Harvey Morris as "a dour and joyless place" ruled by a harsh regime that "seemed to have nothing to offer but endless war".

    Though Iran was becoming bankrupt, Khomeini interpreted Islam's prohibition of usury to mean they could not borrow against future oil revenues to meet war expenses. As a result, Iran funded the war by the income from oil exports after cash had run out. The revenue from oil dropped from $20 billion in 1982 to $5 billion in 1988. French historian Pierre Razoux argued that this sudden drop in economic industrial potential, in conjunction with the increasing aggression of Iraq, placed Iran in a challenging position that had little leeway other than accepting Iraq's conditions of peace.

    In January 1985, former prime minister and anti-war Islamic Liberation Movement co-founder Mehdi Bazargan criticised the war in a telegram to the United Nations, calling it un-Islamic and illegitimate and arguing that Khomeini should have accepted Saddam's truce offer in 1982 instead of attempting to overthrow the Ba'ath. In a public letter to Khomeini sent in May 1988, he added "Since 1986, you have not stopped proclaiming victory, and now you are calling upon population to resist until victory. Is that not an admission of failure on your part?" Khomeini was annoyed by Bazargan's telegram, and issued a lengthy public rebuttal in which he defended the war as both Islamic and just.

    By 1987, Iranian morale had begun to crumble, reflected in the failure of government campaigns to recruit "martyrs" for the front. Israeli historian Efraim Karsh points to the decline in morale in 1987–88 as being a major factor in Iran's decision to accept the ceasefire of 1988.

    Not all saw the war in negative terms. The Islamic Revolution of Iran was strengthened and radicalised. The Iranian government-owned Etelaat newspaper wrote, "There is not a single school or town that is excluded from the happiness of 'holy defence' of the nation, from drinking the exquisite elixir of martyrdom, or from the sweet death of the martyr, who dies in order to live forever in paradise."

    Comparison of Iraqi and Iranian military strength

    See also: Order of battle during the Iran–Iraq War

    Iran's regular Army had been purged after the 1979 Revolution, with most high-ranking officers either having fled the country or been executed.

    At the beginning of the war, Iraq held a clear advantage in armour, while both nations were roughly equal in terms of artillery. The gap only widened as the war went on. Iran started with a stronger air force, but over time, the balance of power reversed in Iraq's favour (as Iraq was constantly expanding its military, while Iran was under arms sanctions). Estimates for 1980 and 1987 were:

    Imbalance of Power (1980–1987) Iraq Iran
    Tanks in 1980 2,700 1,740 (~500 operable)
    Tanks in 1987 4,500+ 1,000
    Fighter aircraft in 1980 332 445 (205 operable)
    Fighter aircraft in 1987 500+ 65 (serviceable)
    Helicopters in 1980 40 500
    Helicopters in 1987 150 60
    Artillery in 1980 1,000 1,000+ (~300 operable)
    Artillery in 1987 4,000+ 1,000+

    The conflict has been compared to World War I in terms of the tactics used, including large-scale trench warfare with barbed wire stretched across trenches, manned machine gun posts, bayonet charges, human wave attacks across a no man's land, and extensive use of chemical weapons such as sulfur mustard by the Iraqi government against Iranian troops, civilians, and Kurds. The world powers United States and the Soviet Union, together with many Western and Arab countries, provided military, intelligence, economic, and political support for Iraq. On average, Iraq imported about $7 billion in weapons during every year of the war, accounting for fully 12% of global arms sales in the period.

    The value of Iraqi arms imports increased to between $12 billion and $14 billion during 1984–1987, whereas the value of Iranian arms imports fell from $14 billion in 1985 to $5.89 billion in 1986 and an estimated $6 billion to $8 billion in 1987. Iran was constrained by the price of oil during the 1980s oil glut as foreign countries were largely unwilling to extend credit to Iran, but Iraq financed its continued massive military expansion by taking on vast quantities of debt that allowed it to win a number of victories against Iran near the end of the war but that left the country bankrupt.

    Despite its larger population, by 1988 Iran's ground forces numbered only 600,000 whereas the Iraqi army had grown to include 1 million soldiers.

    Foreign support to Iraq and Iran

    Main article: International aid to combatants in the Iran–Iraq War
    Donald Rumsfeld as the American special envoy to the Middle East meets Saddam Hussein in December 1983. Rumsfeld was later US Defense Secretary during the 2003 Iraq War, which saw Saddam ousted from power and ultimately executed.

    During the war, Iraq was regarded by the West and the Soviet Union as a counterbalance to post-revolutionary Iran. The Soviet Union, Iraq's main arms supplier during the war, did not wish for the end of its alliance with Iraq, and was alarmed by Saddam's threats to find new arms suppliers in the West and China if the Kremlin did not provide him with the weapons he wanted. The Soviet Union hoped to use the threat of reducing arms supplies to Iraq as leverage for forming a Soviet–Iranian alliance.

    During the early years of the war, the United States lacked meaningful relations with either Iran or Iraq, the former due to the Iranian revolution and the Iran hostage crisis and the latter because of Iraq's alliance with the Soviet Union and hostility towards Israel. Following Iran's success in repelling the Iraqi invasion and Khomeini's refusal to end the war in 1982, the United States made an outreach to Iraq, beginning with the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1984. The United States wished to both keep Iran away from Soviet influence and protect other Gulf states from any threat of Iranian expansion. As a result, the U.S. began to provide limited support to Iraq. In 1982, Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, outlined U.S. policy towards Iran:

    The focus of Iranian pressure at this moment is Iraq. There are few governments in the world less deserving of our support and less capable of using it. Had Iraq won the war, the fear in the Gulf and the threat to our interest would be scarcely less than it is today. Still, given the importance of the balance of power in the area, it is in our interests to promote a ceasefire in that conflict; though not a cost that will preclude an eventual rapprochement with Iran either if a more moderate regime replaces Khomeini's or if the present rulers wake up to geopolitical reality that the historic threat to Iran's independence has always come from the country with which it shares a border of 1,500 miles : the Soviet Union. A rapprochement with Iran, of course, must await at a minimum Iran's abandonment of hegemonic aspirations in the Gulf.

    Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State during the war, testified to Congress in 1984 that the Reagan administration believed a victory for either Iran or Iraq was "neither militarily feasible nor strategically desirable".

    Support to Iraq was given via technological aid, intelligence, the sale of dual-use chemical and biological warfare related technology and military equipment, and satellite intelligence. While there was direct combat between Iran and the United States, it is not universally agreed that the fighting between the United States and Iran was specifically to benefit Iraq, or for separate issues between the U.S. and Iran. American official ambiguity towards which side to support was summed up by Henry Kissinger when he remarked, "It's a pity they can't both lose."

    More than 30 countries provided support to Iraq, Iran, or both; most of the aid went to Iraq. Iran had a complex clandestine procurement network to obtain munitions and critical materials. Iraq had an even larger clandestine purchasing network, involving 10–12 allied countries, to maintain ambiguity over their arms purchases and to circumvent "official restrictions". Arab mercenaries and volunteers from Egypt and Jordan formed the Yarmouk Brigade and participated in the war alongside Iraqis.

    Iraq

    See also: French support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, Italian support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war, and British support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War
    An Iraqi Mil Mi-24 on display at the military museum of Sa'dabad Palace in Iran

    According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, the Soviet Union, France, and China together accounted for over 90% of the value of Iraq's arms imports between 1980 and 1988.

    The United States pursued policies in favour of Iraq by reopening diplomatic channels, lifting restrictions on the export of dual-use technology, overseeing the transfer of third-party military hardware, and providing operational intelligence on the battlefield. France, which from the 1970s had been one of Iraq's closest allies, was a major supplier of military hardware. The French sold weapons equal to $5 billion, which made up well over a quarter of Iraq's total arms stockpile. Citing French magazine Le Nouvel Observateur as the primary source, but also quoting French officials, The New York Times reported France had been sending chemical precursors of chemical weapons to Iraq, since 1986. China, which had no direct stake in the victory of either side and whose interests in the war were entirely commercial, freely sold arms to both sides.

    Iraq also made extensive use of front companies, middlemen, secret ownership of all or part of companies all over the world, forged end-user certificates, and other methods to hide what it was acquiring. Some transactions may have involved people, shipping, and manufacturing in as many as 10 countries. Support from Great Britain exemplified the methods by which Iraq would circumvent export controls. Iraq bought at least one British company with operations in the United Kingdom and the United States, and had a complex relationship with France and the Soviet Union, its major suppliers of actual weapons.

    Turkey took action against the Kurds in 1986, alleging they were attacking the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which prompted a harsh diplomatic intervention by Iran, which planned a new offensive against Iraq at the time and were counting on the support of Kurdish factions.

    Sudan supported Iraq directly during the war, sending a contingent to fight at the frontlines. The Sudanese unit consisted to a large degree of Ugandan refugees from the West Nile Region, recruited by Juma Oris.

    The United Nations Security Council initially called for a cease-fire after a week of fighting while Iraq was occupying Iranian territory, and renewed the call on later occasions. However, the UN did not come to Iran's aid to repel the Iraqi invasion, and the Iranians thus interpreted the UN as subtly biased in favour of Iraq.

    Financial support

    Iraq's main financial backers were the oil-rich Persian Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia ($30.9 billion), Kuwait ($8.2 billion), and the United Arab Emirates ($8 billion). In all, Iraq received $35 billion in loans from the West and between $30 and $40 billion from the Persian Gulf states during the 1980s.

    The Iraqgate scandal revealed that a branch of Italy's largest bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL), in Atlanta, Georgia, relied partially on U.S. taxpayer-guaranteed loans to funnel $5 billion to Iraq from 1985 to 1989. In August 1989, when FBI agents raided the Atlanta branch of BNL, branch manager Christopher Drogoul was charged with making unauthorised, clandestine, and illegal loans to Iraq—some of which, according to his indictment, were used to purchase arms and weapons technology. According to the Financial Times, Hewlett-Packard, Tektronix, and Matrix Churchill's branch in Ohio were among the companies shipping militarily useful technology to Iraq under the eye of the U.S. government.

    Iran

    See also: Israel's role in the Iran–Iraq war and North Korean support for Iran during the Iran–Iraq War

    While the United States directly fought Iran, citing freedom of navigation as a major casus belli, it also indirectly supplied some weapons to Iran as part of a complex and illegal programme that became known as the Iran–Contra affair. These secret sales were partly to help secure the release of hostages held in Lebanon, and partly to make money to help the Contras rebel group in Nicaragua. This arms-for-hostages agreement turned into a major scandal.

    Israel supported Iran in its war against Iraq through the supply of military equipment including spare parts for fighter jets, missile systems, ammunition and tank engines. Israel's motivations for supporting Iran stemmed from a fear of what would have become if Iraq came out victorious and as an opportunity to create business for the Israeli arms industry.

    North Korea was a major arms supplier to Iran, often acting as a third party in arms deals between Iran and the Communist bloc. Support included domestically manufactured arms and Eastern-Bloc weapons, for which the major powers wanted deniability. Among the other arms suppliers and supporters of Iran's Islamic Revolution, the major ones were Libya, Syria, and China. According to the Stockholm International Peace Institute, China was the largest foreign arms supplier to Iran between 1980 and 1988.

    Syria and Libya, breaking Arab solidarity, supported Iran with arms, rhetoric and diplomacy. However, Libya then distanced itself from Iran from 1987, criticizing Tehran's attitude and restoring diplomatic relations with Iraq.

