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Terror bombing is a strategy of deliberately bombing and/or strafing civilian targets in order to break the morale of the enemy, make its civilian population panic, bend the enemy's political leadership to the attacker's will, or to "punish" an enemy.

Legal framework

International law in 1945

International law relating to aerial area bombardment before and during World War II rested primarily on the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which constituted the basis for most of the laws of war at that time. These were the most relevant war-related international treaties because they were the last ratified before 1939 which specify the laws of war on aerial bombardment. The relevant sections of these treaties, dealing directly with the issue of bombardment, are "Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), October 18, 1907" and "Laws of War: Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (Hague IX), October 18, 1907". It is significant that different sections of the treaty deal with bombardment of land by land (Hague IV) and of land by sea (Hague IX). Hague IV, which reaffirmed and updated Hague II (1899), contains the following clauses:

Article 25: The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited.

Article 26: The Commander of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault, should do all he can to warn the authorities.

Article 27: In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes.

The besieged should indicate these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs, which should previously be notified to the assailants.

In 1923, a draft convention promoted by the United States was proposed: The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, December, 1922-February, 1923". There are number of Articles therein which would have directly affected how nations used aerial bombardment and defended against it; these are Articles 18, 22, and 24. It was, however, never adopted in legally binding form.

In response to a League of Nations declaration against bombardment from the air, a draft convention proposed in Amsterdam in 1938 would have provided specific definitions of what constituted an "undefended" town, excessive civilian casualties, and appropriate warning. This draft convention made the qualifying standard for a locale to be considered "undefended" quite high - any military or anti-aircraft units within a defined radius qualifies a town as defended. This convention, like the 1923 draft, was not even close to being ratified when hostilities broke out in Europe in 1939. While the two conventions offer a guideline to what the belligerent powers were considering before the war, neither document was legally binding.

After World War II, the judgment of the Nuremberg Trials records the decision that, by 1939, those rules laid down in the 1907 Hague Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war. Under this post-war decision, a country did not have to have ratified the 1907 Hague conventions in order to be bound by them.

The legality of the status of area bombardment during World War II rested on the language of the treaties of 1899 and 1907, from a time before large-scale aerial bombardment was even possible. In advance of the first Hague conference, Imperial Russia circulated a proposal calling for a complete ban on bombardment from the air, subsequent negotiations resulted in a five-year ban. By the time of the second Hague conference in 1907, advances in both aircraft and dirigible technology made even another temporary ban anathema to perceptions of national security. This left international law with language which, despite repeated diplomatic attempts, was not updated in the immediate run-up to the Second World War.

"In examining these events in the light of international humanitarian law, it should be borne in mind that during the Second World War there was no agreement, treaty, convention or any other instrument governing the protection of the civilian population or civilian property, as the Conventions then in force dealt only with the protection of the wounded and the sick on the battlefield and in naval warfare, hospital ships, the laws and customs of war and the protection of prisoners of war."

International law since 1945

In the post-war environment, a series of treaties governing the laws of war were adopted, starting in 1949. These Geneva Conventions would come into force, in no small part, because of the general reaction against the practices of the Second World War.

• Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts.
• Nuclear weapons can be seen as a type of area bombardment weapon and it is not clear that their use is illegal .

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (May 2008)

World War I

The first large-scale aerial bombardment of civilians occurred during World War I. On January 19, 1915, in which two German Zeppelins dropped 24 fifty-kilogram high-explosive bombs and ineffective three-kilogram incendiary bombs on Great Yarmouth, Sheringham, King's Lynn, and the surrounding villages. In all, four people were killed, sixteen injured, and monetary damage was estimated at £7,740, although the public and media reaction were out of proportion to the death toll {reference}.

There were a further nineteen raids in 1915, in which 37 tons of bombs were dropped, killing 181 people and injuring 455. Raids continued in 1916. London was accidentally bombed in May, and in July the Kaiser allowed raids directly against urban centres. There were 23 airship raids in 1916, in which 125 tons of ordnance were dropped, killing 293 people and injuring 691. Gradually, British air defences improved, and Zeppelin losses mounted. In 1917 and 1918, there were only eleven Zeppelin raids against England, and the final raid occurred on August 5, 1918, which resulted in the death of KK Peter Strasser, commander of the German Naval Airship Department. By the end of the war, 51 raids had been undertaken, in which 5,806 bombs were dropped, killing 557 people and injuring 1,358. The Zeppelin raids were complemented by the Gotha bomber, which was the first bomber aircraft used for strategic bombing. It has been argued that the raids were effective far beyond material damage in diverting and hampering wartime production, diverting twelve squadrons and over 10,000 men to air defences. The calculations that were performed on the number of dead to the weight of bombs dropped had a profound effect on the attitude of the British authorities and population in the inter-war years, because as bombers became larger it was fully expected that deaths from aerial bombardment would approach those anticipated in the Cold War from the use of nuclear weapons. Adding to this was the fear that aerial chemical weapons might be used against civilian targets on a massive scale. The fear of aerial attack on such a scale was one of the fundamental driving forces of British appeasement in the 1930s.

