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War of the Pacific
Map showing changes of territory due to the war
Date 1879-1883 Location Peru and Bolivia in Pacific coast of South America Result Chilean victory Territorial changes Litoral Department (Antofagasta) ceded by Bolivia to Chile in 1904. Tarapaca Department ceded by Peru to Chile in 1884. Puna de Atacama ceded by Bolivia/Chile to Argentina in 1889/1899 Tarata occupied by Chile in 1885, return to Peru in 1925. Arica province occupied by Chile in 1884, ceded by Peru in 1929. Tacna (Sama River) occupied by Chile in 1884, return to Peru in 1929.
Belligerents
Peruvian Republic Republic of Bolivia	Republic of Chile
Commanders and leaders
Miguel Grau †, Juan Buendia, Narciso Campero, Pedro Silva, Andres A. Caceres	Manuel Baquedano, Patricio Lynch, Juan Williams
Strength
1878 Bolivian Army: 2,300 soldiers Bolivian Navy: None Peruvian Army: 4,700 soldiers Remington and Minie rifles. Blakely cannon Peruvian Navy: 2 ironclad, 1 corvette, 1 gunboat 1881 Peruvian Army: 28,000 soldiers Peruvian Navy: None	1878 Chilean Army: 4,000 soldiers Comblain rifle. Krupp cannon Chilean Navy: 2 battleships, 4 corvettes, 2 gunboats 1881 Chilean Army: 45,000 soldiers Chilean Navy: 2 battleships, 1 ironclad, 4 corvettes, 2 gunboats
Casualties and losses
35,000 Peruvians killed or wounded 5,000 Bolivians killed or wounded Pisagua, Iquique, Mollendo, Supe, Chorrillos, Miraflores, Concepcion, San Pablo, bombed or burned	15,000 killed or wounded

The War of the Pacific, occurring from 1879-1883, was a conflict between Chile and the joint forces of Bolivia and Peru. Also known as the "Saltpeter War," the war arose from disputes over the control of territory that contained substantial mineral-rich deposits. After a taxation controversy in a territory disputed by Chile and Bolivia, the crisis worsened following the Chilean invasion of Bolivian territory and the discovery of a secret defensive alliance between Bolivia and Peru. The war officially began on 1879, after the Chilean declaration of war and the activation of the casus foederis of the treaty between Peru and Bolivia. The conclusion of the conflict ultimately led to the Chilean annexation of the Peruvian Tarapaca department and Arica province, as well as the Bolivian department of Litoral, leaving Bolivia as a landlocked country.

Origins of the war

The War of the Pacific grew out of the initial dispute between Chile and Bolivia for control over a part of the Atacama desert that lies between the 23rd and 25th parallels on the Pacific coast, a territory that contained valuable mineral resources amid a period of worldwide economic recession.

Natural resources

The dry climate of Peruvian and Bolivian coast had permitted the accumulation and preservation of vast amounts of high-quality nitrate deposits - guano and saltpeter over many thousands of years. The discovery during the 1840s of the use of guano as a fertilizer and saltpeter as a key ingredient in explosives made the area strategically valuable. Bolivia, Chile and Peru suddenly found themselves sitting on the largest reserves of a resource that the world needed, and caused the population of the Atacama desert with Chilean operators backed by European capital.

From 1864 to 1866, Peru and Chile fought as allies against former colonial power Spain in the Chincha Islands War. It began with Spain's seizure of the guano-rich Chincha Islands and continued with bombing of Valparaíso and El Callao, but Spain was repulsed by the allied forces of Peru and Chile, whom signed a deffensive and ofensive alliance in 1866.

Heavy British capital investment drove development through the area, although Peru nationalized the guano exploitation during the 1870s. Prior to the war, Peru held 58.5% of all saltpeter production in the region, while Chile held 19% and Great Britain 13.5%. After the war, Peru was left without saltpeter production and Chile decreased its production to 15%, while Great Britain increased its production to 55%.

Treaties

No permanent borders had been established between Bolivia and Chile until 1866. Bolivian and Chilean historians disagree on whether the territory of Charcas, originally part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, later of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata, had access to the sea. Supporting their claims with different documents, Bolivians claim that it had while Chileans disagreed. Bolivia and Chile claimed its borders according to the uti possidetis principle.

In 1866, the two countries had negotiated the Boundary Treaty of 1866 (commonly referred to as the Treaty of Mutual Benefits) that established the 24th parallel as their boundary, and entitled Chile and Bolivia the right to share in the tax revenue on mineral exports from the territory between the 23rd and 25th parallels. Within this zone, Chile and Bolivia were provided equal rights.

In 1872 the foreign minister of Peru, Jose de la Riva-Agüero, told the Minister Plenipotentiary of Peru in Santiago, Ignacio Novoa, to move quikly in order to use the (then) preponderance of the Peruvian Navy in the Pacific to obtain secure boundary for Bolivia before the Chilean ironclads in construction (the Blanco Encalada and the Cochrane) became finished.

On 6th February 1873 Peru and Bolivia signed the treaty of alliance. The preamble of the treaty stated that Bolivia and Peru mutually guaranteed certain rights, thus formulating a treaty that they called one of defensive alliance. Specifically, the treaty guaranteed independence, sovereignty and the integrity of their territories, obliging them by the terms of the treaty to defend each other against all foreign aggression. An additional clause kept the treaty secret among the allies. Chile viewed the alliance as a menace. Argentina had begun talks with Peru and Bolivia to join the alliance, and the Chamber of Deputies, in a secret session, approved the law, but the Argentine Senate postponed the matter to 1874. Chile was not directly mentioned in the text of the treaty, and was not informed about its existence.

In 1874 a second Boundary Treaty between Chile and Bolivia superseded the first, granting Bolivia the authority to collect full tax revenue between the 23rd and 24th parallels, fixing the tax rates on Chilean companies for 25 years, and calling for Bolivia to open up. Most of the exploitation of the coastal region of Atacama was to be conducted by Chilean companies and British interests.

On 26 December, 1874, the new (and incomplete) ironclad Cochrane arrived in Valparaiso; it remained in Chile until the completion of the Blanco Encalada, reversing the balance of power in the south Pacific ocean. After that, Peru tried to pospone the Argentine signing of the Alliance Treaty.

Crisis

Taxation on Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company

On November 27 of 1873, the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company signed a contract with the Bolivian government in which it would have authorized the extraction of saltpeter duty-free for 15 years. In 1878, The Bolivian Congress and a National Constituent Assembly found the contract incomplete due to that it had not been ratified by congress as required by the Bolivian Constitution of 1871. Subsequently, the Bolivian congress suggested that it would approve the contract only if the company would pay a 10 cents tax per quintal of mineral extracted. The company complained the increased payments were illegal, and after mounting significant pressure demanded that the Chilean government intervene in the problem. In response, Chile claimed that the border treaty of 1874 did not allow for such a tax hike.

When the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company refused to pay the tax, the Bolivian government under President Hilarion Daza threatened to confiscate its property. In December 1878, Chile answered by sending a warship to the area. Nonetheless, with the company failing to pay the tax, on February 14, 1879, Bolivia announced the seizure and auction of the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company. In turn, Chile threatened that such action would render the border treaty null and void. On February 14, the day of the auction of the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company, 500 Chilean soldiers arrived by ship and occupied the Bolivian port city of Antofagasta, whose population was 93%-95% Chilean, without a fight. According to Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre, not only did the Chilean troops occupy the city without any major resistance, but they also received widespread public support and encouragement..