    Aid to both countries

    See also: Soviet Union during the Iran-Iraq War and Portugal and the Iran–Iraq War

    Besides the United States and the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia also sold weapons to both countries for the entire duration of the conflict. Likewise, Portugal helped both countries; it was not unusual to see Iranian and Iraqi flagged ships anchored at Setúbal, waiting their turn to dock.

    From 1980 to 1987, Spain sold €458 million in weapons to Iran and €172 million to Iraq. Weapons sold to Iraq included 4x4 vehicles, BO-105 helicopters, explosives, and ammunition. A research party later discovered that an unexploded chemical Iraqi warhead in Iran was manufactured in Spain.

    Although neither side acquired any weapons from Turkey, both sides enjoyed Turkish civilian trade during the conflict, although the Turkish government remained neutral and refused to support the U.S.-imposed trade embargo on Iran. Turkey's export market jumped from $220 million in 1981 to $2 billion in 1985, making up 25% of Turkey's overall exports. Turkish construction projects in Iraq totaled $2.5 billion between 1974 and 1990. Trading with both countries helped Turkey to offset its ongoing economic crisis, though the benefits decreased as the war neared its end and accordingly disappeared entirely with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the resulting Iraq sanctions Turkey imposed in response.

    U.S. involvement

    Main article: United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War See also: Iraq–United States relations and Iran–United States relations

    American support for Ba'athist Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, in which it fought against post-revolutionary Iran, included several billion dollars' worth of economic aid, the sale of dual-use technology, non-U.S. origin weaponry, military intelligence, and special operations training. The U.S. refused to sell arms to Iraq directly due to Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, but several sales of "dual-use" technology have been documented; notably, Iraq purchased 45 Bell helicopters for $200 million in 1985. Total sales of U.S. dual-use technology to Iraq are estimated at $500 million.

    U.S. government support for Iraq was not a secret and was frequently discussed in open sessions of the Senate and House of Representatives. American views toward Iraq were not enthusiastically supportive in its conflict with Iran, and activity in assistance was largely to prevent an Iranian victory. This was encapsulated by Henry Kissinger when he remarked, "It's a pity they both can't lose."

    U.S. embargo

    President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George H. W. Bush in the Oval Office of the White House, 20 July 1984

    A key element of U.S. political–military and energy–economic planning occurred in early 1983. The Iran–Iraq war had been going on for three years and there were significant casualties on both sides, reaching hundreds of thousands. Within the Reagan National Security Council concern was growing that the war could spread beyond the boundaries of the two belligerents. A National Security Planning Group meeting was called chaired by Vice President George Bush to review U.S. options. It was determined that there was a high likelihood that the conflict would spread into Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, but that the United States had little capability to defend the region.

    It was determined that a prolonged war in the region would induce much higher oil prices and threaten the fragile world recovery which was just beginning to gain momentum. On 22 May 1984, President Reagan was briefed on the project conclusions in the Oval Office by William Flynn Martin who had served as the head of the NSC staff that organized the study. The full declassified presentation can be seen here.

    The conclusions were threefold: firstly, oil stocks needed to be increased among members of the International Energy Agency and, if necessary, released early in the event of oil market disruption; second, the United States needed to reinforce the security of friendly Arab states in the region; and thirdly, an embargo should be placed on sales of military equipment to Iran and Iraq. The plan was approved by the President and later affirmed by the G-7 leaders headed by Margaret Thatcher in the London Summit of 1984.

    U.S. knowledge of Iraqi chemical weapons use

    According to Foreign Policy, the "Iraqis used mustard gas and sarin prior to four major offensives in early 1988 that relied on U.S. satellite imagery, maps, and other intelligence. ... According to recently declassified CIA documents and interviews with former intelligence officials like Francona, the U.S. had firm evidence of Iraqi chemical attacks beginning in 1983."

    Iraqi attack on U.S. warship

    Main article: USS Stark incident
    USS Stark listing following two hits by Exocet missiles

    On 17 May 1987, an Iraqi Dassault Mirage F1 fighter jet launched two Exocet missiles at USS Stark, a Perry class frigate. The first struck the port side of the ship and failed to explode, though it left burning propellant in its wake; the second struck moments later in approximately the same place and penetrated through to crew quarters, where it exploded, killing 37 crew members and leaving 21 injured. Whether or not Iraqi leadership authorised the attack is still unknown. Initial claims by the Iraqi government that Stark was inside the Iran–Iraq War zone were shown to be false, and the motives and orders of the pilot remain unanswered.

    Though American officials claimed that the pilot who attacked Stark had been executed, an ex-Iraqi Air Force commander since stated he had not been punished, and was still alive at the time. The attack remains the only successful anti-ship missile strike on an American warship. Due to the extensive political and military cooperation between the Iraqis and Americans by 1987, the attack had little effect on relations between the two countries.

    U.S. military actions toward Iran

    U.S. attention was focused on isolating Iran as well as maintaining freedom of navigation. It criticised Iran's mining of international waters, and sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 598, which passed unanimously on 20 July, under which the U.S. and Iranian forces skirmished during Operation Earnest Will. During Operation Nimble Archer in October 1987, the United States attacked Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for an Iranian attack on the U.S.-flagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City.

    On 14 April 1988, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts was badly damaged by an Iranian mine, and 10 sailors were wounded. U.S. forces responded with Operation Praying Mantis on 18 April, the U.S. Navy's largest engagement of surface warships since World War II. Two Iranian oil platforms were destroyed, and five Iranian warships and gunboats were sunk. An American helicopter also crashed.

    Iran Air Flight 655

    In the course of escorts by the U.S. Navy, the cruiser USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988, killing all 290 passengers and crew on board. The American government claimed that Vincennes was in international waters at the time (which was later proven to be untrue), that the Airbus A300 had been mistaken for an Iranian F-14 Tomcat, and that Vincennes feared that she was under attack. The Iranians maintain that Vincennes was in their own waters, and that the passenger jet was turning away and increasing altitude after take-off. U.S. Admiral William J. Crowe later admitted on Nightline that Vincennes was in Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles. At the time of the attack, Admiral Crowe claimed that the Iranian plane did not identify itself and sent no response to warning signals he had sent. In 1996, the United States expressed their regret for the event and the civilian deaths it caused.

    Iraq's use of chemical weapons

    Main article: Iraqi chemical attacks against Iran See also: Halabja chemical attack, Iraqi chemical weapons programme, and Second Battle of al-Faw
    Usage of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran
    Year Number of usage Chemical agent used Casualties*
    Mustard Nerve Blood Choking Killed Injured
    1980 4 Yes — 20 1
    1981 6 101 Un­known
    1982 12 Un­known
    1983 64
    1984 Un­known Yes Yes Yes 40 2,225
    1985 76 77 11,644
    1986 102 102 4,720
    1987 43 442 9,440
    1988 34 Un­known
    * The actual casualties may be much higher, as the latency period is as long as 40 years.

    In a declassified 1991 report, the CIA estimated that Iran had suffered more than 50,000 casualties from Iraq's use of several chemical weapons, though current estimates are more than 100,000 as the long-term effects continue to cause casualties. The official CIA estimate did not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans of Iran. According to a 2002 article in the Star-Ledger, 20,000 Iranian soldiers were killed on the spot by nerve gas. As of 2002, 5,000 of the 80,000 survivors continue to seek regular medical treatment, while 1,000 are hospital inpatients.

    According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France. A report stated that Dutch, Australian, Italian, French and both West and East German companies were involved in the export of raw materials to Iraqi chemical weapons factories. Declassified CIA documents show that the United States was providing reconnaissance intelligence to Iraq around 1987–88 which was then used to launch chemical weapon attacks on Iranian troops and that the CIA fully knew that chemical weapons would be deployed and sarin and cyclosarin attacks followed.

    On 21 March 1986, the United Nations Security Council made a declaration stating that "members are profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian troops, and the members of the Council strongly condemn this continued use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons." The United States was the only member who voted against the issuance of this statement. A mission to the region in 1988 found evidence of the use of chemical weapons, and was condemned in Security Council Resolution 612.

    Victims of the 1987 chemical attack on Sardasht, West Azerbaijan, Iran

    According to W. Patrick Lang, senior defense intelligence officer at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, "the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern" to Reagan and his aides, because they "were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose". He claimed that the Defense Intelligence Agency "would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival". The Reagan administration did not stop aiding Iraq after receiving reports of the use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians.

    The United States accused Iran of using chemical weapons as well, though the allegations have been disputed. Joost Hiltermann, the principal researcher for Human Rights Watch between 1992 and 1994, conducted a two-year study that included a field investigation in Iraq, and obtained Iraqi government documents in the process. According to Hiltermann, the literature on the Iran–Iraq War reflects allegations of chemical weapons used by Iran, but they are "marred by a lack of specificity as to time and place, and the failure to provide any sort of evidence".

    Analysts Gary Sick and Lawrence Potter have called the allegations against Iran "mere assertions" and stated, "No persuasive evidence of the claim that Iran was the primary culprit was ever presented." Policy consultant and author Joseph Tragert stated, "Iran did not retaliate with chemical weapons, probably because it did not possess any at the time". Documents uncovered after the 2003 invasion of Iraq show that Iraqi military intelligence was not aware of any large-scale chemical attacks by Iranian forces, although a March 1987 document describes five small-scale chemical attacks perpetrated by the Iranians (four involving mustard gas and one involving phosgene, with the likely source being captured Iraqi munitions), and there are also reports of Iranian use of tear gas and white phosphorus.

    At his trial in December 2006, Saddam said he would take responsibility "with honour" for any attacks on Iran using conventional or chemical weapons during the war, but that he took issue with the charges that he ordered attacks on Iraqis. A medical analysis of the effects of Iraqi mustard gas is described in a U.S. military textbook and contrasted effects of World War I gas.

    At the time of the conflict, the United Nations Security Council issued statements that "chemical weapons had been used in the war". UN statements never clarified that only Iraq was using chemical weapons, and according to retrospective authors "the international community remained silent as Iraq used weapons of mass destruction against Iranian as well as Iraqi Kurds." A 1987 UN report conducted at the behest of both belligerents discovered weapon fragments that established Iraqi responsibility for chemical attacks on Iranian soldiers and civilians, but could not substantiate Iraq's allegations of Iranian chemical weapons use: "Iraqi forces have been affected by mustard gas and a pulmonary element, possibly phosgene. In the absence of conclusive evidence of the weapons used, it could not be determined how the injuries were caused."

    Evidence suggests that these Iraqi chemical casualties were likely the result of "blowback", whereas the evidence that Iraq submitted to the UN—such as two Iranian 130 mm shells that UN specialists found had "no internal chemical-resistant coating" and were "normally used for filling with high explosives"—did not withstand scrutiny; UN official Iqbal Riza later acknowledged that Iraq's evidence was "clearly fabricated". However, the report's phrasing—"chemical weapons were again used against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces ... now also Iraqi forces have sustained injuries from chemical warfare"—contributed to an erroneous perception that Iran and Iraq were equally at fault.

    In response to further Iraqi chemical attacks on Kurdish civilians after the August 1988 ceasefire with Iran, United States senators Claiborne Pell and Jesse Helms called for comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq, including an oil embargo and severe limitations on the export of dual-use technology. Although the ensuing legislation passed in the U.S. Senate, it faced strong opposition within the House of Representatives and did not become law. In a rare rebuke, Secretary of State George Shultz condemned Iraq's "unjustified and abhorrent" chemical attacks, which Shultz's assistant Charles E. Redman characterized as "unacceptable to the civilized world". Even after these pronouncements, however, the State Department advised against sanctions.