Inter-war years

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (May 2008)

• Theoretical developments in the use of Aerial Warfare
  • Area bombing Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell
  • Blitzkrieg
• Use of aerial bombardment as part of French colonial policy
• Use of aerial bombardment by Italians in Ethiopia during the Italo-Ethiopian War
• Use of aerial bombardment by Japan in China during the Second Sino-Japanese War (notably, Shanghai, Canton, and Chungking)

'Air Control' in British colonial policy

As part of British colonial policy, Sir Hugh Trenchard involved the RAF in policing of mandated areas of the Middle East. The techniques of 'Air Control', as it was called were developed in the Iraq, around 1924. Air Control replaced the use of ground forces in effecting the restoration of order, particularly in distant areas. Where before it would be necessary to send a column of troops through the countryside to the unrest with the problems of needing a long supply column and provoking tension in the areas they passed, aircraft were used. If law and order broke down a summons was issued to call those affected to appear at a court by a set date. The summons also spelt out the consequences of not obeying. If the summons was not obeyed the inhabitants of the village or fort would be informed of the date and time of the air raid that would follow; then the bombers would bomb on that time and date after the inhabitants had vacated the site. The elements of the system which included target marking and locating, as well as formation flying, was taken up by the Trenchardian school which included Arthur Harris, Charles Portal, and Sid Bufton.

In 1920 the RAF undertook attacks against Rebels in British Somaliland. The attacks were not indiscriminate and were aimed at the rebels forts and camps, "which were to be their primary targets". The strategy worked and the Mullahs were destroyed or overthrown in three weeks.

In the British Mandate of Mesopotamia, the Kurds were amongst the first to learn that air war was indiscriminate in its victims. As a young Squadron Leader in the RAF, Arthur Harris provided a description of an air campaign in Iraq in 1924:

"The Arab and Kurd... now know what real bombing means in casualties and damage; they now know that within 45 minutes a full-sized village can be practically wiped out and a third of its inhabitants killed or injured by four or five machines."

To maximise the salutary yield of aerial bombing, said the man who was to be known in later life as "Bomber" Harris, it was essential that casualties should be of sufficient scale to produce "a real as opposed to a purely moral effect." A colleague of Harris' in the Iraq operations of the 1920s had a rather more benign account of his experiences:

"Air control is a marvellous means of bringing these wild mountain tribes to heel. It is swift, economic and humane, as we always drop warning messages some hours before we start to 'lay eggs' on their villages, so that they can clear out... An eastern mind forgets quickly, and if he is not punished for his misdeeds straight away, he has forgotten all about them, and feels his punishment is not merited if delayed."

In the 1930s, RAF bombings destroyed 1,365 out of 2,382 dwellings in 79 villages of the Barzani cultivators. The use of delay-action bombs, in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1914 British Manual of Military Law, caused widespread civillian casulties.

Spanish Civil War

During the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39, the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica both conducted aerial attacks against towns and cities. The bombing of Guernica was the foremost example, leading to the seminal painting of "Guernica" by the artist Picasso showing all the horror and terror of such attacks. Many other cities were also bombed in this conflict, including Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Sevilla, Zaragoza, Malaga, Bilbao, Alicante, and Valladolid.

World War II

Japanese use of terror raids in Asia

The Imperial Japanese Army Air Service frequently used incendiary bombs aimed at non-military targets. The bombings were mostly done against Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Wuhan and Chonging, with around 5,000 raids from February 1938 to August 1943.

The bombing of Nanjing and Canton, which began on 22 and 23 September 1937, called forth widespread protests culminating in a resolution by the Far Eastern Advisory Committee of the League of Nations. Lord Cranborne, the British Under-Secretary of State For Foreign Affairs, expressed his indignation in his own declaration. "Words cannot express the feelings of profound horror with which the news of these raids had been received by the whole civilized world. They are often directed against places far from the actual area of hostilities. The military objective, where it exists, seems to take a completely second place. The main object seems to be to inspire terror by the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians..."

German bombing and policy, 1939-1941

The Luftwaffe did not have a policy of terror bombing civilians as part of the doctrine prior to World War II and the Luftwaffe leadership specifically rejected the concept of terror bombing in the interwar period.

The vital industries and transportation centres that would be targeted for shutdown were valid military targets. Civilians were not to be targeted directly, but the breakdown of production would affect their morale and will to fight. German legal scholars of the 1930s carefully worked out guidlines for what type of bombing was permissible under international law. While direct attacks against civilians were ruled out as "terror bombing", the concept of the attacking the vital war industries - and probable heavy civilian casualties and breakdown of civilian morale - was ruled as acceptable.