Discovery of secret defensive alliance

On February 18, while in Antofagasta, Chilean colonel Emilio Sotomayor intercepted a letter from Hilarión Daza directed to Bolivian prefect-colonel Severino Zapata. According to Chilean historian Gonzalo Bulnes, in said letter Daza mentioned his worry that Chile might intervene in Bolivia's nationalization of British saltpeter companies in the region, and made mention of a secret treaty that they would, if necessary, demand Peru to honor in case Chile declared war.

After the Chilean invasion of Antofagasta, Hilarión Daza made a presidential decree on March 1, 1879, which demanded the expulsion of Chileans, the nationalizing of Chilean private property and prohibited trade and comunications with Chile "as long as the war lasts". Due to its aggressiveness the Chilean government understood the decree as a declaration of war. However, although both nations had already taken aggressive actions, in reality no war had yet been formally declared from either side of the conflict. Bolivia then requested that Peru activate the secret defensive treaty of 1873 as they felt that the Chilean invasion of Antofagasta constituted as a reason for the defensive alliance to come into effect.

Peruvian mediation and the Battle of Topáter

Peru attempted to peacefully mediate the conflict by sending Jose Antonio Lavalle, a senior diplomat, to negotiate with the Chilean government in order to request for Chile to return Antofagasta to Bolivian authorities. Nonetheless, it has been argued that Peru’s mediation was not Bona fide and caused suspicion in the Chilean government for the following reasons; (1)The denial on the part of the mediating minister of the existence of the secret treaty of which Chile had lately become aware; (2) Previous Peruvian demands compatible only with the pretensions of Bolivia; (3) Hurried war preparations of Peru, meanwhile showing a desire to gain time.

On March 14 the Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Alejandro Fierro sent a telegram to the Chilean representative in Lima, Joaquin Godoy, requesting immediate neutrality from the Peruvian government.

On March 17, Godoy held a meeting with Peruvian President Mariano Ignacio Prado, and Godoy formally requested neutrality from the Peruvian Government, The next day, March 18, Prado told Godoy that there existed a defensive treaty allying Peru with Bolivia.

The Battle of Topater, which took place on 23 March, 1879 is considered the first battle of the war. On their way to occupy Calama, north of 23th parallel, 554 Chilean troops and cavalry were opposed by 135 Bolivian soldiers and civilian residents led by Dr. Ladislao Cabrera, dug in at two destroyed bridges; calls to surrender were rejected before and during the battle. Outnumbered and low on ammunition, most of the Bolivian force withdrew, except for a small group of civilians led by Colonel Eduardo Abaroa, who fought to the end. Further land battles would not take place until the war at sea was resolved.

Chilean declaration of war and casus foederis of the alliance

On March 24, Peru responded to Chile and Bolivia by proposing consideration in the Peruvian Congress of April 24 of both the Chilean request for neutrality and the Bolivian request of alliance.. On March 31, Peru's Jose Antonio Lavalle proceeded to read the whole treaty to Chile's Fierro and told him that it was not offensive to Chile.

Acknowledging awareness of the Bolivia-Peru alliance, Chile responded by breaking diplomatic ties and formally declaring war on both countries on April 5, 1879. On April 6, Peru declared casus foederis of the defensive alliance treaty, stating that it had officially come into effect. The War of the Pacific thus officially began.

Role of Argentina

In 1873 and 1879, Argentina had began talks with Perú and Bolivia in order to join the alliance, since it had a territorial dispute with Chile regarding the region of Patagonia, On September 24, 1873, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies had approved the (secret) law, but the Argentine Senate postponed the matter to 1874.

According to Peruvian accounts, prior to the Chilean declaration of war, the Argentine President asked to Peruvian minister in Buenos Aires if Peru could be prepared to render assistance to Argentina in the event of a diplomatic break with Chile. At the time, the Peruvian minister had not received instructions of any kind. According to Argentine sources, prior to the Argentine declaration of neutrality, Peruvians offered to Argentina an access to the Pacific Ocean through the Bolivian territories in order to join the conflict against the Chilean government. However, the offer was so vague in its formulation, that the Argentine foreign minister and the representative in Bolivia thought it did not deserve consideration.

On May 20, 1879 the Argentine Foreign Minister Montes de Oca declared the neutrality of Argentina. However, despite its neutrality in the Pacific war, the Argentine authorities did not fail to play an important role in the delicate balance of forces in the Southern Cone, and particularly relevant in relation to the "minor" nations in terms of power in the sub-region. When war broke out Argentina sent a naval squadron to Rio Negro menacing Chilean dominion over the Straits of Magellan. Thus, the Argentine Foreign Ministry launched a series of diplomatic actions aimed at preventing that Chile could gain big profits, especially land, at the expense of the defeated countries, Peru and Bolivia.

On the basis of that attitude Argentina was under the fear that after the victory over Peru and Bolivia, Chile could seek to expand on Argentine territory. The prevailing perception among men in the Argentine government during the 1870s and 1880s, for their inferior status of military forces in comparison with those of Chile helped to exacerbate the fear. John Crow, in his book The Epic of Latin America, argues that the Chilean naval superiority was the main factor preventing Argentina from taking part in the war.

The War

Naval campaign

Given the few roads and railroad lines, the nearly waterless and largely unpopulated Atacama desert was a rough terrain to conquer and maintain occupied for long. From the beginning of the war it became clear that, in order to achieve control of the local nitrate industry in a difficult desert terrain, control of the sea would prove to be the deciding factor of the war. Since Bolivia did not count with any military vessels, the naval conflict was left to be resolved between the Armada de Chile and the Marina de Guerra del Perú.

The power of the Chilean navy was based on the twin armored frigates, Cochrane and Blanco Encalada, of 3,560 tons, equipped with 6 guns of 250 pounds of muzzle-loading, 2 of 70, 2 of 40 pounds, a shield of 9 inches, and had a maximum capacity speed of 11 miles. The rest of the fleet was formed by the corvettes Chacabuco, O'Higgins, and Esmeralda, the gunboat Magallanes, and the schooner Covadonga.

The Peruvian navy based its power on the armored frigate Independencia and the monitor Huáscar. The Independencia weighed 3,500 tons, had a shield of 4 ½ inches, 2 guns of 150 pounds, 12 of 70, 4 of 32, 4 of 9 pounds, and had a maximum capacity speed of 11 miles. The monitor Huáscar weighed 1,745 tons, had a shield of 4 ½ inches, 2 muzzle-loading guns of 300 pounds located in the revolving turret, and had a maximum capacity speed of 11 miles. Consequently, the Huáscar was possibly the most modern military vessel of the Peruvian navy. The rest of the fleet was completed by the corvette Unión, the gunboat Pilcomayo, and the fluvial monitors Atahualpa and Manco Cápac.

In one of the first naval tactical moves of the war, the Peruvian port of Iquique was blocked by of the Chilean Navy. In the Battle of Iquique, which took place on May 21 of 1879, the monitor Huáscar, under the command of captain Miguel Grau Seminario, manages to sink the Chilean corvette Esmeralda, which was under the control of commander Arturo Prat Chacón, who, upon dying during the combat, became the Chile's greatest naval hero. At around the same time, the Peruvian frigate Independencia, led by captain Juan Guillermo More, chases the Chilean schooner Covadonga, whose leader lieutenant commander Carlos Condell takes it through shallow coastal zones which eventually caused the heavier Independencia to crash at Punta Gruesa. The naval battles of Iquique and Punta Gruesa gave a tactical victory to Peru: the blockade of the port of Iquique was lifted and the Chilean ships were sunk or retreated. Nevertheless, the victory had a high strategic cost; during the combat of Punta Gruesa, the Peruvian navy registers the loss of an armored frigate of 3,500 tons when it unfruitfully tried to capture a wooden ship of 630 tons. The loss of the armored frigate Independencia, one of most important ships of the Peruvian navy, represents an irreparable blow for Peru.