    Comparison to other conflicts

    Events leading up
    to the Iraq War

    Bruce Riedel describes the Iran–Iraq War as "one of the largest and longest conventional interstate wars" of the twentieth century and "the only war in modern times in which chemical weapons were used on a massive scale". Kanan Makiya writes that "there has not been anything like it in the long history of Iraqi–Iranian relations, just like there had been nothing like World War I in the history of Europe."

    Iran's attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in September 1980 was the first attack on a nuclear reactor and one of only a small handful of military attacks on nuclear facilities in history. It was also the first instance of a pre-emptive attack on a nuclear reactor to forestall the development of a nuclear weapon, though it did not achieve its objective, as France repaired the reactor after the attack. (It took a second pre-emptive strike by the Israeli Air Force in June 1981 to disable the reactor, killing a French engineer in the process and causing France to pull out of Osirak. The decommissioning of Osirak has been cited as causing a substantial delay to Iraqi acquisition of nuclear weapons.)

    The Iran–Iraq War was the first conflict in the history of warfare in which both forces used ballistic missiles against each other. This war also saw the only confirmed air-to-air helicopter battles in history with the Iraqi Mi-25s flying against Iranian AH-1J SeaCobras (supplied by the United States before the Iranian revolution) on several separate occasions. In November 1980, not long after Iraq's initial invasion of Iran, two Iranian SeaCobras engaged two Mi-25s with TOW wire-guided antitank missiles. One Mi-25 went down immediately, the other was badly damaged and crashed before reaching base.

    The Iranians repeated this accomplishment on 24 April 1981, destroying two Mi-25s without incurring losses to themselves. One Mi-25 was also downed by an Iranian F-14A Tomcat. The Iraqis hit back, claiming the destruction of a SeaCobra on 14 September 1983 (with YaKB machine gun), then three SeaCobras on 5 February 1984 and three more on 25 February 1984 (two with Falanga missiles, one with S-5 rockets). After a lull in helicopter losses, each side lost a gunship on 13 February 1986. Later, a Mi-25 claimed a SeaCobra shot down with YaKB gun on 16 February, and a SeaCobra claimed a Mi-25 shot down with rockets on 18 February.

    The last engagement between the two types was on 22 May 1986, when Mi-25s shot down a SeaCobra. The final claim tally was 10 SeaCobras and 6 Mi-25s destroyed. The relatively small numbers and the inevitable disputes over actual kill numbers makes it unclear if one gunship had a real technical superiority over the other. Iraqi Mi-25s also claimed 43 kills against other Iranian helicopters, such as Agusta-Bell UH-1 Hueys. Both sides, especially Iraq, also carried out air and missile attacks against population centres.

    In October 1986, Iraqi aircraft began to attack civilian passenger trains and aircraft on Iranian soil, including an Iran Air Boeing 737 unloading passengers at Shiraz International Airport. In retaliation for the Iranian Operation Karbala 5, Iraq attacked 65 cities in 226 sorties over 42 days, bombing civilian neighbourhoods. Eight Iranian cities came under attack from Iraqi missiles. The bombings killed 65 children in an elementary school in Borujerd. The Iranians responded with Scud missile attacks on Baghdad and struck a primary school there. These events became known as the war of the cities.

    The war of the cities resumed and peaked in 1988, when Iraq dropped 40 tons of high explosives on Tehran using modified Scud missiles (dubbed "al-Husayn" missiles) over seven weeks, causing panic among civilians and prompting almost 1 million residents of Tehran to temporarily flee their homes. Nevertheless, scholars have noted that this still "ranks as one of the smallest strategic bombing campaigns in history", paling in comparison to strategic bombing during World War II, which saw 1.2 million tons of bombs dropped on German cities in 1944 alone, or more recent events such as the so-called "Christmas bombings" of North Vietnam, which saw 20,000 tons of bombs dropped on Hanoi and Haiphong in a mere eleven days. In total, 10,000–11,000 civilians died as a result of the aerial bombardment of Iranian cities with the majority of those deaths occurring in the final year of the war.

    Despite the war, Iran and Iraq maintained diplomatic relations and embassies in each other's countries until mid-1987.

    Iran's government used human waves to attack enemy troops and even in some cases to clear minefields. Children volunteered as well. Some reports mistakenly have the Basijis marching into battle while marking their expected entry to heaven by wearing "Plastic Keys to Paradise" around their necks, although other analysts regard this story as a hoax involving a misinterpretation of the carrying of a prayer book called "The Keys to Paradise"(Mafatih al-Janan) by Sheikh Abbas Qumi given to all volunteers.

    According to journalist Robin Wright:

    During the Fateh offensive in February 1987, I toured the southwest front on the Iranian side and saw scores of boys, aged anywhere from nine to sixteen, who said with staggering and seemingly genuine enthusiasm that they had volunteered to become martyrs. Regular army troops, the paramilitary Revolutionary Guards and mullahs all lauded these youths, known as baseeji , for having played the most dangerous role in breaking through Iraqi lines. They had led the way, running over fields of mines to clear the ground for the Iranian ground assault. Wearing white headbands to signify the embracing of death, and shouting "Shaheed, shaheed" (Martyr, martyr) they literally blew their way into heaven. Their numbers were never disclosed. But a walk through the residential suburbs of Iranian cities provided a clue. Window after window, block after block, displayed black-bordered photographs of teenage or preteen youths.

    Iran and Iraq's modern relationship

    The relationship between Iraq and Iran has warmed immensely since the downfall of Saddam Hussein, out of mostly pragmatic interests, as they share a common enemy in the Islamic State. Significant military assistance has been provided by Iran to Iraq, resulting in Iran holding a large amount of political influence in Iraq's newly elected Shia government. Iraq is also heavily dependent on the relatively more stable and developed Iran for its energy needs, so a stable Iraq is an interest for Iran, foreign policy wise.

    Damage to a mosque in Khoramshahr, Iran, the city that was invaded by Iraq in September 1980

    The Iran–Iraq War is regarded as being a major trigger for rising sectarianism in the region, as it was viewed by many as a clash between Sunni Muslims (Ba'athist Iraq and other Arab States) and the Shia revolutionaries that had recently taken power in Iran. There remains lingering animosity however despite the pragmatic alliance that has been formed as multiple government declarations from Iran have stated that the war will "affect every issue of internal and foreign policy" for decades to come.

    The sustained importance of this conflict is attributed mostly to the massive human and economic cost resulting from it, along with its ties to the Iranian Revolution. Another significant effect that the war has on Iran's policy is the issue of remaining war reparations. The UN estimates that Iraq owes about $149 billion, while Iran contends that, with both the direct and indirect effects taken into account, the cost of the war reaches a trillion.

    Iran has not vocalized the desire for these reparations in recent years, and has even suggested forms of financial aid. This is due most likely to Iran's interest in keeping Iraq politically stable, and imposing these reparation costs would further burden the already impoverished nation. The most important factor that governs Iraq's current foreign policy is the national government's consistent fragility following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Iraq's need for any and all allies that can help bring stability and bring development has allowed Iran to exert significant influence over the new Iraqi state despite lingering memories of the war.

    Currently, Iraq is between two opposing interests, one with Iran, who can provide a reliable source of power as well as military support to the influential Shia militias and political factions, and the other with the United States, who can offer Iraq significant economic aid packages, along with military support in the form of air and artillery strikes. If Iraq is seen to be pulled too far into one side's orbit, then the benefits offered to them by the other side will likely be gradually reduced or cut off completely. Another significant factor influencing relations is the shared cultural interests of Iraq and Iran's citizens to freely visit the multitude of holy sites located in each country.

    Legacy and memory

    Main article: Legacy and memory of the Iran–Iraq War
    An Iranian mother mourning her son in a military cemetery. Isfahan, 2011.

    The war is known in Iran as the Defā-e Moqaddas ("Sacred Defence") and the Jang-e Tahmili ("the Imposed War"). The war is known in the Arab world and a few other regions as the First Gulf War (Arabic: حرب الخليج الأولى). That name, or simply the 'Gulf War', was used by Western sources also, until it was used to refer to the conflict between the American-led coalition and Iraq in 1991. The Iran–Iraq War was rarely referred to as the Persian Gulf War until the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, after which the previous war was dubbed the First Persian Gulf War.

    Besides the Iran–Iraq war, the 1990 Iraq–Kuwait conflict, as well as The Iraq War from 2003 to 2011 have all been called the Second Persian Gulf War. State media in Iraq dubbed the war Saddam's Qadisiyyah (قادسية صدام, Qādisiyyat Ṣaddām), in reference to the seventh-century Battle of al-Qādisiyyah, in which Arab warriors overcame the Sasanian Empire during the Muslim conquest of Iran.

    "We are armed with Allahu Akbar", the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolutionary military march song performed by IRGC troops in front of Ayatollah Khomeini in Jamaran Husinie, made a cultural impact during the war.

    See also

    Notable Iranian veterans

    Notable Iranian casualties

    Notable Iraqi veterans

    Notable Iraqi casualties

    Persons

    Memoirs

    Stories

    Relevant conflicts

    Notes

    1. Pollack gives the figure as 1,000 for fully operational tanks in April of 1988. Cordesman gives the figure as 1,500+ operational tanks in March 1988 (1,298 were captured by the Iraqis by July 1988, 200 were still in the hands of the Iranians, and an unknown number were destroyed), with an unknown number in workshops.
    2. Estimates of Iranian casualties during the Iran–Iraq War vary.
    3. Estimates of Iraqi casualties during the Iran–Iraq War vary.
    4. The total 100,000+ civilians killed during the war does not include 50,000–200,000 Kurdish civilians killed in the Anfal campaign.
    5. ^ Called Arvand Rood (اروندرود) in Iran and Shatt al-Arab (شط العرب) in Iraq
    6. Massoud Rajavi
    7. Muslim ibn Aqil referring to the Muslim figure.
    8. Muharram referring to the first month of the Islamic calendar, during which the operation took place.
    9. This was a "decision" rather than a resolution.
    1. from:
    2. from:
    3. Also: 1983–1988 Kuwait terror attacks, 1981 Iraqi embassy bombing in Beirut, Lebanon hostage crisis, 1983 Beirut barracks bombings and 1985–86 Paris attacks.
    4. Iraq claimed victory following a successful 1988 counter-offensive aimed at expelling Iranian forces from Iraq which compelled Iran to submit to a ceasefire the same year, and also due to the country becoming the dominant power in the Middle East as a result of the conflict, while Iran also claimed victory for expelling Iraqi forces from Iran following 1982 offensives, despite failing in its later-goal to overthrow the Iraqi government and also despite suffering higher military and economic losses than Iraq.
    5. After the war concluded, Iraq continued to maintain control over the entire Shatt al-Arab and other Iranian territories it had occupied along the border, covering an area of 9,600 km. It was not until 16 August 1990 that Iraq agreed to return these occupied territories back to Iran and to divide sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. This restored the border to the terms established by the 1975 Algiers Agreement.
    6. Arabic: حرب الخليج الأولى, romanized: Ḥarb al-Khalīj al-ʾAwlā; Persian: جنگ ایران و عراق, romanized: Jang-e Irān va Erāq
    7. Also known in Iran as the Sepah-e-Pasdaran
    8. A resort that became increasingly necessary as the war continued. Though Iran could and did acquire weapons from multiple foreign manufacturers; the pre-revolution arsenal was composed overwhelmingly of US made weaponry, meaning obtaining additional spare parts was not an option.

