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Operation Pokpoong 폭풍 작전 (暴風 作戰)
Part of the Korean War
Date 25 June – 31 July 1950 Location 38th parallel north Result DPRK victory DPRK takes control of Seoul Dissolution of most of ROK forces DPRK occupies most of Korean Peninsula Successful ROK delaying tactics Devastation of DPRK II Corps UN passes UNSC Resolution 84 United Nations joins the war DPRK fails to achieve strategic goals
Belligerents
North Korea Soviet Union (limited)	South Korea
Commanders and leaders
Choe Yong-geon Kang Geon	Shin Sung-mo Chae Byeong-deok † Chung Il-kwon Son Won-il
Strength
198,380	105,752

Operation Pokpoong (폭풍 작전; Korean for Storm) was an offensive operation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) against the Republic of Korea (ROK) that marked the start of the Korean War. The operation began at 04:00 KST on 25 June 1950 along the 38th parallel north without a declaration of war.

The operation was planned by both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In addition, the USSR supplied weapons such as tanks and aircraft to its communist ally. With the support from the USSR, the DPRK was able to take control of the ROK capital Seoul within a few days.

The original goal for the operation was to occupy the entire Korean Peninsula by 15 August 1950 ― 50 days, with an average 10 km advance each day ― in commemoration of the 5th anniversary of the Gwangbokjeol. However, heavy losses incurred by the DPRK II Corps, which was in charge of the eastern front, at the hands of the ROK 6th Infantry Division, enabled the ROK to delay the DPRK advance. Soon, the United States joined the war on June 27, and the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 84 on July 7.

Background

Stalin’s influence over Kim Il-Sung dictated the timing of the invasion. Kim Il-Sung and Syngman Rhee both wanted to reunify Korea. Kim's objective was to achieve reunification through force. Kim was not able to achieve his goal without Stalin’s assistance. On 30 January 1950, Stalin contacted Ambassador Shtykov and explained he was ready to help organise an invasion plan. Stalin noted that in order to capture South Korea, Kim Il-Sung would need to be prepared to minimise the risk of a lengthy battle. In the lead up to April 1950, Kim requested to launch an invasion on repeated occasions but was denied by Stalin. Stalin did not allow Kim to launch the invasion until favourable tactical conditions in the Far East emerged.

Since March 1950, the Korean People's Army started to build up its armament, and redeployed its troops to get ready to attack South Korea. On 16 May officers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics began final inspections for the war.

Kim Sung-Il met Stalin in Moscow in April 1950 to formulate the invasion plan. Stalin permitted the plan on the condition that the Chinese allies were also in agreement. On 13 May 1950, Kim Il-Sung went to Beijing to meet Mao. On 14 May 1950, Mao reviewed Stalin’s telegram and approved the North Korean invasion. Stalin had dispatched Lieutenant General Vasiliev, to prepare the invasion plan before the Stalin-Kim meeting was held in Moscow in April 1950. On 29 May 1950, Vasiliev and General Kang Kon finalised the invasion plan.

On 10 June the Ministry of People's Defense secretly summoned all division and brigade commanders to Pyongyang for a meeting. Kang Geon, the Chief of the General Staff of the DPRK, ordered troops to be fully ready for an offensive operation in disguise of defensive operation by June 23. On 11 June, the KPA was reorganized into two corps, and the divisions that were placed at the rear started to move as close as 10 to 15 km of north to the 38th parallel north. Advanced forces from the KPA 2 Division moved to Kumhwa on the same day. The entire division was placed in Kumhwa by 14 June 1950. By 23 June 1950, all North Korean forces involved in the invasion were positioned around the 38 parallel.

On 18 June the Ministry of People's Defense sent Reconnaissance Order Number 1 (정찰명령 제1호) to division commanders to gather information about locations of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces and terrain. On 22 June after completion of reconnaissance and reorganization and approval from Joseph Stalin, Soviet military advisors ordered the Ministry of People's Defense to send Engagement Order Number 1 (전투명령 제1호) to its divisions.

In the meantime, Kim Il-sung informed Joseph Stalin that the war would be started on June 25, and Stalin consented to the plan. As scheduled, the Korean People's Army began the operation and crossed the 38th parallel north at 04:00 KST on 25 June 1950. When the war began, Kim Il-sung held a governmental emergency meeting and stated the following to the members of the Workers' Party of Korea who did not realize the situation:

Comrades, the forces of traitor Rhee Syngman have crossed the 38th parallel and started a full-scale invasion to challenge our northern republic.