Although in a condition of numerical inferiority, Miguel Grau, the commander of the Huáscar, managed to hold-off all of the Chilean navy for six months. Among the most outstanding actions of these "Excursions of the Huáscar" are the Battle of Antofagasta (May 26, 1879) and the Second Battle Antofagasta (August 28, 1879). The culminating point was the capture of the steamship Rímac, on July 23, 1879. Not only does Grau capture the ship, but also captures the cavalry regiment Carabineros de Yungay which was on board. This causes a crisis in the Chilean government which brings about the resignation of admiral Juan Williams Rebolledo. After the resignation of Williams, the command of the Chilean fleet was handed to commodore Galvarino Riveros Cárdenas, who is decided on catching the Huáscar.

The decisive battle of the sea campaign took place in Punta Angamos, on October 8, 1879. In this battle, the monitor Huáscar is finally captured by the Chilean navy, despite the attempts of its crew to sink the ship. Miguel Grau Seminario dies during the combat, but he becomes a national hero in Peru. The Battle of Angamos marks the end of the naval campaign of the War of the Pacific. However, the Peruvian navy would go on to achieve victories at the Naval Battle of Arica (February 27, 1880) and the Second Naval Battle of Arica (March 17, 1880), before finally being completely defeated during the Blockade of Callao, where the Peruvian fleet was set on fire and the coastal defenses of Callao were destroyed or taken to Chile.

Land campaign and invasion

 In progress

Once the naval superiority was achieved, the troops of the Chilean army initiated a series of military maneuvers in the Peruvian provinces of Tarapacá, Tacna, and Arica. The battles of Pisagua, Tacna, and Arica, were Chilean victories in the year 1880. Although the Battle of Tarapacá was an allied victory, it did not change the course of the events in favor of the allies because Bolivia retired from war after the Battle of Tacna, and Peru was left alone to face against Chile.

The Peruvian capital, Lima, at that point an aristocratic city, lived disconnected from the rest of Peru and completely underestimated the war situation. This contributed to a destabilization of its political class and prevented an effective defensive preparation against the Chilean landing just south of the city. On January of 1881, after the battles of San Juan and Chorrilos and Miraflores, the Chilean troops entered Lima. In the Battle of Miraflores, the civilian population unsuccessfully defended the city when the Chilean army attacked three of the twelve redoubts. After the battle there were fires and sackings by demoralized Peruvian soldiers in the towns of Chorrillos and Barranco.

The Chilean forces established their authority over the city and imposed military coupons upon the Limean population. Order was imposed into the city, in the zones of occupation, and the activities reestablished. Nevertheless, while the occupation in Lima lasted, Chilean troops systematically pillaged Peruvian public buildings, turned the old University of San Marcos into a barracks, raided medical schools and other institutions of education, and stole a series of monuments and artwork that had adorned the city. As war booty, Chile confiscated the contents of the National Library of Peru in Lima and transported thousands of books (including many centuries-old original Spanish, Peruvian, and Colonial volumes) to Santiago de Chile, along with much capital stock.

The Peruvian dictator Nicolás de Piérola retreated from the capital in order to try to continue governing from the rear area, that was replaced by a civil government in charge of Francisco García Calderón, who refused to sign a treaty that relenquished Peruvian control over Tarapacá.

Without the possibility of signing a peace treaty, the commander of the Chilean occupation, Vice-admiral Patricio Lynch, set down his military headquarters in the Government Palace of Peru in Lima. Lynch controlled the battle against the Peruvian resistance in the mountain range, which would come to be known as the Campaign of the Breña or Sierra, facing abundant acts of rebellion in Lima and, later, a clearly organized Peruvian resistance.

After the confrontations in San Juan and Miraflores, then Peruvian Colonel Andrés Avelino Cáceres and others as captain Jose Miguel Perez decided to arrive at Central the $andes to organize and to reinitiate the resistance to the Chilean occupation army; for it, the 15 of April of 1881, embarked in the train of the station of Viterbo (evading vigilacia of the Chilean soldiers), with final destiny the city of Jauja. Thus, and to a great extent helped by its deep knowledge of the language quechua, Cáceres organized the defense between the civil populace of the Central Mountain range and Colonel Gregorio Albarracín in the South Mountain range; who executed an effective war of guerillas during three years. They chose the scrub of Central the $andes, because it presented/displayed an excellent topography to apply the strategy military of guerillas; also, because new human elements existed, although without training and with little armament for a prolonged fight.

The military resistance led by Cáceres in Andean the South regions and center gained several victories against the Chilean aggressor forceses until it suffered a decisive defeat in Huamachuco the 10 of 1883 July, in the region of the North mountain range and that abrió to the way for the culmination of the war by the encumbramiento of Peruvian General Miguel Churches, that approached positions with the Chilean military administration to be elevated like new president. Finally, in spite of the resistance of Cáceres and Montero, it signs a treaty of peace with Chile that involved territorial cession, and so aim to the fight would be put.

After the war, the differences between Cáceres and Churches gave rise of a civil war between those in favor of both leaders, who finalized in 1885 with the triumph of first.

Characteristics of the War

Strategic control of the sea

The theatre of war between 1879 and 1881 was a large expanse of desert, sparsely populated and far removed from major cities or resources; it is, however, close to the Pacific Ocean. It was clear from the beginning that control of the sea would be the key to an inevitably difficult desert war: supply by sea, including water, food, ammunition, horses, fodder and reinforcements, was quicker and easier than marching supplies through the desert or across the Bolivian high plateau.

While the Chilean Navy started an economic and military blockade of the Allies' ports, Peru took the initiative and utilized its smaller but effective navy as a raiding force. Chile was forced to delay the ground invasion for six months, and to shift its fleet from blockading to hunting Huascar until she was captured.

With the advantage of naval supremacy, Chilean ground strategy focused on mobility: landing ground forces in enemy territory in order to raid Allied ground assets; landing in strength to split and drive out defenders and leaving garrisons to guard territory as the war moved north. Peru and Bolivia fought a defensive war: maneuvering along long overland distances; relying where possible on land or coastal fortifications with gun batteries and minefields; coastal railways were available to Peru, and telegraph lines provided a direct line to the government in Lima. When retreating, Allied forces made sure that little if any assets remained to be used by the enemy.

Sea mobile forces proved to be, in the end, an advantage for desert warfare on a long coastline. Defenders found themselves hundreds of kilometers away from home; invading forces were usually a few kilometers away from the sea.

Occupation, resistance and attrition

The occupation of Peru between 1881 and 1884 was a different story altogether. The war theatre was the Peruvian Sierra, where Peruvian resistance had easy access to population, resource and supply centres further from the sea; it could carry out a war of attrition indefinitely. The Chilean army (now turned into an occupation force) was split into small garrisons across the theatre and could devote only part of its strength to hunting down rebels without a central authority.