    References

    This article cites its sources but its page reference ranges are too broad or incorrect. Please help in adding a more precise page range. (September 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

    Citations

    1. Nimrod Raphaeli (11 February 2009). "The Iranian Roots of Hizbullah". MEMRI. Archived from the original on 11 February 2009.
    2. "Memoires of Afghan volunteers in Iran–Iraq war published (tehrantimes.com)". 7 October 2018. Archived from the original on 17 June 2021. Retrieved 3 February 2021.
    3. "'Mohsen, the Japanese' chronicles life of Afghan volunteer fighter in Iran–Iraq war (tehrantimes.com)". 16 December 2020. Archived from the original on 7 February 2021. Retrieved 3 February 2021.
    4. "Iran's Shia Diplomacy: Religious and Foreign Policy in the Islamic Republic" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 July 2023. Retrieved 30 August 2023.
    5. Shaery-Eisenlohr, Roschanack (2011). Shi'ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities. Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231144278. Archived from the original on 27 April 2023. Retrieved 21 March 2023.
    6. Williamson Murray, Kevin M. Woods (2014): The Iran–Iraq War. A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-06229-0 p. 223
    7. ^ "Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Project Muse)". Archived from the original on 9 July 2022. Retrieved 30 August 2023.
    8. Johnson, Rob (2010). The Iran–Iraq War. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1137267788.
    9. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). The Iran–Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107062290.
    10. Entessar, Nader (2010). Kurdish Politics in the Middle East. Lanham: Lexington Books. p. 48. ISBN 9780739140390. OCLC 430736528. Throughout much of the 1980s, the KDPI received aid from the Ba'thi regime of Saddam Hussein, but Ghassemlou broke with Baghdad in 1988 after Iraq used chemical weapons against Kurds in Halabja and then forced Kurdish villagers to...
    11. van Bruinessen, Martin (15 August 1986). The Naqshbandi Order as a Vehicle of Political Protest among the Kurds (With Some Comparative Notes on Indonesia). New Approaches in Islamic Studies. Jakarta: Indonesian Institute of Sciences. pp. 1–3. Archived from the original on 16 August 2023. Retrieved 19 July 2023 – via Academia.edu.
    12. ^ Middleton, Drew (4 October 1982). "Sudanese Brigades Could Provide Key Aid for Iraq; Military Analysis". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 8 December 2019. Retrieved 8 December 2019.
    13. ^ "Iraq–Iran war becoming Arab-Persian war? (The Christian Science Monitor)". The Christian Science Monitor. 5 February 1982. Archived from the original on 8 December 2019. Retrieved 8 December 2019.
    14. "Jordan's call for volunteers to fight Iran misfires (The Christian Science Monitor)". The Christian Science Monitor. 11 February 1982. Archived from the original on 8 December 2019. Retrieved 8 December 2019.
    15. Schenker, David Kenneth (2003). Dancing with Saddam: The Strategic Tango of Jordanian–Iraqi Relations (PDF). The Washington Institute for Near East Policy / Lexington Books. ISBN 0-7391-0649-X. Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 January 2017.
    16. "Jordanian Unit Going To Aid Iraq 6 Hussein Will Join Volunteer Force Fighting Iranians (The Washington Post)". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 8 December 2019. Retrieved 8 December 2019.
    17. Dictionary of modern Arab history, Kegan Paul International 1998. ISBN 978-0710305053 p. 196.
    18. "Iran–Iraq War Timeline. Part 1" (PDF).
    19. Berridge, W.J. "Civil Uprisings in Modern Sudan: The 'Khartoum Springs' of 1964 and 1985", p. 136. Bloomsbury Academic, 2015
    20. Mylroie, Laurie (1989). "Iraq's Changing Role in the Persian Gulf". Current History. 88 (535): 89–99. doi:10.1525/curh.1989.88.535.89. ISSN 0011-3530. JSTOR 45316185. S2CID 249695060. Archived from the original on 21 July 2023. Retrieved 21 July 2023.
    21. "The 'beauty' and the horror of the Iran–Iraq war". BBC News. 26 September 2015. Archived from the original on 14 June 2018. Retrieved 21 July 2023.
    22. Malovany, Pesach (2017). Wars of Modern Babylon: A History of the Iraqi Army from 1921 to 2003. University Press of Kentucky. p. 443. ISBN 9780813169453.
    23. Coll, Steve (15 August 1990). "Saddam offers to conclude full peace with Iran". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 9 June 2023. Retrieved 8 June 2024.
    24. ^ "Iran–Iraq War". Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 30 August 2021. Retrieved 2 September 2021.
    25. ^ Pollack, p. 186.
    26. ^ Razoux, Pierre (2015). The Iran–Iraq War. Harvard University Press. pp. 515, 540. ISBN 978-0674915718. Archived from the original on 17 February 2023. Retrieved 29 January 2023.
    27. Farrokh, Kaveh, 305 (2011)
    28. Pollack, p. 187.
    29. Farrokh, Kaveh, 304 (2011)
    30. "The state of the air combat readiness of Iran ... • corporal_historian_23". Archived from the original on 2 October 2018. Retrieved 9 December 2018.
    31. Pollack, p. 232.
    32. Cordesman, Anthony H. The Lessons of Modern War: The Iran–Iraq War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990. Chapter 10: "In fact, Iraq had captured so much equipment that it was able to put on an incredible show on the outskirts of Baghdad. Rather than include all of Iraq's gains, it included the equipment that could either be used immediately or be easily reconditioned. Iraqi sources claimed that since March, Iraq had captured a total of 1,298 tanks, 155 armored infantry fighting vehicles, 512 heavy artillery weapons, 6,196 mortars, 5,550 recoilless rifles and light guns, 8,050 rocket propelled grenades, 60,694 rifles, 322 pistols, 6,156 telecommunications devices, 501 items of heavy engineering equipment, 454 trucks, 1,600 light vehicles and trailers, 16,863 items of chemical defense gear, and 16,863 caskets... After its recent defeats, Iran was virtually defenseless in the south. It was down to less than 200 tanks."
    33. ^ Razoux, Pierre (2015). The Iran–Iraq War. Harvard University Press. pp. 543–544. ISBN 978-0674915718. Archived from the original on 17 February 2023. Retrieved 29 January 2023.
    34. Pollack, p. 3.
    35. ^ Hiro, Dilip (1991). The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict. New York: Routledge. p. 205. ISBN 978-0-415-90406-3. OCLC 22347651.
    36. ^ Rajaee, Farhang (1997). Iranian Perspectives on the Iran–Iraq War. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-8130-1476-0. OCLC 492125659.
    37. ^ Mikaberidze, Alexander (2011). Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. p. 418. ISBN 978-1-59884-336-1. OCLC 775759780.
    38. Hammond Atlas of the 20th Century (1999), pp. 134–135.
    39. ^ Dunnigan, A Quick and Dirty Guide to War (1991)
    40. ^ Dictionary of Twentieth Century World History, by Jan Palmowski (Oxford, 1997)
    41. ^ Clodfelter, Micheal, Warfare and Armed Conflict: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1618–1991
    42. ^ Chirot, Daniel: Modern Tyrants : the power and prevalence of evil in our age (1994)
    43. "B&J": Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, International Conflict : A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management 1945–1995 (1997), p. 195.
    44. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand (2008). A History of Modern Iran. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 171–175, 212. ISBN 978-0511984402. OCLC 171111098.
    45. ^ Potter, Lawrence G.; Sick, Gary (2006). Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 8. ISBN 978-1-4039-7609-3. OCLC 70230312.
    46. ^ Zargar, Moosa; Araghizadeh, Hassan; Soroush, Mohammad Reza; Khaji, Ali (December 2012). "Iranian casualties during the eight years of Iraq–Iran conflict". Revista de Saúde Pública. 41 (6). São Paulo: Faculdade de Higiene e Saúde Pública da Universidade de São Paulo: 1065–1066. doi:10.1590/S0034-89102007000600025. ISSN 0034-8910. OCLC 4645489824. PMID 18066475.
    47. ^ Hiro, Dilip (1991). The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict. New York: Routledge. p. 251. ISBN 978-0-415-90406-3. OCLC 22347651.
    48. Rumel, Rudolph. "Centi-Kilo Murdering States: Estimates, Sources, and Calculations". Power Kills. University of Hawai'i. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 26 March 2019.
    49. ^ Karsh, Efraim (2002). The Iran–Iraq War, 1980–1988. Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing. p. 89. ISBN 978-1-84176-371-2. OCLC 48783766.
    50. ^ Koch, Christian; Long, David E. (1997). Gulf Security in the Twenty-First Century. Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. p. 29. ISBN 978-1-86064-316-3. OCLC 39035954.
    51. Black, Ian (23 September 2010). "Iran and Iraq remember war that cost more than a million lives". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 2 January 2017. Retrieved 14 December 2016.
    52. Rumel, Rudolph. "Lesser Murdering States, Quasi-States, and Groups: Estimates, Sources, and Calculations". Power Kills. University of Hawai'i. Archived from the original on 4 October 2012. Retrieved 16 May 2012.
    53. Sinan, Omar (25 June 2007). "Iraq to hang 'Chemical Ali'". Tampa Bay Times. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 17 October 2015. Retrieved 9 February 2013.
    54. Pfetsch & Rohloff 2013, p. 154.
    55. ^ Riedel, Bruce (2012). "Foreword". Becoming Enemies: U.S.–Iran Relations and the Iran–Iraq War, 1979–1988. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. ix. ISBN 978-1-4422-0830-8. The Iran–Iraq War was devastating—one of the largest and longest conventional interstate wars since the Korean conflict ended in 1953. A half million lives were lost, perhaps another million were injured, and the economic cost was over a trillion dollars. ... the battle lines at the end of the war were almost exactly where they were at the beginning of hostilities. It was also the only war in modern times in which chemical weapons were used on a massive scale. ... The Iranians call the war the 'imposed war' because they believe the United States imposed it on them and orchestrated the global 'tilt' toward Iraq in the war.
    56. Gölz, "Martyrdom and Masculinity in Warring Iran. The Karbala Paradigm, the Heroic, and the Personal Dimensions of War." Archived 17 May 2019 at the Wayback Machine, Behemoth 12, no. 1 (2019): 35–51, 35.
    57. Karsh, Efraim The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988, London: Osprey, 2002 pp. 7–8
    58. Bulloch, John and Morris, Harvey The Gulf War, London: Methuen, 1989 p. 37.
    59. ^ Karsh, Efraim The Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988, London: Osprey, 2002 p. 8
    60. ^ Farrokh, Kaveh (2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78096-221-4.
    61. ^ "Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988". History of Iran. Iran Chamber Society. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 29 June 2012.
    62. Asadzade, Peyman (2019). "War and Religion: The Iran−Iraq War". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.812. ISBN 978-0190228637. Archived from the original on 23 October 2020. Retrieved 21 April 2020.
    63. ^ Karsh, Efraim (2002). The Iran–Iraq War: 1980–1988. Osprey Publishing. pp. 1–8, 12–16, 19–82. ISBN 978-1-84176-371-2.
    64. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "A context of 'bitterness and anger'". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 58–59 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    65. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "A context of 'bitterness and anger'". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 57–58 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    66. Whitaker, Brian (25 April 2003). "Christian outsider in Saddam's inner circle". The Guardian. London, UK. Retrieved 24 December 2007.
    67. Sick, Gary (2003). "Iran: Confronting terrorism". The Washington Quarterly. 26 (4): 83–98. doi:10.1162/016366003322387127. S2CID 153688389.
    68. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "A context of 'bitterness and anger'". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 57–58, 145–146 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    69. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "A context of 'bitterness and anger'". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 58–59 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    70. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "A context of 'bitterness and anger'". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 61–62 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290. Certainly Saddam believed that the oil-rich areas of Arabistan (Khuzestan) were within his reach, a goal his intelligence services seemed delighted to further.
    71. "Britannica Online Encyclopedia: Saddam Hussein". Archived from the original on 3 May 2015. Retrieved 28 October 2012.
    72. Makiya, Kanan (1998). Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Updated ed.). University of California Press. p. 273. ISBN 978-0520921245.
    73. ^ Rajaee, Farhang, ed. (1993). The Iran–Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. ISBN 978-0-8130-1177-6.
    74. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "The opponents". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 71–73 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    75. Makiya, Kanan (1998). Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Updated ed.). University of California Press. pp. 33–34. ISBN 978-0520921245.
    76. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "The opponents". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 77–79 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    77. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "The opponents". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 79–80 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    78. ^ Fürtig, Henner (2012). "Den Spieß umgedreht: iranische Gegenoffensive im Ersten Golfkrieg" [Turning of the Tables: the Iranian counter-offensive during the first Gulf War]. Damals (in German) (5): 10–13.
    79. ^ Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "1980: The Iraqi invasion begins". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 104–106 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290. While the evidence now available suggests the skirmishes were more a convenient excuse for war, questions still remain.
    80. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "A context of 'bitterness and anger'". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 59–61, 63 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    81. Brands, Hal (2012). "Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the invasion of Iran: was there a green light?". Cold War History. 12 (2). Routledge: 334. doi:10.1080/14682745.2011.564612. ISSN 1468-2745. S2CID 154354622. Archived from the original on 15 February 2022. Retrieved 15 February 2022.