— James Corum

Standing instructions for the Luftwaffe at the start of the war forbade any entrance into Western airspace for combat aircraft, with the exception of reconnaissance missions, and strictly adhered to international laws of war. Terror attacks, and the initiation of an unrestricted air warfare were forbidden. Following the German invasion of Poland and subsequent declaration of war by the Western Allies, in Hitler's OKW Direktive Nr 2 and Luftwaffe Direktive Nr 2 made no mention of strategic bomber raids, while attacks upon enemy naval forces were permitted only if the enemy bombed Germany, with the exception in the German Bight, noting that "The guiding principle must be not to provoke the initiation of aerial warfare on the part of Germany"; by contrast, Göring's directive permitted restricted attacks upon warships anywhere, as well as upon troop transports at sea.

Poland

During the invasion of Poland in 1939, the Luftwaffe extensively bombed several cities in Poland, devestating Frampol and Wieluń (over 90% of structures destroyed) and Warsaw. The Polish Air Force (PLW) also bombed Berlin on 1 September 1939. Warsaw`s air bases and PZL aircraft factory was also the subject of bombing from September 2, 1939 before being declared a fortress by Polish military forces, while subsequent attacks targeted bridges on the Vistula, communications around the city, precision night missions against munitions dumps using X-Gerät guidance and direct support of the Army in the southern suburbs by Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers.

On the 13 of September, following orders of the ObdL to launch a retaliatory attack on the Warsaw Ghetto for unspecified crimes committed against German soldiers, apprx. 200 bomber sorties were flown with 50:50 load of high explosives and incendiaries, setting the Ghetto ablaze. On 22 September Wolfram von Richthofen requested: "Urgently request exploitation of last opportunity for large-scale experiment as devastation terror raid.....Every effort will be made to eradicate Warsaw completely". His request was rejected. By then, Warsaw itself was a fortress garrisoned by some 150,000 men and therefore no longer an 'open city', so under the international rules of warfare it could be subjected to wholesale bombardment. To conserve the strength of the bomber units, the modern He 111 bombers were replaced by Ju 52 transports using "worse than primitive methods" for bombing. Due to prevailing strong winds they achieved poor accuracy, even causing some casualties to besieging German troops. The Germans flew 1,150 sorties and dropped 560 tonnes of high explosive and 72 tonnes of incendiaries. As result of this and previous bombings, 10 percent of the buildings in the city were destroyed, and 40,000 civilian casualties were inflicted. On 14 September the French Air attaché in Warsaw reported to Paris that "... the German Air Force acted in accordance to the international laws of war and bombed only targets of military nature. Therefore, there is no reason for French retorsions.". However the Germans recognised and planned for an aerial assault before hostilities. Plans for "and the level of importance of aerial bombing of cities, even in an operational sense was illustrated by plans for the heavy bombing of Warsaw". Only the weather thwarted the Luftwaffe from carrying it out fully.

Netherlands

On 14 May 1940, Luftwaffe bombers were ordered to bomb Rotterdam by its chief, Hermann Göring, in an effort to force the capitulation of the besieged city. The controversial bombing targeted the center of the city, instead of providing direct tactical support for the hard-pressed German 22nd infantry division (under Lt. Gen. Sponeck, which had airlanded on May 10) in combat with Dutch forces northwest of the city, and in the eastern part of the city at the Meuse river bridge.> As negotiations for the surrender were in progress, an unsuccessful attempt was made to call off the assault. Nevertheless, 57 He-111's (out of 100) did drop 97 tons of bombs, and in the resulting fire 1.1 square miles (2.8 km) of the city center was devastated, including 21 churches and 4 hospitals, and killing between 800-1000 civilians, wounding over 1,000, and making 78,000 homeless. International news agencies vastly exaggerated the events, portraying Rotterdam as a city mercilessly destroyed by terror bombing without regard to civilian life, with 30,000 dead lying under the ruins. Neither claim was true: the bombing was against well defined targets, in direct support of advancing German Army's operations. The Germans had threatened to bomb Utrecht in the same fashion, the threat of a second such bombing was sufficient to force the surrender of the Netherlands to Nazi Germany.

The Blitz

The Luftwaffe carried out intensive bombing of industrial cities and ports in the United Kingdom, including London and Coventry, in a bombing campaign known in Britain as "the Blitz," from September, 1940 through May, 1941. Hitler's No. 17 Directive, issued 1 August 1940 on the conduct of war against England specifically forbade Luftwaffe to conduct terror raids on its own initiative, and reserved the right of ordering terror attacks as means of reprisal for the Führer himself, despite the raids conducted by RAF Bomber Command against industries located in German cities since May 1940. This echoed Göring's general order issued on 30 June, 1940 on the the air war against the island fortress:

The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. ... The most thorough study of the target concerned, that is vital points of the target, is a pre-requisite for success. It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unnecessary loss of life amongst the civilian population.