After a costly occupation and prolonged anti-insurgency campaign, Chile sought to achieve a political exit strategy. Rifts within Peruvian society provided such an opportunity after the Battle of Huamachuco, and resulted in the peace treaty that ended the occupation.

Participation of Chinese immigrants

According to "Chinese Migration into Latin America – Diaspora or Sojourns in Peru?" some Chinese supported the Chilean army against their plantation owners.

Technology

The war saw the use by both sides of new, or recently introduced, late 19th century military technology such as breech-loading rifles & cannons, remote-controlled land mines, armor-piercing shells, naval torpedoes, torpedo boats, and purpose-built landing craft.

The second-generation of ironclads (i.e. designed after the Battle of Hampton Roads) were employed in battle for the first time. That was significant for a conflict where a major power was not directly involved, and it drew the attention of British, French, and U.S. observers of the war.

During the war, Peru developed the Toro Submarino ("Submarine Bull"). Though completely operational, she never saw action, and she was scuttled at the end of the war to prevent her capture by Chilean forces.

The U.S.S. Wachusett with Alfred Thayer Mahan in command, was stationed at Callao, Peru, protecting American interests during the final stages of the War of the Pacific. He formulated his concept of sea power while reading a history book in an English gentleman’s club in Lima, Peru. This concept became the foundation for his celebrated The Influence of Sea Power upon History.

World perspectives

Brazil

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France

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Great Britain

In the book Influencia británica en el salitre, Chilean historian Alejandro Soto proposes the idea that although throughout the war Great Britain presented itself as a neutral viewer of the matter, in reality Great Britain had great influence and domination over Chilean saltpeter, nitrate, and iodine companies in the region. At first, the British positioned its saltpeter production in the zone as a small commercial venture, but soon the investments began to serve as a guarantee for the payment of Chile's external debt, in which large amounts of British capital were stocked. Between 1860 and 1870, Great Britain financed a loan of £1,000 pounds. British saltpeter production in the region increased from 13.5% on 1879 to 55% by 1901. In order to protect its interests, Great Britain had to act in Chilean internal and external matters, which greatly destabalized the country at various points throughout its history.

During the War of the Pacific, Chile was backed morally and financially by the British Empire. During the Chilean invasion of the Atacama desert, British businessman John Thomas North provided support for the Chilean army during its occupation of Antofagasta and Iquique. North, taking advantage of the chaos caused by the war, was able acquire the Peruvian certificates of the saltpeter companies that operated within its territories, and was later given by the Chilean government a monopoly of the saltpeter production in the region, which North later used to finance investments in Europe and Egypt.

In the early years of the war (1879-1881), Chile acquired a series of ships from the British shipyard company Yarrow Poplar. Also, Chilean soldiers were said to be equipped with English uniforms and rifles. Throughout the conflict, Britain had seven battleships stationed at the front of Peruvian and Chilean coasts, which were a menace for Peru.

However, while Peru was attempting to buy armament for the war, Britain sent a series of diplomatic missions across Europe in order to prevent Peruvians from acquiring weaponry. In the Ottoman Empire, Peru sought to acquire the battleship Fehlz-Bolend by using a Greek banker as an intermediary, but a British sailor working for the Turkish government warned the Chilean delegation in London of the event, which resulted in the cancellation of the buy. Britain also thwarted Peru's acquisition of German warships Sócrates and Diógenes, both which were stopped at the English port of Southampton after Chilean agents warned the British government of the Peruvian acquisitions of the ships.

During a speech made to the Comission of Foreign Relations assembled in the United States congress, secretary of state James G. Blaine stated: "It is a complete mistake to see this as a Chilean war against Peru. it is a British war against Peru using Chile as its instrument." The allegations were never proven, but it resulted in the United States favoring a foreign policy that backed Peru.

United States

The United States tried to bring an early end to the war, mainly because of American financial interests in Peru, but also because the nation worried that Great Britain would take economic control of the region through Chile. Nonetheless, the American Pacific Squadron, containing only a few obsolete wooden vessels, was not taken seriously by the Chileans who owned two new, state-of-the-art, British-built armored warships. Chile instead asked that the United States remain neutral, and the United States, unable to match Chilean naval power, backed down. Under the belief that Great Britain was supplying Chile with money, materials, and weapons in an attempt to take commercial control of the region, United States Secretary of State James G. Blaine (who had taken office on March of 1881) sent a diplomatic team that would resolve the conflict and leave Peru's territorial control over its regions in the Atacama desert intact.

Blaine had been warned about the rise of Britain's power in this region by the previous U.S. minister to Peru, Isaac Christiancy. Nonetheless, after a series of accusations, James G. Blaine was denounced at home as a bellicose meddler and corrupt practitioner of “guano diplomacy”, who sought to make a financial killing by supporting the specious claims of unscrupulous entrepreneurs and hustler to guano deposits in Peru. Charges for which he was later invistegated.

Peace negotiations failed when a stipulation required Chile to return the conquered lands. Chileans, suspected the new American initiative was tainted with a pro-Peruvian bias. As a result, relations between Chile and the United States turned for the worse. Ironically, in 1866 a younger Blaine working as a representative in the United States House of Representatives had publicly denounced Spain's attack on Valparaiso, Chile.

After the assassination of United States president James A. Garfield, vice-president Chester A. Arthur took over the presidency and replaced James G. Blaine with Frederick T. Frelinghuysen. The new secretary of state also attempted to find a solution to the ongoing war between Chile and Peru, but claimed that the United States would not proceed to intervene in the matter unless a European power became involved in the conflict. Moreover, Frelinghuysen warned Peru that the United States would not support Peruvian resistance against Chilean demands. Nonetheless, after the occupation of Lima, Peruvian resistance continued for three more years, with encouragement from the United States. During the presidency of Benjamin Harrison, James G. Blaine would return to the office of secretary of state only to face more problems with Chile after the massacre of several American sailors in the Chilean port of Valparaiso.

Aftermath

Peace terms

Under the terms of the Treaty of Ancon, Chile was to occupy the provinces of Tacna and Arica for 10 years, after which a plebiscite was to be held to determine nationality. The two countries failed for decades to agree on the terms of the plebiscite. Finally in 1929, through the mediation of the United States under President Herbert Hoover, an accord was reached by which Chile kept Arica. Peru reacquired Tacna and received some concessions in Arica.

In 1884, Bolivia signed a truce that gave control to Chile of the entire Bolivian coast, the province of Antofagasta, and its valuable nitrate, copper, and other mineral deposits, and a further treaty in 1904 made this arrangement permanent. In return, Chile agreed to build a railroad connecting the capital city of La Paz, Bolivia with the port of Arica, and Chile guaranteed freedom of transit for Bolivian commerce through Chilean ports and territory.

Bolivia has also negotiated treaties of commercial access to the oceans via Brazil, Argentina, etc.

Socioeconomic and territorial consequences

The War of the Pacific left traumatic scars on all societies involved in the conflict.

Bolivia

For Bolivians, the loss of the territory which they refer to as the Litoral (the coast) remains a deeply emotional issue and a practical one, as was particularly evident during the internal natural gas riots of 2003. Popular belief attributes much of the country's problems to its landlocked condition; accordingly, recovering the seacoast is seen as the solution to most of these difficulties. However, the real issue is the fear of being dependent on Chile or Peru. In 1932, this was a contributing factor in the failed Chaco War with Paraguay, over territory controlling access to the Atlantic Ocean through the Paraguay River. In recent decades, all Bolivian Presidents have made it their policy to pressure Chile for sovereign access to the sea. Diplomatic relations with Chile have been severed since 17 March 1978, in spite of considerable commercial ties. Currently, the leading Bolivian newspaper "El Diario" still features at least a weekly editorial on the subject, and the Bolivian people annually celebrate a patriotic "Dia del Mar" (Day of the Sea) to remember the crippling loss.