    82. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "1980: The Iraqi invasion begins". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 103–106 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    83. Finlan, Alistair (2003). Essential Histories – The Gulf War 1991. New York: Routledge. p. 1. ISBN 0-203-57971-2.
    84. National Intelligence Daily (PDF) (Report). Central Intelligence Agency. 10 March 1980. Archived from the original (PDF) on 5 November 2010.
    85. Farmanfarmaian, Roxane (14 February 2011). "What makes a revolution succeed?". Al Jazeera. Archived from the original on 5 November 2012. Retrieved 1 October 2012.
    86. ^ "National Security". Pars Times. Archived from the original on 15 May 2013. Retrieved 8 September 2012.
    87. Ottolenghi, Emanuelle (3 September 2011). "The Pasdaran: Inside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps". Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Archived from the original on 25 June 2012. Retrieved 13 October 2012.
    88. ^ Pollack, Kenneth M. (2004). "Iraq". Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-8783-9.
    89. ^ Alfoneh, Ali (6 October 2010). "The Basij Resistance Force". The Iran Primer. United States Institute of Peace. Archived from the original on 20 January 2013. Retrieved 13 October 2012.
    90. The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum. Stephen C. Pelletiere
    91. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "A context of 'bitterness and anger'". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 61–62 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 9781107062290. Certainly Saddam believed that the oil-rich areas of Arabistan (Khuzestan) were within his reach, a goal his intelligence services seemed delighted to further.
    92. Ariane M. Tabatabai, No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran's National Security Strategy, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 198.
    93. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "A context of 'bitterness and anger'". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 62–63 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290. On 7 September 1980, Iraq accused Iran of shelling Iraqi villages in the territories of Zain al-Qaws and Saif Saad on 4 September 1980. Iraq demanded that the Iranian forces in those territories evacuate and return the villages to Iraq. Tehran gave no reply. Iraqi forces then moved to 'liberate' the villages, and on 10 September announced that its forces had done so in a short, sharp military engagement. ... On 14 September 1980, Iran announced it would no longer abide by the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Given the scene that was set, it was no surprise that on 17 September, five days before the invasion, Iraq declared the accords null and void. ... On 22 September, Iraqi units crossed the frontier.
    94. Makiya, Kanan (1998). Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Updated ed.). University of California Press. p. 270. ISBN 978-0520921245. There remains the issue of sovereignty over Shatt al-Arab. ... Granted that this might have been a genuine motive for abrogating the 1975 treaty, and reclaiming title to the whole Shatt, what was the point of the invasion on September 22? Iraq had taken back by unilateral action on September 10 the only strips of territory it still claimed under the treaty. There was no longer any 'territory' as such on the other side to conquer. The Ba'th had already followed the Shah's example of 1971 when he unilaterally took over the three islands in the Gulf.
    95. ^ Cordesman, Anthony H.; Wagner, Abraham (1990). The Lessons of Modern War: Volume;– The Iran–Iraq Conflict. Westview Press. p. 444 567 102. ISBN 978-0-8133-0955-2.
    96. ^ Brogan, Patrick (1989). World Conflicts: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife Since 1945. London: Bloomsbury. ISBN 0-7475-0260-9.
    97. Robinson, Julian Perry; Goldbat, Jozef (May 1984). "Chemical Warfare in the Iran–Iraq War 1980–1988". History of Iran. Iran Chamber Society. Archived from the original on 1 January 2016. Retrieved 1 November 2012.
    98. ^ Ghareeb, Edmund A.; Dougherty, Beth (2004). Historical Dictionary of Iraq. Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press. p. 135. ISBN 0-8108-4330-7.
    99. Georges Malbrunot (16 October 2007). "Majid: 'Saddam is no longer the lion I knew'". Le Figaro.
    100. ^ Cooper, Thomas; Bishop, Farzad (9 September 2003). "Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980". Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf Database. Air Combat Information Group. Archived from the original on 21 February 2014. Retrieved 9 September 2012.
    101. Modern Warfare: Iran–Iraq War (film documentary).
    102. ^ Wilson, Ben. "The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting during the Iran–Iraq War" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 October 2013.
    103. Eckholm, Leif (1 August 2011). "Invading Iran: Lessons From Iraq". Policy Review. 168. Stanford University Hoover Institution. Archived from the original on 8 May 2013. Retrieved 1 October 2012. Invading forces would need to be prepared for a deeply embedded and enduring insurgency, due to extreme challenges presented by terrain, and resolve...
    104. ^ Wilson, Ben (July–August 2007). "The Evolution of Iranian Warfighting During the Iran–Iraq War: When Dismounted Light Infantry Made the Difference" (PDF). Infantry. U.S. Army: Foreign Military Studies Office. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 October 2013.
    105. ^ Aboul-Enein, Youssef; Bertrand, Andrew; Corley, Dorothy (12 April 2012). "Egyptian Field Marshal Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah on the Combat Tactics and Strategy of the Iran–Iraq War". Small Wars Journal. Ghazalah's Phased Analysis of Combat Operations. Small Wars Foundation. Archived from the original on 1 January 2016. Retrieved 6 October 2012.
    106. Tucker, A.R. (May 1988). "Armored warfare in the Gulf". Armed Forces, p. 226.
    107. "Irano–Irakskii konflikt. Istoricheskii ocherk." Niyazmatov. J.A. – M.: Nauka, 1989.
    108. Dennis, Simon Dunstan (2009). The Six Day War, 1967: Jordan and Syria (1st ed.). Oxford: Osprey Publishing. p. 22. ISBN 978-1-84603-364-3.
    109. ^ Jafari, Mojtaba (26 July 2019). "Nasr Offensive Operation". Archived from the original on 15 July 2014. Retrieved 13 October 2012.
    110. Shay, Shaul (October 1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
    111. Piazza 1994, p. 16: "At the beginning of January of 1983, Rajavi held a highly publicized meeting with then Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Tarqi Aziz, which culminated in the signing of a peace communique on January 9 of that year. Rajavi, acting as the chairman of the NCR, co-outlined a peace plan with Aziz based on an agreement of mutual recognition of borders as defined by the 1975 Algiers Treaty."
    112. "Iraqi Visits Iranian Leftist in Paris". The New York Times. 10 January 1983. Archived from the original on 16 August 2021. Retrieved 30 December 2021. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the exiled leader of an Iranian leftist group met for four hours today and said afterward that the war between their countries should brought to an end. The conversations between Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz of Iraq and Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mujahedeen, an organization that includes a guerrilla wing active in Iran, were described by Mr. Rajavi as the first of their kind. He said the exchange of views had been "an important political turning point on the regional level and for the world in relation to the Iran–Iraq War"
    113. Shay, Shaul (1994). The Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror. Routledge. ISBN 978-0765802552. Despite the mortal blow inflicted on the organization, the Iranian regime continued to regard the Mujahidin as a real threat, and therefore continued to persecute its followers and damage their public image. The organizations' ties with Iraq (mainly Rajavi's meeting with Tariq Aziz in January 1983) were exploited to demonstrate the organizations betrayal due to its willingness to join forces with Iran's enemies on the outside.
    114. "Iran–Iraq War bogs down in rain, conflicting claims". The Christian Science Monitor. 20 January 1981. Archived from the original on 31 December 2013. Retrieved 5 October 2013.
    115. "Assault on Al-Wallid". Imperial Iraniasn Air Force. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 9 September 2012.
    116. ^ Cordesman, Anthony. "Lessons of Modern Warfare: The Iran Iraq War Chapter V" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 11 September 2009. Retrieved 4 May 2013.
    117. ^ Cooper, Tom. "Bombed by Blinders Part 1". Archived from the original on 30 June 2017. Retrieved 20 April 2013.
    118. ^ Khomeini: life of the Ayatollah Archived 24 September 2015 at the Wayback Machine By Baqer Moin
    119. ^ Pelletiere, Stephen (1992). The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum. Abc-Clio. ISBN 978-0275938437.
    120. ^ Woods, Kevin. "Saddam's Generals: A Perspective of the Iran–Iraq War" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 April 2013.
    121. Iran Yearbook. Moini-Biontino. 1988. p. 125. ISBN 978-3927073005. LCCN sn89044105.
    122. "Tactical Evolution in the Iraqi Army: The Abadan Island And Fish Lake Campaigns of the Iran-Ipaq War" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 3 December 2013. Retrieved 18 August 2014.
    123. Firestone, Reuven (2008). Who are the real chosen people?: The Meaning of Chosenness in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (2008 hardcover ed.). Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Paths Publishing. p. 143. ISBN 978-1-59473-248-5.
    124. "Iran at war". Reuters. 31 May 2012. Archived from the original on 8 August 2014. cited in Farrokh, Kaveh. "Review: Wall Street Journal and Reuters". Archived from the original on 16 August 2018. Retrieved 25 November 2012.
    125. Keegan, John (2004). The Iraq war. New York: Knopf. ISBN 978-1-4000-4199-2.
    126. ^ Thomas Cooper and Farzad Bishop (9 September 2003). "Fire in the Hills: Iranian and Iraqi Battles of Autumn 1982". Arabian Peninsula & Persian Gulf Database. Air Combat Information Group. Archived from the original on 22 August 2014. Retrieved 17 September 2009.
    127. ^ "Viewpoints of the Iranian political and military elites". Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 10 June 2013.
    128. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "1983–1984: A war of attrition". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 252–253 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    129. ^ Bulloch, John; Morris, Harvey (1989). The Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences (1st published ed.). London: Methuen. ISBN 978-0-413-61370-7.
    130. ^ "Annex D: Iraq Economic Data (1989–2003)". Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD. Vol. 1 of 3. Central Intelligence Agency. 27 April 2007. Archived from the original on 1 November 2012. Retrieved 3 November 2012.
    131. Darwich, May, ed. (2019), "The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)", Threats and Alliances in the Middle East: Saudi and Syrian Policies in a Turbulent Region, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 54–91, doi:10.1017/9781108656689.004, ISBN 978-1-108-49362-8, retrieved 14 November 2023
    132. "The Gulf War, 1991". Archived from the original on 8 November 2016. Retrieved 14 November 2023.
    133. ^ King, John (31 March 2003). "Arming Iraq and the Path to War". U.N. Observer & International Report. Archived from the original on 18 September 2017. Retrieved 6 January 2005.
    134. ^ Williams, Scott (June 2002). The Battle of al-Khafji (PDF) (Master's thesis). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. Archived from the original on 13 April 2013. Retrieved 21 September 2012.
    135. Yaphe, Judith (2013). "Changing American Perspectives on the Iran–Iraq war". The Iran–Iraq War: New International Perspectives. Routledge. ISBN 9780415685245.
    136. Battle, Joyce. Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980–1983 Archived 2012-02-04 at the Wayback Machine, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82. George Washington University National Security Archive, 25 February 2003.
    137. "Declaration of Howard Teicher" (PDF). Case No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH. United States District Court: Southern District Florida. 31 January 1995. Archived (PDF) from the original on 26 May 2012. Retrieved 4 April 2009. . Plain text version Archived 23 April 2013 at the Wayback Machine
    138. "Importer/Exporter TIV Tables". armstrade.sipri.org. Archived from the original on 25 November 2015. Retrieved 13 April 2013.
    139. Iraq Vows to Quit Iran, Fight Israel Archived 16 November 2018 at the Wayback Machine AP 10 June 1982
    140. Iran Says Iraqis' Withdrawal Won't End War Archived 23 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine New York Times 22 June 1982
    141. Mearsheimer, John J.; Walt, Stephen M. (12 November 2002). "Can Saddam Be Contained? History Says Yes". International Security. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Archived from the original on 18 January 2008.
    142. "Navy Theft Ring Linked to Iran Undetected for Years", Los Angeles Times, 16 July 1985, archived from the original on 23 December 2022
    143. Cordesman, Anthony H. (1999). Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction (1st published ed.). Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. ISBN 0-275-96528-7.
    144. ^ Dunn, Brian (3 June 2009). "The First Gulf War". Archived from the original on 16 November 2018. Retrieved 23 November 2012.
    145. Jupp, Michael (19 December 1988). "Child-Soldier Treaty Has Wide Support". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 15 September 2018. Retrieved 9 February 2017.
    146. Special to The Christian Science Monitor (7 August 1985). "Giving one's life to the cause of Islam and Iran. Guarding the revolution's Islamic standards". The Christian Science Monitor. Archived from the original on 7 October 2013. Retrieved 5 October 2013.
    147. O'Ballance, E. (1988). The Gulf War. Brassey's. p. 95
    148. Zabih, S. (1988). The Iranian Military in Revolution and War. New York: Routledge. p. 181
    149. Naficy, Hamid (2012). A Social History of Iranian Cinema The Globalizing Era, 1984–2010. Duke University Press. p. 11. ISBN 978-0-8223-4878-8.
    150. ^ Aboul-Enein, Youssef; Bertrand, Andrew; Corley, Dorothy (23 April 2012). "The 'Dawn of Victory' campaigns to the 'Final Push': Part Three of Three". Small Wars Journal. Small Wars Foundation.
    151. Bergquist, Ronald E. (1988). The Role of Airpower in the Iran–Iraq War. Alabama: Air University Press. p. 56. ISBN 978-1-234-87718-7.
    152. Razoux, Pierre (2015). The Iran–Iraq War. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp. 568–572. ISBN 978-0-674-08863-4.
    153. Segal, David (28 January 2009). "The Iran–Iraq War: A Military Analysis". Foreign Affairs. 66 (Summer 1988). Archived from the original on 28 November 2018. Retrieved 16 March 2019.