After a succession of British raids on Berlin factories, and with his patience was exhausted, Hitler became infuriated; he ordered that the 'night piracy of the British' be countered by a concentrated night offensive against the island, and especially London. In a public speech in Berlin on 4 September 1940, Hitler announced that:

"The other night the English had bombed Berlin. So be it. But this is a game at which two can play. When the British Air Force drops 2000 or 3000 or 4000 kg of bombs, then we will drop 150 000, 180 000, 230 000, 300 000, 400 000 kg on a single night. When they declare they will attack our cities in great measure, we will eradicate their cities. The hour will come when one of us will break - and it will not be National Socialist Germany!"

Göring - at Kesselring's urging and with Hitler's support- turned to a massive assault on the British capital. On the night of 7 September, 318 bombers from the whole KG 53 supported by eight other Kampfgruppen, flew almost continous sorties against London, the dock area which was already in flames from earlier daylight attacks. This all-out effort, directed at London's East End and the Thames docks, accorded well with Giulio Douhet's theories and the German's own belief that ruthlessness could pay extra dividens. The attack of 7 September 1940 did not entirely step over the line into a clear terror bombing effort since its primary target was the London docks, but there was clearly an assumed hope of terrorizing the London population.

The Blitz continued into the winter 190-41. While some historians maintain that German air fleets targeted civilian areas, with the goal of destroying dwellings and inflicting casualties on British workers to disrupt production of military industry,, officially terror attacks were banned for the Luftwaffe. The bombing killed thousands of civilians and caused temporary losses of production output. The Blitz failed to have the desired effect.

Although the plan adopted by the Luftwaffe early September had mentioned attacks on the population of large cities, detailed records of the raids made during the autumn and the winter of 1940-41 does not suggest that indiscriminate bombing of the civilians was intended. The points of aim selected were largely factories and docks. Other objectives specifically allotted to bomber-crews included the City of London and the governmental quarter rounds Whitehall.

— Sir Basil Collier

Germany continued to bomb the UK throughout the war with varying intensity, long after any possible effect could be achieved, culminating in the 'vengeance' attacks by V-1 flying bombs and V-2 missiles.

Belgrade

In April 1941, during the Balkans campaign, Germany invaded Yugoslavia after a new government in that nation repudiated its ties with Germany. Codenamed "Operation Punishment", Hitler ordered the destruction of Belgrade specifically to punish Yugoslavia, carried out with 50 percent of the force dropping incendiaries and the other half dropping high explosives. Although Hitler`s orders were specific about the destruction of the city, they were replaced in the last moment for military, communications and logistical targets in the city by Generaloberst Alexander Löhr - the commander of the Luftwaffe formations that bombed Belgrade - and his staff. In the survey prepared by the Luftwaffe ten days after the attack to assess the results obtained by the 218.5 tons dropped, the following targets are mentioned: the royal palace, the ministry of defence, military colleges, the main post office, the telegraph office, railway stations, powerplants and barracks. The number of civilians killed in the bombing of Belgrade is claimed to be 2,274 and 12,000 injured ; other estimations claim as high as 17,000 killed and 50,000 wounded.

British bombing and policy prior to 1942

During most of 1940, RAF Bomber Command did not adopt "terror" bombing. Between May 1940 and July 1941 it focused on operational interdiction against oil and marshalling yards in France and Germany, fearing for German retaliation on British cities after the large scale destruction of Warsaw and Rotterdam. The British Bombing Unit Survey records just 1% of its effort was expended on attacking German towns, while 25% was directed at Industry, 44% at military targets an 30% at "other" targets.

The first British bombs fell on a German city, Mönchengladblach, on the night of 11/12 May 1940, while Bomber Command was attempting to hit roads and railroads near the Dutch-German border. Gelsenkirchen was attacked first on the 14/15, followed by Cologne on May 15, 1940.

Following the attack on Rotterdam, Bomber Command was authorized to attack German targets east of the Rhine on May 15, 1940; the Air ministry authorized Air Marshal Charles Portal to conduct attacks on rail and communications targets only; to attack targets in the Ruhr, including oil plants and other civilian industrial targets which aided the German war effort, such as blast furnaces (which at night were self-illuminating). Bomber Command's strategic bombing campaign on Germany has thus begun.

During May, Essen, Duisburg, Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Hanover and Bremen were also attacked for the first time by Bomber Command, while in June similar attacks were made on Dortmund, Mannheim, Frankfurt and Bochum. The number of German civilian casualties begun to mount: when on the night of 17/18 May 72 British bombers attacked industrial targets in Hamburg and Bremen, 47 were killed and 127 were wounded; the H.E. and 400 incendiaries dropped caused six large, one moderately large and 29 small fires. As at the time Bomber Command lacked the necessary navigational and bombing technical background, the accuracy of the bombings during the night attacks was abysmal, and the bombs usually being scattered over a large area, causing an uproar in Germany. As a result, Hitler authorized the 'reprisal' bombing of targets on the British mainland nine days later. Actual Luftwaffe operations over England did not start for six weeks; but by then Hitler specifically forbade terror bombings, other than means of retaliation for Bomber Command bombing operations against German cities.