Chile

Economically, Chile fared better, gaining a lucrative territory with major sources of income, including nitrates, saltpeter and copper. The national treasury grew by 900% between 1879 and 1902 due to taxes coming from the newly acquired Bolivian and Peruvian lands. Victory was, however, a mixed blessing. British involvement and control of the nitrate industry rose significantly after the war, leading them to meddle in Chilean politics and ultimately to back an overthrow of Chilean President José Manuel Balmaceda in 1891. High nitrate profits lasted for only a few decades and fell sharply once synthetic nitrates were developed during World War I. This led to a massive economic breakdown (known as the nitrate crisis), since many industrial factories around the country had closed in the early 1880s to free up labor for the then rising and now dead extraction business, dramatically slowing the country's industrial development. When the saltpeter mines closed or proved no longer profitable, the British companies left the country, leaving a large number of unemployment behind. Currently, the former Bolivian region is still the world's richest source of copper and its ports move trade between nearby countries and the Pacific Ocean; the former Peruvian region faces more problematic issues since no new sources of richness have been discovered since the Nitrate Crisis

Socially, Chile became an increasingly racist nation who thought of itself, in the words of Chilean historian Diego Barros Arana, as "the British of South America," while viewing its northern neighbors (Bolivia and Peru) as people of inferior races. By the end of the 20th century, Chilean society still showed signs of deep racial tensions with its northern neighbors, with members of the ruling class spreading messages of racial hate, and parts of the country showing signs of xenophobia against immigrants.

Territorialy, during the war Chile waived most of its claim over the Patagonia in the Boundary treaty of 1881 between Chile and Argentina, in order to ensure Argentina's neutrality; Chilean popular belief sees this as a territorial loss of almost half a million square miles. After the war, the Puna de Atacama dispute grew until it was solved in 1899, since both Chile and Argentina claimed former Bolivian territories. On 28 August 1929, Chile returned the province of Tacna to Peru. In 1999, Chile and Peru at last agreed to complete the implementation of the last parts of the Treaty of Lima, providing Peru with a port in Arica.

Peru

According to Bruce W. Farcau in his book The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884; "in Peru, the wounds run less deep, than in neighboring Bolivia. The defeat was certainly humiliating, and Peru also lost a substantial chunk of potentially valuable real estate, but it was nothing so traumatic as being converted overnight into a landlocked nation"

On the other hand, George J. Mills argues that after Peru's defeat, Peruvian resentment, born of the loss of her nitrate territories, is still smoldering , to this day. It has also been argued that the behavior of local politicians and their honest desire to maintain neighborly relations is questionable. According to a report from the University for peace, an independent subsidiary of the United Nations; "The unaccounted variable in this equation is the consolidating predisposition of Peruvians to quickly direct themselves against Chile should problems arise". The same report also claims that "instead of fomenting a political culture that questions and checks its government, Peru is diverting for a fundamentalist nationalism incapable of seeing beyond the hatred".

Peruvians also developed a cult for the heroic defenders of the patria (nation, literally fatherland), such as Admiral Miguel Grau Seminario, Colonel Francisco Bolognesi, Colonel Alfonso Ugarte, who were killed in the war, and General Andres Avelino Caceres who went on to become a leading political figure and symbol of resistance to the occupying Chilean Army. Peruvian heroes of the war are buried in the "Cripta de los Heroes" in Presbitero Maestro cemetery in Lima, Peru. This mausoleum is the largest in the cemetery, and its entrance reads "La Nacion a sus Defensores" (From the nation, to its defenders). The defeat engendered a deep revenge desire among the ruling classes, which also led to a skewed view of the role of the armed forces; this attitude dominated society throughout the 20th century. War honors are also held for Vice Admiral Abel-Nicolas Bergasse Dupetit Thouars, a French commander, who after the Battle of Miraflores prevented the destruction and looting of Lima by threatening to engage and destroy the Chilean Navy with a French naval force under his command.

Prominent military commanders

Bolivia

• Mr. Eduardo Abaroa /-, an engineer, was killed leading a group of civilian defenders at the Battle of Topater
• Dr. Ladislao Cabrera, organizing the defense of Calama
• General Narciso Campero, military President of Bolivia (1880-1884)
• General Hilarion Daza, military President of Bolivia (1876-1879)

Chile

• General Manuel Baquedano Gonzalez, commander in chief of the Chilean Army
• Captain Ignacio Carrera Pinto /-, killed with the entire garrison at the Battle of Concepcion, Peru
• Colonel Pedro Lagos Marchant, captured the Morro de Arica (Arica Cape)
• Rear Admiral Patricio Lynch y Solo de Zaldivar, military Governor of occupied Peru
• Captain Arturo Prat Chacon /-, was killed on the Huascar at the Naval Battle of Iquique. He jumped from "La Esmeralda" and landed in the "Huascar". He died with a bullet wound in his head.

Peru

• Colonel Francisco Bolognesi /-, was killed while leading the defense of the Arica garrison
• General Andres Caceres, led the guerilla war during the occupation of Peru, was elected President of Peru after the war
• Rear Admiral Miguel Grau /-, commander of Huascar and widely known as the gentleman of the seas, was killed at the Naval Battle of Angamos
• Colonel Leoncio Prado /-, the son of former President Mariano Ignacio Prado, chose duty as a soldier over an oath not to fight, was captured and executed by a Chilean firing squad after the Battle of Huamachuco
• Colonel Alfonso Ugarte /-, Bolognesi's top lieutenant, a rich saltpeter entrepreneur and former mayor of Iquique, was killed during the Battle of Arica, believed to have jumped off a cliff on his horse to save the flag from capture.

Foreigners

• Rear Admiral Abel Bergasse Dupetit-Thouars, French commander, after the Battle of Miraflores, he prevented the destruction and looting of Lima by threatening to engage and destroy the Chilean Navy with a French naval force under his command.
• Colonel Robert Souper Howard /-, a British soldier who served in the Chilean Army in nearly every battlefield of the war, was killed at the Battle of San Juan.
• Lt. Colonel Roque Saenz Pena, an Argentine lawyer who served as an officer in the Peruvian Army during the battles of Tarapaca and Arica, was later elected President of Argentina.

Bibliography

• Gonzalo Bulnes(1851-1936), "Chile and Peru : the causes of the war of 1879", Publisher Imprenta Universitaria, Santiago de Chile, in english Language (Download here)
• Diego Barros Arana Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879-1880), Publisher: "librería central de servat i c", Esquina de Huerfanos i Ahumada, Santiago, Chile, 1881 , 2 Vols. (Download Vol.1 and Vol.II) in Spanish Language
• Jorge Besadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru, La guerra con Chile" in Spanish Language

See also

• Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1904 between Chile and Bolivia
• Atacama border dispute
• Chincha Islands War
• Chilean-Peruvian Maritime Dispute of 2006--2007
• Chile-Peru relations
• List of wars involving Bolivia
• Puna de Atacama Lawsuit
• War of the Confederation

References

1. 19,000 in San Juan, 4,000 in Lima, 1,000 in El Callao (Pierola letter to Julio Tenaud) 4,000 in Arequipa, Col. Jose de la Torre
2. Aprobando Tratado de Alianza ofensiva y defensiva, celebrado entre las Repúblicas de Perú y Chile
3. http://www.memoriachilena.cl/archivos2/pdfs/MC0000312.pdf Pages 50 and 51
4. ^ Tratado de limites de 1866 entre Bolivia y Chile Template:Es icon
5. See Private note of Riva-Agüero to Novoa, November 20 1872. Godoy papers. Cited in Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile Peru, the causes of the War 1879, page 58 and 59:

   It is desirable that once for all, and as soon as possible, the relations between the two Republics should be defined, because it is necessary to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory to both parties. If Chile dealing with this boundary question seizes the most favourable opportunity to take possession of that coast-line, it is necessary that their plans develop before Chile is in possession of the ironclads under construction, in order that in the definite settlement of this question, the influence, which we are in a position to exert by means of our maritime preponderance may have due weight.