    154. "Iraq Population 2021 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs)". Archived from the original on 13 April 2024. Retrieved 14 September 2021.
    155. "Iran Population 2021 (Demographics, Maps, Graphs)". Archived from the original on 27 September 2021. Retrieved 14 September 2021.
    156. ^ "Phase Five: New Iranian Efforts at "Final Offensives", 1986–1887" (PDF). The Lessons of Modern War – Volume II: Iran–Iraq War. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 June 2013. Retrieved 21 September 2012.
    157. ^ Thomas Coper and Farzad Bishop (9 September 2003). "Persian Gulf War, 1980–1988: The Mother of All Build-Ups". Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf Database. Air Combat Information Group. Archived from the original on 15 November 2013. Retrieved 9 September 2012.
    158. ^ Cordesman, Anthony (May 1990). "The Lessons of Modern War Vol II". Archived from the original on 5 July 2013. Retrieved 10 March 2013.
    159. Dugdale-Pointon, T.D.P. (27 October 2002). "Tanker War 1984–1988". Archived from the original on 24 January 2010. Retrieved 17 January 2008.
    160. Wars in Peace: Iran–Iraq War (film documentary). Wars in Peace. 1995. Archived from the original on 1 April 2016. Retrieved 14 November 2015.
    161. Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack on the USS Stark (FFG 31) on 17 May 1987 (PDF) (Report). JAG Manual Investigations. U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps. 3 September 1987. Archived (PDF) from the original on 1 May 2011. Retrieved 13 July 2010.
    162. Pokrant, Marvin (1999). Desert Storm at Sea: What the Navy Really Did. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. p. 43. ISBN 978-0-313-31024-9.
    163. ^ Kelley, Stephen Andrew (June 2007). Better Lucky Than Good: Operation Earnest Will as Gunboat Diplomacy (Master's thesis). Monterrey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. hdl:10945/3463.
    164. ^ Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Attack of the USS Stark in 1987 (PDF) (Report). OSD/JS FOIA Library. Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 February 2013.
    165. "Iran: Gradual Superpower Involvement". Country Study & Guide. AllRefer. Archived from the original on 28 June 2011. Retrieved 2 August 2011.
    166. Ross, William. "Seawise Giant". Relevant Search Scotland. Archived from the original on 9 August 2011. Retrieved 2 August 2011.
    167. Tucker, Spencer C. (2010). The Encyclopedia of Middle East Wars: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts [5 volumes]: The United States in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Conflicts. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-85109-948-1.
    168. Cooper, Tom. "Bombed By Blinders Part 2". Archived from the original on 22 August 2012. Retrieved 30 April 2013.
    169. ^ Daraghai, Borzou (19 March 2007). "1987 Chemical Strike Still Haunts Iran". Los Angeles Times. Archived from the original on 15 October 2015. Retrieved 16 April 2013.
    170. Rubin, Barry (2009). Conflict and Insurgency in the Middle East. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0203881873.
    171. Wright, Robin (1989). In the name of God: The Khomeini decade. New York: Simon and Schuster. pp. 126, 133. ISBN 978-0-671-67235-5.
    172. A speech on 4 April 1985 by Ruhollah Khomeini in Persian quoted in Brumberg, Daniel (2001). Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 132–134. ISBN 978-0-226-07758-1.
    173. ^ نگاهی به نقش ناشناخته "تلاش" و "مهاجر" در کربلای 5 و والفجر 8 [Looking at the unrecognised role of (the drones) 'effort' and 'immigrant' in Dawn Operations 5 and 8]. Mashregnews (in Persian). 2 October 2011. Archived from the original on 23 October 2015. Retrieved 9 October 2012.
    174. Pollack, Kenneth M. (2002). The Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. p. 217. ISBN 0-8032-3733-2.
    175. ^ Cordesman, Anthony. "Lessons of Modern War: The Iran–Iraq War" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 January 2014. Retrieved 28 May 2013.
    176. Rubin, Michael (Spring 2003). "Are Kurds a pariah minority?". Social Research. Pariah Minorities. 70 (1). The New School: 295–330. doi:10.1353/sor.2003.0028. JSTOR 40971614. S2CID 141846747.
    177. Silverstein, Adam J. (2012). Islamic History: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-160934-3.
    178. Pollack, Kenneth M. (2004). "Iraq". Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0803287839.
    179. "fatehan.ir". Archived from the original on 24 October 2017. Retrieved 26 September 2017.
    180. "Iran–Iraq war". Archived from the original on 23 September 2012. Retrieved 13 October 2012.
    181. ^ "The Combination of Iraqi offensives and Western intervention force Iran to accept a cease-fire: September 1987 to March 1989" (PDF). The Lessons of Modern War – Volume II: Iran–Iraq War. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Archived from the original (PDF) on 7 June 2013. Retrieved 6 October 2012.
    182. "Anti-war protests reported in Iran". Spokane Chronicle. Associated Press. 10 May 1985. Archived from the original on 3 September 2015. Retrieved 20 June 2015.
    183. Sciolino, Elaine (5 July 1987). "Human Wave raid loses Iran's favor". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 6 November 2017. Retrieved 9 February 2017.
    184. "Kaveh Farrokh | Western, Pakistani and Egyptian pilots flying Iraqi Combat Aircraft during the Iran–Iraq War". Archived from the original on 16 November 2018. Retrieved 29 September 2018.
    185. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "1987–1988: An end in sight?". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 318–320 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    186. Mohammadi, Karim. "The Forgotten Victims of the Iran–Iraq War". Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 16 April 2013.
    187. ^ "1988: Thousands die in Halabja gas attack". On This Day. BBC. Archived from the original on 10 February 2018. Retrieved 9 September 2012.
    188. ^ Tyler, Patrick (18 August 2002). "Officers Say US Aided Iraq in war despite use of gas". The News York Times. Archived from the original on 20 January 2018. Retrieved 9 February 2017.
    189. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "1987–1988: An end in sight?". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 334–335 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    190. Crist, David (2012). The Twilight War: The secret history of America's thirty-year conflict with Iran. New York: Penguin Press. p. 434 (Photo plates). ISBN 978-1-59420-341-1.
    191. ^ Piazza 1994: "On June 19, 1988, the NLA launched its offensive entitled Chetel Setareh or "40 Stars" in which twenty-two organized brigades of Mojahedin recaptured the city of Mehran, which the regime had wrested from Iraqi control after the Mojahedin had set up its "provisional government" there. The Mojahedin claimed that absolutely no Iraqi soldiers participated in this operation, and Iraqi Culture and Information Minister, Latif Nusayyif Jasim, later denied that Iraq had deployed air units to help the NLA or had used chemical weapons to drive the Islamic Republic's troops from Mehran."
    192. Razoux, Pierre (2015). The Iran–Iraq War. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674915718. Archived from the original on 25 November 2023. Retrieved 5 January 2024.
    193. ^ Iran's strategic intentions and capabilities. Diane Publishing. p. 211. ISBN 978-1-4289-9255-9.
    194. ^ Dodds, Joanna; Wilson, Ben (6 June 2009). "The Iran–Iraq War: Unattainable Objectives". Middle East Review of International Affairs. 13 (2). Archived from the original on 6 October 2014. Retrieved 17 January 2019.
    195. "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 August 2016. Retrieved 28 October 2017.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
    196. "Iran Reports New Iraqi Gas Raids; And Says Cities May be Hit Next". The New York Times. 2 April 1988. Archived from the original on 7 October 2013. Retrieved 5 October 2013.
    197. "Mersad operation". Special Edition. Tebyan. 27 July 2005.
    198. Wong, Edward (5 April 2006). "Hussein charged with genocide in 50,000 deaths". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 24 June 2018. Retrieved 9 February 2017.
    199. ^ Molavi, Afshin (2005). The Soul of Iran: A Nation's Journey to Freedom (Revised ed.). England: W.W. Norton & Company. p. 152. ISBN 978-0-393-32597-3.
    200. Fathi, Nazila (14 March 2003). "Threats And Responses: Briefly Noted; Iran–Iraq Prisoner Deal". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 13 August 2018. Retrieved 9 February 2017.
    201. Tarock, Adam (1998). The superpowers' involvement in the Iran–Iraq War. Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers. p. 208. ISBN 978-1-56072-593-0.
    202. "Iran–Iraq War: Legal and International Dimensions". iranreview.org. Archived from the original on 20 April 2018. Retrieved 31 July 2015.
    203. Hammond Atlas of the 20th Century (1996), pp. 134–135
    204. War Annual: The World in Conflict War Annual .
    205. "B&J": Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management 1945–1995 (1997), p. 195
    206. ^ Pelletiere, Stephen C.; Johnson, Douglas V. (10 December 1990). Lessons Learned: Iran–Iraq War (PDF). Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps. pp. 117–119. OCLC 37998429. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 November 2013. Retrieved 2 November 2013.
    207. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "1987–1988: An end in sight?". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 300–301 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    208. ^ Tarock, Adam (1998). The Superpower's Involvement in the Iran Iraq War. Nova Publishers. ISBN 978-1560725930. Archived from the original on 18 January 2023. Retrieved 12 November 2020.
    209. "Iran–Iraq war 1980–1990". Archived from the original on 10 April 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2013.
    210. Segal, David (28 January 2009). "The Iran–Iraq War: A Military Analysis". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 66, no. Summer 1988. Archived from the original on 28 November 2018. Retrieved 16 March 2019.
    211. Further Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 (PDF) (Report). U.N. Secretary General's. 9 December 1991. Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 January 2012. Retrieved 23 May 2012. That explanations do not appear sufficient or acceptable to the international community is a fact. Accordingly, the outstanding event under the violations referred to is the attack of 22 September 1980, against Iran, which cannot be justified under the charter of the United Nations, any recognized rules and principles of international law or any principles of international morality and entails the responsibility for conflict.
      Even if before the outbreak of the conflict there had been some encroachment by Iran on Iraqi territory, such encroachment did not justify Iraq's aggression against Iran—which was followed by Iraq's continuous occupation of Iranian territory during the conflict—in violation of the prohibition of the use of force, which is regarded as one of the rules of jus cogens.
      ...On one occasion I had to note with deep regret the experts' conclusion that "chemical weapons ha been used against Iranian civilians in an area adjacent to an urban center lacking any protection against that kind of attack" (s/20134, annex). The Council expressed its dismay on the matter and its condemnation in Resolution 620 (1988), adopted on 26 August 1988.       S/23273, items 6, 7, and 8
    212. "Iraq accuses Iran of Scud missile attack". Los Angeles Times. 19 April 2001. Archived from the original on 11 January 2012. Retrieved 21 April 2013.
    213. Black, Ian (23 September 2010). "Iran and Iraq remember war that cost more than a million lives". The Guardian. London. Archived from the original on 2 January 2017. Retrieved 14 December 2016.
    214. ^ "Iran–Iraq War". Encarta. MSN. 20 August 1988. Archived from the original on 6 April 2009. Retrieved 1 March 2009.
    215. Weiss, Martin A. (29 March 2011). Iraq's Debt Relief: Procedure and Potential Implications for International Debt Relief (PDF) (Report). Congressional Research Service. Archived (PDF) from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 20 June 2015 – via Federation of American Scientists.
    216. Truman, Edwin M. (28 April 2003). "Op-ed: The Right Way to Ease Iraq's Debt Burden". Financial Times. London. Archived from the original on 13 July 2011. Retrieved 2 August 2011. Re-published by Peterson Institute for International Economics
    217. "UAE waives billions of Iraqi debt". BBC News. 6 July 2008. Archived from the original on 22 July 2008. Retrieved 12 August 2009.
    218. "Iraq war reparations to Kuwait could be reduced: UK". Reuters. 4 August 2009. Archived from the original on 26 January 2021. Retrieved 1 July 2017.
    219. ^ Healy, Melissa (24 January 2011). "Advances in treatment help more people survive severe injuries to the brain". Los Angeles Times. ISSN 0458-3035. Archived from the original on 13 October 2016. Retrieved 12 October 2016.
    220. Amirjamshidi, Abbass (2003). "Minimal debridement or simple wound closure as the only surgical treatment in war victims with low-velocity penetrating head injuries: indications and management protocol based upon more than 8 years follow-up of 99 cases from Iran–Iraq conflict". Surgical Neurology. 60 (2): 105–110, discussion 110–111. doi:10.1016/S0090-3019(03)00358-6. PMID 12900110.
    221. Entessar, Nader (1992). Kurdish Ethnonationalism. Lynn Rienner Publishers. p. 131. ISBN 978-1-55587-250-2.
    222. "The Dujail Massacre". The Indian Express. 31 December 2006.
    223. Katzman, Kenneth (1 October 2010). The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq (PDF) (Report). Congressional Research Service. p. 2. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 August 2011. Retrieved 2 August 2011 – via Federation of American Scientists.
    224. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "1980: The Iraqi invasion begins". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 107–109 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    225. ^ Tracy Samuel, Annie (2021). The Unfinished History of the Iran–Iraq War: Faith, Firepower, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-47842-7. Archived from the original on 26 April 2024. Retrieved 26 April 2024.
    226. "Iran's Revolutionary Guards". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 20 October 2021. Retrieved 26 April 2024.
    227. "ببینید | اعلام رسمی هزینه‌های جنگ تحمیلی توسط عالی‌ترین مقام نظامی کشور برای اولین بار". خبرآنلاین. 27 September 2020. Archived from the original on 28 October 2020. Retrieved 30 January 2021.
    228. Nasr, Vali Nasr (2007). The Shia revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New ed.). New York: W.W. Norton. p. 140. ISBN 978-0-393-32968-1.
    229. Column in Etelaat, 4 April 1983, quoted in Molavi, Afshin (2005). The soul of Iran a nation's journey to freedom (Revised ed.). England: W.W. Norton & Co. ISBN 978-0-393-32597-3.