Churchill began flirting with the idea of terror attacks soon after the Battle of France has ended. On 5 July he wrote Lord Beaverbrook : "There's one thing that will bring back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon Nazi homeland." On 20 July, Churchill suggested to bombing of Berlin on the 1 September. That on the night of 24/25 August 1940 German bombers bombed London in error came helpful to him; the Prime Minister order a retaliatory attack on factories in Berlin. Hitler reacted promptly. He ordered German air attacks to be directed against British cities and towns, with London as the primary objective. Winston Churchill had a significant influence on RAF Bomber Commands operations. His directive to the Command was to "pulverise the entire industry and scientific structure on which the war effort and economic life of the enemy depended". In response to German attacks on British cities, Bomber Command was ordered to "retaliate with attacks on industrial targets in Berlin (25 August) ". A "new bombing directive on 21 September 1940, continued to stress the disruption of Germany's oil supply as the long-term offensive policy".

On 13 December, 1940, the British War Cabinet authorized a raid against a German city; there were no specific targets, the bombs were to be simply unladen onto the city centre. Crews were briefed before the mission that the objective of the mission was to "cause the most severe possible damage in the city centre". As a result, on the 17/18 December, Bomber Command raided the German city of Mannheim with 134 bombers, using methods copied from the Luftwaffe, that were used over Coventry to mark targets for the bomber force: eight Wellington bombers flown by an experienced crews were dropping incendiaries. The attack was poorly executed, and the bombs scattered over a large area; though most of the incendiaries fell on residential areas, causing the death of 34 people, the damage done to industrial areas was negligible. In Germany, the attack contributed significantly to Bomber Command crew`s image as a Terrorfliger.

British and American policy of terror bombing

Initial refusal to employ terror bombing

As World War II began in 1939, the president of the United States (then a neutral power), Franklin D. Roosevelt, issued a request to the major belligerents to confine their air raids to military targets. The French and the British agreed to abide by the request, which included the provision that "upon the understanding that these same rules of warfare will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents".

At the start of the war, the United Kingdom had a policy of using aerial bombing only against military targets and against infrastructure such as ports and railways which were of direct military importance. Whilst it was acknowledged that the aerial bombing of Germany would cause civilian casualties, the British government renounced the deliberate bombing of civilian property, outside of combat zones, as a military tactic.

Like the Germans, the British abandoned daytime precision bombing of targets in the enemy's homeland. Initially, the RAF attempted night time precision bombing, but after the circulation of the Butt report in August 1941, the British government abandoned the policy of precision bombing for area bombardment with the issuing of the area bombing directive to the RAF on 14 February 1942.

Change of strategic direction, February 1942

On 14 February 1942 Arthur "Bomber" Harris took up the post of Air Officer Commanding (AOC) of Bomber Command. The change in strategy was hotly debated inside the British military establishment, as it had a direct effect on the most effective use of the Britain's limited resources in waging war on Germany. Should the Royal Air Force (RAF) be scaled back to allow more resources to go to the British Army and Royal Navy, or should the strategic bombing option be followed and expanded. It was decided to change the bombing policy from industrial assaults to the civilian population:

Consequent upon the enemy's adoption of a campaign of unrestricted air warfare, the Cabinet have authorised a bombing policy which includes the attack of enemy morale.

On on 30 March 1942 Lord Cherwell, the British government's leading scientific adviser, sent to the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill a memorandum which after it had become accepted by the Cabinet became known as the dehousing cabinet paper. Mr. Justice Singleton, a High Court Judge, was asked by the Cabinet to look into the competing points of view. In his report, that was delivered on 20 May 1942, he concluded that:

If Russia can hold Germany on land I doubt whether Germany will stand 12 or 18 months’ continuous, intensified and increased bombing, affecting, as it must, her war production, her power of resistance, her industries and her will to resist (by which I mean morale).

Area bombing offensives

Until the last month of the war in Europe the British did not abandon the policy of area bombardment — apart from a break during the summer of 1944 while RAF bomber command stopped the strategic bombing of Germany to concentrate on the tactical bombing of France to support the Normandy landings — although later directives put more emphasis on the bombing of strategic targets such as oil production and distribution facilities, area bombardment was not totally abandoned until the last month of the European war. The most effective way to dehouse the population was fire-bombing of city centres which inevitably caused many deaths to civilians. This was a deliberate attack on the moral of the enemy as it was believed by the British that in the words of Lord Cherwell in the dehousing paper that "Investigation seems to show that having one's home demolished is most damaging to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relatives killed."

While politicians maintained the pretence that Bomber Command was attacking military and industrial targets, Arthur Harris was more honest, seeing no shame in attacking the German people and having no problem with describing the aim of his attacks on Berlin as being "to cause the heart of the German nation to stop beating". When pressed to use a higher proportion of incendiaries, he argued the case for high explosive, saying:

I do not agree with this policy. The moral effect of HE is vast. People can escape from fires, and the casualties on a solely fire raising raid would be as nothing. What we want to do in addition to the horrors of fire is to bring the masonry crashing down on top of the Boche, to kill Boche and to terrify Boche.

— Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris

The bombing of Dresden

One of the most devastating raids of the European theatre was the Dresden bombing of February 13-15, 1945, which started a firestorm and left the city in ruins and claimed between 25,000 and 40,000 lives.The raids were carried out under the pretext of supporting the Soviet Red Army advance: the Soviets had requested the destruction of Dresden on 4 February 1945, at the Yalta conference, as well as the bombing of Berlin and Leipzig. Operation Thunderclap was already planned by Bomber Command in January 1945, However, until the Soviet request was made it had been rejected. The attack was to be centered on the sports stadium, next to the city's medieval Altstadt (old town), with its congested, and highly combustible, timbered buildings; the major industrial areas in the suburbs, which stretched for miles, were not targeted.

Bomber Command issued the following briefing notes to its Squadrons:

Dresden has developed into an industrial city of first-class importance, and like any large city with multiplicity of telephone and rail facilities, is of major value for controlling the defence of that part of the front now threatened by Marshal Koniev's breakthrough. The intentions are to attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it most, behind an already partially collapsed front, to prevent the use of the city in the way of further advance, and incidently to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do.

Bomber Command, in the extended briefing note, acknowledged the presence of refugees and workers. Due to the presence large concentration of troops and administrative services displaced from elsewhere it was considered a target. Commenting on this Alexander McKee stated that: "The standard whitewash gambit, both British and American, is to mention that Dresden contained targets X, Y and Z, and to let the innocent reader assume that these targets were attacked, whereas in fact the bombing plan totally omitted them and thus, except for one or two mere accidents, they escaped" McKee further asserts, "The bomber commanders were not really interested in any purely military or economic targets, which was just as well, for they knew very little about Dresden; the RAF even lacked proper maps of the city. What they were looking for was a big built up area which they could burn, and that Dresden possessed in full measure" John Terraine rejects the common notion that the Dresden bombing was needless:

The argument, sometimes heard, that it was 'unnecessary' to bomb Dresden because the war was nearly over is absurd. That was a thought that could have reality only after the 7 May; in February it was an unfact, and what mattered above all else to most people was to end the war soon as possible by any and every means.

Following the bombing of Dresden, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated in a top secret telegram:

"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed." "...I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive."

It is estimated that Allied air force raids on the Third Reich killed between 305,000 and 600,000 civilians of which about 80,000 were children. 3,700,000 dwellings were destroyed, of which 600,000 were in Berlin. The primary objective of these attacks was to damage economic infrastructure to seriously weaken the enemy's ability to fight the war, in line with the doctrines of Total war. Senior Allied commanders like Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris and politicians also hoped, in the early years of the war, that the morale of the Axis populations and governments could be so undermined by these tactics that they would sue for peace. However the resilience of Londoners under the Blitz, and the failures to break the morale of the Germans with the bombing of Hamburg and the Battle of Berlin, showed that this was unrealistic to all but the most ardent advocates of area bombardment, such as Arthur "Bomber" Harris.

German response

The Germans harboured similar unrealistic hopes for their V1 and V2 rockets. With only conventional warheads and limited to area targeting they did not make any difference to the military outcome. The Nazi government propaganda ministry made much of their use as reprisal weapons (Vergeltungswaffen) on the population of London in response to the Allied strategic bombing campaign waged against German cities.

The American offensives

The USAAF officially only bombed precision targets over Europe, but for example, when 316 B-17 Flying Fortresses, of the XXI Bomber Command, bombed Dresden in a follow up raid at around noon on the 14 February 1945, because of cloud the later waves bombed using using H2X radar for targeting. The mix of bombs to be used on the Dresden raid was about 40% incendiaries, much closer to the RAF city busting mix than that usually used by the Americans in precision bombardments. This was quite a common mix when the USAF anticipated cloudy conditions over the target.

In its attacks on Japan the USAAF abandoned its policy of precision bombing and used a mix of incendiaries and high explosives to burn Japanese cities to the ground. These tactics were used to devastating effect with many burnt out. The first raid using low-flying B-29s carrying incendiaries to drop on Tokyo was on the night of February 24-25 1945 when 174 B-29s destroyed around one square mile (3 km²) of the city. Changing their tactics to expand the coverage and increase the damage, 279 B-29s raided on the night of March 9–10, dropping around 1,700 tons of bombs. Approximately 16 square miles (41 km²) of the city were destroyed and some 100,000 people are estimated to have died in the resulting firestorm, more than the immediate deaths of either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Another example is the Bombing of Kobe on 17 March 1945, 331 B-29 bombers launched a firebombing attack against the city. Of the city's residents, 8,841 were confirmed to have been killed in the resulting firestorms, which destroyed an area of three square miles and included 21% of Kobe's urban area. At the time, the city covered an area of 14 square miles (36 km²). More than 650,000 people had their homes destroyed, and the homes of another million people were damaged.

The United States fire-bombing of Tokyo, Kobe, and other targets in Japan is a case in which contradictory conclusions have been made. American airmen such as General Curtis LeMay felt that changing from a relatively ineffective campaign of precision bombing carried out against industry to a much more successful firebombing campaign carried out against the general population was a reasonable way to interrupt Japanese industry. Such attacks damaged homes and light industry, leaving large numbers of workers homeless and jobless, reducing war output by half in Tokyo. On the other hand, many observers felt that the firebombing of civilians in densely-packed cities was inhumane. A military aide to General Douglas MacArthur called the incendiary attacks "one of the most ruthless and barbaric killings of non-combatants in all history."

According to Emperor Showa's speech, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki forced the Japanese Government into "enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable"; and agreeing to unconditional surrender of their armed forces under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.

Aerial bombardments since World War II

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Vietnam

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During the Vietnamese War the USAF increasingly resorted to 'box bombing', a form of carpet bombing in which the entire area within 'the box' (usually miles wide) is destroyed by fire. Napalm was also introduced at this time and many photos taken by journalists showed burning civilians covered in the napalm (a sticky substance). This included a famous picture of a running child.

Afghanistan

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During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet forces used helicopter gunships to destroy villages of suspected of supporting anti-Soviet resistance.

Collateral damage

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With modern precision-guided munitions (or "smart bombs"), fewer casualties are caused among the civilian populations than with area bombing. This was demonstrated in the use of guided munitions before the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, when U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke of Shock and Awe bombings that he hoped would lead to an Iraqi surrender without the destruction of large areas of Baghdad. Modern weapons still cause collateral damage and a significant proportion of unguided bombs may still be used; for example in Iraq and Afghanistan it was around 30% . There are instances in recent conflicts of civilians being killed by airborne munitions, mostly by bombs missing their targets. In the Kosovo War, NATO intended to bomb military, economic and political targets in Serbia and Montenegro. However, scores of civilians were killed and the Chinese embassy was accidentally hit in the bombings, leading to international protest.

See also

• Firebombing
• Command responsibility
• Geneva Conventions
• Laws of War
• Nuremberg Charter
• War crimes
• Strategic bombing during World War II

Footnotes

1. Hyde 1976, p. 90.
2. ^ Hyde 1976, p. 91.
3. ^ McDowall, 2004. p. 180
4. ^ "The 'terror bombing' of Iraq" Frontline - India's National Magazine
5. Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2001
6. The Illustrated London News, Marching to War 1933-1939, Doubleday, 1989, p.135
7. Corum, 1995., p. 7
8. James Corum 1997, p. 240
9. Poeppel-von Preußen-von Hase, 2000. p. 248.
10. Spetzler, 1956. p. 259
11. Planstudie 1939, Heft. I-III, BA-MA RL 2 II/1-3.
12. ObdL FüSt Ia Nr. 5375/39 g. Kdos. Chefsache, Entwurf, Weisung Nr. 2 für das X. Fliegerkorps vom 11. November 1939
13. ObdL FüSt Ia Nr. 5445/39 vom 16 Dezember 1939.
14. Hooton 1994, p. 190.
15. Willmott, 1991. p. 236
16. Hooton 1994, p. 181.
17. Hooton 1994, p. 185.
18. Hooton 1994, p. 186.
19. Hooton 2007, p. 92.
20. Hooton 1994, p. 187.
21. Hooton 1994, p. 187.
22. Hooton 1994, p. 188.
23. Hooton 2007, p. 92.
24. Hooton 2007, p. 92.
25. Der Prozess gegen die Hauptskriegsverbrecher vor der Internationalen Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg. 14 November 1945 - 1 Oktober 1946. Volume 9. Nürnberg, 1947. p. 759.
26. Buckley 1999, p. 127.
27. Rutherford, Ward, Blitzkrieg 1940, G.P.Putnam's Sons, NY, 1980, p.52.
28. Piekalkiewicz, Janusz, The Air War, 1939-1945, Blandford Press, Poole, Dorset, UK, 1985, p.74.<
29. Hooton Vol 2 2007, p. 52.
30. Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 42
31. Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 43
32. Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 43
33. Maass, Walter B., The Netherlands at War: 1940-1945, Abelard-Schuman, NY, 1970, pp. 38-40.
34. Kennett, Lee, A History of Strategic Bombing, Charles Scribner's Sons, NY, 1982, p.112.
35. Boyne, Walter J., Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air, Simon & Schuster, NY, 1994, p.61.
36. Wood and Dempster, 2003. p. 122.
37. Wood and Dempster, 2003. p. 117.
38. Taylor and Mayer 1974, p. 74.
39. Smith&Creek, 2004. Volume II. p. 122
40. Schmidt-Klingenberg, Michael. "Wir werden sie ausradieren" Spiegel Online
41. Murray 1983, p. 52.
42. Smith&Creek, 2004. Volume II. p. 122
43. Murray 1983, p. 52.
44. Taylor & Mayer 1974, pp. 73-74.
45. Hooton, 1997. p. 35
46. Taylor & Mayer 1974, pp. 73-74.
47. Collier, 1957. p. 261
48. Diakow, 1964. pp. 33-44.
49. Luftflottenkommando 4, Führungsabteilung Ia op Nr. 1000/41. g. Kdos. vom 31 März 1940. BA-MA RI. 7/657, pp. 1-14
50. Spetzler&Veale, 1954. p. 274.
51. LC 7 II LC 7 Nr. 2550/40 geh. Vom 24. April 1941. Bericht über die Bomberwirkung in Belgrad. BA-MA RL 3/2157.
52. Lfl Kdo 4 FüAbt Ic vom 15. April 1941, Zusammenestellung der auf Belgrad abgeworfenen Bomben, BA-MA RL 3/2157
53. Savich, Carl Belgrade 41: Hitler’s Attack Serbianna
54. Ciglic & Savic 2007, p. 59.
55. Murray 1983, p. 75.
56. Buckley 1999, p. 132.
57. Pape 1996, p. 267
58. Pape 1996, p. 268.
59. Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 43
60. Jane`s, 1989. p. 34
61. Hastings 1979, p. 6
62. Taylor References Chapter "Call Me Meier", Page 111
63. Hinchliffe, 2000. p. 44
64. Jane`s, 1989. p. 34
65. Hinchliffe, 2000. pp. 44-45
66. Kennett, Lee, A History of Strategic Bombing, Charles Scribners' Sons, NY, 1982, p.112
67. Wood and Dempster, 2003. p. 117.
68. Wood and Dempster, 2003. p. 122.
69. Deist-Boog-Maier-Rahn, 2001. p. 502.
70. Deist-Boog-Maier-Rahn, 2001. p. 502.
71. Smith&Creek, Volume II. p. 121
72. Deist-Boog-Maier-Rahn, 2001. p. 502.
73. Taylor and Mayer 1974, pp. 73-74.
74. Biddle 2002, p. 186.
75. Biddle 2002, p. 188.
76. Biddle 2002, p. 188.
77. Hinchliffe, 2000. pp. 68-69
78. Hinchliffe, 2000. pp. 68-69
79. President Franklin D. Roosevelt Appeal against aerial bombardment of civilian populations, 1 September, 1939
80. Taylor p. 105
81. A.C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities (Bloomsbury 2006), Page 24.
82. Biddle 2002, p. 197.
83. Longmate 1983, p. 133
84. Copp, Terry; The Bomber Command Offensive , originally published in the Legion Magazine September/October 1996
85. Issues : Singleton - World War Two
86. Longmate 1983, p. 131
87. ^ Lake, Jon - ‘Bomber’ Harris, an enduring enigma. 2002, Osprey Publishing.
88. The consensus among historians is that the number killed was between slightly under 25,000 to a few thousand over 35,000. See
    • Evans, Richard J. David Irving, Hitler and Holocaust Denial: Electronic Edition, [(i) Introduction.
    • Addison, Paul. Firestorm: The bombing of Dresden, p. 75.
    • Taylor, Frederick. Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945, p. 580.
    • All three historians, Addison, Evans and Taylor, refer to:
    • Bergander, Götz. Dresden im Luftkrieg: Vorgeschichte-Zerstörung-Folgen. Munich: Wilhelm Heyne Verlag, 1977, who estimated a few thousand over 35,000.
    • Reichert, Friedrich. "Verbrannt bis zur Unkenntlichkeit," in Dresden City Museum (ed.). Verbrannt bis zur Unkenntlichkeit. Die Zerstörung Dresdens 1945. Altenburg, 1994, pp. 40-62, p. 58. — Richard Evans regards Reichert's figures as definitive.
89. ^ Taylor, p. 430. Cite error: The named reference "Taylor-430" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
90. Hastings 1979, p. 341.
91. Hinchliffe, 1996. p. 434.
92. Taylor, 207–214
93. De Bruhl (2006), pp. 209.
94. McKee 1983, p. 62
95. Hastings 1979, p. 342.
96. Hastings 1979, p. 342.
97. McKee (1983), p.61.
98. McKee (1983), p.63.
99. Terraine 1985, p. 678.
100. British Bombing Strategy in World War Two, Detlef Siebert, 2001-08-01, BBC History, verified May 2009
101. Longmate 1983, p. 133
102. Hastings 1979, p. 352.
103. Davis p.504
104. Taylor p. 366. Taylor compares this 40% mix with the raid on Berlin on February 3 where the ratio was 10% incendiaries
105. Davis pp. 425,504
106. Dyson, Freeman Part I: A Failure of Intelligence Technology Review, November 1 2006, MIT
107. Rauch, Jonathan. Firebombs Over Tokyo The Atlantic, July/August, 2002
108. Speech by Emperor Hirohito accepting the Terms of Surrender
109. Smart bombs 'missed Iraqi targets' BBC news, 22 February, 2001

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