6. (See full english version of the treaty in Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879, Imprenta Universitaria. Santiago de Chile.
7. See Gonzalo Bulnes, "Chile and Peru, The causes of the War of 1879" page 57 and 58:

   The Treaty menaces Chile … Never was Chile in greater peril, nor has a more favourable moment been elected for reducing her to the mere leavings that interested none of the conspirators. The advantage to each of them was clear enough. Bolivia would expand three degrees on the coast; Argentina would take possession of all our eastern terrisories to whatever point she liked; Peru would make Bolivia pay her with the salitre region. The synthesis of the Secret Treaty was this: opportunity: the disarmed condition of Chile; the pretext to produce conflict: Bolivia: the profit of the business: Patagonia and the salitre.

8. See Jorge Basadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru", Tomo V, Editorial Peruamerica S.A., Lima-Peru, 1964, page 2282, "El comienzo de la inferioridad naval peruana y la falta de iniciativa para una guerra preventiva":

   La supremacía conquistada por Chile en el mar ese mismo año de 1874 contribuyó a que el Perú procurase evitar cualquier problema

9. See Jorge Basadre, "Historia de la Republica del Peru", Tomo V, Editorial Peruamerica S.A., Lima-Peru, 1964, page 2286, "El Peru en 1874 y 1878 evita la alianza con Argentina":

   …en agosto, septiembre y octubre de 1875 … el Peru se apresuro a tomar una actitud dilatoria y hasta inhibitoria para la firma del tratado de alianza con aquella republica con el fin de conservar su libertad de accion. La existencia de los blindados chilenos explica acaso la diferencia entre esta actitud y otras anteriores. …

   En 1878 se nego a entregar los elementos navales pedidos por el gobierno argentino y colaboro en la busqueda de una solucion pacifica …

10. Retrospectiva del enclaustramiento maritimo. Una vision critica sobre como se inicio el conflicto. Jorge Gumucio. La Paz, Bolivia
11. Relaciones Chile-Bolivia-Peru: La Guerra del Pacifico. June 2004. Patricio Valdivieso. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
12. Los empresarios, la politica y la Guerra del Pacifico. Luis Ortega. Santiago de Chile. 1984. (Page 18. File Antony Gibbs & Sons AGA. Valparaiso to Londres. Private N 25. March 6, 1878)
13. Template:Es iconhttp://es.wikisource.org/Tratado_de_l%C3%ADmites_de_1874_entre_Bolivia_y_Chile
14. ^ See Diego Barros Arana, "Historia de la Guerra del Pacifico", Vol. I, page 59.
15. See Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru, the Causes of the War of 1879 page 42
16. The Peruvian Historian stated See also Jorge Basadre, here (retrieved on 9 Juli 2009):

    El desembarco se efectuó sin resistencia, con manifestaciones de entusiasmo. La bandera chilena flameó en todos los edificios del puerto.

17. Gonzalo Bulnes. Guerra del Pacífico. De Antofagasta a Tarapacá. 1911.
    Tengo una buena noticia que darle. He fregado a los gringos (se refiere a Mr. Hicks) decretando la reivindicacion de las salitreras i no podran quitarnoslas por mas que se esfuerce el mundo entero. Espero que Chile no intervendra en este asunto... pero si nos declara la guerra podemos contar con el apoyo del Peru a quien exijiremos el cumplimiento del Tratado secreto. Con este objeto voi a mandar a Lima a Reyes 0rtiz. Ya ve Ud. como le doi buenas noticias que Ud. me ha de agradecer eternamente i como le dejo dicho los gringos estan completamente fregados i los chilenos tienen que morder i reclamar nada mas.
18. See Guillermo Lazos Carmona, Historia de las fronteras de Chile ,page 65
19. http://www.archive.org/stream/storiadellaguer00caivgoog/storiadellaguer00caivgoog_djvu.txt
20. http://books.google.com.bo/books?q=Este+hecho%2C++fue+interpretado+por+el+gobierno+chileno%2C+como+declaratoria+de+guerra+y+como+causal+justificativa+parala+de+todo+el+litoral&btnG=Buscar+libros
21. http://www.la-razon.com/versiones/20080220_006188/nota_246_551329.htm
22. http://books.google.com.bo/books?id=WxppsTcZf7oC&q=%22la+expulsi%C3%B3n+de+los+chilenos.+Este+hecho,+h%C3%A1bilmente+fue+interpretado+por+el+gobierno+chileno+como%22&dq=%22la+expulsi%C3%B3n+de+los+chilenos.+Este+hecho,+h%C3%A1bilmente+fue+interpretado+por+el+gobierno+chileno+como%22&pgis=1
23. (See full english version of the treaty in Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879, Imprenta Universitaria. Santiago de Chile.

    "Republics of Bolivia and Peru, desirous of drawing together in a solemn manner the bonds which unite them, thus aujimenting their strength and mutually guaranteeing certain rights, formulate the present treaty of Defensive Alliance; for which object the President of Bolivia has conferred power adequate for such a negotiation to Juan de la Cruz Benavente, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plonipotenciary in Peru, and the President of Peru has conferred like powers to Jose de la Riva-Aguero; who have agreed on the following stipulations:

    Article I. The High Contracting Parties unite and league together mutually to guarantee their independence, their sovereignty and the integrity of their territories respectively, obliging themselves by the terms of the present treaty to defend themselves against all foreign aggression, whether emanating from one or several independent states or from a force without flag and obeying no recognised power.

    Additional Article:

    The present treaty of Defensive Alliance between Bolivia and Peru shall be secret until the two high contracting parties by common accord consider its publication necessary."