    230. "در گفت و گو با هوشنگ صمدی، فرمانده تکاوران نیروی دریایی مستقر در خرمشهر مطرح شد/ گلایه های ناخدای خونین شهر از کیمیا – دولت بهار". Archived from the original on 3 June 2016. Retrieved 27 May 2016.
    231. "The Arming, and Disarming, of Iran's Revolution". The Economist (International ed.). 19 September 1987. pp. 56–57.
    232. Abrahamian, Ervand (2008). A History of Modern Iran (3rd print ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-52891-7.
    233. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "1981–1982: Stalemate". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 171–173 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    234. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "Conclusion". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 350–354 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    235. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "1987–1988: An end in sight?". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 328–330 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    236. ^ McCarthy, Andrew C. (3 March 2012). "It's a Pity Somebody Has to Win". National Review Online. Archived from the original on 30 March 2013. Retrieved 7 November 2012.
    237. Rajaee, Farhang, ed. (1997). Iranian perspectives on the Iran–Iraq War. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. ISBN 978-0-8130-1476-0.
    238. Jessup, John E. (1998). An encyclopedic dictionary of conflict and conflict resolution, 1945–1996. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-313-28112-9.
    239. SIPRI Database Archived 28 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine Indicates that of $29,079 million of arms exported to Iraq from 1980 to 1988 the Soviet Union accounted for $16,808 million, France $4,591 million, and China $5,004 million (Info must be entered)
    240. Ibrahim, Youssef M. (21 September 1990). "Confrontation in the Gulf; French Reportedly Sent Iraq Chemical War Tools". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 13 June 2020. Retrieved 1 January 2019.
    241. United Nations Special Commission, "Annex D: Actions by Iraq to Obstruct Disarmament", UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, archived from the original on 3 January 2013
    242. Entessar, Nader (1992), p. 134
    243. Leopold 2005, p. 44.
    244. Safire, William (19 May 1992). The Administration's Iraq Gate Scandal (Report). Congressional Record. Archived from the original on 20 June 2015 – via Federation of American Scientists.
    245. Seale, Patrick (2 November 1980). "Israel sends spares for US arms to Iran". The Observer. London. p. 9.
    246. Marshall, Jonathan; Scott, Peter Dale; Hunter, Jane (1987). The Iran–Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era. Black Rose Books Ltd. ISBN 978-0-921689-15-7.
    247. SIPRI Database Archived 28 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine Indicates that of $5,044 million of arms exported to Iran from 1980 to 1988 China count for $1,958 million (Info must be entered)
    248. Terrill, W. Andrew (Spring 2015). "Iran's Strategy for Saving Asad". Middle East Journal. 69 (2). Middle East Institute: 222–236. doi:10.3751/69.2.13. S2CID 142964464.
    249. "La Libye 'rééquilibre' sa position au profit de l'Irak". Le Monde (in French). 12 September 1987. Archived from the original on 11 March 2023. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
    250. "La guerre du Golfe Le colonel Kadhafi critique la France et l'Iran". Le Monde (in French). 25 April 1987. Archived from the original on 11 March 2023. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
    251. El camino de la libertad: la democracia año a año (1986) [The Path of Liberty: Democracy Year to Year] (in Spanish). El Mundo. pp. 27–32.
    252. Fuller, Graham E. (2008). The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. pp. 40, 49. ISBN 978-1-60127-019-1.
    253. Friedman, Alan. Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq, Bantam Books, 1993.
    254. Timmerman, Kenneth R. The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991.
    255. Sciolino, Elaine (1991). The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis. John Wiley & Sons. p. 168. ISBN 9780471542995. Under pressure from the Reagan administration, the began extending short-term loans to cash-starved Iraq for American-made spare parts and consumer goods. Iraq was also keenly interested in more than credits and rice, but the Reagan administration repeatedly told Iraq not even to ask for weapons. Iraq had more than enough arms from Moscow, Paris, and other capitals to fight Iran, and weapons sales to a country with a history of terrorism and antagonism to Israel would never receive congressional approval. ... In some instances, items that could be used for military purposes did go through. In 1985, for example, the United States approved a $200 million sale of 45 Bell helicopters to Iraq, on condition they would be used only for civilian purposes. But administration officials learned later that the Iraqi Army took possession of at least some of the helicopters, painted them in military colors, and used them to ferry VIP delegations and journalists to the war front.
    256. Byrne, Malcolm (2013). "Critical Oral History: A new approach to examining the United States' role in the war". The Iran–Iraq War: New International Perspectives. Routledge. ISBN 9780415685245.
    257. Koppel, Ted. "The USS Vincennes: Public War, Secret War", ABC Nightline. 1 July 1992.
    258. ^ "Presentation on Gulf Oil Disruption 5–22–84" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 21 August 2013.
    259. "Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran". Foreign Policy. 26 August 2013. Archived from the original on 15 September 2014. Retrieved 1 January 2019.
    260. Boring, War Is (27 July 2016). "In 1987, a Secret Iraqi Warplane Struck an American Frigate and Killed 37 Sailors". Archived from the original on 17 August 2016.
    261. ^ Fisk, Robert (2005). The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 1-84115-007-X.
    262. ^ Martins, Mark S. (Winter 1994). "Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering" (PDF). Military Law Review. 143: 43–46. Archived (PDF) from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 29 December 2017.
    263. Peniston, Bradley (2006). No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf. Persian Gulf: Naval Institute Press. pp. 61–63. ISBN 1-59114-661-5. Archived from the original on 22 June 2012. Retrieved 4 June 2006.
    264. Qasemi, Hamid Reza (2016), "Chapter 12: Iran and Its Policy Against Terrorism", in Alexander R. Dawoody (ed.), Eradicating Terrorism from the Middle East, Policy and Administrative Approaches, vol. 17, Springer International Publishing Switzerland, p. 210, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-31018-3, ISBN 978-3-319-31018-3
    265. Wright, Robin (20 January 2014). "Iran Still Haunted and Influenced By Chemical Weapons Attacks". Time. ISSN 0040-781X. Archived from the original on 13 June 2018. Retrieved 30 September 2017.
    266. Wright, Robin (2008). Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East. New York: Penguin Press. p. 438. ISBN 978-1-59420-111-0.
    267. Bryant, Terry (2007). History's Greatest War (1st ed.). Chandni Chowk, Delhi: Global Media. ISBN 978-8189940638.
    268. Fassihi, Farnaz (27 October 2002). "In Iran, grim reminders of Saddam's arsenal". New Jersey Star-Ledger. Archived from the original on 13 December 2007. Retrieved 10 January 2020.
    269. ^ Center for Documents of The Imposed War, Tehran. (مرکز مطالعات و تحقیقات جنگ)
    270. "Iraqi Scientist Reports on German, Other Help for Iraq Chemical Weapons Program". Federation of American Scientists. Archived from the original on 13 May 2019. Retrieved 10 May 2013.
    271. Harris, Shane; Aid, Matthew M. (26 August 2013). "Exclusive: CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed Iran". ForeignPolicy.com. Archived from the original on 26 August 2013. Retrieved 27 August 2013.
    272. United Nations Security Council (12 March 1986). Report of the mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq S/17911 (PDF) (Report). Security Council Report. S/17911 and Add. 1. Cited in Hurd, Nathaniel. "U.S. Diplomatic and Commercial Relationships with Iraq, 1980 – 2 August 1990".
    273. Galbraith, Peter W.; Van Hollen, Christopher Jr. (21 September 1988). Chemical Weapons Use in Kurdistan: Iraq's Final Offensive (Report). Report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. p. 30. Archived from the original on 18 December 2019. Retrieved 3 November 2012.
    274. Pear, Robert (15 September 1988). "U.S. Says It Monitored Iraqi Messages on Gas". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 30 January 2018. Retrieved 9 February 2017.
    275. ^ Potter, Lawrence; Sick, Gary (2004). Iran, Iraq, and the legacies of war. MacMillan. ISBN 1-4039-6450-5.
    276. Tragert, Joseph (2003). Understanding Iran. Indianapolis, Indiana: Alphan. p. 190. ISBN 1-59257-141-7.
    277. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "Introduction". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. p. 2. ISBN 9781107062290.
    278. Rasheed, Ahmed (19 December 2006). "Saddam admits Iran gas attacks". The Australian. Archived from the original on 27 May 2007. Retrieved 18 December 2006.
    279. Sidell, Frederick R.; Urbanetti, John S.; Smith, William J.; Hurst, Charles G. "Chapter 7: Vesicants". Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Office of The Surgeon General, Department of the Army, United States of America. Archived from the original on 12 January 2006. Retrieved 17 January 2019.
    280. "Iraq vii. Iran–Iraq War". Encyclopædia Iranica. 15 December 2006. Archived from the original on 13 September 2017. Retrieved 8 February 2012.
    281. Hiltermann, Joost (17 January 2003). "America Didn't Seem to Mind Poison Gas". Global Policy Forum. Archived from the original on 10 March 2016. Retrieved 18 January 2010.
    282. ^ Hiltermann, Joost R. (2007). A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja. Cambridge University Press. pp. 165–166, 170–172. ISBN 9780521876865.
    283. Sciolino, Elaine (1991). The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis. John Wiley & Sons. p. 171. ISBN 9780471542995.
    284. Makiya, Kanan (1998). Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Updated ed.). University of California Press. p. 261. ISBN 9780520921245.
    285. Cohen, Marsha (6 August 2010). "Iran: Eyes on the Skies Over Bushehr Nuclear Reactor". Inter Press Service News Agency. Archived from the original on 7 August 2011. Retrieved 2 August 2011.
    286. ^ Schneider, Barry (1980). "Iran Attacks an Iraqi Nuclear Reactor". Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation. McNair Paper. National Defense University Library. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 2 August 2011.
    287. "Osiraq: Iraq Special Weapons Facilities". Federation of American Scientists. Archived from the original on 1 September 2009. Retrieved 2 August 2011.
    288. Reiter, Dan (July 2005). "Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the "Success" at Osiraq"" (PDF). Nonproliferation Review. Viewpoint. 12 (2). The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies: 355–371. doi:10.1080/10736700500379008. ISSN 1746-1766. S2CID 144450978. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2 October 2012. Retrieved 3 November 2012.
    289. Raas, Whitney; Long, Austin (Spring 2007). "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities" (PDF). International Security. 31 (4). Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: 7–33. doi:10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.7. S2CID 57560777. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 July 2012. Retrieved 6 November 2012.
    290. پايگاه هشتم شكاري (in Persian). Airtoair. Archived from the original on 8 July 2011. Retrieved 2 August 2011.
    291. ^ Yakubovich, Nikolay. Boevye vertolety Rossii. Ot "Omegi" do "Alligatora" (Russia's combat helicopters. From Omega to Alligator). Moscow, Yuza & Eksmo, 2010, ISBN 978-5-699-41797-1, pp. 164–173.
    292. ^ Goebel, Greg (16 September 2012). "Hind in Foreign Service / Hind Upgrades / Mi-28 Havoc". The Mil Mi-24 Hind & Mi-28 Havoc. Archived from the original on 13 November 2013. Retrieved 16 September 2012.
    293. "I Persian Gulf War: Iraqi Invasion of Iran, September 1980". Archived from the original on 8 August 2016. Retrieved 10 April 2018.
    294. Murray, Williamson; Woods, Kevin M. (2014). "1987–1988: An end in sight?". The Iran–Iraq War, A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. pp. 330–331 (e-book, page numbers approximate). ISBN 978-1107062290.
    295. Wright, Robin (2001). Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (Updated ed.). New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 37. ISBN 978-0-7432-3342-2.
    296. "Iran–Iraq War, 30 Years Later: From Foes to Allies with U.S. In Between". Newsweek. 20 August 2018. Archived from the original on 31 October 2018.
    297. Review, Catholic (19 January 2012). "Iraqi Christians were safer under Saddam". Archdiocese of Baltimore. Archived from the original on 5 July 2022. Retrieved 15 August 2022.
    298. "Iraqi Christians want a stronger state and weaker militias – opinion". The Jerusalem Post. 24 April 2022. Archived from the original on 15 August 2022. Retrieved 15 August 2022.
    299. "Iraqi Christians' long history". BBC News. 1 November 2010. Archived from the original on 2 June 2021. Retrieved 15 August 2022.
    300. Faily, Lukman. "Reflecting on the Iran–Iraq War, Thirty Years Later". Archived from the original on 31 October 2018.
    301. ^ Tabatabai, Arianne (Summer 2017). "What the Iran–Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal". International Security. 42: 152–185. doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00286. S2CID 57559579 – via EBSCO host.
    302. ^ Barzegar, Kayhan (2004). "The New Iraqi Challenge to Iran". The Iranian Hub.
    303. Takeyh, Ray (Summer 2010). "The Iran–Iraq War: A Reassessment". The Middle East Journal. 64 (3): 365–383. doi:10.3751/64.3.12. S2CID 144891295.
    304. Barzegar, Kayhan (Winter 2008). "Iran's Foreign Policy in Post-Invasion Iraq". Middle East Policy. 15 (4): 47–58. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2008.00368.x.
    305. Khosronejad 2013, p. 3.
    306. ^ "Iraq War | Summary, Causes, Combatants, & Facts". Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 21 January 2019. Retrieved 20 January 2019.
    307. Lewental, D. Gershon (November 2014). "'Saddam's Qadisiyyah': Religion and history in the service of state ideology in Baʿthi Iraq". Middle Eastern Studies. 50 (6). Taylor & Francis: 891–910. doi:10.1080/00263206.2013.870899. S2CID 143904965.
    308. "سرودی حماسی که به تیتراژ "خبر" تبدیل شد/ ما مسلح به "الله اکبر"یم – خبرگزاری مهر | اخبار ایران و جهان | Mehr News Agency". خبرگزاری مهر | اخبار ایران و جهان | Mehr News Agency (in Persian). 5 March 2021. Archived from the original on 5 March 2021. Retrieved 20 January 2022.