Order of battle

Almost entire forces from both sides were involved in the operation either directly or indirectly. The order is at the beginning stage of the operation, and only the major combatants are listed below.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Army

• I Corps
  • 1st Infantry Division
    • 1st Infantry Regiment
    • 2nd Infantry Regiment
    • 3rd Infantry Regiment
  • 3rd Infantry Division
    • 7th Infantry Regiment
    • 8th Infantry Regiment
    • 9th Infantry Regiment
  • 4th Infantry Division
    • 5th Infantry Regiment
    • 16th Infantry Regiment
    • 18th Infantry Regiment
  • 6th Infantry Division
    • 13th Infantry Regiment
    • 14th Infantry Regiment
    • 15th Infantry Regiment
• II Corps
  • 2nd Infantry Division
  • 5th Infantry Division
    • 10th Infantry Regiment
    • 11th Infantry Regiment
    • 12th Infantry Regiment
  • 7th Infantry Division
  • 8th Infantry Division
    • 81st Infantry Regiment
    • 82nd Infantry Regiment
    • 83rd Infantry Regiment
  • 15th Infantry Division
    • 48th Infantry Regiment
    • 49th Infantry Regiment
    • 50th Infantry Regiment
• 9th Infantry Division
• 10th Infantry Division
• 13th Infantry Division
• 105th Armored Brigade
  • 107th Armored Regiment
  • 109th Armored Regiment
  • 203rd Armored Regiment
  • 206th Mechanized Regiment
• 549th Infantry Regiment
• 766th Infantry Regiment

38th Parallel Guard

• 1st Guard Brigade
• 3rd Guard Brigade

Republic of Korea

Army

• Capital Division
  • 3rd Infantry Regiment
  • 18th Infantry Regiment
• 1st Infantry Division
  • 11th Infantry Regiment
  • 12th Infantry Regiment
  • 13th Infantry Regiment
• 2nd Infantry Division
  • 5th Infantry Regiment
  • 16th Infantry Regiment
  • 25th Infantry Regiment
• 3rd Infantry Division
  • 22nd Infantry Regiment
  • 23rd Infantry Regiment
• 5th Infantry Division
  • 15th Infantry Regiment
  • 20th Infantry Regiment
• 6th Infantry Division
  • 2nd Infantry Regiment
  • 7th Infantry Regiment
  • 19th Infantry Regiment
• 7th Infantry Division
  • 1st Infantry Regiment
  • 9th Infantry Regiment
• 8th Infantry Division
  • 10th Infantry Regiment
  • 21st Infantry Regiment
• 17th Infantry Regiment

Controversy over origins of battle

There have been conflicting accounts regarding the opening phases of the battle from sources on both sides. This resulted in discrepancies about which army initiated military action on 25 June 1950.

A report on behalf of UNCOK was submitted on the 24 of June 1950 by two Australian military observers, Major F. S. B. Peach and Squadron Leader R. J. Rankin. The report made claim that ROK forces were organised entirely for defence and were in no condition to carry out an attack on a large scale against the forces of the north. The inadequate resources of the ROK army, in particular the absence of armour, air support and heavy artillery, rendered a South Korean invasion impossible in military terms. At 17:00 on 25 June the field observers had reported that North Korean forces had that morning mounted a surprise attack all along the 38th parallel.

However, Kim Il Sung had claimed in a broadcast made on 26 June at 9.20 a.m. that South Korea had attacked the north in the section of Haeju, provoking counterattacks. In the light of the report by Peach and Rankin, UNCOK unanimously rejected the North Korean contention. There remains undisclosed information from the Soviet and North Korean side.

Battle

On 24 June 1950, the North Korean forces were ordered in their starting positions by 24:00.

On 25 June Washington received a report at 10:00 detailing that North Korean forces has invaded the south across several locations that morning. The report claimed combat was initiated at 04:40 when Ongijin was attacked by North Korean artillery fire. Individual KPA units advanced 3 to 5 kilometres into South Korean territory within the first three hours. The South Korean forces put up a strong resistance in the direction of Ongjin, Kaizin and Seoul. Osin, Kaesong and Sinyuri were captured on the first day. The KPA forces advanced 12 kilometres in the Sunsen direction and 8 kilometres along the eastern coast.

Two amphibious landings occurred on the coast south of Kangnung at 05:25. One landing occurred in the Korio region and was comprised of 2 battalions of naval infantry and 1000 partisans. The other landing occurred in the Urutsyn area and was comprised of 600 partisians. The city of Urutsyn was captured. The South Korean military engaged battle with North Korean warships. The North Korean landings were successful.

The KPA invasion was spearheaded by Soviet manufactured T-34 medium, diesel fuelled tanks that could operate at up to thirty kilometres an hour. The T-34 was equipped with high-velocity 85 mm guns and was lined with medium armour. The armor proved nearly impregnable to the ill-equipped ROK army. The T-34 weighed 29 tons, making it light enough to withstand limits on Korean railroads due to bridge capacities being thirty tons.

The battle continued on June 26 with further advance of KPA forces into South Korea.The Kaisan and Ongjin peninsula were cleared. The 1 and 4 Divisions captured Tongducheb and Bunsan. The 2 Division overtook Siunseen. The 6 Division crossed the bay and captured the point in the direction of Kimpo airport. The forces from the amphibious landings advanced and had taken the port of Tubuiri. The main force advanced through the Uijongbu corridor towards Seoul. Aerial support was offered from 150 Soviet manufactured Yakovlev (Yak-9P) fighters, 1 IO attack bomber and 78 Yak trainer aircraft. The aircraft utilised blitzkrieg warfare strategy and bombarded Seoul and strategic locations.

The South Korean forces did not have enough aircraft or tanks to counteract the invasion. A significant portion of the South Korean forces, numbering 65 000 combat troops and 33 000 support troops, began deserting.

On the 28 June ROK forces demolished the Hangang Bridge in an attempt to slow the KPA invasion. The demolition resulted in South Korean refugee casualties and stranded the ROK army’s fifth division. KPA forces were able to cross the river later that day and occupy Seoul.

North Korean command during battle

A Soviet report made during the invasion highlighted the inadequacies in KPA operations. Communication within the KPA was inefficient. The general staff did not direct battle, since from the beginning of the forward advance staff communication was weak. The unit commanders did not receive commands from senior staff. The report stated that the KPA command did not have battle experience. Once Soviet military advisers withdrew the battle was poorly commanded. The directed use of tanks and artillery in battle was tactically unsound. However, the KPA soldiers were enthusiastic and dedicated to completing their role. The people of North Korea also responded positively to the news of the invasion. They had a strong belief in the North Korean government and the KPA.

Aftermath

On 30 June U.S. President Truman released a statement that indicated the invasion of South Korea had grown the threat of Communism to the Pacific area and the United States. In response to the invasion, Truman ordered United States provide assistance with air and land forces in Korea. Moreover, Truman ordered the 7 fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa and strengthened the United States forces in the Philippines.

As a result of North Korea’s invasion, the UN passed . The Resolution authorised the use of the United Nations flag in operations against North Korean forces and those nations partaking. The United Nations Security Council provided a recommendation to members to provide assistance to the Republic of Korea in repelling the North Korean attack and restoring worldwide peace and security.

References

1. ^ "전쟁 직전 남˙북한의 전력 차이는?" (PDF). Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense.
2. ^ "준비된 도발". Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. Archived from the original on 2015-07-24. Retrieved 2011-11-18.
3. ^ Weathersby, Kathryn (1993). "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence". The Journal of American-East Asian Relations. 2(4): 425–458 – via JSTOR.
4. ^ Kim, Youngho (1999). "The origins of the Korean War: Civil war or Stalin's Rollback?". Diplomacy & Statecraft. 10 (1): 186–214. doi:10.1080/09592299908406115. ISSN 0959-2296.
5. ^ "북한군의 남침 전투명령은 어떻게 하달됐는가?" (PDF). Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-04-05.
6. ^ (June 26, 1950).Top Secret Report on the Military Situation in South Korea from Shtykov to Comrade Zakharov. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Collection of Soviet military documents obtained in 1994 by the British Broadcasting Corporation for a BBC TimeWatch documentary titled Korea, Russia’s Secret War (January 1996) https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110686
7. ^ Lowe, Peter (1981). The origins of the Korean War (Second ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1-315-84312-4. OCLC 889272377.
8. ^ Johnston, William (2008). A War of Patrols. UBC Press. ISBN 978-0-7748-5054-4. OCLC 923440696.
9. ^ O'Neill, Robert (1981). Australia in the Korean War 1950-53. Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service. ISBN 0-642-04329-9. OCLC 8475749.
10. ^ Cumings, Bruce (2002). The origins of the Korean War. Seoul, Korea: Yuksabipyungsa. ISBN 89-7696-613-9. OCLC 56572103.
11. ^ Keene, R (2010-06-01). "The Korean War: It Started On A Sunday in June". The Leatherneck. 93: 18–22.
12. Cite error: The named reference :8 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
13. "Top Secret Report on the Military Situation in South Korea from Shtykov to Comrade Zakharov." (June 26, 1950)". History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Collection of Soviet military documents obtained in 1994 by the British Broadcasting Corporation for a BBC TimeWatch documentary titled “Korea, Russia’s Secret War” (January 1996). 26 June 1950.
14. "Statement by the President, Truman on Korea". History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953. 27 June 1950). {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
15. {[cite web|url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117725%7Ctitle=United Nations Security Council Resolution 84|date=5 July 1950|publisher=History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, United Nations. Department of Public Information|accessdate=}}

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