24. http://books.google.com/books?id=4LYqAAAAYAAJ&pg=PP5&dq=The+New+York+times+-+Current+History+1922&ei=wchfSpfFBZjKzATf_eSVCw (page 450) The New York times - Current History (1922)
25. Bulnes, Gonzalo. Chile and Peru : the causes of the war of 1879. p. 147. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
26. Bulnes Gonzalo, Guerra del Pacífico, Tomo 1: De Antofagasta a Tarapacá. Page 148
27. ^ "Mientras el señor Lavalle gozaba de relativa tregua, y estudiaba las causas de la poca prisa del Gobierno chileno para continuar las negociaciones, éste, en constante comunicación con nuestro Ministro Godoy, quedaba impuesto el 18 de Marzo, por comunicación del día anterior, 17, de la existencia del pacto secreto, y de una nota clara y terminante de nuestro Ministro al Gobierno de Lima...Por fin, el 31 de Marzo, el señor Lavalle se apersonó al señor Ministro de Relaciones y le dió conocimiento del tratado secreto, que acababa de recibir de Lima, en circunstancia que hacía días, el general Prado le había confesado su existencia a nuestro Ministro Godoy, en una conferencia tenida en Chorrillos."
28. Jorge Basadre, Historia de la Republica del Peru, vol. VI, p. 40.
29. Peruvian Congress March, 24 1879
30. Vicuna Mackena. Campana de Tarapaca. Santriago de Chile
31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2510820?seq=6
32. See http://www.argentina-rree.com/6/6-066.htm "Sarmiento y Tejedor proponen al Congreso la adhesión al tratado secreto peruano-boliviano del 6 de febrero de 1873":

    el 24 de septiembre el presidente Sarmiento firmara el pedido de autorización al Congreso para la adhesión al tratado de alianza peruano-boliviano. El asunto fue aprobado en la Cámara de Diputados por 48 a 18 votos…

    El tratamiento del tema en el Senado sufrió sucesivos aplazamientos hasta finalmente quedar para las sesiones ordinarias del año siguiente

33. See La actitud de la Argentina. Jorge Basadre:

    el 26 me pidió una conferencia S. E. el Presidente y habiendo tenido lugar comprendí que su objeto había sido conocer la actitud que adoptaríamos en la cuestión que se ventilaba entre Chile y Bolivia y quizás aun si estaríamos dispuestos al fin a prestar auxilio a la Argentina en caso de un rompimiento con Chile. En esa conferencia me dijo que tenía noticia de que la mediación del Perú no sería admitida. Como ya no había recibido instrucciones de ninguna clase, bien a mi pesar tuve que eludir la respuesta que él esperaba, perdiendo de nuevo la oportunidad que se me presentaba para conseguir la alianza, sin solicitarla, lo que a mi juicio habría sido muy fácil entonces..."

    (Translation:

    On 26 asked me a conference the President and having been understood that its purpose had been to know the attitude taken in the matter was ventilated between Chile and Bolivia, and perhaps even be prepared to render assistance to Argentina in the event of a break with Chile. At that conference told me that he had news that the mediation of Peru would not be admitted. As I had not received instructions of any kind, I had to evade the answer he expected, again losing the opportunity that I had to get the alliance, without asking

34. See La misión Balmaceda: asegurar la neutralidad argentina en la guerra del Pacífico:

    … había instruido inicialmente a su ministro en Buenos Aires, Aníbal Víctor de la Torre, a ofrecer a la Argentina los territorios bolivianos situados entre los 24º y 27º de latitud en la costa oeste, a cambio del ingreso argentino en el conflicto contra el gobierno de Chile...Además, el canciller Montes de Oca creyó que el plan era "tan vago en la formulación que del mismo se hacía en la correspondencia de Uriburu que no merecía consideración"

    (Translation:

    … had given instructions to his minister in Buenos Aires, Aníbal Víctor de la Torre, to offer to Argentina the Bolivian territories located between the 24°S and 27°S of the west coasts, in exchange of Argentine participation in the conflict against the government Chile...In addition, Foreign Minister Montes de Oca believed the plan was "so vague in the formulation, that did not deserve consideration according to Uriburu correspondence"

35. See http://www.argentina-rree.com/6/6-081.htm "La misión Balmaceda: asegurar la neutralidad argentina en la guerra del Pacífico":

    Paradójicamente, una semana después, el ministro de relaciones exteriores Montes de Oca proclamó oficialmente la neutralidad argentina…

36. ^ http://www.argentina-rree.com/7/7-060.htm. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)
37. The role of Jose Balmaceda in preserving Argentine neutrality
38. Crow, John. The Epic of Latin America. pp. 182–183. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
39. See Charles de Varigny, "La Guerra del Pacifico", Imprenta Cervantes, Moneda 1170, Santiago de Chile, 1922, page XVIII:

    rendía incondicionalmente. La soldadesca desmoralizada y no desarmada saqueaba la ciudad en la noche del 16, el incendio la alumbraba siniestramente y el espanto reinaba en toda ella.

40. Hugh Chisholm. "Encyclopedia Brittanica: Lima". Google Books. Retrieved 2008-12-04.
41. Dan Collyns. "Chile returns looted Peru books". BBC. Retrieved 2007-11-10.
42. http://www.history.appstate.edu/ConferencePapers/dorotheamartinpaper.pdf
43. See "The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan" by Richard W. Turk; Greenwood Press, 1987. 183 pgs. page 10
44. See Larrie D. Ferreiro 'Mahan and the "English Club” of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of The Influence of Sea Power upon History', The Journal of Military History - Volume 72, Number 3, July 2008, pp. 901-906
45. http://www.memoriachilena.cl/archivos2/pdfs/MC0000312.pdf Page 609, 651
46. http://www.memoriachilena.cl/archivos2/pdfs/MC0000312.pdf Page 609-610, 658
47. http://www.elcorreo.eu.org/esp/article.php3?id_article=3426
48. http://www.memoriachilena.cl/archivos2/pdfs/MC0000312.pdf Page 37
49. http://www.memoriachilena.cl/archivos2/pdfs/MC0000312.pdf Page 656-658
50. http://books.google.com/books?id=QzUPAAAAYAAJ&sitesec=reviews&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 139
51. http://www.hemisphericinstitute.org/eng/publications/emisferica/5.2/52_images/pdf/beckman_print.pdf
52. http://www.granvalparaiso.cl/v2/2009/03/21/los-ingleses-de-america/
53. http://www.elcorreo.eu.org/esp/article.php3?id_article=3426
54. http://www.la-razon.com/versiones/20090323_006675/nota_244_782485.htm
55. http://books.google.com/books?id=KYQTAQAAIAAJ&dq=Yarrow+Poplar+Guerra+del+Pacifico&q=Yarrow+Poplar Page 52
56. http://books.google.com/books?id=FkGaAAAAIAAJ&dq=Yarrow+Poplar+Guerra+del+Pacifico&q=Yarrow+Poplar Page 154
57. http://books.google.com/books?id=5v4SAQAAIAAJ&sitesec=buy&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 91
58. http://books.google.com/books?id=rsgXAAAAYAAJ&dq=los+uniformes+chilenos+eran+de+tela+inglesa&q=tela+inglesa Page 57
59. http://books.google.com/books?id=AYoTAQAAIAAJ&sitesec=reviews&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 217
60. http://books.google.com/books?id=wbgKAQAAIAAJ&sitesec=reviews&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 68
61. http://books.google.com/books?id=wbgKAQAAIAAJ&sitesec=reviews&source=gbs_navlinks_s Page 68
62. http://books.google.com/books?id=bXIKAQAAIAAJ&dq=Per%C3%BA+%E2%80%9CS%C3%B3crates%E2%80%9D+y+el+%E2%80%9CDi%C3%B3genes%E2%80%9D+Southampton&q=Southampton Pages 193, 318, and 691
63. page 65
64. http://books.google.com/books?id=Yo4Rruf-5ggC&pg=PA70&lpg=PA70&dq=James+G.+Blaine,+Chile+War+of+the+Pacific&source=bl&ots=HooVYbT1qW&sig=VUJiHwb-3IU5lOGbpD61d68RRVQ&hl=en&ei=gythSuq-KeTcmQe-xfinDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
65. http://books.google.com/books?id=y-7zk_kK9dgC&pg=PA65&lpg=PA65&dq=James+G.+Blaine+Chile+England&source=bl&ots=1FAl8dgfGu&sig=oJk3NsGVWssa1sRqB9oeynDWC8Y&hl=en&ei=Rs5kSui-FYSksgO0-IRn&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
66. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/war-of-the-pacific.htm
67. http://books.google.com/books?id=y-7zk_kK9dgC&pg=PA65&lpg=PA65&dq=James+G.+Blaine+Chile+England&source=bl&ots=1FAl8dgfGu&sig=oJk3NsGVWssa1sRqB9oeynDWC8Y&hl=en&ei=Rs5kSui-FYSksgO0-IRn&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
68. Page 71
69. page 70
70. http://books.google.com/books?id=Yo4Rruf-5ggC&pg=PA70&lpg=PA70&dq=James+G.+Blaine,+Chile+War+of+the+Pacific&source=bl&ots=HooVYbT1qW&sig=VUJiHwb-3IU5lOGbpD61d68RRVQ&hl=en&ei=gythSuq-KeTcmQe-xfinDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1
71. http://www.h-mexico.unam.mx/cgi-bin/resenias/ver_texto.cgi?id=5
72. Peruvian resistance continued for three more years, with U.S. encouragement.
73. Sater, William (Aug., 1987), Chile and the war of the pacific, Duke University Press {{citation}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)....characteristically clumsy US diplomatic and naval intervention on Peru's side...
74. http://www.h-mexico.unam.mx/cgi-bin/resenias/ver_texto.cgi?id=5
75. El dia del mar se recordara con mas que un tradicional desfile civico
76. Crow, The Epic of Latin America, p. 180
77. Foster, John B. & Clark, Brett. (2003). "Ecological Imperialism: The Curse of Capitalism" (accessed September 2 2005). The Socialist Register 2004, p190-192. Also available in print from Merlin Press.
78. http://www.elcorreo.eu.org/esp/article.php3?id_article=3426
79. http://www.hemisphericinstitute.org/eng/publications/emisferica/5.2/52_images/pdf/beckman_print.pdf
80. http://www.elobservatodo.cl/admin/render/noticia/9990
81. http://books.google.com/books?id=45vSrgn7DdMC&pg=PA96&lpg=PA96&dq=Jos%C3%A9+Toribio+Merino+Bolivia+auqu%C3%A9nidos&source=bl&ots=xPdEFO353y&sig=tNKHPsGrNjAwZ9HdCq0tUbN9QC4&hl=en&ei=T-NkSreOH4jyMdaxqZ8M&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8
82. http://www.hemisphericinstitute.org/eng/publications/emisferica/5.2/52_images/pdf/beckman_print.pdf
83. Dominguez, Jorge et al. 2003 Boundary Disputes in Latin America. United States Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace.
84. Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884&printsec=frontcover&source=bn &hl=en&ei=luVlSqTVIJK6MPjCuZsB&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4 The Ten Cents War: Chile, Peru, and Bolivia in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1884(Page 2).
85. http://books.google.com/books?id=FcdlAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA201&dq=Chile+by+george+j+mills&ei=4hJlSprSJ5mwyATcz52xDw By George J. Mills, William Henry Koebel (page 39)
86. http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=301#_ftn3

External links

• The United States and the Bolivian Seacoast Online book by Bolivian historian and diplomat Jorge Gumucio Granier
• Clear brief account of causes and consequences of the War of the Pacific, 1879-1883.
• Template:Es icon La Guerra del Pacifico, Los Heroes Olvidados Chilean site
• History of Chemical Engineering: Nitrogen, for a brief description nitrates and its strategic importance
• Template:Es icon Sin mar... hace 127 anos ("Without Sea... for 127 years"); page about the war and its impact on Bolivian society.
• Article: Bolivia Reaches for a Slice of the Coast That Got Away - NY Times 9/24/06
• Sociedad de Estudios Historicos Coronel Arnaldo Panizo Peruvian site

v t e Bolivia articles
History	Pre-colonial Inca Empire 16th century Colonial era Spanish colonization 17th century Viceroyalty of Peru 18th century Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata Upper Peru Rebellion of Túpac Katari Rebellion of Túpac Amaru II 19th century Early Republic Bolivian War of Independence Chuquisaca Revolution La Paz revolution Declaration of Independence Peru–Bolivian Confederation Salaverry-Santa Cruz War War of the Confederation Bolivia-Argentina War War of the Pacific Treaty of Defensive Alliance Battle of Río Grande Litoral Department Puna de Atacama dispute Liberal Era Chiriguano War Federal War 20th century Acre War Treaty of Petrópolis Manuripi campaign Revolutionary era Chaco War Military Socialism Bolivian National Revolution Dictatorship era Operation Condor Ñancahuazú Guerrilla Teoponte Guerrilla 21st century Contemporary era Cochabamba Water War Gas conflict Plurinational State Constitution Constituent Assembly 2009 referendum 2019 crisis COVID-19 pandemic Coups d'état
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Politics	Executive Cabinet President of Bolivia List Legislative Chamber of Deputies current members Chamber President Chamber of Senators current members Senate President Vice President of Bolivia Judiciary Plurinational Constitutional Court Supreme Tribunal of Justice Law Constitution history Law enforcement Human rights Military Armed Forces Army Air Force Navy Politics Elections Plurinational Electoral Organ Foreign relations Atacama border dispute Parties Movement for Socialism Civic Community Creemos
Economy	Agriculture Boliviano (currency) Central Bank Cement Industry Companies Energy Natural Gas Mining Stock Exchange Telecommunications Tourism Transport
Society	Crime Education Health Irrigation Languages People Demographics Women LGBT Water supply and sanitation Water resources management Culture Architecture Cinema Coat of arms Cuisine (Wine) Flag Literature Media Music National anthem Public holidays Religion Sport Olympics
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v t e Chile articles
History	Timeline Periods Prehispanic (ACN–1536 AD) Spanish Discovery (1536–1540) Spanish Conquest (1540–1600) Colonial (1600–1810) Independence (1810–1826) Republic Organization (1823–1831) Conservative Republic (1831–1861) Liberal Republic (1861–1891) Parliamentary Era (1891–1925) Presidential Republic (1925–1973) Pinochet Regime (1973–1990) Democracy Transition (1990–Present) By topic Agriculture Banditry Economic Expansionism Mining Maritime Wars
Geography	Cities Climate Earthquakes Environment Extreme points Fjords, channels, sounds and straits Geology Islands National parks Natural regions Provinces Regions Rivers Lakes Volcanoes Lighthouses World Heritage Sites
Politics	National Congress Elections Foreign relations Government Political parties President Ministries Law Civil Code Constitution History Human rights LGBT Intersex Law enforcement Supreme Court Constitutional Court Comptroller General of Chile Public safety Carabineros Gendarmerie Investigations Police Military Air Force Army Navy Ministry of Defence
Economy	Agriculture Aquaculture Central Bank Companies Energy Forestry Peso (currency) Stock Exchange Mining Telecommunications Tourism Transport
Society	Crime Demographics Education Healthcare Immigration Languages People Indigenous Religion Squatting Water supply and sanitation Women Culture Arts Beauty pageants Cinema Cuisine Literature Music Mythology Newspapers Public holidays Sports Television
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• Misplaced Pages neutral point of view disputes from July 2009
• History of South America
• Wars involving Argentina
• Wars involving Bolivia
• Wars involving Chile
• Wars involving Peru
• War of the Pacific
• 19th century in Bolivia
• 19th century in Chile