    Sources

    Further reading

    External links

    Iran–Iraq War
    Participants
    & supporters
    Timeline
    Prelude
    Iraqi invasion (1980)
    Stalemate (1981)
    Liberation of Iranian territories (1982)
    Iranian offensives (1982–84)
    Iranian offensives (1985–87)
    Final stages (1988)
    US intervention
    Related
    Category
    Iran topics
    History
    Prehistory
    Ancient
    3400–539 BC
    550 BC–AD 224
    AD 224–651
    Medieval and
    early modern
    632–1090
    977–1432
    1370–1925
    Modern
    1925–1979
    Islamic Republic
    1979–present
    See also
    Geography
    Politics
    General
    Councils
    Officials
    Economy
    General
    Sectors
    State-owned
    companies
    Places
    Society
    Demographics
    Languages
    Peoples
    Religion
    Other
    Culture
    Music
    Other topics
    Iraq Iraq topics
    History
    Chronology
    638–1958
    Republic
    Geography
    Politics
    Economy
    Society
    Demographics
    General
    Saddam Hussein
    Biography Saddam Hussein
    Books
    Propaganda
    Family
    Media
    Category:Saddam Hussein
    Ruhollah Khomeini
    Politics
    Positions
    Books
    Family
    Related
    Category
    Iran Iran–United States relations United States
    Diplomatic posts
    Diplomacy
    Conflicts
    Incidents after 1979
    Legislation
    Groups and individuals
    Related
    Category
    Iraq Iraq–United States relations United States
    Diplomatic posts
    Conflicts
    Incidents
    Iraq War
    Military relations
    Legislation
    Related
    Category:Iraq–United States relations
    North Korea North Korea–United States relations United States
    Diplomatic posts
    Diplomacy
    Conflicts
    Incidents
    Legislation
    Related
    Category:North Korea–United States relations
    Syria–United States relations
    Diplomatic posts
    Diplomacy
    Incidents
    Conflicts
    Legislation
    Related
    Category:Syria–United States relations
    Iran Iran–Saudi Arabia relations Saudi Arabia
    Diplomatic posts
    Diplomacy
    Conflicts
    Incidents
    Iranian relations
    with GCC member states
    Related
    Category:Iran–Saudi Arabia relations
    Iran Iran–United Kingdom relations United Kingdom
    Diplomatic posts
    Diplomacy
    Conflicts
    Incidents
    Individuals
    Related
    Category:Iran–United Kingdom relations
    Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
    Background
    Conflicts
    Incidents
    Iranian relations
    with GCC member states
    Related topics
    Category:Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict
    List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
    1910s
    1920s
    1930s
    1940s
    1950s
    1960s
    1970s
    1980s
    1990s
    2000s
    2010s
    2020s
    This list includes World War I and later conflicts (after 1914) of at least 100 fatalities each
    Prolonged conflicts are listed in the decade when initiated; ongoing conflicts are marked italic, and conflicts with +100,000 killed with bold.
    Categories: